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In July 2013 the British Government unveiled its Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) policy, 
which aimed to radically change the role and function of the Army Reserve by making 
it both more capable and more deployable. One of the policy’s central organising 
principles was its focus on outsourcing military logistics capability previously held in 
the regular army to reserve forces in order to save costs. Reserve logistics 
transformation was therefore deemed central to the success of FR20. This thesis 
examines the origins, evolution and impact of FR20 as an attempt to organisationally 
transform the British Army Reserve’s logistics forces. In first detailing the historical, 
political and conceptual origins of FR20, it argues that reserve transformations rarely 
succeed in the manner envisaged; that the intensely political origins of FR20 have 
shaped the policy during each step of its development; and that the radical change in the 
delivery of military logistics since 2000 which underpins FR20’s emphasis on logistics 
is best understood through a post-Fordist analytical framework. Examining the impact 
of FR20 at the reserve sub-unit level, it argues that many units will struggle to deliver 
the capability required of them, but in other areas, such as integration with the regulars 
and increased professional opportunities, FR20 is succeeding. Quantitative evidence is 
presented to support these arguments. It then details how reserve logistics cohesion is 
different from that of regular combat forces, and shows how such inherent micro-level 
organisational factors can influence transformation. Finally, the wider implications of 
FR20 as a transformative attempt are discussed. This thesis’s central argument is that 
the political origins of FR20 within Parliament, and the Army Reserves’ organisational 
nature, have undermined the policy’s ability to deliver the key military capabilities it 
envisaged of reserves logistics units. However, in some important cultural/normative 
aspects, FR20 is slowly transforming the reserves. To date, FR20 has therefore been a 
‘partial transformation’. In making this argument, this study contributes to the literature 
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‘I don’t find it hard to change, 
But some people seem to, 
And some countries seem to, 
And some institutions seem to, 
But it is particularly important.’1 
 
 
Donald Rumsfeld,  
US Secretary of Defense, 
 comments to media, 22 September 2002. 
  
                                                 






Future Reserves 2020 and Transformation 
 
On 3 July 2013 in the House of Commons, the then Defence Secretary Philip Hammond 
outlined perhaps the most radical transformation of the Territorial Army (TA) attempted 
since its inception 105 years before. Summarising the new Future Reserves 2020: 
Valuable and Valued (FR20) policy, Hammond announced that in order to arrest the 
decline of the reserves and better integrate them with the regular armed forces, the 
government was investing £1.8 billion over the next ten years in reserve equipment, 
training and re-numeration.2 £1.2 billion of this investment would focused on the TA – 
by far the largest of Britain’s four reserve forces – to increase both its size and military 
capability. The quid pro quo of this investment was that the reserves would increase 
their military capability, become much more closely integrated with the regulars, and 
deploy more often. As Hammond outlined: ‘The job that we are asking our reservists to 
do is changing, and the way in which we organise and train them will also have to 
change’3, while FR20 itself went on to state that ‘We will use our Reserve Forces to 
provide military capability as a matter of routine, mobilising them when appropriate’.4  
Decisively for this study, FR20 placed major emphasis on outsourcing military logistics 
capability previously held in the regular army to an expanded and more deployable 
reserve logistics component. Crucially, as explored in this work, FR20 outlined 
significant changes to the capabilities expected of reserve logistics sub-units, stating 
                                                 
2 Ministry of Defence (2013) Future Reserves 2020: Valuable and Valued, (White Paper) London: HMSO. 
Henceforth Future Reserves 2020. 
3 Hansard (2013) Statement to House of Commons on Reserve Forces, 3 July, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130703/debtext/130703-
0001.htm#13070366000004 , retrieved 10 September 2016; Future Reserves 2020, 12. 
4 Future Reserves 2020, 12. 
 6 
 
‘Greater reliance will be placed on the Reserves to provide routine capability… 
primarily in the areas of combat support (artillery and engineers), [and] combat service 
support (such as logistics, medical)’.5 Such a transformation foresaw the centralisation 
of reserve units and their incorporation into the army’s new tiered readiness structure, 
‘Army2020’. This new vision articulated a step-change in the prominence of the reserve 
army in British defence policy and a major transformation of a force that had 
traditionally been a part-time militia of citizen-soldiers. The challenge was great, but 
with Hammond stressing the investments to be made to the reserves in numerous areas, 
FR20 received wide cross-party support in the House that day. The attempt to transform 
Britain’s reserve army from a strategic to an operational reserve had begun. 
 This thesis examines the origins, evolution and impact of FR20 as an attempt to 
organisationally transform the British Army Reserve’s logistics forces. In doing so, I 
address three inter-related research questions:  
1. What are the historical, organisational and conceptual origins of FR20?  
2. What is the impact of FR20 on the reserve logistics forces it was designed to 
transform? 
3. What does this experience of FR20 tell us about professionalism and cohesion in 
reserve logistics units and, more broadly, the transformation of the Army 
Reserve? 
In doing so, my central argument is that the political origins of FR20 within Parliament, 
and the Army Reserves’ organisational nature, have undermined the policy’s ability to 
deliver the key military capabilities it envisaged of reserves logistics units. However, in 
some important cultural/normative aspects, FR20 is slowly transforming the reserves. 
Thus, my overall argument is that FR20 has been, and will be, a ‘partial 
transformation’. It is struggling to deliver its central aim of increasing reserve logistics 
                                                 
5 Future Reserves 2020, 22. 
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capability in the timeline required, but conversely, it is gradually changing cultural 
elements of the Army Reserve. Some micro-level associative patterns, though, are likely 
to prove more resistant to change. 
In making this argument I present three original contributions to the academic 
literature. Firstly and primarily, I provide detailed empirical evidence of the 
organisational origins and evolution of FR20. In doing so, I originally and significantly 
contribute to the literature on the British reserves in general, and on FR20 in particular. 
Secondly, in order to understand FR20’s heavy focus on increasing reserve logistics 
capability and the policy’s impact on logistics units, I detail how Western military 
logistics structures and practices have recently transformed in line with what have been 
termed ‘post-Fordist’ principles to conceptually challenge much of the military logistics 
literature. Building on these arguments, I then detail how the political and conceptual 
origins of FR20, and the organisational nature of Britain’s reserve army, have limited 
this attempt to transform reserve logistics and increase sub-unit capability. Finally, 
contrasting the military cohesion and transformation literatures which have exclusively 
focused on regular combat forces, by examining the impact of FR20 in these sub-units, I 
contribute new evidence on the nature of cohesion in reserve non-combat forces, while 
highlighting how the distinct nature of reserve service has resulted in a partial 
transformation. In the conclusion I broaden out my arguments to discuss how this 
partial transformation has been reconciled with FR20’s original aims, and what this 
transformative attempt tells us about British civil-military relations and modern British 
society in general. 
Future Reserves 2020 
The support Hammond received unveiling FR20 in the Commons in July 2013 stood in 
stark contrast to its genesis, and indeed, its later evolution. Before the government had 
even unveiled the transformation it had had to reconcile intra-party political divisions, 
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overcome resistance from the army high command, then set up its own separate 
planning team due to lingering distrust, while all the time remaining sensitive to public 
opinion in the wake of the recent swinging cuts to the defence budget and the size of the 
army in particular. Indeed, in a nod to the impact these cuts had had on the army, 
Hammond remarked: ‘The Army… has had substantially to redesign its reserve 
component to ensure that regular and reserve capabilities seamlessly complement each 
other in an integrated structure designed for [its] future role.’6 Hammond thus 
highlighted that the transformation of the reserves was closely related to, and was also 
being undertaken simultaneously with, what was arguably the most significant 
organisational transformation of the army since the abolition of conscription in 1960.  
Driven by political, financial – and to a much lesser-extent – strategic 
imperatives, the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 
(SDSR) of 2010 signalled the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government’s primary desire to prioritise the economic security of the United Kingdom 
in the wake of the 2008 global recession.7 However, it also represented a political desire 
to avoid the long term interventions of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. This had 
dominated the British public’s perception of the armed forces during the same period, 
left them questioning previous governments’ decision making, and exposed major 
tensions between senior military commanders and their political masters.8 Nevertheless, 
the government’s desire to reduce defence spending forced significant changes on the 
army, including how it perceived its future operations and how it organisationally 
oriented itself toward fulfilling them. The resulting transformation, labelled Army2020, 
                                                 
6 Hansard, 3 July 2013.  
7 HM Government (2015) National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A 
Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom, Norwich: HMSO; Cornish, P. and Dorman, A. (2011) ‘Dr. Fox and 
the Philosopher’s Stone: the alchemy of national defence in the age of austerity’, International Affairs, 
87 (2). 
8 Kellner, P. (2012) Public Perceptions of the Army’, RUSI Land Warfare Conference, available at  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eS6DgD5ZUSM , retrieved 10 September 2016;  Bailey, J., Iron, R. 
and Strachan, H. (eds) (2013) British Generals in Blair's Wars, London: Routledge; Strachan, H. (2003) 
'The Civil-Military Gap in Britain', Journal of Strategic Studies, 26. 
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adopted a contingency-based approach to operations and emphasised defence 
engagement as one of its core tasks.9 However, the most profound element was the 
reduction in regular army manpower from 102,000 in 2010 to 82,000 by 2018.10 This 
reduction in personnel resulted in a new structure and readiness model for the army, and 
in particular, a renewed emphasis on the integration of the TA (soon to be re-christened 
the Army Reserve) to support the readiness cycle. Thus, the reductions in regular 
personnel were to be offset by a larger and more deployable force of army reservists, 
whose trained strength was to be expanded from 20,000 to 30,000 personnel by 2018. 
Much of this expansion was focused on the logistics component, which was expected to 
now routinely provide the logistics capability stripped from the regulars. On paper at 
least – and certainly, as will be discussed, it was presented in this manner by the 
government – FR20 was therefore central to the success of Army2020. In the following 
months and years, this repositioning of the Army Reserve at the core of British defence 
policy would ensure strong political and media interest in its evolution, and heavy 
criticism of its failures. But what exactly does FR20 aim to achieve? 
FR20 represents the most severe transformation of the army’s reserve since the 
Haldane reforms of 1907-08 created the TA, linked it with the regular army’s 
regimental system, and ensured that TA units would be raised locally.11 Most 
decisively, the full integration of the new Army Reserve into the Army2020 force 
readiness structure represents a fundamental change to the once peripheral 
organisation’s place in British defence policy. The traditional evolution of the TA, 
bureaucratic politics, and the 1996 Reserve Forces Act limited the deployability of the 
                                                 
9 Ministry of Defence (2013) Transforming the British Army, An Update – July 2013, London: MoD, 1. 
10 Ministry of Defence (2012) Transforming the British Army, July 2012 – Modernising to face an 
unpredictable future, London: MoD. This number has been achieved ahead of schedule, see The Daily 
Telegraph (29 July 2015) ‘British Army already below smaller 82,000 target’. 
11 Territorial and Reserve Forces Act 1907. It actually created the Territorial Force, the Territorial Army 
and Militia Act 1921 changed the name from TF to TA. 
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TA and the roles it fulfilled, especially abroad.12 The essence of FR20 envisages the 
Army Reserve as more highly trained, more deployable, and therefore more capable of 
operating with their regular counterparts. Crucially, it states: ‘As an integral part of the 
Armed Forces, reservists will be required for almost all military operations… [and] 
principally in the Army’s case and as the situation demands, as formed sub-units or 
units.’13 As such FR20 aims to change the traditional perception of the TA as a part-
time force for use only in time of great emergency; the Army Reserve will now deploy 
routinely and aims to potentially compel employers to release personnel through 
changed legislation.14 Similarly, it outlined a change in the nature of how reservists are 
to be used on operations. Taken together, this transformation marked a step-change in 
the liability for the Army Reserve and represented a change in its role from a strategic to 
an operational reserve. FR20 also detailed the closure and centralisation of a number of 
local Army Reserve sites in order to increase efficiencies during peacetime. Thus, FR20 
aimed to transform the structure, role and capabilities of the Army Reserve.  
Due to its close relationship to the army’s operational capability this transformed 
reserve is designed to deliver, the emphasis on deploying Army Reserve sub-units is 
worthy of further discussion here. In the past, although some infantry and medical 
company groups have collectively deployed on operations, this has been the exception 
rather than the norm. The pattern of mobilisation of the TA, in both the infantry and its 
its supporting services, has usually been one of ‘intelligent mobilisation’ of individuals 
who volunteer to serve on operations by backfilling regular units, rather than deploying 
fully-formed reserve units together.15 Thus, by deploying formed units and sub-units, 
FR20 aims to significantly change the way in which the TA will be used on operations. 
                                                 
12 Ministry of Defence (2011) Future Reserves 2020 – The Independent Commission to Review the United 
Kingdom’s Reserves, London: HMSO, 14-18. Henceforth The Independent Commission. 
13 Future Reserves 2020, 17. 
14 Future Reserves 2020, 9. 




This requirement to deploy formed sub-units presents new challenges for the Army 
Reserve in terms of delivering the capability and readiness expected of it under FR20. 
Indeed, given FR20’s emphasis, the sub-unit may be a particularly useful level of 
analysis for investigating FR20 as it is at this level that the transformation has been 
focused. 
The Logistics Component 
FR20’s central focus on the reserve logistics component is critical to this study as it 
provides the rationale for examining reserve logistics sub-units. Army2020 drastically 
reduced the size of the regular army’s logistics component to save costs. For example, 
the regular army’s Royal Logistics Corps (RLC) lost two regiments, while the Royal 
Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME) lost one battalion as result of the policy.16 
However, as detailed above, FR20 outlined significant changes to the capabilities 
expected of reserve logistics sub-units, stating ‘Greater reliance will be placed on the 
Reserves to provide routine capability… primarily in… combat service support (such as 
logistics…)’.17 A central organising principle of FR20 is therefore the outsourcing of 
logistics capability previously held in regular forces to the reserves to save costs. This 
cannot be overstated: the main organisational focus of the FR20 transformation was on 
supporting services and logistics. Meanwhile, other reserve units have been formed to 
deliver bespoke logistic capabilities. A central tenet of this increasing reliance on the 
reserve component is that combat service support (CSS, or logistics) reserve 
organisations at the sub-unit (company) level will be held at a higher level of readiness 
and must be capable of operating with their regular counterparts. In short, reserve 
logistics sub-units are to deliver more of the capability previously provided by regular 
                                                 
16 BBC (5 July 2012) ‘Army to lose 17 units amid job cuts’.  
17 Future Reserves 2020, 22. 
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units. Thus, FR20 also represents an attempt to transform the role, capability and 
deployability of logistics sub-units. 
Indeed, initial communication with Major General Kevin Abraham, Director 
General Army Transformation and the officer responsible for implementing FR20, 
indicated that one of the greatest risks to successfully implementing FR20 lay with the 
logistics element, and within this group, the REME and RLC; the regular army will be 
more dependent on the ability of these elements to deploy quickly and perform 
effectively.18 The REME provide the army with its mechanics, and are specialists in 
heavy vehicle and helicopter recovery, repair and maintenance. The RLC has a myriad 
of responsibilities, from the transportation of supplies by road, sea and air, to the 
provisioning of food, operating ports and delivering post, amongst many others. The 
ability of REME and RLC sub-units to meet the new readiness requirements is therefore 
central to FR20’s aims and important to its success, which in turn underpins Army2020. 
By contrast, the reserve combat component was not deemed to present such a major 
organisational challenge to FR20 as the policy was not as focused on it.19 
Thesis and Structure 
This attempt to transform the Army Reserve’s logistics raises a number of interesting 
questions about how the policy originated and how these origins determined its 
implementation. In order to understand the context of FR20 and hence its likely impact, 
I utilise a number of different literatures and methods to understand the different aspects 
of the central question detailed above. To address these interrelated issues, this study is 
primarily situated in the literature on the ‘post-Fordist’ military, a term which scholars 
have used to describe modern military organisations. I also incorporate this literature 
with that on military logistics, professionalism and cohesion in certain chapters. 
                                                 





Following the methods chapter, Chapter Three assesses the organisational and strategic 
factors that have influenced previous attempts at reserve reform. While these previous 
reforms are centrally important to understanding the historical context for the current 
transformation, they allow me to highlight that while reserve transformations are often 
driven by similar political, financial and strategic factors, the organisational solutions 
that FR20 has adopted are unique. Building on this evidence, Chapter Four asks how 
and why did FR20 come to be implemented? It argues that the origins of FR20 were 
intensely political and that these origins had a major impact on the development and 
implementation of the policy.  
As discussed above, FR20 placed heavy emphasis on the outsourcing of logistics 
capabilities to the reserve. Understanding how logistics organisation and practice has 
transformed in the past 15 years is therefore central to understanding the rationale 
behind FR20. Indeed, the transformation of the reserves and in particular its logistics 
component cannot be understood without recognising the drastic changes in how 
logistics is now delivered. Chapter Five therefore utilises a post-Fordist analytic 
framework to originally conceptualise the processes through which this drastic change 
has occurred. Post-Fordist processes are centrally important to understanding FR20’s 
design and aims, but also to understanding its impact on the reserve logistics units who 
must now provide much of the capability outsourced from the regulars. Crucially, the 
organisation of forces around post-Fordist principles also provides a historically novel 
solution to the recurrent organisational problems experienced in past periods of reserve 
reform. The chapter also makes an original conceptual contribution to the military 
logistics literature by using recent business logistics and the post-Fordist literature to 
detail the principles and processes around which modern Western military logistics 
structures and practices have been designed, and how these principles have ultimately 
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shaped wider force structures. Chapters three, four and five therefore answer the first 
research question. 
 Once this context has been examined, this study investigates the new reserve 
policy’s impact in the area where it – by FR20’s own definition – matters the most: in 
reserve logistics sub-units. To answer the second research question, the impact of FR20 
on the military capability of, and perceptions of cohesion and readiness in, reserve 
logistics sub-units are addressed. Chapter Six examines in detail the ability of sub-units 
to meet the increased ‘hard’ operational capability requirements demanded by FR20’s 
post-Fordist approach. It highlights the bottom-up organisational factors impeding the 
transformation whilst assessing areas of FR20’s success to date, namely opportunity, 
training course availability and integration. However, crucially, and controversially, it 
shows how the political origins of FR20 have resulted in an overemphasis on, and the 
politicisation of, recruiting. Chapter Seven draws on the ‘Standard Model’ cohesion 
literature to present the first quantitative cohesion and readiness data collected from 
surveys of reserve logisticians. It also assesses reservists’ perceptions of morale and 
confidence in FR20, and uses a smaller sample to longitudinally examine changes in 
these perceptions as FR20 progresses. Finally, it also compares this reservist data with 
indicative data from regular units to support my arguments about the differing nature of 
cohesion in these forces discussed in Chapter Eight.  
Aside from capability and perceptions of cohesion and readiness, FR20 also 
marks a potentially decisive change in the relationship between the regular army and the 
reserves; between a full-time professional army and what has traditionally been a part-
time force of last resort. In short, FR20 is attempting to professionalise the reserves. 
These attempts to professionalise citizen-soldiers, and especially those in logistics 
trades, provides a new evidential base to compare with the recent literature on the 
impact of professionalisation on the nature of military group cohesion in modern, post-
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Fordist regular combat forces. In order to address the third research question, Chapter 
Eight therefore fuses this literature with that on normative military transformations to 
discuss the softer, cultural impacts of FR20 on the selected units, allowing arguments 
about the nature of cohesion in logistics and reserve forces in general to be made. 
Building on these arguments, in the concluding chapter I draw together the study’s 
findings and place them within the context of the military transformation literature, 
before widening the scope to discuss what the experience of FR20 tells us about recent 
British civil-military relations, and the major changes in British society since the 1960s. 
Finally, I argue that although FR20 has been a ‘partial transformation’ due its political 
origins and organisational friction, some of its failings as a transformative attempt are 
due to its failure to understand how British society itself has transformed. 
Reserve Literature 
Not only are the chapters above important in assessing FR20’s effectiveness in 
transforming these sub-units, and hence the wider success of the plan, they also address 
gaps in the academic literature on reserve forces in general and on the British reserves 
in particular. Referring to the ‘dearth of sustained academic studies of [reserve forces]’, 
Eyal Ben Ari and Edna Lomsky-Feder recently noted that this is because military 
sociologists have concentrated on issues associated with conscripts, regulars or 
commanders.20 Indeed, they argue that it is because reserve forces have traditionally 
been viewed by military professionals as ‘marginal organisations’ that they have 
received relatively little attention from academics.21 However, with the increased 
deployment of reserves in the 9/11 decade – especially of United States (US) National 
Guard/Army Reserve in Iraq – and the impact of the 2008 global recession on defence 
spending, there has been a growth in academic focus on reserve forces recently. 
                                                 
20 Ben-Ari, E. and Lomksy-Feder, E. (2011) ‘Epilogue: Theoretical and Comparative Notes on Reserve 
Forces’, Armed Forces and Society, 37(2), 361. 
21 Ben-Ariand Lomksy-Feder, ‘Epilogue:’, 362. 
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Indicative of this increasing interest, in 2011 Armed Forces and Society published a 
special edition exclusively examining the subject. The works in this edition are broadly 
representative of the extent of the literature on reserve forces, and can be divided into 
three main categories: ethnographies and organisational studies of particular nations’ 
reserve forces; identity work on reservists; and quantitative research on particular 
elements of reserve service, such as health issues, and recruitment and retention. For 
example, Arie Perliger has usefully outlined the somewhat unusual cultural and 
organisational characteristics of reserve service in Israel and the changing relationship 
between the citizen-solider and the state as the Israeli military professionalises.22 
Similarly, Hugh Smith and Nick Jan’s ethnography charted the development of, and 
recent issues in, the Australian Defence Force Reserves, with some interesting examples 
of their deployment at the sub-unit level, while Claude Weber discussed the 
complicated organisational structure and stagnation in the French reserves.23 
Meanwhile, situating his study of the US Army Reserve and National Guard in the 
identity literature, James Griffith offered a framework for analysing the changing nature 
of reserve identities as their mission has evolved since the end of the Second World 
War.24 While a central theme running through Perliger’s, Smith and Jan’s, and Griffith’s 
works is the impact that the professionalisation of regular armies has had on respective 
reserve forces, none of these studies conducted in-depth examinations of how periods of 
organisational change have shaped this professionalisation, nor their effects on cohesion 
or conceptualisations of professionalisation in the reserves. Instead they are more 
organisational summaries of the current state of play within their respective forces.  
                                                 
22 Perliger, A. (2011) ‘The Changing Nature of the Israeli Reserve: Present Crises and Future Challenges’, 
Armed Forces and Society, 37(2). 
23 Smith, H. and Jans, N. (2011) ‘Use Them or Lose Them? Australia’s Defence Force Reserves’, Armed 
Forces and Society, 37(2); Weber, C. (2011) ‘The French Military Reserve: Real or Abstract Force?’ Armed 
Forces and Society, 37(2). 
24 Griffith, J. (2011) ‘Contradictory and Complimentary Identities of US Army Reservists: A Historical 
Perspective’, Armed Forces and Society, 37(2). 
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Reserve identities have also received much attention. Referring to the Israeli 
reserves, Lomsky-Feder, Gazit and Ben-Ari have interestingly argued that reserve 
identities represent those of transmigrants, continually ‘journeying between military and 
civilian spheres.’25 Griffith has examined how social identity and personal identity 
impact reserve soldiers’ perceived readiness for combat and commitment to part-time 
military service.26 More recently, Bonnie Vest has built on these works to examine the 
negotiated identities of National Guard soldiers, concluding that deployments have the 
largest impact on whether reservists identify themselves as soldiers, rather than citizens 
or citizen-soldiers.27 Meanwhile, Gabriel Ben Dor et al. have expanded on the identity 
literature to quantitatively examine how collective and individual factors influence 
Israeli reservists’ motivations to serve.28 Griffith – following Charles Moskos – has also 
examined reservists’ motives for serving in the Army National Guard through the 
institutional-occupational model, finding that institutional motives are more positively 
correlated with positive values of recruitment, retention and readiness.29 Other works by 
Griffith – currently the most prolific published academic on the US reserves – examine 
the changing role and unique identities of US reservists and their impact on mental 
health,30 and investigate the correlates of suicide amongst Guard soldiers.31 Indeed, to 
date the sociological literature on the reserves has been heavily weighted toward US and 
Israeli experiences, perhaps because these have been the most deployed reserve forces 
                                                 
25 Lomsky-Feder, E., Gazit, N. and Ben Ari, E. (2008) ‘Reserve Soldiers as Transmigrants: Moving between 
the Civilian and Military Worlds’, Armed Forces and Society, 34(4), 593. 
26 Griffith, J. (2009) ‘Being a Reserve Soldier: A Matter of Social Identity’, Armed Forces and Society, 
36(1). 
27 Vest, B. (2013) ‘Citizen, Soldier, or Citizen-Soldier? Negotiating Identity in the US National Guard’, 
Armed Forces and Society, 39(4). 
28 Ben Dor, G. et al. (2008) ‘I versus We’ Collective and Individual Factors of Reserve Service Motivation 
during War and Peace’, Armed Forces and Society, 34(4). 
29 Griffith, J. (2008) ‘Institutional Motives for Serving in the US Army National Guard’, Armed Forces and 
Society, 34(2); Griffith, J. (2009) ‘After 9/11 What Kind of Reserve Soldier’, Armed Forces and Society, 
35(2). 
30 Griffith, J. (2011) ‘Decades of transition for the US reserves: Changing demands on reserve identity 
and mental well-being’, International Review of Psychiatry, 23. 
31 Griffith, J. (2012) ‘Correlates of Suicide Among Army National Guard Soldiers’, Military Psychology, 24. 
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over the past 50 years.32 Furthermore, while there have been some comparative studies 
of reserve forces in Western militaries – most notably those of Louis Zurcher and Gwyn 
Harries-Jenkins, and Wallace Earl Walker – the latest of these was published over 25 
years ago and therefore lacks currency..33 Again, with many of these studies’ focus on 
identity or other specific issues, they do not provide a deep, sociologically-informed 
analysis of the forces in question. Decisively, they do not address the professional or 
cohesion literature, nor that on military transformations. 
The same is true of sustained academic study of Britain’s reserve forces, and of 
the TA in particular. In 1975 Hugh Cunningham, and later Ian Beckett in 1982, both 
traced the origins and evolution of the Volunteer movement that preceded the TA, while 
Peter Dennis’ useful study of the TA between 1906-1940 was published in 1987.34 
More recently, K.W. Mitchinson has examined the Territorials’ formative years, its role 
in the Great War, and on the home front.35 More pertinent to this study, in 1990 Walker 
published the most recent and in-depth organisational analysis of the TA.36 In this work, 
Walker noted that the part-time, voluntary nature of service in the TA meant that it was 
fundamentally distinct from the regulars, and he identified a number of organisational 
paradoxes. Perhaps most tellingly, this included the contradiction between a militarily-
capable force generated by intensive training and the lack of time the organisation, due 
                                                 
32 For example Sarkesian, S. and Connor, R. (1999) The US Military Profession in the 21st Century: War, 
Peace and Politics, London: Frank Cass; Duncan, S. (1997)  Citizen Warriors: America's National Guard 
and Reserve Forces and the Politics of National Security, California: Presido Press;  Horowitz, D. and 
Kimmerling, B. (1974) ‘Some Social Implications of Military Service and the Reserves System in Israel’, 
Archives European de Sociologie, 15; Sion, L. and Ben-Ari, E. (2005) ‘Hungry, Weary and Horny: Joking 
and Jesting among Israel’s Combat Reserves’, Israel Affairs, 11(4). 
33 Walker, W. (1990) Reserve Forces and The British Territorial Army, London: Tri-Services; Walker, W. 
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to its part-time nature, had to achieve this.37 Thus, as well as the many cultural and 
organisational differences between the TA and the regulars, Walker recorded high 
variations in culture and capability across TA sub-units and a 30 percent turnover in 
personnel per year.38 This created another contradiction whereby the need to continually 
train new personnel resulted in major retention issues. As a result Walker argued that 
the force was predominantly a reactive force of last resort, never really ready for war, 
and would likely have been unable to fulfil its Cold-War mission of providing support 
to first-line NATO troops in Western Europe.39 Perhaps most significantly, he noted 
that the voluntary and part-time nature was conducive to organisational stasis; as one 
TA officer remarked: ‘There is nothing in the TA you can affect immediately. It takes 5-
10 years [to make changes].’40  
However, written at the end of Cold War, Walker’s insightful study is now over 
25 years out of date. Furthermore, while Walker’s analysis is interesting and 
comprehensive, it lacks a theoretical framework beyond brief reference to 
organisational theory literature.41 Consequently, his analysis could be argued to lack 
conceptual depth and it does not attempt to inform a wider analysis of reserve forces in 
general; the series of organisational ‘paradoxes’ Walker outlines in the TA are therefore 
left to the reader to decide if these are unique to the TA. 42 In short, Walker’s study tells 
us how the TA was in 1990, without placing it within the broader sociological literature 
on professionalism, cohesion, and transformations. It is therefore more of a snapshot of 
the TA in time, rather than a theoretically-driven piece of analysis. And the major 
question remains: how has the TA changed since then? More recently, Beckett 
published a historical overview of the TA in 2008, charting the changing roles and 
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organisation of the Territorials over the first 100 years of their service. While 
illuminating, this is historical rather than sociological analysis and it does not include 
the most recent attempt to transform the Army Reserves.43 In summary therefore, the 
existing literature on the TA is relatively out of date and does not address recent wider 
sociological debates about professionalism, cohesion and transformation in modern 
Western reserve forces, nor indeed, their logistics components. 
Even the most recent research on the TA/Army Reserve does not specifically 
address these questions. Whilst Christopher Dandeker et al.’s 2011 article does outline 
the bureaucratic debates around the changing role of the British reserves in general, it 
does not focus on the Army Reserve in particular and, as it predates the FR20 
transformation, it lacks detail as to its exact nature and the possible implications for the 
Army Reserve. There is also no emphasis placed on the importance of sub-unit 
cohesion. Indeed, half the article concerns itself with reserve experiences and health 
outcomes which have become of increasing interest to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
as the reserves are deployed more often and public perceptions of the impact of PTSD 
have also been heightened.44 In a similar vein, King’s Centre for Military Health 
Research has conducted numerous recent studies into the impact of operational service 
on British soldiers’ health outcomes, many of which include data from reservists.45 
Organisational culture academics have also studied the traditional clash of cultures 
between the regulars and the Territorials, most recently at the MoD’s behest. Charles 
Kirke’s small-scale study examined the Regular Army’s perception of closer integration 
of the TA in 2008, and found that significant issues and cultural differences need to be 
overcome before any such policy could be effective.46 Vince Connelly’s interesting 
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2013 study of perceptions amongst regular and reserve soldiers, also undertaken for the 
MoD, drew similar conclusions, outlining the many cultural and practical barriers to 
integration that are undermining efforts to impose the FR20 transformation on both 
components of the army.47  
Reflecting greater academic interest in the British reserves since FR20 was 
unveiled, in 2014 the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) made grants to 
four universities in the United Kingdom (UK), including the University of Exeter, to 
examine different aspects of British reserve service. These examine four separate 
themes related to the reserves in general, and it is interesting to note that these themes 
follow those of the majority of the reserve literature. These projects are: ‘negotiating 
civilian and military lives’; ‘sustaining Future Reserves 2020 (which focuses on 
decisions to leave the reserve); ‘keeping enough in the reserve’ (which examines what 
FR20 will mean for the armed forces, reservists, and civilian employers); and the ‘role 
of army reservists’ which examines competing claims on reservists’ time. While Tim 
Edmunds et al. have recently published an interesting overview of FR20 and some of 
the issues identified to date, especially in terms of recruitment, I would contend this 
paper lacks a recognition of the intensely political origins of FR20 and does not attempt 
to assess it in terms of a transformation.48 Decisively, none of the above studies are 
primarily concerned with the military aspects of FR20, and especially this project’s 
focus on capability, transformation, professionalism, and cohesion. Similarly, while the 
most recent research on the Army Reserve is being conducted within the context of 
FR20, these do not seek to assess FR20’s origins and evolution, nor are they focused on 
logistics capability. Changes at the sub-unit level have also not been addressed. Overall 
therefore, this study is well-sited to update the literature on the British reserves in 
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general by contributing new data on FR20, whilst also using this evidence to contribute 
to wider debates on reserve professionalism, cohesion and transformation. These 
literatures are important as they allow different aspects of FR20 to be understood from 
different but complimentary perspectives. 
Post-Fordism  
Given the relatively limited research on reserve forces, this study is situated within three 
distinct strands of the wider sociological literature on the armed forces. At the macro-
level of analysis, post-Fordism provides a theoretical framework for both the 
transformation of military logistics in particular and of Western militaries in general. As 
I have highlighted above, this is critically important in understanding the organising 
principles behind FR20 and in particular the transformation of reserve logistics sub-
units as a result of the policy. In utilising this literature in Chapter Three, I conceptually 
advance the literature on military logistics by detailing how logistics have been 
transformed in the past 15 years around post-Fordist principles. At the meso-level the 
post-Fordist literature fuses with that on military transformation and professionalism, 
which run throughout this work. At the micro-level these fuse with the literature on 
cohesion, informing chapters seven and eight especially. These distinct but related 
literatures provide useful tools for examining the transformation of the British Army 
Reserve.  
Indeed, at the heart of this transformation lies the uneasy dichotomy between the 
professionalisation of most Western armies since the 1960s through the interrelated 
processes that scholars have usefully described as ‘post-Fordist’, and the increasing 
reliance on part-time citizen-soldiers who are now to be better integrated with their full-
time professional counterparts. Initially following the post-modernist trend, numerous 
scholars have examined how societal changes and increasing post-Cold War strategic 
uncertainty has resulted in changes to the missions and structures of the modern 
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military.49 For James Burk and Charles Moskos, recent societal evolutions have resulted 
in changing conceptions of the rights and duties of citizens with regards to military 
service, whilst simultaneously underpinning an organisational shift from conscript 
forces designed to partake in mass state-on-state conflicts towards a ‘smaller, voluntary 
professional force that relies on reserve force to accomplish its missions.’50  
However, the post-modern critique fails to address economic and industrial 
change, and while the debate over the extent to which modern militaries are truly post-
modern continues,51 Anthony King has developed the term of post-Fordism to describe 
the ongoing changes in the Western militaries.52 King draws on industrial sociology to 
examine how the end of the Fordist mode of production, relying on mass labour forces 
‘employed on long term contracts, producing standardised products for stable markets’ 
began to be undermined in the 1970s by rising production costs and competition.53 In 
response to these dual pressures, companies in Japan and America in particular began to 
organisationally transform. Four central changes were identified in this transformation: 
the replacement of mass labour with a highly skilled core and less-skilled periphery; the 
outsourcing of non-core functions and the adoption of ‘just in-time’ (JIT) logistics to 
reduce overheads; the centralisation of headquarters and the flattening of industrial 
hierarchies; and the development of a network approach to supply and knowledge.54  
For King, the professionalisation of Western militaries, their continued reduction 
in size, and the concentration of military power in the special forces, are indicative of 
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the development of a highly specialised core, whilst the increasing emphasis on surging 
reserve manpower in times of need highlights the periphery.55 The US military’s 
outsourcing of specialist logistical and technical services is briefly discussed while King 
also acknowledges the adoption of JIT logistics practices to reduce overheads. 
Centralisation is evident in the development of joint and transnational military 
headquarters which share professional knowledge whilst paradoxically encouraging 
subordinates to act on their own initiative by decentralising command decisions, thereby 
flattening hierarchies. Similarly, the development of a non-linear operational approach 
to the dispersal and co-coordination of forces centred around independent brigades 
indicates the military’s adoption of a network approach to warfare.56 Using this 
evidence, King argues that modern Western militaries have transformed in a fashion 
analogous with post-Fordist industry, primarily due to similar ‘supply and demand-side 
pressures.’57 He draws on the wider literature on institutional transformation to posit 
that, faced with these pressures, Western militaries have emulated industry in a process 
similar to the ‘institutional mimetic isomorphism’ first coined by Paul Dimaggio and 
Walter Powell.58  
King’s contribution is an accurate description of the changes occurring within 
Western militaries and is perceptive as to why these are happening. In identifying 
dominant modes of production, and economics, as important sources of military 
transformation, his approach explicitly links military change with industrial and 
economic change. However, in determining post-Fordism’s four central changes, King’s 
main focus remains on land combat forces. While he notes the role of logistics in wider 
military transformation, in particular in relation to outsourcing, the exact nature and 
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impact of these logistical changes is not fully developed. The question remains if 
logistics in modern militaries – presumably under similar, if not more intense, economic 
pressures than the combat function – has transformed in a similar post-Fordist fashion.  
Crucially in terms of this study, in the post-Fordist mode of production the 
distinction is made between the ‘specialist core... and a subsidiary workforce on 
temporary and short-term contracts.’59 Clearly, these core/periphery observations have 
immediate relevance for the current transformation of the British Army, with Army2020 
reorganising the force into a Reaction/Adaptable Force structure, and its renewed 
emphasis on the reserves. Moreover, in keeping with the reasons for these changes, and 
countering the fluidity associated with post-modernism, King argues that militaries are 
‘changing in structure to fulfil new missions in the face of economic and strategic 
pressures.’60 Similarly, the outsourcing of defence tasks to the reserves and the tiered 
readiness outlined in Army2020 are indicative of the post-Fordist trend toward JIT 
delivery of services and supplies to increase efficiency. As such, in examining the 
current changes to the structure and role of the reserves, and in particular their logistics 
component, the post-Fordist literature provides a rich theoretical framework to 
understand why and how Britain is attempting to transform the Army Reserves’ 
effectiveness, especially in terms of logistics. 
Professionalism 
Related to the post-Fordist literature is that on the professional military. There is wide 
consensus that the pace of Western military professionalisation vastly increased in the 
second half of the 20th Century with the end of conscription, the reduction in armies’ 
size and the increasing technological sophistication of warfare.61 Samuel Huntington’s 
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The Soldier and the State is both dated and problematic, but it was the first to identify 
the changes that increasing professionalism were having on the US Army in the 
1950s.62 Huntington argued that the US professional officer corps was a ‘functional 
group with highly specialised functions’ akin to other professions; he thus defined 
professionalism as a product of expertise, responsibility and corporateness.63 He 
therefore noted how officers in particular were now increasingly educated and trained to 
acquire skills and knowledge to conduct highly specialised tasks.64 Echoing Huntington, 
in The Professional Soldier Morris Janowitz also saw ‘skills acquired through intensive 
training’ as the hallmark of the professional army, seeing professional-era officers as 
similar to other professions such as lawyers and doctors.65 Interestingly, Huntington 
specifically argued that the reservist was a caste apart from the new professional 
military class, claiming that as reservists ‘seldom achieve the level of professional skill 
open to career officers’, consequently the reservist ‘only temporarily assumes 
professional responsibility.’66 Indeed, he went further, positing that the reservist’s 
‘principal function in society lies elsewhere’;67 an argument that undermines the 
common perception of reservists’ role in building civil-military ties. As a result of this 
functional difference, Huntington argued that reservists’ ‘motivations, values and 
behaviour frequently differ greatly from those of career professionals.’68  
It is clear that, for Huntington, the origins of the professional military are to be 
found in expertise, in time spent training, and that because reservists by their very 
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nature do not have the same amount of time as regulars, they are therefore 
unprofessional. Similarly, Janowitz states bluntly: ‘A man is either in the armed forces 
or not’,69 thereby missing the complex roles and identities of reservists. The views of 
Huntington and Janowitz are also consistent with Connelly’s recent findings on the 
regular army’s attitudes toward integrating the TA.70 This definition of professionalism 
based on status groups with specialised expertise, and, crucially, the amount of time 
spent undertaking professional activity, is fundamentally at odds with the very concept 
of reserve service. Indeed, numerous academics have argued that professionalisation – 
with its shift to a volunteer force encouraging occupational rather than institutional 
motivations to serve – has caused the demise of the mass-era citizen-soldier, who were 
defined by their representativeness of society, their notion of service to the nation, and 
their primary identity as citizens who are only temporarily in uniform.71 While these 
arguments on the death of the citizen-soldier have been challenged,72 it is clear that 
within the current attempt to transform the British Army Reserves, there exists an 
interesting paradox; on the one hand, professional soldiering is still largely defined by 
full-time service and experience, yet FR20 is seeking to increase the performance of 
part-time reservists who remain – by the military’s own definition – unprofessional 
citizen-soldiers. As such, this literature provides a rich context to collect data on the 
juxtaposition between professionalism and the citizen-soldier. 
One critique of King’s work on the post-Fordist military is that it lacks the wider 
social and cultural aspects of the post-modernist scholars.73 More recently, King has 
convincingly argued that professionalisation ‘does not simply involve a change of 
                                                 
69 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, xvi. 
70 Connelly, Cultural Differences, 11. 
71 Cohen, E. (2001) ‘Twilight of the Citizen-Soldier’, Parameters, Summer; Moskos, C. (1977) ‘From 
Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization,’ Armed Forces & Society, 4 (November); Burk, 
J. (2007) ‘The Changing Moral Contract for Military Service,’ in Bacevich, A. (ed) The Long War: America’s 
Quest for Security since World War II, New York: Columbia University Press. 
72 Krebs, R. (2009) ‘The Citizen-Soldier Tradition in the United States: Has its Demise Been Greatly 
Exaggerated?’ Armed Forces and Society, 36(1). 
73 Levy, Y. (2010) ‘The Essence of the "Market Army", Public Administration Review, 70(3), 379. 
 28 
 
employment contract between the soldier and the armed forces. It represents a profound 
transformation of the associative patterns within the armed forces and the solidarities 
displayed within military units.’74 He has examined how, at the micro-interaction level, 
the continued applicability of this skills-based definition of professionalism is 
evidenced in the successful execution of battle drills and other formalised practices, 
both individually and collectively.75 Following Huntington, King argues that competent 
performance, and the status this generates, defines professionalism in modern militaries. 
By taking a similar approach to the ongoing attempt to increase the effective 
performance of the Army Reserve at the sub-unit level, in this thesis I investigate the 
interesting commonalities and contradictions between reserve logistics sub-units and the 
regular combat forces about which King writes. In relating the literature on the 
professional military to the British Army Reserve, this research adds an additional 
strand to it. Similarly, by focusing on the logistics sub-unit, this study not only 
addresses one of the most important areas of FR20, it also complements King’s work on 
the impact of professionalisation in regular combat units.  
Military Transformations 
That FR20 is an attempt to transform the reserves is clear. The FR20 policy document 
itself stated that ‘FR20 is part of the wider Transforming Defence campaign that is 
aiming to transform our Armed Forces and deliver Future Force 2020.’76 It also 
specifically mentioned reserve transformation a further three times, placed it within the 
context of the Army2020 transformation, and made the 2-star Director General Army 
Transformation responsible for implementing the policy.77 That the army and the wider 
defence establishment viewed Army2020 and FR20 as a transformative process is also 
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clearly supported by other official documents.78 Conversely, reform is not mentioned 
once in relation to the reserves in FR20, and once in another document, but only in 
relation to reserve recruitment systems.79  
The recent appearance of transformation in the lexicon of military policy and 
academia in part reflects the RMA, and Western armies’ difficulties re-organising 
themselves for expeditionary counter-insurgency operations post-2003. Indeed, the 
major tactical, operational and strategic changes introduced as a result of the adoption of 
COIN principles in Iraq from 2006 led the US Army to embark on a ‘transformation’ of 
its structure into modular brigades, and in 2009 the British Army initiated a 
‘transformation in contact’ policy to implement similar organisational changes.80 
Nevertheless, as ‘reform’ has been used more predominantly in the literature describing 
past periods of organisational change in the reserves, it is important to make the 
distinction here between reform and transformation. The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines reform as: ‘make or become better by removal or abandonment of 
imperfections.’81 Interestingly however, transformation does not have the same focus on 
improvement: ‘change from one figure or expression or function to another of same 
magnitude, value etc.’82 Somewhat pedantically, other definitions imply that 
transformation involves greater change than reform.83 Transformation therefore is a 
rhetorically more positive term – it implies change without implying weakness – a 
potentially useful distinction for senior military officers when advocating the need for 
organisational change. It has also become an increasingly fashionable term. Despite 
these issues, this study uses the term transformation to examine FR20, rather than 
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reform, as it reflects the terminology used in official documents. Reflecting the more 
widely used term for past attempts to change the reserves, reform is used when 
discussing historical cases. 
 Recently a significant body of literature has emerged that considers the sources 
of transformation within military organisations. Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff have 
defined military transformation as a major ‘change in the goals, actual strategies, and/or 
structures of a military organisation.’84 Crucially, they argued that ‘it is the outcome of 
military change that determines whether it is major or minor in character.’85 Broadly 
speaking, two main schools of thought have developed on how militaries change. The 
top-down approach of Barry Posen, Steven Rosen and Deborah Avant, has focused on 
the importance of doctrine, civil-military relations and inter- and intra-service politics as 
drivers of military transformation.86 This top-down transformation – what Farrell later 
labelled ‘innovation’ – represents most of the previous attempts initiated by political or 
military elites to reform British reserve forces in the past.87 As Chapter Three highlights, 
major reserve reform has traditionally been a top-down process. However, more 
recently Adam Grissom, Elliot Cohen, and James Russell, amongst others, have argued 
that militaries can also transform in response to bottom-up – or tactical – pressures.88 
Grissom has argued that bottom-up tactical changes can be simultaneously involved in 
transformation,89 and Farrell later conceptualised these processes as top-down 
innovation – a ‘major change that is institutionalised in new doctrine, a new 
organisational structure and/or new technology’ – and bottom-up ‘adaption’ which 
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represents a ‘change to tactics, techniques or existing technologies to improve 
operational performance’.90 Rob Foley, Stuart Griffin and Helen McCartney have shown 
how top-down and bottom-up changes are largely dependent on each other if 
transformation is to be lasting.91 Meanwhile, Sergio Catignani and Rafael Marcus have 
examined how forces’ ability to incorporate lessons learned affects their ability to 
transform.92 
Clearly then, there are different approaches to understanding military 
transformations, and scholars have recently begun to acknowledge the complexity of 
transformative processes. Very recently, Stuart Griffin has excellently critiqued the 
transformation literature. While lauding the discipline for its open, multidisciplinary 
approach, he argues that it has predominantly followed the cultural turn. Decisively, he 
also argues that it frequently lacks the sustained application of wider organisational and 
sociological theory.93 While Griffin cites the organisational learning literature,94 this 
observation also applies to the organisational change management literature. For 
example, Foley et al.’s arguments, (and indeed others) about the inter-relatedness of 
transformative processes fails to realise that change management scholars David Nadler 
and Michael Tushman had identified almost exactly the same processes in their Change 
Management Congruence Model some 15 years earlier.95 This thesis seeks to address 
this lack of broader theoretical inquiry in transformation studies by incorporating not 
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only the post-Fordist conceptual framework for explaining organisational change, but 
also the sociological literature on professionalism and cohesion to give greater 
theoretical depth to my evidence on the nature of the Army Reserve and my arguments 
on FR20 as an attempt to transform it.  
While different aspects of the transformation literature run through this study, I 
primarily draw on two major contributions. The first is the top-down innovation 
literature detailed above, which is particularly pertinent as it provides the closest 
conceptual link between the transformation literature and previous works on the British 
reserves. The second concerns normative transformative patterns. Elizabeth Kier has 
challenged the top-down approach’s realist-functional focus, arguing that organisational 
culture, rather than institutional politics and power, explains the choice of offensive and 
defensive doctrinal postures. For Kier, doctrine ‘is best understood from a cultural 
perspective’.96 She supports her arguments with evidence from the inter-war years of 
the British military’s refusal to professionalise due to concerns about control of the 
military inherently bound in British history and culture, and with evidence showing that 
competing ideologies on the political Left and Right in France about the military’s role 
in society at the time curtailed its ability to increase its effectiveness, resulting in a 
defensive doctrinal posture. Kier drew heavily on Ann Swidler’s definitions of culture 
and ideology, which is worthy of repetition here. For Swidler, culture is defined as ‘the 
set of assumptions so unself-conscious as to seem a natural, transparent, undeniable part 
of the structure of the world’, while ideology is the ‘highly articulated, self-conscious 
belief in [a] ritual system aspiring to offer a unified answer to the problems of social 
action.’97 Thus, culture can be perceived of as an inherent cause of action, ideology an 
explicit call for a certain kind of action. However, whilst adding a rich cultural 
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perspective, Kier’s analysis is also top-down, doctrinal-based, and focused solely on 
regular combat forces. Building on Kier’s work, Farrell also used a constructivist 
approach to highlight the importance of cultural norms within military organisations in 
relation to change.98 Farrell and Kier were right to identify the importance of culture in 
influencing transformations. However, Farrell’s analysis is predominantly concerned 
with militaries’ tendency to emulate others’ organisational structure and doctrine, and 
although Kier discusses professionalism in the context of the British military, she does 
not examine in detail the impact that professional culture can have on a force.  
Interestingly, but unsurprisingly, all these approaches to military transformation 
have focused exclusively on the combat arms and how the way they conduct operations 
over time has changed. Similarly, King’s work on the transformation of Europe’s armed 
forces identified very important changes in the operational planning, structures and 
networks of combat forces exclusively.99 King’s later study of the impact of 
professionalisation on the modern Western soldier also focused exclusively on combat 
troops.100 Indeed, none of the recent literature on military transformation has examined 
military logistics, nor reserve components. Crucially, it remains to be seen if and how 
differences in the organisational culture and bureaucratic politics of the reserves 
influences transformation compared to the regular forces.  More specifically, how is the 
culture of professionalism influencing the FR20 transformation of reserve logistics 
units? It can also be argued that the majority of the transformation literature is 
positivist: almost exclusively, only major transformations that have been successful 
have been studied. While Rosen, Avant and Kier, have considered how organisational 
stasis and the inability to adopt the appropriate offensive or defensive military postures 
leave states ill-prepared for war, they do not consider transformations that have not, or 
                                                 
98 Farrell, T. (2001) ‘Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland’s Professional 
Army’, European Journal of International Relations, 7(1). 
99 King, A. (2011) The Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
100 King, The Combat Soldier. 
 34 
 
have only partially, succeeded in and of themselves. Warning against this over emphasis 
in the literature, Griffin has called for ‘revisiting some of the case studies of failure to 
innovate’.101 Indeed, I am only aware of three works examining the failure to transform. 
Catignani has argued that the British Army struggled to adopt counterinsurgency 
(COIN) practices at the tactical level in Afghanistan despite them being incorporated 
into higher command doctrine.102 Similarly, Grissom has discussed how the 
organisational nature and tribal politics in Afghan National Army limited NATO 
attempts to transform it, while Kristen Harkness and Michael Hunzeker’s have shown 
how the failure of the British Army to conduct a COIN campaign in Southern 
Cameroon in the early 1960s was caused by a lack of political appetite, despite tactical 
adaption actually occurring.103 Nevertheless, all of these works are focused on war time 
transformation and do not address the issue of top-down, politically-imposed 
transformations in peacetime, nor consider wider sociological debates about the 
changed nature of modern society. Overall, therefore, this leaves open the important 
question of why do peacetime attempts to transform reserve forces flounder?  
Cohesion  
While the question of why soldiers continue to fight when faced with the horrors of 
combat has fascinated society since at least the time of Herodotus,104 it was only in the 
latter 20th Century that social scientists turned their attention to the topic of military 
group cohesion. Broadly defined, group cohesion has been traditionally defined as the 
‘extent to which members come together to form the group and hold together under 
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stress to maintain the group.’105 Building on the social-psychological approach of early 
group interaction theorists such as Charles Cooley and Leon Festinger,106 Edward Shils 
and Morris Janowitz’s seminal work Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht, 
established the classical school of military group cohesion focused on the close 
interpersonal bonds between small-unit members that motivates them to perform in 
combat.107 This view, which has been developed and adjusted to become known as the 
‘Standard Model’, provided the basis for most of the research on military cohesion until 
the 2000s, when other social psychologists and organisational management scholars 
began to focus on the motivational influence that commitment to the mission – known 
as task cohesion – has on military group members.108 While there is continued debate 
over which of these components of cohesion is predominant, there is general agreement 
that cohesion is a multi-dimensional construct whose components can be divided into 
three distinct categories; a social component, a task component and a group identity 
component.109 However, crucially, nearly all of the classical group cohesion studies 
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focus on combat forces, and the methods utilised by these schools have predominantly 
been based on interviews or surveys.    
More recently, scholars such as King, Ben-Ari, and Hew Strachan, amongst 
others, have identified other important aspects of cohesion in military units, highlighting 
the importance of training, communication, and drills.110 This understanding of 
cohesion is based not principally on interpersonal bonds, nor motivations, but rather on 
shared understandings and the practices of military professionalism that enable the 
group to perform effectively in combat. These authors’ emphasis on professionalism, 
training and collective action is a key addition to the literature, and was arrived at by 
archival analysis, interviewing soldiers during, and closely observing units in, training 
and on operations to generate qualitative data. While these differing disciplinary and 
methodological approaches have clearly led to different conceptualisations of cohesion, 
again even these revisionist cohesion scholars have only focused on regular, combat 
forces. Indeed, to date there has been no examination of cohesion in logistics units, nor 
cohesion in British reserve units by either the classical or revisionist cohesion scholars.  
It is clear from this review that this study addresses a number of significant gaps 
in the academic literature. Firstly and primarily, I provide detailed empirical evidence of 
the organisational and conceptual origins and evolution of FR20. In doing so, I 
originally and significantly contribute to the literature on the British reserves in general, 
and on FR20 in particular by utilising a post-Fordist conceptual framework to explain 
the policy and its impact. Secondly, I contribute to the professionalism and cohesion 
literature by providing empirical data from the reserves logistics community to argue 
that, although the reserves are emulating the regulars’ culture to gradually 
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professionalise, conversely their cohesion still remains fundamentally based on social 
bonds. I therefore argue that reserves cohesion is different to that from the regulars. 
Finally, in arguing that FR20 has been a ‘partial transformation’ I highlight how the 
distinct nature of reserve service has fused with FR20’s political origins and wider 

















Definitions, Research Design, and Methods 
 
In the last chapter, I outlined the three fundamental questions this research seeks to 
answer. These are: what are the historical, organisational and conceptual origins of 
FR20?; what is the impact of FR20 on the reserve logistics forces it was designed to 
transform?; and what does this experience of FR20 tell us about professionalism and 
cohesion in reserve logistics units and, more broadly, the transformation of the Army 
Reserve? In this chapter, I define the central terms this study uses to answer these three 
related questions and outline the methods used to investigate them. In order to make 
judgements on its success, it is important to set out the terms by which FR20 aims to 
transform the Army Reserve. Overall, FR20’s objective is to increase the military 
capability and deployability of the reserves, through better training, equipment, and 
integration with the regulars. By focusing on the deployment of formed Army Reserve 
sub-units in particular, FR20 states it will provide ‘military capability in a different way 
from the past to deliver the range and scale of military forces and skills required.’111 
Understanding what is meant by capability, and the related terms of effectiveness and 
readiness, is therefore the first issue to be addressed. 
Capability, Effectiveness and Readiness 
A broad definition of capability is ‘the power or ability to do something’.112 The British 
military definition of capability is the ‘combination of equipment, manpower, and 
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training to provide an effect or output.’113 This essentially physical definition is 
supported by less-tangible moral group attributes such as cohesion, and discipline, 
which are generated and maintained through sub-unit ethos and leadership to maintain 
professional standards.114 Sub-unit capability is also related to its ability to sustain itself. 
Intrinsically related to capability is effectiveness: the ‘degree to which something is 
successful in producing a desired result.’115 In sub-units, physical and moral capabilities 
therefore determine effectiveness. However, effectiveness is often role specific; the 
output on which it is judged can vary considerably between sub-units with different 
functions. Meanwhile, the ability of sub-units to be both capable and effective enough 
to execute assigned missions on operations is referred to as readiness.  
The British Army uses a defined set of standards for both the capability and 
readiness for all regular and reserve sub-units. Reserve sub-units undergoing major 
transition as a result of FR20 were given two dates by which they had to deliver a 
certain level of capability. While these dates varied by unit, broadly speaking sub-units 
had to reach Initial Operating Capability (IOC) about 18-24 months after transition, 
while all units are to meet Full Operational Capability (FOC) in a similar time frame 
after IOC. While the exact sub-unit capability requirements for IOC and FOC are 
restricted, for a unit to be assessed as FOC it must be fully manned, qualified, and 
trained to the requisite standard. The FR20 schedule holds that most units should be at 
FOC by April 2019. Additional demands come from the readiness cycle, which is 
separate to the FR20 capability schedule. Across British defence a system is used which 
assesses units’ readiness in terms of manpower, equipment and collective training.116 
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The readiness cycle is used to bring units up to readiness for potential deployment, and 
can consist of boosts to manpower, equipment and intensified collective training. 
Reflecting their difficulties in deploying fully trained and qualified personnel, reserve 
sub-units’ requirement to be at readiness is usually much lower than their established 
strength. For example, a reserve sub-unit could be required to deploy a section of eight 
personnel – all qualified in the rank they hold – to support a regular unit on the first 
roule of a deployment. While the sub-unit could probably fill this requirement whilst 
only at IOC, its ability to sustain this requirement over subsequent roules would be 
affected if it was not at FOC. Understanding FR20’s capability, effectiveness and 
readiness requirement is therefore central to answering the question of how the policy 
has impacted the selected sub-units. 
Post-Fordism and Military Logistics 
It is important to note that while post-Fordism is an analytical term that academics have 
coined to usefully describe the changes happening in some Western militaries since the 
1990s, the wider UK defence establishment, nor the British Army in particular, use the 
term. Nor should they. It is important to stress here that no military officer would 
consciously describe themselves as a ‘post-Fordist’. Indeed, during the research for this 
thesis, when I used the term, I was directly asked what this meant by both a former 
Chief of the General Staff (CGS), and by a Colonel responsible for implementing future 
logistics doctrine and concepts.117 Nevertheless, when I explained the four tenets of 
post-Fordism, both immediately concurred it was an accurate term to describe the 
process ongoing in the army and its logistics component. Thus, while the terms post-
Fordism and post-Fordist principles are used throughout this work, it must be stressed 
that although the army has implemented these four central tenets, it has not done so self-
consciously. More, as I show in Chapter Five, they have emulated business best practice 
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in doing so. As such, throughout this work I provide evidence of the processes of post-
Fordism within British military logistics rather than argue that the British military has 
consciously implemented a post-Fordist logistics ‘model’ as it were.  
While Martin Van Creveld, John Lynn, and Thomas Kane, amongst others,118 
have all provided their own definitions of logistics, these are problematic, or ignore the 
increasingly important role of medical services.119 The latest US definition– published 
in Joint Warfare Publication 4-0: Logistics – is: ‘planning and executing the movement 
and support of forces’.120 It defines the core logistics functions as: ‘deployment and 
distribution, supply, maintenance, logistic services, operational contract support, 
engineering, and health services.121 Britain’s 2015 Joint Doctrine Publication 4-0: 
Logistics for Joint Operations uses the NATO definition of logistics as ‘the science of 
planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces’122 before outlining 
that this includes the: ‘design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, 
distribution, maintenance, recovery and disposal of materiel; the transport of personnel; 
the acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; the 
acquisition or furnishing of services; and medical and health service support.’123 
However, it is the author’s contention that a simple unifying principle unites these 
definitions: support to military forces synchronised through space and time. In short, 
military logistics from the ancient to the modern era has always been about getting the 
required quantity and quality of material and services, to the correct place, at the 
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correct time, and in the correct order, to ensure military forces are as capable as 
possible. This definition is used here. At the same time, I acknowledge that this work 
cannot address each and every element of military logistics contained above, and will 
instead focus on specific areas where British, US and NATO logistics processes and 
practices have been transformed. 
British, US and wider NATO militaries are examined in this study as these have 
been the most deployed Western forces over the past twenty five years. The British 
example provides the context for the transformation of its reserve logistics component, 
while the relevance of the US is also important as, as will be shown, British logistics 
transformation has usually emulated the US military. Combined, these logistics chains 
have also continually sustained the largest deployments of soldiers in hostile areas of 
the Balkans, the Gulf and Afghanistan over the last 20 years. Moreover, the US, the 
UK, and to a lesser extent NATO, have adopted new methods of sustaining these forces; 
other powers’ militaries, such as those of China and Russia – despite modernisation 
drives – have not yet transformed their logistics systems to similar degrees, raising 
interesting strategic questions about how they compare with the privatised, 
expeditionary and contingency-based logistics systems of the West. Chapter Five’s 
greater emphasis on land forces also reflects the fact that these have been the most 
heavily deployed and engaged during the past two decades. 
Research Design 
In Military Power, Stephen Biddle sets out to prove that the modern system of military 
employment, especially that of the West, is central to understanding these forces’ 
success on the battlefield. Contrasting arguments about numerical or technological 
preponderance, Biddle shows in a detailed fashion that the modern interrelated system, 
which he defines as comprising the principles and practices of ‘cover, concealment, 
dispersion, suppression, small unit independent manoeuvre and combined arms at the 
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tactical level, and depth, reserves, and differential concentration at the operational level 
of war’, is crucial for battlefield success.124 Despite the complexity of the system he 
describes, Biddle is able to support his claims through a rigorous methodological 
approach reliant on the triangulation of data from separate sources and methods. Firstly, 
he draws on qualitative archival and secondary source material to examine previous 
cases. Secondly, he uses separate quantitative datasets to compliment the cases and test 
his theory. Finally, he uses military simulations to test his arguments in practice. 
Biddle’s results are complimentary and conclusive due to triangulation, and represent an 
innovative approach to social science research on the military.  
While it proved impossible to conduct simulations for this project, the system of 
triangulation was utilised to provide a solid methodological base for the research. 
Overall, following Biddle, an interdisciplinary, mixed-methods approach was used to 
address different aspects of the central question. Indeed, the problem of utilising a 
single literature or method approach to assess FR20 as a transformation is similar to 
those found in other subjects. Richard Lebow has noted that scholarly enquiry in 
general can be conceptualised as a matrix ‘with problems representing the horizontal 
dimensions and disciplines the vertical one.’125 Thus single approaches cannot fully 
capture many of the issues they seek to understand. At the theoretical/philosophical 
level, Paul Cilliers has also noted the friction in ‘the relationship between our 
descriptions of the world and the world itself.’126 Both points seem particularly pertinent 
to the different approaches to cohesion in particular, and to the diversity of FR20’s 
impacts in general. A multi-literature, mixed-methods approach is therefore followed 
here to understand as much of the FR20 ‘problem’ as possible. Thus, in the first three 
empirical chapters I examine the historical origins, politico-organisational evolution, 
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and the conceptual framework of FR20 using the military transformation and post-
Fordist literature. In the subsequent chapters, I show how this context explains the 
policy’s impact on sub-units’ capability, professionalism and cohesion, using both the 
Standard Model and collective action approaches to cohesion in particular. This 
evidence is then used to draw implications for professionalism and cohesion in reserve 
service more broadly. In the final chapter, I discuss what this transformative attempt 
highlights about British civil-military relations and British society in general.    
  A further word on the specific methods used to assess cohesion and readiness in 
the selected sub-units is required here. As noted in the last chapter, the classical social 
psychology focus on the social, task and group identity components of cohesion 
primarily involves asking members about their experiences of the group. Within this 
approach, the Standard Model uses questionnaires to produce comprehensive analyses 
of unit cohesion, and has been utilised by the US, UK, Israeli, Canadian and Finnish 
armies.127 However, as the proponents of this approach admit themselves, the survey 
approach is limited to ascertaining unit members’ attitudes toward their units and their 
perceptions of unit cohesion. 128 As such, the Standard Model offers a snapshot – albeit 
a highly-informed and complex one – of cohesion. While results of the Standard Model 
have been correlated to later collective performance, this approach does not assess the 
interactions which constitute collective performance themselves. Related to this issue is 
the concept of causality. While there may be some direct causal relationships, even the 
multiple regressions of the Standard Model cannot prove causality in cohesion – at best 
they indicate a moderate correlation (r = .4) between higher cohesion and higher 
performance,129 whilst the strongest relationships between the components of cohesion 
                                                 
127 Siebold, ‘The Essence of Military Cohesion’; Salo, M. (2011) United We Stand – Divided We Fall: A 
Standard Model of Unit Cohesion, Helsinki: Department of Social Research, Helsinki University. 
128 Siebold, ‘The Science of Military Cohesion’. 
129 Siebold, ‘The Science of Military Cohesion’, 50; Oliver, L. et al. (1999) ‘A Qualitative Integration of the 
Military Cohesion Literature’, Military Psychology, 11(1). 
 45 
 
and cohesion itself – for example the effect of good leadership on the unit – can also 
only be moderately correlated (r =.6).130 Similarly the Standard Model is also open to 
critique because, as Hogg has identified, social psychology’s ‘group level theories 
readily tend to dissolve into theories of interpersonal processes’.131 
A similar accusation can be made against King and Ben Ari’s collective action 
approach that observes performance but lacks the same depth of focus on social bonds 
between individuals. As such there is a distinct difference in level of analysis. As 
discussed in Chapter Seven, King, and others, have insightfully shown that there are 
relationships between interpersonal bonds and effective collective performance. But 
here it can be argued that in seeing the causes of cohesion at the group level, theories of 
the importance of collective action have necessarily excluded some individual level 
factors. So much depends on definitions and level of analysis in studying cohesion that 
the limitations of cohesion research must be borne in mind. Indeed, conceptually, to 
date only one side of the cohesion ‘box’ has been the primary focus for academic study 
at a single time. This study seeks to change that by incorporating both approaches and 
methods. 
Case Selection, Sources and Methods 
The research used primary and secondary sources, individual and group interviews, 
longitudinal surveys, and fieldwork observations. Primary and secondary sources were 
used to address the questions concerning FR20’s context. Once this had been 
completed, qualitative data on reserve logistician’s perceptions of the impact of the 
transformation on their sub-unit’s effectiveness and cohesion was collected through 
individual and group interviews and field observations. This was simultaneously 
complimented by quantitative data collection involving three surveys of logistics 
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reservists. While secondary source research was conducted from 2012, access was only 
granted to speak to and survey soldiers in February 2015 after an 11-month delay 
caused by the requirement that the Ministry of Defence Research Ethics Committee 
approve the project. The research was also approved by the University of Exeter’s 
Ethics Committee. All participants consented to taking part and most participants were 
anonymised, but those senior officials quoted gave their consent to be cited.  
The research focus on the reserve logistics component was suggested by the 
army as this area of the overall FR20 transformation was deemed at higher risk than in 
the combat arms, such as the infantry. This was for a number of reasons, but mainly 
because the changes that some logistics units had to undergo in order to provide the 
required capability – including forming new units, changing base locations or re-roling 
into a new trade – represented major organisational changes that would require 
considerable time and effort to implement. Even taking this into account, the 
transformation of the army reserve logistics component as a whole was not seen as 
guaranteed. As a result, it must be made very clear from the outset that this thesis used a 
sample of logistics units within which some had undergone profound organisational 
change as a result of FR20. This sampling was intentional as the research question was 
firmly based in both the logistics component and the transformation literature, and 
sought to understand factors affecting change in these units. It is therefore recognised 
that the logistics reserve component may have proved more difficult to transform than 
other components, where experiences of transformation may have been more positive. 
For example, it was beyond the scope of this study to examine in detail the experiences 
of infantry units. Nevertheless, in the quantitative chapter I have incorporated data from 
regular and reserve infantry and logistics units for comparison. It is also important to 
note that these comparisons are not statistically representative to their respective wider 
populations and are indicative only. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that while 
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some of the organisational issues identified in the logistics units are unique to them, 
other issues have been identified in other units with different military functions. 
  Given the limitations of a single researcher in this project, geography was an 
initial constraining factor in case selection. However, the varied use of methods allowed 
some mitigation of this through the research design: I conducted fieldwork with a unit 
close by, undertook group interviews with those further afield, and surveyed units from 
all over the UK. Overall, these units were selected by the army to cover a diverse 
spectrum of locations and experiences of FR20. The fieldwork unit and the group 
interview units were selected by case as they had undergone some sort of organisational 
change as a result of FR20. The surveyed units were a mix of those that had and hadn’t. 
A final word is also needed about sub-unit experiences themselves. The experiences of 
units of 60 personnel are conducive to being shaped by individual personalities, 
especially of leaders. They can therefore vary depending on personalities and 
leadership. As this fact is pertinent to almost all units this does not negate the evidence 
presented here; it just must be noted that some variance can be explained by 
personalities and leadership in sub-units. 
Finally, although the research was conducted over a four year period, due to the 
length of time it took MoDREC to clear the project, I only had 18 months or so to 
directly speak with soldiers and conduct fieldwork. FR20 is scheduled to be an almost 
six year transformation. Thus, while interviews with senior officials began in 2014, and  
longitudinal data was later collected from soldiers, the data concerning the sub-units 
experiences of FR20 presented in this thesis has been primarily collected from the 
second quarter of FR20’s projected lifespan. The evidence presented here therefore 
needs to be treated with some caution, as FR20 will still have over two years to run after 
the research phase for this project ended. Nevertheless, the period that the research 
covered was an important one, distinguished by a major effort to solve organisational 
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problems identified in the first three years of the policy’s introduction, and included the 
first manifestations of the impact of organisational change. While this period may have 
skewed the data somewhat, it is also conceivably a period where FR20 should have 
been starting to gain major momentum, given the resources and effort being expended at 
this time. Moreover, where possible I have attempted to enrich the data from outside the 
logistics community in order to situate the findings within the broader reserve 
experience. As such, while any assessment of a six year policy at the halfway point in 
its life-cycle is limited, and further developments no doubt will occur, I have made 
every effort to identify enduring issues that are likely to shape FR20’s impact in the 
future.  
Primary and Secondary Source Documents 
Primary and secondary source documents were predominantly used to inform the 
chapters explaining the context of FR20. These draw on a wide range of documents. 
The third chapter on the previous periods of reserve reform is situated within the 
organisational transformation literature and is primarily based on secondary historical 
sources. A note is perhaps required here on the sources for this chapter. While both the 
Cardwell-Childers and Haldane reforms have received much scholarly attention, the 
reserves aspect of their plans have received considerably less so.132 As a result, this 
chapter utilises the limited number of major works which have done so. Beckett is one 
of two of the world’s leading expert on the Volunteers and the Territorial Army, and his 
Riflemen Form, and Territorials: A Century of Service are used throughout, as are those 
by the other expert, Edward Speirs. David French’s Military Identities was also 
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thoroughly useful, while Peter Dennis’ The Territorial Army 1907-1940 covers the 
impact of the Haldane reforms. Walker’s Reserve Forces and The British Territorial 
Army is also used for cross reference, and where possible I have utilised other 
publications and documents. 
Chapter Four, which discusses the political origins of FR20, was primarily based 
on elite interviews with senior military and civilian officials involved with the policy, 
close textual analysis of Ministry of Defence FR20 documents as the policy evolved, 
and other related official documents. This was supported by think-tank publications and 
numerous newspaper and news agency reports, including The Times, The Guardian, The 
Daily Telegraph, BBC, The Evening Standard and (even) The Daily Mail. The fifth 
chapter on post-Fordism is based in the industrial and military sociology literature and 
draws together literature from the business and military logistics disciplines to advance 
conceptual understanding of the recent transformation in military logistics. Other 
secondary sources include bespoke military publications and doctrinal documents. 
Primary sources include US newspapers, government publications and interview data, 
complimented by credible websites. As detailed below, the group interview and 
fieldwork data was used to predominantly inform the empirical chapters concerning the 
impact of FR20 on capability, professionalism and cohesion, while the final quantitative 
chapter relied mainly on the survey data. However, this was not exclusive; some survey 
data is used to support the qualitative chapters and vice versa, as is secondary source 
data. 
Qualitative Primary Sources:  
Individual and Group Interviews:  
Individual interviews were conducted to gain insight into how the FR20 policy was 
formed, the exact intent of the plan in relation to reserve logistics units, and to give 
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context to the data collected in the group interviews. Informal interviews also took place 
during the fieldwork. Overall 16 formal and nine informal interviews were conducted. 
These 25 interviews consisted of a serving minister; two former defence ministers; a 
serving and a former Chief of the General Staff; three generals involved in different 
aspects of FR20; and two brigadiers and two colonels involved in logistics and the 
reserve component. Others included sub-unit commanders. These were selected on the 
case relevance basis; people whose positions and roles indicated they would be 
informed on the subject. Some of these personnel were interviewed twice. Interviews 
took place in various locations, including Army Headquarters in Andover and 
Whitehall, the House of Commons, unit locations, and on Skype, while some 
participants were interviewed twice in order to clarify earlier points. Interview data was 
recorded in notebooks, and in some cases on a Dictaphone with the participant’s 
permission. These recordings were then transcribed. Informal interviews usually 
occurred during the fieldwork with officers and soldiers from the respective sub-units. 
This data was recorded in a notebook. 
While there is ambiguity in the academic literature on the difference between a 
‘focus group’ and a ‘group interview’, the group interview approach adopted here was 
not primarily interested in the transactional nature of opinion formation traditionally 
associated with focus groups.133 Instead, the simpler group interview method was 
adopted to allow the researcher to quickly gain as many qualitative insights as possible 
into the issues being discussed, and to ensure that individual responses were 
representative of the wider group. Four sub-units were initially selected for the group 
interviews. These sub-units were selected in consultation with the army chain of 
                                                 
133 Kitzinger R., and Barbour, J. (1999) ‘Introduction: the challenge and promise of focus groups’ in 
Kitzinger, R. and Barbour , J. (eds.) Developing Focus Group Research, London: Sage, 1; Albrecht, T. et al. 
(1993) ‘Understanding Communication Processes in Focus Groups’ in Morgan, D. (ed.) Successful Focus 




command to represent a broad spectrum of locations and experiences of FR20, and also 
to be reflective of the 3:1 reserve RLC: REME population ratio. Of note is that of these 
sub-units, three had either been newly created or changed their role as a result of FR20, 
with one of the others changing their base location. The group interview sample was 
therefore intentionally weighted toward sub-units that had undergone organisational 
transformation, as the research goal was to examine the impact of FR20 in those units 
the army deemed higher risk when implementing the policy. As a result, group 
interview responses could conceivably be more negative than the wider reserve 
REME/RLC population due to the greater organisational frictions experienced. 
Nevertheless, as discussed below, this issue was mitigated by the inclusion of survey 
data from a different sample from the wider population. Indeed, as the research 
continued, an additional set of interviews in another REME sub-unit were conducted to 
triangulate the data from the initial REME unit after it emerged that the latter had had a 
very positive experience of FR20 that may not have been representative of other sub-
units in the same battalion. 
The researcher visited each sub-unit to explain the nature of project and request 
individuals’ participation before the group interviews were undertaken. The group 
interviews varied in size from two participants in some cases to approximately 15 in one 
other. The average was 6-8. In order to encourage honest responses, groups were 
separated by rank to include: officers and senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs); 
NCOs; and privates and Junior NCOs (JNCOs). Interviews took place on unit premises, 
eg in messes during duty hours. To collect longitudinal data reflective of the long-term 
FR20 plan, interviews were conducted twice in two of the four sub-units; in May-July 
2015 and in the same period in 2016.  
The group interviews were semi-structured, with the same set of questions 
delivered to each group, but with the scope to explore different themes as they emerged. 
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The list of group interview questions are available at Annex B, but broadly, they sought 
to examine the nature of the units before FR20, and then what had changed as a result of 
it, across a number themes. Interviews usually lasted 45-60 minutes. In total, 14 group 
interviews were conducted. Responses were recorded on a digital Dictaphone and in 
handwritten notes. To improve reliability, the group interview data was transcribed and 
then analysed to identify common response themes using the NVivo coding software. 
Initial coding identified potential major themes and sub-themes. Full coding was based 
on respondents’ dialogue which was then grouped together to create data nodes. These 
nodes were then searched for data that supported or refuted their proposed themes. 
Connections between overlapping themes and deviations from coded material were 
identified, allowing the themes to be defined and refined. Published responses were then 
chosen on the basis of representativeness. 
Fieldwork 
As discussed in Chapter One, the ability to perform collectively is widely recognised as 
a key source of cohesion in infantry units. Field observations were conducted to collect 
qualitative data on the importance of collective training in reserve logistics units, and to 
triangulate this with the interview and quantitative data. While participant observation 
has a long tradition in anthropology,134 it is also an increasingly common qualitative 
approach amongst the revisionist cohesion scholars and involves the researcher closely 
observing military units as they train on exercises and in their on-duty hours.135 This 
approach differs markedly from the classical cohesion scholars’ emphasis on interviews 
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and surveys, and has produced markedly different understandings of cohesion as a 
result.  
Following James Spradley, a moderate participant approach was utilised for the 
fieldwork.136 Participant observation is conducive to a better understanding of the ‘life 
world’ of sub-units and how they perform collectively. Furthermore, a deeper 
understanding of the successes and challenges associated with FR20 in the sub-units 
was gained.137 Finally, as the sub-unit was visited by the researcher frequently, it 
allowed rapport to be built with personnel. This generated qualitatively rich data to 
support the interviews and surveys. The particular sub-unit that was observed was 
selected by the army and I on key case study criteria (eg. the unit had undergone major 
transformation as a result of FR20), representativeness (RLC rather than REME unit) 
and location. I visited this unit on four separate occasions in barracks to observe their 
training and joined them on training exercises in the field on two further occasions to 
observe the nature of their trades. Observation data was recorded in a notebook and 
using a camera to capture the nature of collective performance and equipment used by 
the unit.  
Quantitative Primary Sources: Survey 
Given the high-risk nature of the reserve logistics development as articulated by the 
Director General Army Transformation, Major General Kevin Abraham,138 the army 
were especially interested in quantitative analysis that could inform the implementation 
of FR20. As a result a number of surveys were conducted. The first, which is not 
referred to in detail in this thesis, concerned recruitment and retention in reserve RLC 
and REME units and was completed in January 2015. It was used to inform policy, 
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resulted in a new set of questions on the Ministry of Defence’s annual Reserve 
Continuous Attitudes Survey (ResCAS), and its results have recently been published. 
Some of these findings are used to support qualitative data presented herein. 
In an attempt to integrate the sharp methodological and conceptual distinction 
between the traditional and more recent cohesion literature, I collected quantitative data 
to increase triangulation. Therefore, following Guy Siebold’s ‘Standard Model of 
Cohesion’ the research undertook a longitudinal survey to generate data on reservists’ 
perceptions of the impact of FR20 on cohesion and readiness in their sub-units. The 
survey (see Annex C) drew heavily on already-established surveys used by the US, 
British and Israeli armies to measure soldiers’ attitudes to sub-unit cohesion and 
readiness. The survey contained two sub-questionnaires: the modified Platoon Cohesion 
Index (PCI) and the Sub-Unit Readiness and Morale questionnaire. The PCI has been 
shown to be a reliable and quick measure of unit cohesion, and the only modification 
made was to change the level of analysis to the sub-unit level. This allowed an 
examination of cohesion to be undertaken across horizontal, vertical and organisational 
bonding scales at this level of analysis. The Readiness and Morale questionnaire 
measures soldiers’ attitudes to morale, confidence in equipment and leaders, and overall 
unit readiness for operations. Using these already established questionnaires also 
allowed comparison with previous research. Near the end of the survey a set of 
questions acted as a criteria scale for the earlier scales.  
The survey was delivered twice in a 12 month period. One major issue identified 
with longitudinal surveys in the army especially is the high turnover of personnel which 
can affect the stability of data. Unfortunately, as MoDREC required the full 
anonymisation of data, it was impossible to track individual soldiers. While this is a 
methodological weakness, stable response rates in the selected sub-units were able to 
mitigate this somewhat. Indeed, the moving of individuals away from the unit, or the 
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introduction of new members is viewed as representative of the social life of the sub-
unit, and the response rates in the selected sub-units were stable enough that weighting 
was not needed. Similarly, changes in leaders and deployments can also account for 
changes in cohesion and readiness. These were taken into account in the research. Any 
major changes in the sub-units circumstances were identified in consultation with the 
chain of command and used to inform the subsequent analysis.  
Survey Aims and Hypotheses 
Based on the ‘Standard Model’ literature, this study set out to achieve the following: 
a. For the first time, gather specific cohesion and readiness data on RLC and 
REME reservists. In particular, investigate the levels of cohesion amongst 
certain sub-units that have undergone organisational change as a result of 
FR20. 
b. Gather longitudinal data on REME and RLC reservists’ experiences of 
working with the Regulars and of the impact of the FR20 reforms to date. 
c. Determine whether the PCI is an accurate and useful tool when applied to 
the British Army Reserve and whether it may aid 360-degree reporting. 
Hypothesis 1: Reservists’ perceptions of cohesion and readiness should increase as a 
result of the FR20 reforms as the force is professionalised and better equipment, 
training, and resources are directed toward the reserve logistics population in general 
and specific sub-units in particular.  
Hypothesis 2: Following previous research, sub-units with higher cohesion should 
report higher levels of readiness and morale. 
Hypothesis 3: Given the importance of social bonds in the reserves (See Chapter Eight), 
reserve sub-units should display higher scores for affective (social) bonds on the PCI 
scales than their regular colleagues. Conversely, regular sub-units should report higher 
instrumental (task) bonds.  
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Descriptions of the surveys’ sample size, design and scale validity are available in 
Annex A.  
Conclusion 
Overall, the methodologies outlined above were chosen to generate the richest forms of 
qualitative and quantitative data to ensure triangulation and increase the validity of the 
evidence. While each method is used predominantly in certain chapters, the data is 
presented in a way that incorporates all the relevant evidence to support the argument 
being made. This interdisciplinary, mixed-methods approach is a novel means of 
conducting cohesion research in particular, and also marks the first time that cohesion 
research on British reserve forces, or their logistics component, has been undertaken. 
First, however, it is important to understand how previous periods of reserve 
transformation have organisationally manifested themselves in order to gain a better 














Balancing Budgets, Strategy and Recruitment: Previous 
Reserve Reforms 
 
As outlined in Chapter One, the British Army, and the Army Reserve, is currently in a 
period of profound organisational transformation. One the one hand, this attempt to re-
organise the Army Reserve for complex and diverse 21st Century missions appears to be 
a response to the strategic uncertainty of an increasingly globalised world.139 As is 
discussed in detail in Chapter Five, the desire for more professional and adaptable 
reserve forces is itself symptomatic of what academics have described as the post-
Fordist approach to military organisation that has developed in this era, primarily in 
order to generate greater efficiencies. Understanding this approach is central to an 
understanding of the attempted transformations in logistics sub-units. This chapter, on 
the other hand, examines the historical context of previous attempts to change British 
reserve land forces to show how the current attempt at transformation is perhaps less 
novel than it initially appears. It shows that the impetus for transforming the army’s 
reserve forces have remained remarkably similar during the ‘classical’ modern period 
and that of ‘late’ modernity.140 Indeed, the dynamic interplay between budgetary 
constraints, strategic rationale, and recruiting the reserve force has heavily influenced 
the decision to implement – and ultimately the effectiveness of – the previous three 
major attempts to transform the reserves. While this chapter shows that attempts to 
reform the reserve are cyclical – they represent an attempt to change a military 
organisation response to changed strategic, economic and operational circumstances – 
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crucially, it also shows that the organisational solutions to the problems these changed 
circumstances present are historically specific. Moreover, each previous attempt at 
reserve transformation has been politically-imposed rather than undertaken by the army 
of its own volition.  
How stakeholders influence policy outcomes has been excellently highlighted by 
Graham Allison in his dissection of American and Soviet strategic rationale, 
bureaucratic politics, and organisational process during the Cuban Missile Crisis, which 
Posen heavily drew on in his seminal study on transformation.141 Both Allison and 
Herbert Kaufmann, amongst others, have argued that organisations transform when 
intense pressures build up around them to force change in order to ensure their 
continued viability.142 Transformational leaders and the acquiescence of internal elites 
are needed to drive through this change, but in meeting organisational resistance, these 
changes are negotiated and modified. The net result is that the organisation adapts. But 
these adaptions are not dramatically new, they are instead a re-booted version of 
procedures the organisation is already familiar with. Organisational change thus occurs 
through, and is modified by, the interplay of its parts.  This chapter seeks to identify the 
key roles of stakeholders in previous reserve army reforms and explain how they shaped 
their outcomes, in order to better understand the current transformation. This historical 
analysis is central to my argument as not only does it show the continuities with 
previous attempts to change the army reserve, it also highlights how the latest, post-
Fordist approach is an organisationally novel attempt to solve enduring fiscal, strategic 
and organisational problems. 
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The Cardwell-Childers Reforms: A First Attempt at Integration 
Although the origins of the Army Reserve date back to the fyrds of the Anglo-Saxon 
period,143 it was not until Henry II’s Assize of Arms in 1181 and Edward I’s Statute of 
Westminster in 1285 that the military obligation of freemen to defend the community 
became enshrined in England. The need for continental armies in the mid-sixteenth 
Century saw the first of the Militia statutes in 1558, effectively incorporating the Militia 
into a formal existence, which remained in place despite periods of repeal until the 
twentieth century.144 Growing government regulation and the gradual 
professionalisation of the army and its reserve forces over this period has been charted 
by numerous scholars.145 By the mid-1860s, Britain’s army reserve forces were 
essentially organised in two systems whereby those who volunteered for the Militia 
would complete a few months’ initial training and then return to civilian life on the 
understanding that they would undertake a few weeks’ annual refresher training. The 
Militia’s mission was defence against invasion (although it was used in a public order 
role when required) and those serving in it, who were mainly drawn from agricultural 
areas, signed up for five years, on the condition that – unlike the regular army – they 
could not be deployed overseas nor posted outside their regiment. The Yeomanry was 
the cavalry arm of the Militia and served under the same conditions. The other part of 
the system was represented in the more urbane Volunteers who had been created in 
1859-60 as a result of the public’s largely imaginary fears of an imminent French 
invasion. The Volunteers consisted of mainly riflemen, gunners and engineers who, like 
the Militia and Yeomanry, had been recruited locally and could also not be compelled to 
serve overseas. However, unlike the Militia who were more closely controlled by the 
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state, the Volunteers had originally funded and equipped themselves, representing ‘the 
military expression of the spirit of self-help, Victorian capitalism in arms.’146  
 Although on paper the Militia was 130,000 strong and the Volunteers numbered 
over 160,000 by 1868, both the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny had exposed the 
inability of Britain’s reserve system to mobilise the required numbers of second line 
troops when the army deployed overseas.147 Moreover, by the late 1860s, the Yeomanry 
and especially the Volunteers were in decline, as both forces fell out of fashion with the 
landed gentry and upper middle classes that supplied them with the officers and recruits 
and, decisively, the donations they required to function.148 As the problem worsened, 
prominent Volunteers in Parliament began lobbying for increased government funding 
to make up the budget shortfalls of the supposedly self-sufficient Volunteers. 
 While the Volunteers had cost the state just £3,000 (£250,000 today) in 1860, by 
1897 total government expenditure on them was £697,000 (over £70 million),149 even 
though the size of the force remained relatively stable during this period. Moreover, this 
growing drain on the government’s coffers was occurring precisely at a time when the 
army was being increasingly criticised, both by the Radicals who detested the 
aristocratic nature of army – especially the practice of purchasing commissions – and by 
some officers concerned about the army’s and the reserve’s military effectiveness. Such 
criticism was justified: between 1864 and 1869 spending on the Army and Ordnance far 
exceeded that for any other branch of government, eclipsing funding for the Navy by an 
average of £4 million per annum (£420 million today).150 A considerable proportion of 
these costs paid for soldiers’ pensions rather than for effective military capability, while 
doubts about the Volunteer’s effectiveness had already led to an attempt in 1867 to 
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create an ‘Army Reserve’ of 20,000 men that had failed miserably.151 As such, there 
was a growing realisation within government that the army and the reserves needed to 
be reorganised to guarantee both better efficiency and value for money. It is important 
to stress that this political desire to reduce the military budget was the primary driver of 
the forthcoming reforms. But the drive to make these forces more economical and 
efficient also fused with the strategic situation, coming as it did after a major war and 
during continued colonial withdrawal from Canada, Australia and New Zealand.152 
Indeed, it is noteworthy that one of the most immediate impacts of the subsequent 
reforms was the reduction in colonial garrisons by over 25,000 men between 1869 and 
1871, at considerable savings to the War Office.153 
Yet the withdrawal from the New World was not the only strategic rationale to 
influence the forthcoming organisational reform of the army and reserves. Poorly 
trained Union volunteer units had not performed well in the opening stage of the 
American Civil War. This was in stark contrast to the Prussian militia units whose 
recent victories in Europe had demonstrated the importance of thorough training and 
discipline in battle. Moreover, as British studies had concluded, the Prussian system of 
localised recruitment and the pairing of Line, Reserve and Landwehr (militia) units 
allowed fast mobilisation and rapid expansion of the Prussian army in wartime. Indeed, 
such was the strategic and organisational success of this system in defeating the 
Austrian and French armies that, echoing Farrell’s observations on military emulation, it 
formed the blueprint for the reforms instigated by the Secretary of State for War, 
Edward Cardwell. As Julian Brazier has shown, General Garnett Wolseley was also 
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instrumental in driving the wider reform of the army and ensuring the reform of the 
reserves was integrated with it.154   
However, the Cardwell reforms were also as much a product of the dominant 
ideology at the time as they were the economic and strategic context. The 1867 Reform 
Act had committed the Liberal government to a wider economic and social programme 
by extending the franchise, and the reform of army became a means by which the 
Liberals hoped the working class would be lifted from poverty into respectability and 
thus become better integrated into the political life of the nation. As David French has 
shown, the Radicals hoped the army would become ‘a powerful instrument for national 
education in a powerful and high sense’ as a result of the introduction of new short-
service contracts.155 This ideological element of the reforms was taken up by Gladstone 
himself, who argued that the introduction of new local depots would ‘diminish to a 
minimum immorality in the standing army’,156 while some army officers also argued 
that army service would help create a ‘more perfect man and a better citizen.’157  
Political ideology was therefore clearly mobilised to support reserve reform. 
It was within the context of these economic, strategic and ideological debates 
that the reform of the reserves was shaped. The Cardwell reforms – which began in 
1868 with attempts to abolish the purchase of commissions – are best known for 
enshrining the regimental system into the army’s organisational structure through the 
implementation of the policies of localisation and pairing with reserve units. However, 
the reforms were wide in scope, with the 1870 Army Enlistment Act reducing the period 
of service from 21 years to twelve, with most men passing into the Army Reserve after 
six years of service. This act was vital, as not only did it cut the pension bill, it created a 
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system, on paper at least, by which the army could be expanded rapidly in times of 
crisis, while it was also hoped that shortening the terms of service would attract a better 
quality of recruit. Meanwhile, the Localisation Act of July 1872 and General Order 32 
of 1873 created linked and localised line infantry regiments. Linking saw two-battalion 
infantry regiments become the norm, with one serving overseas and the other at home, 
while localisation divided the country into 66 sub-districts, each with its own pair of 
linked battalions and own permanent depot. This depot was to be shared with at least 
two local Militia battalions and any already existing local Volunteer battalions. The 
rationale behind these reforms was clear; recent evidence from the Prussian and 
Confederate armies suggested that locally-recruited battalions had better morale and 
discipline,158 while in co-locating the headquarters of both regular and reserve units, 
Cardwell hoped that training in close proximity with regulars would increase the 
efficiency of the reserves whilst also encouraging them to join their full-time 
counterparts.159 Similarly, Wolseley’s visits to Confederate troops fighting in the 
American Civil War had convinced him of the need for more musketry and staff 
training.160 
The drive for better integration of the reserves was complemented by other 
measures to increase state control over them and their efficiency. Lord Lieutenants’ 
jurisdiction over the Volunteers was replaced by the Secretary of State for War’s, and a 
proficiency certificate for Volunteer officers and NCOs was introduced. Volunteer 
adjutants were to be phased out and replaced by their regular counterparts and 
permanent staff instructors to boost capability.161 This nascent attempt to professionalise 
the Volunteers was also evident in the introduction of a musketry bonus for soldiers 
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who met the increased standard, and in the amount of mandatory unit training required 
before Volunteer units could receive their increasingly important capitation grants from 
the government, upon which they relied for survival.162 
While these reforms were well-intentioned, predictably they faced intense 
criticism from numerous stakeholder groups opposed to the changes. As French has 
shown, in terms of the wider army, the switch to short-service created an unforeseen 
recruitment and retention problem, with the number of soldiers needed per annum as a 
result of the introduction of short-service doubling by 1879.163 This was complemented 
by a steep rise in deserters, the reduction in the quality of NCOs – who now had less 
experience – and an overage officer corps.164 Meanwhile, the Volunteers mobilised to 
resist the steady incursion of the regulars into their domain. Volunteer Adjutants 
rejected the introduction of the proficiency cert as demeaning, and also clashed with the 
government over the pegging of the capitation grant to the two-thirds unit turnout 
required at parades.165 Most vociferously, they attempted to reject their replacement by 
regulars, becoming ‘something of a pressure group in parliament’.166  
Added to the recruiting problem and internal dissent, strategic imperatives 
heaped organisational pressures on the army and Cardwell’s plan for the reserves. The 
Ashanti, Zulu, Afghan, First Boer and Egyptian campaigns tested the linked battalion 
system to the limit, with home battalions essentially becoming feeder units for their 
sister battalions fighting abroad. As a result of overstretch, the cohesion-destroying 
practice of cross-posting soldiers between regiments – precisely what Cardwell’s 
linking had been designed to end – became common again. Meanwhile, it was also 
apparent that the transfer of former soldiers into the new Army Reserve could not match 
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the need for soldiers to serve abroad because many of these campaigns could not be 
classed as the ‘grave national emergency’ required to mobilise them. Thus, by the late 
1870s it was becoming clear that while Cardwell’s reforms had changed the army and 
reserves on paper, in reality it had not been as thorough a reformation as intended.167 
While localisation had been achieved, it had been at the expense of organisational 
balance and recruitment. These issues would need to be addressed by the next war 
minister, Hugh Childers. 
The fact that Childers needed to undertake any reforms at all offers stark proof 
of the failure of Cardwell’s plans. Indeed, by 1881 criticism of Cardwell’s efforts had 
become so vociferous that a report by a committee of general officers recommended 
abandoning the system of linking entirely and replacing localisation – which hinged on 
a commitment to only post a soldier within his regiment – with a ‘general service’ 
contract.168 However, crucially, most of the £3.5 million (about £310 million today) 
allocated by Cardwell to build the regimental depots had now been spent, and there was 
no way Childers could abandon such a costly programme. Faced with this economic and 
political reality, he continued it, pushing localisation further by amalgamating the linked 
battalions into new territorial regiments now named after the locality they recruited 
from. Militias made up these regiments’ third and fourth battalions, with Volunteer 
units also taking the new regiments’ territorial names. To address the recruitment and 
retention problem, Childers lengthened the terms of service to seven years and reduced 
Army Reserve liability to five, whilst also improving soldiers pay, promotion terms, and 
pensions. He also brought the Draconian discipline system more in line with Liberal 
principles.169 The continued drive for efficiency and professionalism also affected the 
Volunteers, with further mandatory requirements for battalion drills in camp, the 
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introduction of a voluntary exam for field officers and the introduction of uniform 
regulations, the latter of which especially prompted much agitation from officers over 
the expense incurred and ignorance of history the new uniforms represented.170  
 However, while Childers largely completed the process of army reform begun 
by Cardwell, his Militia and Volunteer reforms were less successful. Intensified linking 
and territorialisation did not improve relations between the regulars and their reserve 
counterparts in all units, mainly due to ongoing mutual professional suspicion; 
militiamen training at the Suffolk Regiment’s depot before the Boer War were derided 
as ‘half-soldiers’ by their regular counterparts.171 There was also strong Militia agitation 
against moving their headquarters to the new regimental depots, when they believed 
their headquarters were already local enough to sustain recruitment and identity.172 The 
fact that Militia units also lost the ability to train their own recruits at the depots was 
another source of conflict. Moreover, class-related social divisions between the army 
and the Volunteers meant that the latter did not provide the steady flow of recruits into 
the army in the numbers that Cardwell and Childers had hoped localisation, 
territorialisation and subsequent integration would prompt. However, as French has 
shown, the Militia did join the army in significant numbers – about one third of recruits 
transferring annually between 1882 and 1907 – prompting him to conclude that the 
Cardwell/Childers reforms therefore benefitted the regulars more than they did the 
Militia.173 
At least in this regard the reforms fulfilled their aims. The Volunteers, always 
more detached from the War Office due to their independent origins, lagged behind. 
The drive to reform the Volunteers had to continue under Lord Hartington’s tenure in 
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the War Office, with the introduction of the breech-loading Martini-Henry rifle in 1885 
and the inclusion of an improved musketry qualification in the criteria for the capitation 
grant. However, according to Beckett, it was Edward Stanhope who ‘did more to define 
a place for the Volunteers in national defence, and to develop Volunteer organisations 
accordingly, than any previous occupant of the War Office.’174 Crucially, he integrated 
the Volunteers into the national mobilisation scheme, whilst placating Volunteer 
suspicions of overseas service by clearly stating that they would only be mobilised to 
resist an actual or apprehended invasion rather than a national emergency. Moreover, 
with agitation by Volunteers over the capitation grant and musketry qualifications 
rising, Stanhope established numerous committees to investigate where expenses could 
be saved by better management and relaxed the Volunteer musketry qualification 
somewhat.175  
When seen in the context of the wider army reforms of this period, the changes 
in the Volunteers’ organisation and effectiveness appear to have been more incremental 
than those in the army, or even the Militia. This was mainly due to the distinctive 
institutional origins and collective understandings of the Volunteers as a separate and 
distinct – but still related – entity to the army and Militia, most obviously manifested in 
its members’ perception of the different function of their organisation; that of home 
defence. This position differed greatly from the actual functional requirements of a 
reserve organisation as defined by the state: that of a cheap method of quickly 
reinforcing the regular army in times of crisis. Indeed, it is possible to argue that this 
distinction between perceived function and required function of the army reserves 
resulted in a process of serial incrementalism rather than a single major transformational 
event during the Cardwell/Childers era. Similarly, although there was some increased 
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co-operation,176 it is clear that the full integration of the Volunteers and regulars 
envisaged by Cardwell failed to materialise, mainly due to the different organisational 
nature of the Volunteers.177  
While Childers’ reforms did conclude Cardwell’s transformation of the army, 
crucially, the Militia – and to an even greater extent the Volunteers – lagged behind. For 
example, the Second Boer War of 1899-1902 raised serious questions about the 
effectiveness of the Militia, whilst highlighting disorganisation in the Yeomanry and the 
lack of seriousness in the ranks of the Volunteers.178 Most worryingly, the failure of the 
reservists to back-fill the army in the numbers required due to the voluntary nature of 
their service overseas underscored that the reserves were not able to meet the functional 
demands placed on it by an army engaged in expeditionary warfare.179 Ultimately, while 
the reforms did succeed in turning the Militia into a draft finding body for the army, the 
quality of recruit remained poor, and only 8.5 percent of Volunteers served overseas 
during the Boer War, a disappointing figure given the extent of patriotic feeling at the 
time. By the first decade of the twentieth century, with the threat of European war 
mounting, it was increasingly obvious that these shortcomings would need to be 
addressed. That task would fall to Richard Burdon Haldane. 
Haldane and the Territorial Force 
Haldane’s efforts to reform the army after the failures of the two previous Secretary of 
States for War, St John Brodrick and Hugh Arnold-Forster, have been very well 
documented.180 An intriguing and controversial character, opinion is also split as to 
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Haldane’s legacy.181 Despite this attention, few works examine in detail the impact of 
his reforms on the various British reserve forces. Given Europe’s rising militarism, the 
strategic uncertainty of the early 1900s, and Britain’s continued Indian commitment, it 
is perhaps surprising that, like Cardwell, Haldane undertook his reform of the 
Volunteers for primarily economic rather than strategic reasons. As Spiers has noted ‘it 
was the economy and not [the strategic situation in] Europe that had been the sine qua 
non of Haldane’s army reform.’182 These reforms occurred in a context similar to 
Cardwell’s, with increasing political attention focused on the cost and effectiveness of 
the army and the reserves after an expensive war had once more highlighted their 
inefficiencies. Indeed, such was the growing political demand for change in the wake of 
both the army’s and the reserves’ poor Boer War performance, that the Conservative 
war minister Arnold-Forster had attempted to reverse linking altogether and create 
larger depots to provide recruits for all regiments whilst at the same time cutting costs, 
in what could have been a predecessor of today’s centralised super-garrisons. While 
Arnold-Forster’s attempts to reform the army and the reserves failed due to large and 
sustained resistance in Parliament, and in particular from the Army Council,183 his 
efforts did pave the way for Haldane’s reforms, allowing the new Liberal Secretary of 
State for War to emphasise the continuity of his policies with those of the Tories. 
Decisively, Haldane cemented cross-party political support for his reforms by assuaging 
the Radicals’ fear of militarism whilst highlighting to the Tories how much they would 
save the War Office as well.184 This economic argument was crucial, as a recent Royal 
Commission to investigate constant over-expenditure on the army and the resulting 
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Treasury-imposed cutbacks eloquently concluded that ‘extravagance controlled by 
stinginess is not likely to result in either economy or efficiency.’185 Reducing the army 
by 20,000 men and decreasing the total number of active Militia, Volunteers and 
Yeomanry from 364,000 to 300,000 would allow this cycle to be broken, and the 
savings made could be re-invested into restructuring the Volunteers into a new, army-
controlled Territorial Force (TF, renamed the Territorial Army in 1920).186 This reform 
alone would reduce the reserves budget from over £4.4 million to £2.89 million per 
annum (the equivalent of a £140 million saving today),187 and, for the first time in years, 
bring the entire army budget in below the £28 million (£2.6 billion today) ceiling 
allocated to it.188 By stressing the substantial savings to be made, Haldane was also able 
to gain Liberal support whilst simultaneously outmanoeuvring opposition in the Army 
Council. Thus, once again, the reform of the reserves was undertaken for primarily 
economic reasons and was instigated by politicians rather than generals. 
Yet, like the Cardwell reforms, Haldane’s economic arguments did not occur in 
a political vacuum, and the subsequent organic development of the TF was undertaken 
in propitious circumstances conducive to the fusion of economy with ideological 
argument. The Liberals had been elected in 1905 on the platform of ‘Peace, 
Retrenchment, and Reform’ and were thus ideologically predisposed to the radical 
reform of the army and reserves that was clearly needed after the Boer War. Haldane 
himself was heavily influenced by German philosophy, and his vision of a new 
‘Hegelian army’ that reconciled the military need for defence with the political need for 
economy was the ideological cornerstone on which his reforms rested.189 Supporting his 
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reforms, he declared that: ‘The basis of our whole military fabric must be the 
development of the idea of a real national army, formed by the people, and managed by 
specially organised local associations.’190 Echoing Gladstone, Haldane even suggested 
that the new TF would ‘become a military school for the nation’, indicating his hope 
that a reinvigorated reserve would both attract much-needed recruits and have an 
important moral impact on society.191  
Strategic arguments were also deployed to gain support for the reforms. The 
1903 Nicholson Commission had concluded that the threat of invasion from the 
Continent had declined significantly and that a smaller reserve force was therefore 
required for home defence. However, reserve forces would need to more reliable and 
flexible to be capable of quickly reinforcing the army’s new ‘Expeditionary Force’, 
which it was increasingly foreseen, would serve on mainland Europe.192 This, at least 
temporarily, resolved the ‘blue water’ versus the ‘bolt from the blue’ strategic debate 
over whether the British military should place emphasis on expeditionary warfare or 
home defence.193 In adopting such a strategy, a striking force of three army Corps 
reinforced by elements of the TF was envisaged. Decisively, the consolidated TF was 
therefore to be the primary organisation by which the army could rapidly expand in 
times of need. By freeing the regulars of home defence duties and creating a 
decentralised TF administered on a local basis, Haldane hoped that he would create ‘a 
British version of a nation-in arms based on Voluntary service’ that would fulfil this 
role.194  
In essence, Haldane’s reforms were based on the central desire to ensure the 
largest possible expeditionary army that could be provided for during peace, whilst 
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simultaneously re-organising the reserves into a single force that could reinforce the 
army when deployed overseas. Thus, he planned a regular Expeditionary Force 100,000 
strong. This would be complemented by a Territorial Force of 300,000 incorporating the 
Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers,195 organised into 42 infantry brigades, 14 cavalry 
brigades and supported by full logistics elements.196 The new TF would be more closely 
controlled by the War Office, which stipulated that service contracts would be 
regularised at four years; annual military camps would last 15 days; all members were 
now subject to full military law; and that the army would be responsible for overseeing 
all TF training and assessing their readiness. To provide better oversight, new, 
predominantly civilian and elected Territorial County Associations would be established 
across the country, responsible for raising and administering their local units, but under 
the central direction of the War Office. Crucially Haldane’s intended to create a reserve 
force that, following six months’ training after initial mobilisation, would be ready to 
deploy overseas with the British Expeditionary Force.197 Essentially, he was attempting 
to professionalise the reserves and create a two-tier military readiness force structure 
that once again would balance demands for economy with the need for strategic 
flexibility. 
However, while his reforms had widespread backing in Parliament, Haldane was 
to meet heavy resistance from the reserve organisations themselves. Firstly, the Militia 
representatives’ intransigence when given the choice of integration with the regular 
army or joining the new TF led to the failure to reach any agreement and resulted in 
Haldane abolishing the Militia altogether. Instead, he created a small Special Reserve to 
keep a flow of draftees willing to serve in the army in time of war.198 While the 
Militia’s disbandment and replacement simply formalised the reality of its function, 
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Volunteer and Yeomanry resistance to the erosion of their autonomy by the new County 
Associations also caused Haldane to rethink parts of this policy. Faced with increasing 
opposition from commanding officers, he was forced to drastically reduce the elected 
membership of the Associations, effectively ceding control of the bodies to the 
Territorials themselves and undermining a central tenet of his policy. Thus, as Dennis 
has noted, for ‘the price of minimising Volunteer intransigence, a key element of 
Haldane’s concept of the National Army was sacrificed before the Territorials were 
even born.’199 Worse was to follow.  
Haldane had announced in Parliament that the TF would serve overseas in 
support of the regulars. But when he introduced the Territorial and Forces Act eight 
days later on 19 June 1907, this decisive clause had been dropped. The reason behind 
this omission from the Act was twofold. Firstly, the Volunteers and their ‘trade union in 
the House of Commons’200 had strenuously objected to the introduction of the overseas 
obligation and Haldane needed their support in order to man the TF. Given their 
opposition, Haldane risked a recruiting crisis if he did not allay their fear of overseas 
service. In bending to their demand to drop stipulated overseas service, he instead hoped 
that their voluntary ethos would see between a sixth and a quarter of the TF volunteer 
for service with the army abroad if need be.201 Secondly, as Dennis has noted, the 
change was also aimed at placating the more radical critics of his reforms who saw the 
very creation of an Expeditionary Force itself as disturbing.202 Introducing the Act, 
Haldane thus changed tactics, stating that the role of the Territorials was primarily home 
defence. This was at odds with the whole thrust of his reforms to date which had been to 
create the Expeditionary Force and a reserve to support it. Thus, with strong 
organisational resistance threatening to undo his plans, for political expediency Haldane 
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sacrificed the most vital tenet of his reforms to ensure his new organisation was not 
still-born. His last minute climb-down would have far-reaching implications for the 
TF’s organisational development and performance over the next century, creating 
confusion as to what the exact function of the TF was and when it could and should be 
used. This was as much a result of the institutional realities of the organisation and 
different stakeholder positions as it was Haldane’s unwillingness to see his policies 
flounder. But the lack of clarity represented the start of a difficult and continuing 
juxtaposition within the TF between the state’s functional need for operational 
flexibility and the reserves’ institutional need to recruit.    
In the end, the Act passed through Parliament with little resistance, and the 
creation of the Territorials on 1 April 1908 was strongly supported by the King and the 
Lord Lieutenants who were to chair the newly-formed County Associations. But it was 
clear that Haldane’s reforms had been decisively weakened. One historian has said of 
Haldane that: ‘He spoke and wrote in his memoirs as though he created a New Army. 
All that he had done was to rechristen the Volunteers.’203 This is a little unfair, as 
Haldane had created the BEF (albeit not the means to reinforce it) and the new TF did 
offer a more streamlined organisational framework that was now far stronger in terms of 
its supporting services and equipment. However, after an initial rise in recruitment 
following Haldane’s Act, the TF still failed to meet its targets, with numbers decreasing 
to 268,000 by June 1909.204 By September 1913 this had dropped to 236,000 actives,205 
about 60,000 short of establishment, while only one third of the force had achieved its 
musketry qualifications and just seven percent had signed up for overseas service.206 By 
that time, 80 percent of the force were not re-engaging after their four years’ service, 
and although better pairing between regular and TF units was evident, cultural divisions 
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remained acute, with French arguing that the ‘regulars remained almost as reluctant to 
accept Haldane’s new creation as their equals as they had the Volunteers.’207 This was 
especially evident in the exclusion of Territorials and old Volunteers from the regular’s 
regimental clubs, indicating the limits of integration and pairing even within the wider 
regimental family. As such, Haldane’s ‘frankly militaristic’208 Hegelian vision of a 
nation-in-arms never fully materialised. 
The First World War 
The following years saw much debate arise from the confusion over the Territorials’ 
primary role. Such was the malaise within the TF and the complicated statutory position 
of its members in relation to overseas service that by the outbreak of the First World 
War seven years later the organisation was effectively by-passed in the national 
mobilisation plan. While the new Secretary of State for War, Field Marshall Kitchener, 
somewhat cruelly articulated his distrust of the TF as a ‘town’s clerk army,’209 the 
failure of the Associations to draft expansion plans and the need for a home defence 
force added to the TF’s perceived weakness. As a result, in 1914 Kitchener did not 
attempt to mobilise the Territorials along Haldane’s two-tier plan, instead offering 
volunteers from the TF the chance to serve with their units if initially 80 percent (later 
60 percent) of their unit’s establishment signed the Imperial Service Obligation (ISO) to 
serve overseas.210 Given the wave of patriotism at the time, many Territorial units 
entered the regular army whole scale in this way, and by February 1915 there were 
already 48 Territorial infantry battalions in Flanders. The small numbers of units that 
had taken the ISO prior to war were immediately ordered to replace regulars on colonial 
duties, again indicating their lower status and their perceived lack of combat readiness. 
Importantly, after May 1915 – when larger formations of TF units were deployed 
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overseas – they lost the suffix ‘Territorial’, indicating their assimilation into the 
regulars. By the time voluntary enlistment ended and direct recruiting into the 
Territorials was suspended in December 1915, over 725,000 men had joined its ranks 
over the previous eighteen months; almost half of all those recruited to Kitchener’s New 
Army.211  
Given the need for mass mobilisation to replace the casualties on the Western 
Front, the Territorials, like the Militia before them, had essentially become a drafting 
body for the army. It is important to stress here that this occurred by a process of 
assimilation, not integration; the Territorials were simply subsumed into the regular 
army. As units came up to strength with volunteers they were designated first line units. 
At this point those who had not taken the ISO would revert to the second line units 
being filled by new recruits, and by November 1914 when the first line units began to 
deploy, a third line unit would be established. This system eventually provided 318 
battalions and 23 infantry divisions of ‘Territorials’ for service overseas,212 with the 
performance of these units widely praised, especially after they had adapted to field 
conditions. Such was the importance of the volunteer Territorial units in the early stages 
of the war that Field Marshall John French later stated: ‘Without the assistance that the 
Territorials afforded between October, 1914 and June, 1915, it would have been 
impossible to hold the line in France and Belgium.’213 Indeed, the sombre statistic that 
the Territorials took over 577,000 casualties in all theatres of the war highlights their 
centrality to Britain’s war effort, representing over a quarter of the army’s 2,365,000 
dead and wounded.214 Ironically, when the Territorials were re-established in 1922, it 
was to be the shared sacrifices and the hard-won recognition of their fighting 
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capabilities that increased their integration with the army more than Haldane’s reforms 
ever had.215 It is therefore clear that the model of Territorial mobilisation during the war 
did not follow Haldane’s vision, which had been crucially undermined by the exclusion 
of the overseas pledge. Indeed, the resort to using the TF as a draft finding and training 
body rather than a ready-to deploy reserve provides stark evidence that Haldane’s 
reforms did not succeed in the one decisive area that they were designed to. Allison’s 
and Kaufmann’s organisational arguments offer a strong explanation for why Haldane’s 
transformation ultimately fell short, but the evidence from this period also highlights 
that reforming the army’s reserve forces had historically taken longer and proved more 
difficult than in regular forces. Moreover, the impetus for reforming the reserves again 
arose from the fusion of economic, strategic and politico-ideological goals. 
The Second World War 
Following their strong performance in the First World War, the Territorials had both 
earned the respect of the regular army and found themselves better integrated with them 
due to the shared trials of combat. However, the dire economic situation in Britain soon 
led to decreased defence spending, epitomised in the Geddes cuts of 1922. The newly-
renamed TA, still suffering from an ill-defined role due to the national ‘ten year rule’ 
defence strategy and a continued reluctance to accept a peacetime overseas pledge, 
found themselves bearing the brunt of these cuts. Throughout the inter-war years efforts 
to introduce an overseas service liability for the TA were rebutted by hostile County 
Associations who still resented the way the Territorials had been by-passed during the 
war. Under-recruitment remained a chronic problem, the nadir coming in 1932 when the 
TA was only 128,000 strong out of an establishment of 216,000, while technological 
advances left its equipment obsolete. Meanwhile, oscillations in Britain’s defence 
posture between appeasement and a continental strategy saw the TA’s function switch 
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from air defence to second-tier reinforcement and back to air defence, with the 
Territorials wavering between being at the periphery and the core of defence planning.  
As so often the case with the reserves, it was only the looming European war and a 
rising sense of national emergency that eventually defined a role for the TA and saw its 
numbers swell, especially after the 1938 Munich crisis caused the government to double 
the Territorial’s establishment. When war came, the Armed Forces Act of September 
1939 suspended Territorial service for the duration, resulting in the assimilation of the 
TA into the army in a similar way to that which occurred in September 1914. The 
manner in which the reserves were assimilated into the regular army demonstrated once 
again that in times of national emergency the government could not afford the luxury of 
allowing the reserve army to serve only at home. However, the same was true of the TA 
itself and the citizens who now flocked to join its colours; both saw issues over the 
‘pledge’ as unimportant when compared to national survival. As had been the case in 
1859-60 when the French invasion scare saw the Volunteers created, it was the 
perception if strategic threat which saw recruitment into the TA rise dramatically in the 
late 1930s. But such a fusion of public support with the political will to fund the reserve 
was relatively rare outside of wartime conditions; it was only the threat of major 
conflict that saw the Territorials designated a role, properly invested in, and fully 
manned. And once this had happened, the TA was simply subsumed into the army again 
anyway.  
Nevertheless, there remained clear evidence of disdain for the TA in the 
regulars, embodied by a lack of promotion of TA officers and a distrust of the quality of 
training Territorial units had received.  This was hardly their fault. The rapid expansion 
of the TA from 1938 onwards had once again left it lacking NCOs to train the force, and 
this expansion rested on the assumption that Territorial divisions would have at least 
eight months collective training before they were deployed. Under increasing threat 
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from Germany, this later changed to six months, and in the event, three Territorial 
divisions arrived in France in early 1940 after only four months training.  Indeed, eight 
of the 13 BEF divisions deployed in 1940 were originally Territorial formations, and 
three of these – the 12th, 23rd and 46th Divisions, who had been tasked with rear security 
and lacked supporting arms and services – were thrown into the line in the retreat to 
Dunkirk. Some units in these formations had only one week’s training, while others had 
never fired some of their weapons, many of which lacked ammunition. The 12th and 23rd 
divisions took very heavy casualties and were ultimately destroyed, but not before 
winning respect from the regulars and Germans alike for their tenacity. Nevertheless, 
the very heavy losses suffered by TA divisions in the defeat in France led to the break-
up of most of those formations that did escape to Britain. 
The debacle in France prompted a re-organisation of the surviving army, 
including a re-appraisal of how best to use the TA. Beginning during the First World 
War, the continuing rapid mechanisation of the combat arms in the inter-war period had 
precipitated a steep decline in the ratio of combat troops to support and logistics troops. 
Simultaneously, the dominance of infantry amongst the combat arms had also dropped 
from 53 percent to 31 percent, as mechanisation brought with it an increasing desire for 
armour, artillery and other mechanised support forces.  These shifts in required force 
structure meant that many TA infantry units had to re-role. While this usually happened 
at the battalion level – with units re-training as armoured, parachute, signals or artillery 
specialists – it also occurred at the divisional level, with the 52nd Division assigned as 
mountain warfare experts. Similarly, the logistics arms were also forced to rationalise to 
meet the demands of increasingly mechanised warfare. For example, in August 1942, 
the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers were formed to rationalise vehicle 
repair, for which the Royal Engineers, Royal Army Ordinance Corps, and Royal Army 
Service Corps had all been responsible. As would be expected, advances in technology 
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therefore shaped the strategic and tactical environment which shaped reserve 
organisation.  
A policy of bolstering TA units with regulars was also introduced for both the 
combat and logistics arms. Thus, most original TA divisions had one regular combat 
battalion per brigade, while regular divisions also usually had one to three TA combat 
battalions per division. Support and logistics arms could be drawn from both regular 
and TA in both divisions, and cross-posting was also common. The net result was that, 
when not used as piecemeal infantry units against armour, as in France, the assimilated 
Territorial units performed reasonably well at the Second Battle of El-Alamein, in 
Tunisia, during the Normandy battles, and the following Western European campaign. 
This was especially the case if they had been exposed to combat incrementally. For the 
most part, the policy of combining Territorial and regular units in larger formations 
appears to have boosted combat and logistics performance, while cross-posting also 
meant that the distinction between a former TA soldier and a regular was lessened.  This 
continued after the war, as National Service saw a constant rotation of ex-servicemen 
through the Territorials as part of their obligation, and the deployment of some 
volunteers to Libya and Aden. But for the main the TA reverted to its home defence 
role, and when the phasing out of National Service was announced in 1957, 
accompanied by the changed strategic priorities of the nuclear age and the uncertainties 
of the British economy, the Territorials again found themselves increasingly the target 
for reform.  
Carver-Hackett Cuts Deep 
The origins of the reforms undertaken by General John Hackett and Major General 
Michael Carver are to be found in the 1964 ascension to power of a Labour government 
committed to putting Britain’s ‘defences on a sound basis and to ensure the nation gets 
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value for money.’216 Slow GDP growth and the devaluation of the pound forced the new 
government to seek economies. Moreover, the Labour Party had been elected on the 
promise of more funding for social programmes without seeking more taxation, and, as 
the Liberals before them, they viewed defence as an area where savings could be made.  
The cost of maintaining a nuclear deterrent, contributing to NATO and maintaining 
significant military capacity overseas was argued to be overbearing, and while the 
withdrawal from east of Suez would provide some savings, it was in this context that an 
earlier Defence Review report had concluded the cost of the TA could not be 
justified.217 Similarly, the strategic rationale for a reduction of the Territorials was also 
made by reference to the new nuclear environment and the prevailing NATO ‘short 
war’ scenario, both of which, it was argued, rendered a large home defence force 
redundant.  
The subsequent 1965 Defence Review was traumatic for the Territorials. The 
reforms it envisaged were based on Carver’s assumption that the sole function of the 
TA was to provide a means by which the regular army could expand in wartime, and 
that it was failing in this role.218 As a result, he proposed a slashing of the annual 
Territorial budget from £38 million to £20 million (£380 million today) and a re-
orientation away from combat arms to support services. Crucially, the reforms were 
heavily focused on logistics. Almost half of TA units were designated support 
formations, whilst a 1,500 strong force of high readiness logisticians complemented by 
an expanded force of 11,000 to provide support for the strategic reserve.219 However, 
the expansion of reserve logistics capability was offset by severe reductions in TA 
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manpower, with its established strength cut from 200,000 to 64,000.220 Much of these 
fell on the teeth arms. A total of 73 infantry battalions, 41 artillery regiments and 19 
armoured regiments – effectively meaning the end of the Yeomanry – were cut, leaving 
only 13 infantry battalions, four artillery regiments and a single armoured regiment.221 
Moreover, of the 59 County Associations, only 14 would remain, in a deep blow to 
those organisations that had administered the TA since its inception. With one fell chop, 
the system instituted by Haldane’s reforms had been all but eliminated. 
Not surprisingly, the proposed reforms faced considerable opposition, most 
notably from the Council of Territorial Associations which had not been consulted by 
Hackett prior to the 1965 White Paper and also, it emerged, which had had their 
proposal of a cyclical limited liability for teeth arm units rejected out of hand. Although 
there was no statutory requirement for the Councils to be informed, such was the army’s 
desire to push through the TA reforms that Hackett remarked ‘there is an erroneous 
impression to the extent to which the scheme is open to discussion’.222 With Carver 
likewise warning that there would be ‘no climate of change’ around the reforms, 
negotiations between the Council and the Ministry of Defence quickly broke down. 
Meanwhile, the Conservatives, rallying to protect ‘one of sacred cows of the Tory 
establishment’,223 were defeated in a parliamentary no-confidence vote on the reforms 
by a single vote. Such resistance did result in some concessions from the army and the 
Labour government; an extra 28,000 light infantry being authorised before the Reserve 
Forces Act came into effect in 1967. The Act also reorganised the TA and Special 
Reserve into a four-tier Territorial Army and Volunteer Reserve force held at different 
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levels of readiness and liability; this was essentially a consolidation of previous 
arrangements. But even with this consolation and the consolidation, the Carver-Hackett 
reforms drastically weakened the TA and left its members and those on the surviving 
County Associations deeply suspicious of the top echelons of the army, whom they felt 
had betrayed them in order to save the regulars from the worst of the cuts.224   
Once again, it is clear that primarily economic arguments were fused with those 
of ideology and strategy in the decision to undertake the reforms. However, what is 
interesting about the Carver-Hackett reforms is that they were comparatively successful 
at instigating organisational transformation. What allowed transformation to be driven 
through to its conclusion was the personal determination of Carver and Hackett to 
instigate the reforms, and, most importantly, the political support of the government 
which was conducive to their and the MoD’s unwillingness to negotiate with the 
Council. Although resistance from stakeholders was forthcoming, in comparison to 
Cardwell’s and Haldane’s more consensual approach, the 1967 reforms were to a large 
degree presented as a fait accompli by the army’s elites and simply pushed through 
from the top down, with only one minor modification. However, such an approach not 
only caused long-lasting distrust between the TA and the regular army, it also saw the 
first time that reform of the TA became highly politicised, with the breakdown of cross-
bench support for the reforms evident in the Conservatives’ reaction. The army’s lack of 
consultation with the Council was a major cause of this, but the Carver-Hackett reforms 
were important in that from now on the revival or reduction of the TA would become 
increasingly politicised along party lines. Indeed, it is noteworthy that all the previous 
periods of major reform were undertaken by Liberal governments; as one Tory aide has 
stated: ‘The Conservative Party has liked the TA for two reasons: it fosters the 
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volunteer ethic and it is very cost-effective.’225 As such, when the Conservatives 
returned to government in 1970 it was no surprise they quickly increased the Territorials 
establishment by 10,000, even though the force remained chronically underinvested and 
under-recruited. 
The TA did experience a revival under Margaret Thatcher’s government 
following the publication of the Shapland report in 1982, with numbers expanded to 
86,000 on paper. The force also enjoyed an increase in investment under Thatcher and a 
more clearly defined role: that of the rear defence of NATO areas of operation on the 
Continent. As a result, the Territorials averaged 89 percent of established strength 
between 1979-89, but the 25-30 percent annual soldier wastage rate remained a major 
problem.226 Nevertheless, there were major concerns within the army about the TA’s 
ability to meet this more defined role.227 One senior army officer involved in planning 
FR20 noted that the structural reforms of the Carver-Hackett era only began to come to 
fruition in 1984 when the TA successfully took part in Exercise Lionheart in Germany. 
This was the proof of concept exercise for their rear-defence role, but, importantly, this 
officer stated that ‘it only took 20-odd years!’228 With cashing-in on the peace dividend 
a priority in the 1990 ‘Options For Change’ programme, the TA escaped fairly lightly, 
with a reduction to 63,500 somewhat offset by its inability to reach its full establishment 
anyway. Moreover, chronic neglect by the army remained a major problem, and 
structural problems due to the reduced size of both the army and the TA were not 
addressed. The 1996 Reserve Forces Act, amongst other measures, changed the call-out 
terms for reservists so that that the Secretary of State for Defence, not Parliament, could 
mobilise reservists if need be. However, this once again highlighted the political 
question of when the reserves should be used, especially given the intensification of 
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army operations abroad after Tony Blair became Prime Minister in 1997. Since that 
date, the TA continuously contributed 10-12 percent of the UK’s total mission force in 
both Iraq and Afghanistan, but these forces were predominantly deployed as individuals 
to backfill regular units, rather than as formed units. Moreover, apart from the invasion 
of Iraq in 2003, during this period the Territorials were generally reliant on individuals 
to volunteer for service rather than compelling them to do so. This policy was known as 
‘intelligent mobilisation’ but it severely limited the ability to deploy formed TA units 
overseas, an indication that Haldane’s last minute exclusion was still curtailing the 
utility of the organisation a century later.   
Conclusion 
What do these past periods of reserve reform tell us about these processes, and the 
army’s reserve in general? Firstly, it is clear that attempts to reform the reserve are 
cyclical in that they occur in response to changed economic and strategic circumstances 
which provide the impetus for another cycle of reform. These primarily financial 
impetuses for reforming the reserves have been supported by the politico-ideology of 
those undertaking the reforms. Secondly, it is also clear that throughout their history the 
army’s reserve forces have come under sustained pressure to reform after poor 
performance in wars, and that reform is often, but not exclusively, attempted 
simultaneously with that of the army. Thirdly, the sources of reform have also been 
primarily located in the political rather than the military sphere, and where the army has 
been keen to implement reserve transformation, this has often been in the context of the 
struggle for organisational survival epitomised in reductions in military spending. 
Finally, as I have shown, apart from times of national emergency, the reserves have 
historically struggled to recruit to full strength. As Peter-Caddick Adams has noted 
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‘Whatever the manpower establishment, the Territorials seem to hover at 10 per cent 
below.’229 
However, in terms of informing the central question of this study, the most 
important conclusion to be drawn from this chapter concerns the impact of the previous 
periods of reform, and in particular the time it took to effect organisational change 
within the reserves during each era. Throughout, stakeholder resistance and 
organisational friction within the army, the reserves and Parliament – most frequently 
caused by recruitment issues and potential deployment overseas – have consistently 
limited the impact of reforms. This fact highlights how these two issues are fundamental 
to understanding today’s Army Reserve and attempts to transform it. Indeed, it is clear 
that delays to transformation are inherently bound up in the organisational nature of a 
part-time force. Almost every period of reform has taken years to implement, much 
longer than originally intended. As one TA Colonel has remarked: ‘There is nothing in 
the TA you can immediately… it takes five to ten years [to make changes]’.230 And 
when these changes have finally been implemented their impact has been generally 
more limited than originally envisaged; each reform has been adjusted due to political 
and organisational resistance. Indeed, most reforms have failed in their primary focus of 
making the army’s reserve more operationally deployable. Thus, it appears that the part-
time, volunteer and citizen nature of the reserves inherently limits transformations when 
compared with the regular army. British reserve forces at least, have always been slower 
and more difficult to reform, and much of this has been related to their organisational 
resistance to be deployed overseas en masse. Drawing on this evidence, I would contend 
that in general, reserve transformations take longer to effect than those of regular forces 
due to the distinct character of their organisations. Indeed, it is possible to argue that the 
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fundamental nature of Britain’s army reserve has changed little over the past 150 years. 
Yet, as this chapter has shown, while the economic, ideological and strategic questions 
underpinning the Haldane, Cardwell-Childers, Carver-Hackett reforms – and the FR20 
transformation discussed in the next chapter – are remarkably constant, their 
organisational outcomes were more a product of their own historical contexts than the 
similarities between these questions would suggest. While the rationale for reforming 
the reserves may often bear semblance to previous attempts, how transformation 
actually occurs is firmly based in current organisational realities. The questions may be 
the same, but the solutions are different.  
Over its history, it appears that the reserves have changed by numerous 
processes identified in the military transformation literature outlined in Chapter One. 
While Cardwell’s emulative attempt at organisational reform represented a top-down 
process of change in both the army and the reserves, it was severely hampered by 
stakeholder resistance, organisational friction and the changing strategic imperatives of 
a withdrawal from the colonies. The subsequent Childers reforms represented an 
attempt to relieve the organisational pressures of recruitment and retention that resulted 
from Cardwell’s restructuring and the changed strategic circumstances. Following 
Allison, both Cardwell and Childers provided the personal drive needed for change, the 
reserves in particular evolved as much by the process of incremental adaption – itself 
caused by the friction associated with the struggle for organisational survival – as they 
did by top-down direction. The experience of the Territorials in the First World War 
also suggests that it was adaption to battlefield realities in the field that honed the TF’s 
skills and allowed better integration with the army, rather than the reform process that 
Haldane had instigated. Meanwhile, the ultimate trajectory of Haldane’s reforms were 
shaped by both the external pressures of economy, strategy and ideology, but most 
importantly, by the internal need to recruit the Territorials. Indeed, it was this functional 
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requirement and the debates that resulted from it that ultimately shaped the development 
of the Territorials during this period. The Carver-Hackett reforms were noteworthy for 
the manner in which transformation was imposed upon the TA without cross-party 
political consensus, and driven through by an army keen to protect its own organisation. 
The general’s unwillingness to compromise caused wider political fallout, including 
lasting distrust between the reserves and the army. This has not been helped by the 




















‘A Finger in the Wind Thing’: FR20 and the Struggle for 
Organisational Survival 
 
In the last chapter I discussed how economic, strategic and politico-ideological factors 
have cyclically provided the impetus for past periods of reserve reform, and how these 
attempts to transform the reserves were heavily curtailed by organisational friction and 
resistance. I also argued that the sources of reserve reform have usually been primarily 
political rather than military. Here, I want to build on those arguments by examining 
how the current FR20 transformation originated and how it was implemented. 
Following Allison, in this chapter I focus on how and why the most recent debate over 
the position of the TA in British defence was influenced by the desire for economies in 
defence, strategic uncertainty, and most importantly, by various political and military 
stakeholders. Contrasting Edmunds et al.’s view that ‘the most important long-term 
driver for change [in the reserves was] strategic in nature’, I argue that the intensely 
political origins of FR20, and the army’s resistance to the policy, are of critical 
importance to understanding the evolution and implementation of FR20.231 Building on 
this analysis, the chapter then charts how these origins, coupled with other 
organisational frictions and personal tensions, have caused FR20 to be tested and 
adjusted at each step of its development and implementation, resulting in important 
revisions to the policy. Ultimately, I argue that these political origins and the army’s 
resistance to them, meant the policy was ad hoc, thereby lacking coherence and causing 
organisational issues which had not been foreseen. 
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The Context of FR20 
As Strachan has said, the purpose of history is not simply to tell us what is similar to the 
past, but also what is different. With this in mind, three major contextual differences 
between the previous periods of reserve reform and that of the current period should be 
stressed: the impact of the global recession on British defence spending; the strategic 
uncertainty of the 21st Century; and the post-Fordist principles discussed in the next 
chapter that Western militaries have unselfconsciously utilised to adapt to these 
pressures. In terms of the impact of economics on FR20, Paul Cornish and Andrew 
Dorman have examined how the economic climate and tight financial constraints of the 
Spending Review heavily shaped both the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 
SDSR, which were all released within days of each other in October 2010. Taken 
together, these policy documents began the process of the whole-scale reform of 
Britain’s armed forces – and of the British Army in particular under the Army2020 plan 
– just as these forces began to return from over a decade of operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.232 Crucially, Cornish and Dorman show that the economic climate in 
which the reviews were conducted dictated that, in a globalised world, financial security 
was seen as the fundamental presumption on which the SDSR rested.233 Put simply, 
without economic stability it was seen as impossible for the nation to fund its own 
defence and security. Economic rationale was deployed to support the need for reform 
to such an extent that the military came to accept that large cuts were inevitable, with 
the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), Jock Stirrup, admitting that ‘the financial security 
of the nation must be the primary consideration of any review.’234 Of course, as Cornish 
and Dorman have argued, this contention remains open to question given the ability of 
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nations to access international lending facilities.235 They argue convincingly that in 
reality the SDSR was ‘politics-led’, and representative of the Conservatives ideological 
views on sound economy which were hidden behind arguments for the need for 
austerity.236 Senior officers responsible for implementing the subsequent defence cuts 
indicate that they too were aware at the time that despite the rhetoric, the cuts were ‘a 
political choice.’237 Meanwhile, the fact that both the NSS and SDSR were undertaken 
simultaneously with the 2010 Spending Review, completed in only five months, and 
then had to be re-adjusted for the subsequent Review in 2011 caused some to label the 
SDSR ‘a treasury-led defence review’.238 It also indicated the rushed and ad hoc nature 
of policy formulation at the time which resulted in a lack of coherence. The evidence 
presented below on FR20 supports this analysis. Indeed, the impact of the government’s 
determination to reduce the defence budget on the adoption and implementation of 
FR20 cannot be overstated. It provided the central rationale behind the narrative for 
transforming the reserves. Nevertheless, the relatively unique economic context was 
also complemented by strategic and organisational factors.  
The argument can be made that the strategic situation in the 21st Century is 
qualitatively and quantitatively different to any other period in history due the impact of 
globalisation and the spread of communications technology.239 Numerous sociologists 
have argued that we are now in a period of ‘late modernity’ that is fundamentally 
different to the classical modern period of the Cardwell and Haldane reforms.240 Despite 
excellent critique of the ‘global village myth’ that underpins much of the strategic 
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implications of this change,241 it is clear that strategic uncertainty and the flexibility of 
military forces required to cope with globalisation remain key assumptions of British 
defence policy.242 It is also clear that the range of tasks being assigned to the military 
since the end of the Cold War has increased vastly, with conventional war fighting 
duties; peace support operations; counter-insurgency; capacity-building abroad; anti-
terrorist/ aid to the civil power at home all key tasks for the British Army. While there 
are of course always strategic uncertainties – the debate over the ‘blue water’ strategy in 
Haldane’s time is just one example of this – for the first time it is the multitude of 
possible threats and tasks that provides another supporting rationale for the current 
transformation. Similarly, the impact of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially in 
terms of public adversity to long term interventions and distrust of political ‘spin’ 
remain important historical differentiators. While there is some continuity with the 
strategic contexts of the past, FR20 has been therefore influenced by different strategic 
problems to its forebears.  
Perhaps most importantly, the post-Fordist approach discussed in detail in 
Chapter Four underpins the rationale of FR20, with its desire for smaller (and cheaper), 
more professional and adaptable ‘periphery’ reserve forces to complement the ‘core’ 
professional army. This re-organisation of militaries is a novel historical phenomenon, 
and it has been shown to have positive impacts on the combat effectiveness and 
performance of those militaries who have adopted it.243 As a result, the modern – and 
crucially, professional – post-Fordist military is qualitatively and quantitatively 
different from its 19th and 20th Century predecessors. Indeed, it is post-Fordist logistics 
principles, with their supply chain management approach to force structure and the 
outsourcing of logistics functions to the reserves that have provided the army with a 
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blueprint for releasing some of the dual organisational pressures of declining British 
defence spending and increasing strategic uncertainty. In the British Army’s view, this 
post-Fordist-based transformation has adopted ‘a new and imaginative and original 
structure that is designed to meet the challenges of the 2020 era.’244 Clearly then, there 
appears to be something historically and organisationally unique about the 
unselfconscious utilisation of post-Fordist principles to deliver British military 
capability. 
Background to FR20 
The recent history of FR20 begins with the 1990 Options for Change defence review 
that reduced the TA’s establishment from 76,000 to 63,500.245 While this reduction 
masked an inability to recruit to full establishment (the TA’s total strength was 
apparently 72,500 at this time),246 it created structural problems within the TA and also 
failed to define a collective role in terms of supporting the regular army on operations. 
According to one British general, during this period the TA suffered ‘a massive 
decline… the age profile increased and man training days were reduced due to 
underinvestment.’ Similarly, the lack of a collective role meant that the ‘system of 
individual backfills was introduced which would last for the next 20 years.’247 The 1998 
Security and Defence Review reduced the TA again, from and establishment of 59,500 
to 41,200. Meanwhile, the increased operational tempo experienced under Blair’s 
premiership highlighted differences in the quality of training of TA soldiers compared 
with regulars, especially in critical areas such as battlefield medicine and shooting.248 
Underinvestment also left the TA short of kit and personal equipment. Crucially, these 
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failures were highlighted in coroners’ reports investigating the deaths of TA soldiers in 
Iraq, and their conclusions reiterated that the TA and the army had a legal duty to ensure 
that soldiers were as well trained and equipped as possible.249 In terms of the future 
deployment of the TA, these reports meant that the ‘legal implications [of deploying 
insufficiently trained and equipped reservists] were huge.’250 This re-stated obligation to 
reservists, and the media attention on equipment failures that accompanied it, would 
provide some of the impetus for subsequent transformation of the reserves. However, it 
would also undermine FR20’s ability to deliver one of its central aims. 
The army began to address these shortcomings in the TA in 2004, but the wider 
structural and functional issues took a low priority with both organisations heavily 
committed in Iraq and Afghanistan, in which 25,000 reservists served – and 31 died – in 
total.251 The deployment of 7,000 TA personnel to the initial stages of the 2003 Iraq 
War quickly resulted in a recruitment crisis, with 6,000 personnel reportedly retiring 
between 2004 and 2005 alone. This left the TA at its lowest manning level since its 
foundation and reiterated the paradox that deploying the TA to conflicts other than 
national emergencies often resulted in signoffs and lower recruitment that threatened the 
organisation’s future.252 As a result of the poor state of the TA, by late 2008 the CGS, 
General Sir Richard Dannatt, had ordered the army to conduct full scale review of the 
TA. This review proposed three potential courses of action that would reduce the TA’s 
strength to between 24,000 to 8,000.253 However, it planned that this smaller force 
would be much more deployable, with reservists ‘required to go on a tour of duty at 
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least once every six years’, and with those refusing to do so potentially being asked to 
leave.254 It is important to stress here that this was an internal army plan that only 
considered the TA, not the air and naval reserves, nor had it been discussed as part of a 
wider inter-departmental debate within the MoD on British defence that was beginning 
ahead of the forthcoming SDSR.255 As a result, according to another former CGS, ‘all 
work stopped on the army’s reserve plan in 2009’ when it became clear that the MoD, 
facing tighter fiscal constraints ahead of the SDSR, was considering alternate plans. 
Therefore, although it was still active in Afghanistan and recruited to a trained strength 
of 19,000, ‘as an organisation [the TA] was in stasis, wondering what was going to 
happen next.’256  
By October 2009, Dannatt had been replaced as CGS by General David 
Richards, and with the impact of the 2008 financial crisis now fully reverberating 
through government, the MoD temporarily suspended TA training in an attempt to save 
£20 million.257 Meanwhile, senior officers in the TA were increasingly worried that the 
army intended to shrink their organisation to such a degree that its only role would be to 
surge medical capability on future operations. Indeed, they viewed the halting of TA 
training as evidence that the army’s high command was ready to let the reserves degrade 
to a point that it would be easier to justify reducing its size and budget.258 Crucially, this 
perception of a deliberate army policy to neglect the reserves to the point where it could 
then be transformed – but on the army’s terms – had traction with the TA’s political 
supporters in Parliament. Indeed, the importance of ending the neglect of the reserves as 
a rallying point in arguments for reserve transformation is difficult to overstate. At this 
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point, it was becoming apparent that the future of the reserves would be decided more 
by the external financial situation – and an increasingly vocal and politicised TA lobby 
– than by the army’s own plans for the organisation. 
Policy Exchange Paves the Way? 
The watershed for FR20 came in September 2010 when the centre-right Policy 
Exchange think-tank released a report designed to inform the rushed SDSR process 
underway at the time. The report, Upgrading Our Armed Forces, was authored by two 
retired officers, former 22 SAS commander Lieutenant Colonel Richard Williams, and 
former Director Special Forces, Lieutenant General Graeme Lamb. Although it covered 
a broad spectrum of innovative recommendations for British defence, it also contained a 
specific section on the reserves. Williams and Lamb suggested that the current MoD 
position on the reserves was ‘disconnected from the requirements of any logical 
National Security Strategy’ and had taken ‘little account of their utility relative to cost’ 
in providing a number of capabilities, including homeland security and the 
‘development of a more unified British society.’259 They also stated that the MoD 
seemed ‘to be a reluctant user of its reserve forces’, and, crucially, by drawing 
comparisons with the US National Guard and the Israeli reserves, they challenged the 
policy of using TA soldiers to backfill the regulars on operations, rather than deploying 
them as formed combat-capable units.260 The report controversially argued that the role 
of the TA should be expanded to relieve the army of its heavy, conventional combat 
capability by doubling the size of the TA to 60,000. This would allow the army to be cut 
from ‘100,000 to around 75,000.’261 The report also deployed economic arguments. 
Noting that a reserve soldier cost just one quarter to one fifth of their regular 
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counterparts and that the TA contributed only 26 percent of the regular and reserve 
force – compared with 53 percent in the US and over 40 percent in Australia and 
Canada262 – Williams and Lamb called for a ‘significant mind-set shift within the senior 
leadership of the military’ and a ‘strategic shift in the way that reservist and regular 
manpower is managed’ in order to reinvigorate and re-orientate the reserves to face the 
demands expected in the forthcoming NSS.263 They concluded that with investment the 
UK’s reserves could fulfil a wide range of roles, including homeland defence, 
conventional warfare and stabilisation operations. 
Although the February 2010 Green Paper on defence had briefly mentioned the 
aim of greater integration with the reserves, in the words of Lamb: ‘Policy Exchange 
started the whole [FR20] thing.’264 Certainly, it provided a coherent argument around 
which proponents of reserve transformation could coalesce. But in fact there is evidence 
that the political momentum to examine the reserve issue was growing before then. On 
21 July 2010, the Common’s Defence Select Committee questioned the Secretary of 
State for Defence, Liam Fox, on issues related to the SDSR. During this session, 
Committee member and Conservative back-bencher Julian Brazier quizzed Fox and 
senior MoD civil servants over whether the cost effectiveness of the reserves was being 
considered in the review process.265 Having served with the reserve special forces unit 
21 SAS, Brazier has deep and extensive knowledge of the Army Reserve and has been a 
passionately strong advocate of the organisation in Parliament for over 25 years.266 
After the session, the Committee expressed disappointment that the MoD had failed to 
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conduct a specific study on developing the reserve role as part of the SDSR, noting 
especially the lack of cost/benefit analyses:  
‘The MoD failed to provide comparative costings. This is unsatisfactory, and 
reveals the MoD’s failure to address seriously the option of placing capabilities 
into the Reserve Forces at much lower cost, as the Americans have done. We 
recommend that the increased use of Reservists should be properly covered by 
the National Security Council (NSC) in its discussions.’267  
 
Clearly, in the austerity context, the reduced cost of reservists was seen as a central 
reason for re-examining their position in Britain’s armed forces. 
The first of the NSC meetings to decide the tone and detail of the SDSR was to 
be chaired by then Prime Minister David Cameron on 28 September. Perhaps with this 
timeframe in mind, many of Williams’ and Lamb’s recommendations were initially 
published in an editorial in the centre-right newspaper The Times on 15 September 
2010.268 Both men also appeared before the Defence Select Committee the same day.269 
Clearly, at least some of the Committee was already predisposed to their arguments. 
This appearance was followed a day later by another Times article that seized on the 
reserve issue in particular, with Williams stressing the TA’s ‘pay-as-you-go 
capability’.270 Only a day later, The Times’ Whitehall sources reported ‘very, very 
strong tensions developing’ in the MoD between some ministers and the army on the 
reserves issue.271 By the 28 September both The Daily Telegraph and The Guardian 
were reporting how the Policy Exchange document was causing significant friction in 
government over the future of the TA, just as Williams appeared on BBC Radio to 
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further publicise his proposals.272 While the Policy Exchange report was in fact released 
two days later, it was already clear that the reserves issue had found a wider audience. 
Although FR20 went on to receive wide cross-party support when it was 
unveiled, it is important to situate the political origins of FR20 within sections of the 
Conservative Party here. Policy Exchange, founded by MP Francis Maude in 2002, is 
widely regarded as one of the most influential think-tanks on the political right in 
Britain. It has close ties to David Cameron, and is funded by donations from some of 
the biggest donors to the Conservative Party.273 At the time, Cameron was in the early 
days of his premiership in the coalition with the Liberal Democrats, an alliance that had 
left him open to criticism from the right of his party who, amongst other grievances 
such as Britain’s membership of the European Union (EU), were reluctant to accept 
major defence cuts. Similarly, Cameron’s relationship with defence secretary Fox was 
fraught as the latter had contested the 2005 Conservative leadership election against 
him. Fox remained a senior figure on the party’s hard right with considerable backbench 
support, and had also clashed with Cameron on numerous defence issues in the past.274 
He was also being lobbied by pro-reserve Conservative MPs at this time.275 In 
September 2010, the threat of an alliance of Fox and some disgruntled backbenchers 
landing a political blow to Cameron over the defence cuts was very real, especially as 
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he could not give ground on a referendum on remaining in the EU due Liberal 
Democrat leader Nick Clegg’s refusal to do so.276 
It is within this context that William and Lamb’s findings were quickly backed 
by Tory backbenchers Brazier and David Davis, both champions of the TA in 
Parliament who had regularly rallied against its neglect.277 According to Brazier, it was 
‘hard to overestimate the degree of neglect of the TA’ at this time.278 Interestingly, 
Davis also served in 21 SAS. As former members of the regiment, Brazier and Davis 
could be expected to have known Williams through the Special Force’s Club network. 
Both MPs distrusted the regular army’s motives due to its recent chronic 
underinvestment in, and plans to cut, the TA.279 They also had the support of other 
prominent Tory backbenchers, including Bob Stewart, Julian Lewis and John Baron, 
and up to 15 others, many of whom would subsequently become ‘Brexiteers’. Similarly, 
inside the TA, this lobby could draw on the support of one of Britain’s richest men, the 
Duke of Westminster, the recently deceased Major General Gerald Grosvenor; Major 
General John Crackett; Brigadier Ranald Munro; and Brigadier Sam Evans; all 
prominent senior TA officers very anxious about its organisational survival if entrusted 
to the army.280 According to one regular general, these were ‘quite independent people, 
not short of going off on their own political tack… they want[ed] to be a part of the 
army and part of a separate political axis, and it was a very powerful political axis.’281 
Of course, in senior army officers’ views such lobbying dangerously blurred the 
political and military spheres. But to politicians, this was exactly how one generated 
support for policies. And politicians and senior reserve officers would maintain that the 
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army’s leadership was also playing politics by attempting to cut the reserves down to a 
size that would make it practically useless, without consulting either the TA or the 
MoD.282 Indeed, the lingering existence of different views of each stakeholder groups’ 
political motivations indicates how deeply suspicious they came to be of each other. 
While it is not clear if Brazier and Davis – nor Policy Exchange – specifically 
asked Williams to address the reserves issue (Lamb appears to have come on board at 
Williams’ request and did not have any contact with Brazier beforehand; for his part 
Brazier says he only met Williams and Lamb as their report was readied for 
circulation)283 the report was certainly not drafted in a political vacuum. Similarly, there 
is evidence that Brazier had been floating some of the recommendations of the report 
with TA units before it was published.284 Either way, in calling for the exact opposite of 
Dannatt’s review – a doubling of TA strength rather than halving it – it ensured that the 
reserves debate remained highly contested. It is also clear that with the SDSR 
approaching, and austerity pervasive, the future of the army reserve in particular was 
becoming increasingly politicised. Indeed, a day before David Cameron first met with 
the NSC to discuss the SDSR and the reserves issue within it, the Shadow Defence 
Secretary Bob Ainsworth criticised the process as dogged by ‘spin, squabbles and 
speculations’.285 Another Whitehall source commented: ‘The TA is unfinished business 
– they should have been restructured and cut before now, but a lot of them are well-
connected and eloquent and they’re very good at lobbying.’286 This, of course, does not 
make it unique per se; as I have shown previous periods of reserve transformation 
usually had political origins, but these political origins are important for understanding 
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the subsequent evolution of FR20, and crucially, its impact on reserve logistics sub-
units. 
The Williams and Lamb report, and the heavy media coverage it received, was 
important because it pushed the reserves issue into the spotlight ahead of the SDSR. 
However, the evidence and chronology of events suggests that it was pushing against an 
already open door. The reserves element of Williams’ and Lamb’s proposals appears to 
have been crafted, at least in part, in response to the Dannatt review and the threat this 
posed to the TA’s organisational survival. Williams and Lamb drew attention to ‘a 
tendency within the MoD to cut/limit their [the reserves’] numbers or starve them of 
resources as a way of funding investment in the standing forces.’287 This rebuttal was 
clearly based on the recent historical neglect of the reserves, but it can also be viewed as 
an attempt to undermine the Dannatt review. Indeed, Richards, who succeeded Dannatt 
as CGS in August 2009, has spoken of a ‘classic inter-service battle’ in the run up to 
SDSR, as ‘each service defended [their] respective turfs.’288 When Richards was 
promoted to CDS in October 2010, his successor as CGS, General Sir Peter Wall, had a 
similar view of the regular-reserve issue as a ‘zero-sum game’ of organisational survival 
in which either the army or the TA would be worse off.289 This group of regular officers 
wanted to retain the army’s ‘core’ conventional capabilities and viewed the reserves 
issue as a distraction that was ‘not as important as perceived’.290 As Wall elucidated on 
this shared position:  
‘If you’re the CGS, you’re more worried about the bits of the army that give 
you your fighting power… the reserve is a very important part of the army and 
very important part of the army’s contact with the nation, but it is only ever 
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going to be topping up what the core spine of the army is doing, which is going 
to be the regular piece.’291  
 
Moreover, Wall’s emphasis on the core provides an indication of the unselfconscious 
influence of post-Fordist thought on military planners in the current era. 
Against this view, Williams and Lamb drew on their special forces experience to 
outline how British defence, and in particular the army, should adapt to strategic 
uncertainty and austerity by outsourcing its conventional capability to the TA whilst 
simultaneously relying on the cheaper reserves to provide non-conventional capabilities. 
One recommendation that would remain central to the reserve’s transformation was the 
call for the deployment of reserve forces in formed units. The inclusion of this 
suggestion is particularly indicative as Brazier had visited TA units prior to its 
publication to lobby for formed reserve units, sometimes meeting resistance from the 
units themselves.292 Moreover, the emphasis on the need for a change in mind-set from 
an ‘industrial age into an information age’ way of thinking on defence ‘at the top’ of the 
military leadership indicates that Williams and Lamb were aware that senior generals’ 
strategic and organisational vision for the army, and hence for the reserves, contrasted 
their own.293 They therefore linked the reserve issue with a vision for British defence in 
general and the army in particular that differed markedly from Dannatt’s, Richards’ and 
Wall’s focus on the core. But in emphasising periphery forces’ ability to react to 
strategic uncertainty, their underlying rationale was also to reject the regular army’s 
exclusive ownership of core capabilities. While the themes that academics have 
identified as post-Fordist principles were therefore accepted and used to justify both 
sides’ arguments, a wide chasm was opening as to the exact balance between the core-
periphery divide in reality. This was complimented by disagreements over the nature of 
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strategic threats facing Britain that was underpinned by both the army’s and the TA’s 
struggle for organisational survival.  
Interestingly, in the weeks prior to the publication of the SDSR, David Cameron 
also personally intervened to stop the army from cutting the TA. Media reports at the 
time stressed Cameron’s commitment to his ‘Big Society’ policy as a central reason for 
this,294 and in a subsequent keynote speech to businesses Cameron did explicitly link 
Big Society and the TA.295 At this time, further opinion pieces in The Times cautioned 
against cutting the TA, highlighting the role of some elements of the media in particular 
in shaping and driving the reserves agenda.296 When the SDSR was published on 19 
October 2010, it was obvious that Cameron’s late intervention, combined with the 
Policy Exchange document, agitation on the Tory backbenches, the Defence Select 
Committee’s criticism, the TA lobby and media coverage, had all had an impact. The 
SDSR committed the government to putting defence ‘on a sound and sustainable 
footing’ and outlined wide cuts to, and reform of, the armed forces.297 This included a 
restructuring of the military – and especially the army – around a new ‘Future Force 
2020’ (FF20) model, which, as the next chapter details, followed supply chain 
management (SCM) principles with its higher and lower readiness, rotational force 
structure. Decisively, the SDSR also stated that: ‘there is a strong case for reviewing 
whether our reserve forces are properly structured for the type of conflict we envisage 
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undertaking in future... We will therefore undertake a six month study into the future 
role and structure of the Reserves.’298  
The political impetus for the inclusion of a reserves review is supported by 
Lamb’s assessment that: ‘the Policy Exchange pressure from Parliament and bank 
benchers were the reasons why the Prime Minister then looked at actions that were 
taking place within… the army which looked like it had greater implications than the 
army… and therefore said “we should have a review.”’299 Similarly, according to Wall, 
who was on the other side of the reserve argument, the ‘reserve thing [was] politically 
imposed... Cameron had to give ground to some parts of the Tory back bench and the 
reserves was a way of doing it… Essentially it was a political fait accompli and we just 
had to get on with it.’300 Other senior officers and a former defence minister have 
confirmed the origin of FR20 in the political, rather than the military, sphere.301 These 
fundamentally political origins are crucial to understanding the issues with FR20’s 
subsequent implementation. The political nature of the programme not only created 
tensions between Conservative back benchers and ministers, and between government 
politicians and the army, but also between senior officers in the TA and the regulars. 
These frictions would impact FR20 at almost every step in its development. But perhaps 
more significantly, like the Cardwell-Childers and Haldane reforms before it, FR20’s 
political origins would also create dissonance between the vision for, and the reality of, 
its organisational outcomes.  
An Independent Commission? 
A day after the SDSR was published, David Cameron addressed Parliament on its 
content and announced that an independent commission would be established to 
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investigate the reserves. Lamb has since adroitly outlined both the hurried and 
seemingly ad hoc origins of policy at this time:  
‘So… then I got a call, literally in my garden, from… [Edward Llwelyn] the 
Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff, who said: “Hey General, you’re the only name 
that’s come out of the hat who we’d trust to play this straight. But we’re going 
to put a commission up, General [Nick] Houghton is going to be the serving 
[member], Julian Brazier is going to be the MP, and I’d like you to be in, and 
the Prime Minister is walking across to Parliament, will you do it?”’302 
 
The quote is particularly interesting as it demonstrates the degree to which the reserves 
issue had been politicised even by this early stage: not only was the Prime Minister’s 
Chief of Staff directly involved in recruiting a member of an independent commission, 
he was also indicating the need to ‘play it straight.’ This desire is an acknowledgement 
of deep tensions between senior army officers on the one hand and politicians and 
senior TA officers on the other. Lamb responded in the affirmative, and has since 
elucidated on his participation:   
‘Was I a harsh driven advocate? Not at all. But I was watching what was 
happening and therefore the pressures on the budget for them to say we need to 
reduce the reserves down to what, in my view, would have been probably a 
level at which it was incapable of surviving. It would have been Dad’s Army 
on Dad’s Army. It would have just fallen apart at one point in time… We had 
something that could therefore bring order when chaos or disorder was 
effected. I still believe the reserve have an important part to play in that…’303 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of Brazier, the reserves most passionate and prominent 
political lobbyist and a key advocate of deploying reserve units;304 Lamb, whose views 
countered those at the top of the army; and Houghton, who was in the running for the 
politically-appointed position of CDS; does raise some questions as to the impartiality 
and independence of the Commission. Certainly, Wall’s position is that the review came 
under political pressure, with the reserves lobby ‘banging this drum… in a sense 
coercing Nick Houghton’s Commission to agree bigger numbers… [and] if we’re really 
honest, slightly to political appetite, slightly to political order, [Houghton] said: “yeah 
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they’ll get to 30,000 fine, it’s a tiny proportion of the national workforce”’.305 As I will 
show in the concluding chapter, this reasoning was flawed. 
The Commission examined the state of British reserve forces and, importantly, 
investigated how they were used in Australia, Canada and the US. When it reported 
back to Parliament in July 2011 the Commission noted that the UK’s reserves were in 
‘severe decline’ and, in comparison with these nations, formed too small a part of 
national military capability. It blamed the policy of individual backfilling on operations 
for accelerating the reserves institutional deterioration. Stressing the security and 
organisational benefits reservists could provide, the Commission found that the reserve 
role had not been extended to match the ‘new security environment’ outlined in the 
NSS, including homeland security and resilience, nor the adaptable force structure 
outlined in the SDSR. Crucially, it also placed the argument for investment in the 
reserves within the emerging ‘Whole Force Concept’ that had been instigated by the 
MoD’s Defence Reform Review of June 2011. Central to this inclusion was the 
financial argument that ‘a TA unit, of comparable size to its Regular counterpart, costs 
about 20% of the latter’s manpower bill when not mobilised. When mobilised, the same 
unit costs some 10-15% less than a Regular one.’306 The Commission concluded that the 
reserves were not being exploited for their talent and ability to provide ‘a cost-effective 
manpower balance across the Armed Forces.’ Similarly, the reserves themselves were 
not being used in a cost-effective manner and needed rationalisation.307 The report also 
highlighted the societal benefits of reserve service as a bond between the armed forces 
and citizens. In seeking to strengthen its argument in this regard, the Commission drew 
attention to the fact that with ‘the Government’s [newly launched] ‘Big Society’ 
initiative giving prominence to the need for citizens to volunteer, the Reserve Forces 
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also have an opportunity to provide an outlet for newly engaged volunteers.’308 As such, 
the Commission deployed security, economic, and politico-ideological normative 
arguments in making the case for reserve reform. The interest in other Western reserve 
forces also highlighted both the desire to emulate successful reserve forces – especially 
in terms of deploying formed reserves units – that Farrell has identified. Indeed, the 
experience of other reserve forces provided both a strong rationale and a clear structural 
solution that heavily influenced FR20; FR20 was in part an emulative transformation by 
design. 
  Houghton’s Commission recommended a number of major changes to the roles 
and structure of the reserves, and in particular the TA which made up the vast majority 
of reservists. It identified ‘a range of specialist skills in areas such as Cyber, Medical, 
Intelligence, Police, Linguistics and Stabilisation’ where reservists should be given 
specific roles, and sought £590 million over four years to fund the expansion of the 
reserves to a trained strength of 35,000. Of this number, the Commission confidently 
suggested that the TA should expand from 19,000 to 30,000 by 2015.309 In particular, it 
stressed the need to: ‘Commit to returning formed sub-units to “the fight”, and continue 
to use units in more permissive environments entailing a return to collective training at 
unit and sub-unit level.’310 While the deployment of the TA in formed sub-units on 
more permissive operations was endorsed, in fact this was a small but important 
revision of Policy Exchange’s call for formed reserve units (for example battalions 
rather than companies) to be deployed on combat operations. Other important structural 
recommendations included the pairing of regular and reserve units and the integration of 
the TA into the army’s FF20 force structure. These were to be accompanied by better 
employer and family liaison, while it identified that changes to legislation to allow 
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reservists to be mobilised more routinely and to protect them from dismissal from their 
civilian employment when this was done were needed.311 Overall, the Commission 
therefore recommended a package of welfare and employment reforms designed to 
reinvigorate the TA. These had not been included in Williams’ and Lamb’s proposals. 
Paired Fates: Army and Future Reserves 2020 
July 2011 marked a key moment in the development of FR20. Faced with a 7.8 percent 
reduction in its budget, in May 2011 the MoD began conducting a three-month internal 
review on how these new fiscal targets would impact the SDSR’s FF20 model. In early 
July it concluded that the SDSR ‘was not an affordable proposition’ in light of the 
reduced defence budget and that the army would need to be reduced in size from 
102,000 to 82,000.312 The MoD projected that this further reduction would help the 
army to save £5.3 billion over the ten years from 2012-13 to 2021-22.313 Meanwhile, on 
3 July the Independent Commission released its report on the reserves. Events now 
began to move quickly. With reports of much political friction over the exact extent of 
the cuts to the MoD between Cameron, his Chancellor George Osborne, and Fox,314 and 
‘considerable disquiet’ amongst senior officers (however, reports that Wall threatened 
to resign are inaccurate), at a Cabinet meeting on 15 July the decision was made to 
reduce and re-organise the army and re-invest in the reserves.315 This decision was 
heavily influenced by the almost simultaneous conclusion of the ‘three month exercise’ 
and the Independent Commission. Indeed, given the political friction over the extent of 
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reductions in defence spending, combining both reports presented Fox – and by 
extension Cameron – with a propitious opportunity. Taking the recommendations of 
both reports, Fox could now cut the size of army whilst simultaneously offsetting this 
by increasing the size of the reserves. This had clear political benefits for both Fox and 
Cameron, allowing them to nullify some of the Conservative backbencher criticism of 
their defence policies whilst also presenting the army reductions as part of a wider plan 
of reinvigorating a reserve force that clearly needed reform. And both plans could be 
couched in the language of reducing overall costs, increasing efficiencies and investing 
in the reserves. According to one British general heavily involved with FR20, although 
based on informed advice, Fox’s decision to take both reports and blend their 
recommendations to create a new integrated regular-reserve force structure, was ‘ad 
hoc’ and politically opportunistic.316 Certainly, other senior officers agree that ‘the 
regular army and the reserves thing came together from different directions. The reserve 
thing was politically imposed in terms of it being a political motive.’317 This 
opportunistic and political rationale behind the decision to implement FR20 would 
profoundly shape its subsequent development and implementation.  
On 18 July, Fox briefed Parliament that, due to a ‘£38 billion black hole’318 in 
the defence budget, the army needed to be downsized and restructured. Crucially, Fox 
did not detail numbers, but reports – later confirmed in Parliament – indicate that the 
army was told at this time to implement the 82,000 figure outlined in the three-month 
exercise.319 Nevertheless, the fact that no figures were released further illustrates not 
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only the speed with which MoD policy was being formulated at the time – it was clear 
that detailed planning had yet to be conducted – but also the political sensitivity of the 
cuts. With the army still fighting in Afghanistan, the extent and timing of any 
redundancies needed to be carefully considered in order to avoid political fallout.320 
However, Fox stressed that any reductions would be offset by a £1.5 billion investment 
in the reserves, which would increase the trained strength of the TA from about 19,000 
to 30,000 by 2020. Fox stated that: ‘if the Territorial Army develops in the way we 
intend, we envisage a total force of around 120,000, with a regular to reserve ratio of 
around 70:30:’321 The 120,000 figure is particularly interesting as it was the combined 
size of the army and the trained reserve before the 2010 SDSR introduced the first 
round of army downsizing, and was also the figure recommended by the Independent 
Commission. According to Wall, by also including 8,000 untrained reservists in his 
announcement, Fox was able to claim that: 
‘the army was the same size, just the composition was changing… which was 
an obfuscation and a deliberate lie if we’re really honest… it wasn’t a surprise 
to any of us [in the army] that, slightly fallaciously, the government had sought 
to portray the increase in the reserves as a fair compensation for the reduction 
in the regulars.’322  
 From the outset then, there were tensions between the presentation and reality of FR20. 
With the FF20 plan now to be implemented with a much smaller army 
component, the army ‘quite quickly realised [it] needed to set up a design team that was 
outside the chain of command… that this wasn’t a “business as usual” proposition.’323 
Following a meeting with the Army Board in London in May 2011, Lieutenant General 
Nick Carter, assisted by Brigadier Kevin Abraham, were given the freedom to design a 
new model for the army that would become known as Army2020. As the plan 
developed during 14 meetings over the next six months, it was tested and adjusted at 
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each turn by the Army Board, which consisted of a number of senior generals and civil 
servants. At each step, the new defence secretary, Philip Hammond, was kept informed 
of the process by Wall and gave his consent to most of it.324 However, since replacing 
Fox in October 2011, Hammond, known as a ‘safe pair of hands’325 and for his strict 
information control, had noticeably centralised decision making in the MoD. The Army 
Board worked directly to him.326 As a result, when the Board approved the plan in 
January 2012, it then had to convince many in the MoD, especially those in resourcing, 
that the proposition was viable.327 This debate continued for another six months before 
Hammond announced to Parliament on 5 July 2012 that Army2020 would be 
implemented. 
From the outset, Army2020 was consciously designed to integrate the regular 
and reserve component. This was a strategic choice and reflected both the need for 
efficiency and adaptability in the face of strategic uncertainty, and the political desire to 
reinvigorate the reserves. Overall, Wall directed that the new force should be capable of 
conducting interventions and conventional deterrence; overseas operations in 
multinational alliances; and homeland security/resilience tasks. Nevertheless, it appears 
that supporting one enduring expeditionary operation was the principle around which it 
organisationally oriented. As a result, Army2020 divided the organisation into a high 
readiness ‘Reactive Force’ capable of conducting contingency operations and a less 
ready ‘Adaptive Force’ for follow-on operations. Within both forces was a 36 month 
operational readiness cycle, whereby brigades in the Reactive Force, and lower units 
within the Adaptive Force would come up to readiness for potential deployment for 12 
out of every 36 months. If deployed, another system known as the ‘harmony guideline’ 
                                                 
324 Personal communication, Wall, 10 May 2016. 
325 Reuters (15 October 2011) ‘Defence Secretary quits over "adviser" scandal’, available at 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-briatin-fox-idUKTRE79D3MI20111015, accessed 28 July 2016.    
326 Interview, Wall, 14 January 2015. 
327 Interview, Wall, 14 January 2015. 
 113 
 
designated that forces at readiness could expect to be deployed once in each five-bloc 
cycle; in reality for about six of every 30 months. Critically, the less-ready Adaptive 
Force was to provide the greater capability in roulements four and five of a deployment. 
Unveiling the plan, Carter described it as: ‘new and imaginative and original... Getting 
there will be challenging… And none of this happens very quickly, it will be a gradual 
process.’328 Most decisively, supporting the ‘Whole Force Concept’, Army2020 outlined 
a much more prominent operational role for the TA in the Adaptive Force, with the 
army ‘to deliver a genuinely useable and capable Reserve that is integrated with paired 
Regular units.’329 This move alone significantly increased the demand on the reserve 
component and underscored the post-Fordist principles underpinning Army2020, and 
especially the logistics component of the plan. This part of Army2020 reduced regular 
logistics regiments by six and outsourced the capability to the reserves.330 Indeed, 
reducing regular logistics units and outsourcing to the reserves to save costs was one of 
the central tenets of Army2020. The plan directed that the Adaptive Force would have 
its own logistic support provided by 102 Logistic Brigade, predominantly manned by 
reservists. 
Meanwhile, the scale of the cuts to the army, and the increased reliance on the 
reserves to deliver previous core capabilities drew much media attention. Headlines 
such as ‘Army cuts take ‘military gamble’ by placing burden on reserves’; ‘TA can't 
recruit enough “quality troops” for plans’; and ‘Army2020: Fighting for the future’ are 
indicative of the increasing prominence the restructuring plans were coming to have in 
the public sphere.331 But by outsourcing core capabilities to the reserves and hence 
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putting them at the centre of British defence policy, FR20 ensured that its 
implementation would attract much media focus and remain a politically sensitive issue 
for the Conservatives, vulnerable as they were to internal accusations that they had 
become weak on defence issues.332 Indeed, the degree to which Cameron was worried 
about the political implications of FR20’s failure, and the threat from backbenchers, 
was highlighted in September 2012 when he appointed his close ally and former 
Cabinet whip, Mark Francois, as Minister of State for Defence Personnel. According to 
senior regular officers, Francois sought to add to the political impetus behind FR20.333 
Organisational Reality Bites 
While the army was now clear on its future size and structure, the reserves planning: 
‘was happening in a different department of the army, and it was being handled 
much more by the department [the MoD] than the army, because it was an 
externally proposed proposition that had never been fully tested with us… It 
was a finger in the wind thing, not unreasonable, but there was no science 
behind it... there was no evidence it could be done. And there was no thought 
about if you decided to do it how you would actually go about it.’334 
 
Richards supports this claim, detailing how ‘the motor for this project was Nick 
Houghton’s team, operating largely outside the Ministry of Defence process.’335 The 
fact that the reserves planning had happened without the similar kind of testing 
Army2020 had undergone, and in a separate department in the MoD, is significant as it 
not only indicates the level of distrust between senior regular officers and their political 
masters on the reserve issue, but also, decisively, the political and ad hoc nature of the 
plan. Nevertheless, over the next five months the MoD’s reserve plans solidified, and on 
8 November 2012 it published its consultation paper – Future Reserves 2020: 
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Delivering the Nation’s Security Together. Perhaps most importantly, this Green Paper 
supported an increase in the TA trained strength to the 30,000 recommended by 
Houghton’s Commission, coupled with a much more significant role for the reserves 
and their full integration into the Whole Force. However, the date set for this by 
Hammond at the time was 2018, not 2015 as the Commission had recommended, nor 
the 2020 deadline that the army appear to have understood.336 Again, this lack of clarity 
indicates the friction and confusion in the evolution of FR20. The paper pledged to 
invest £1.8 billion over the next ten years, increasing the amount recommended by the 
Commission by £300 million. It also contained a comprehensive list of reforms that 
would be undertaken in order for the reserves to meet the requirements laid out in the 
SDSR and Army2020. These included the propositions to rename the TA the Army 
Reserve to reflect its more integrated role; investments in training and equipment; 
extended mobilisation powers; increased reservist remuneration and welfare packages; 
and better engagement with reservist employers. 337  
The Green Paper stressed that with a more deployable Army Reserve 
contributing ‘about 15 percent of the first follow-on brigade deployment to around 40 
percent in the fourth and fifth brigades… for the Army in particular, mobilisation of 
formed organisations, generally at sub-unit, but sometimes at unit level, will be 
necessary.’ Importantly, it stated that [there will be a] change from using the reservist 
on an individual basis to mobilising formed sub-units.’338 It proposed a 15 percent 
increase in the annual training requirement to ensure units could deliver collective tasks 
‘at the platoon, company and battalion’ levels. Indeed, the deployment of formed units 
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or sub-units was mentioned at least 14 times. Clearly this was to be a central tenet of 
FR20.339 Hammond also stressed the importance of the sub-unit level, announcing: 
‘This transformation of the Reserves will see a radical shift in the way in which we use 
them, with units deployed as formed units or sub-units as well as delivering individual 
augmentees.’340 This emphasis on the formed unit was complemented by a similar focus 
on the routine use of the reserves on operations, which was stressed on 16 occasions in 
the paper, indicating how the utilisation of the reserves was changing from a force of 
last resort to one that was integral to the army’s deployment plans. Nevertheless, 
notwithstanding these aims, much of the Green Paper’s emphasis fell on proposed 
changes to mobilisation legislation and terms of service, instigating employer/family 
support initiatives, and in increasing monetary compensation to reservists to boost 
recruitment and retention. As Edmunds et al. have noted, what the Green Paper was 
recommending was essentially transactional in nature; a change in the readiness and 
utility of the reserves in order to generate efficiencies, in return for increased investment 
and support.341 
With a new role now clearly defined, recruitment and retention in the Army 
Reserve moved centre-stage, as senior officers and the media questioned the ability of 
the reserves to reach its trained strength,342 and politicians such as Brazier reported 
‘horrifying’ problems with the recruitment system.343 While Hammond stated that he 
was ‘confident that the numbers we require will be achieved’, the Labour opposition 
warned of the implications of reducing the army regardless of whether the Army 
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Reserve was meeting its recruitment targets, as did Fox.344 Indeed, by linking 
Army2020 and FR20, the success of Conservative’s entire reform of the army now 
increasingly hinged on whether the reserve component could be recruited. In the words 
of Fox, politically it was becoming ‘a numbers game… and we’d taken an enormous 
gamble with [those] numbers.’345 Richards also notes that Houghton had outlined to the 
NSC that the FR20 plan needed testing to prove its practicability, but that ‘the 
government decided to push it through without this sensible precaution.’346 This echoes 
Wall’s position that the plans to increase the reserve were ‘not grounded in military 
experience, military fact, or any credible evidence,’ and Dannatt’s that the plan ‘was 
based on hope rather than any science.’347 Indeed, Richards records that even Houghton 
felt outmanoeuvred by the politicians, who said to him as they left the NSC: ‘My good 
nature has been taken advantage of.’348 The top-down political and economic origins of 
FR20 had ensured its design was an ad hoc, rushed and politically-driven process. 
The following consultation process – which lasted less than ten weeks – 
involved reservists, their families, regulars and employers. By the time it ended, a new 
TA recruitment drive had been launched, but this could not stop the organisation 
haemorrhaging 1,000 members per year.349 The situation was complicated by 
employer’s reservations, with the Confederation of British Industry employer’s group 
stating it had not been properly consulted about ‘the biggest change for reserve soldiers 
since the Second World War.’350 Meanwhile, with the army continuing to downsize, 
thereby mounting pressure to fill the reserves, the announcement of the finalised 
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reserves proposition was delayed on numerous occasions as it was tested and adjusted. 
As detailed planning continued in the MoD, a number of issues concerning the 
deployment of formed reserve units alongside the army emerged, the most decisive of 
which was the training differential between regulars and reservists. This meant that the 
army’s ultimate legal responsibility to ensure that the reserves were ‘accredited, 
regulated and subject to legislation’ underpinned any ability to deploy the reserves as 
formed units.351 Although cultural suspicion and institutional rivalry likely played a 
part, the army correctly argued that there were huge legal implications – for both the 
reserves and the regulars – of deploying reservist units to high-risk combat 
environments alongside regular units without providing the similar, time-intensive 
training required of the regulars. Integrated collective training therefore became the 
crucial first step toward building reserve sub-unit operational capability.   
When the ‘Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued’ White 
Paper was finally published on 3 July 2013, it was clear that the drive for deployable 
units had been diluted somewhat due to these organisational realities. While the paper 
approved the Whole Force concept and the readiness cycle for the reserves, as well as 
the recruitment, welfare and employer support initiatives outlined in the Green Paper, 
the requirement to deploy as formed units had been reduced. Although Hammond 
claimed somewhat disingenuously – and in contrast to Fox – that the ‘redesigned 
structure has been driven primarily by the changed function and roles of the Army 
Reserve and by the need to reach critical mass for effective sub-unit training’,352 FR20 
stated that the army ‘while continuing to deploy individuals, (author’s italics) will have 
a greater reliance on [reserve] formed sub-units and units’ and stressed the reserves 
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would provide ‘routine capability’ including ‘augmentation, resilience and depth to 
regular units.’353 This mention of individual backfilling was important as it lessened 
expectations that the reserves would only deploy as formed units, which had been a 
major and continuous strand of the reserve transformation since Policy Exchange first 
mooted the idea almost three years previously. Crucially, it confirmed that the Army 
Reserve could continue to contribute to operations as they had in the past, thereby 
somewhat relieving the collective training burden. Compared to the Green Paper, there 
was also more emphasis on the sub-unit rather than the unit in the White Paper; a fact 
confirmed in Parliament when Hammond announced that the Army Reserve ‘will be 
ready and able to deploy routinely at sub-unit level, and in some circumstances, 
[author’s italics] as formed units.’354 Effectively, the White Paper was vaguer about 
exactly how the reserves would contribute to operations, therefore buying time for FR20 
to deliver.  
The routine nature of reservist mobilisation and deployment was also an 
important part of the White Paper, mentioned eight times in this context. Most 
importantly, introducing FR20 Hammond clearly outlined that: ‘Under our new model, 
the use of the Reserves is no longer exceptional or limited to times of imminent national 
danger or disaster, but is integral to delivering military effect in almost all situations.’355 
Tellingly, Hammond emphasised the new integrated regular and reserve command 
structure and the ‘greater efficiencies in training and equipment resulting from formal 
pairing between regular and reserve units.’356 This emphasis on pairing all regular units 
with their reserve counterparts in order to ‘deliver high quality training to reservists and 
the development of fully integrated capabilities’ came to prominence in the White 
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Paper.357 While the Independent Commission had recommended it, content analysis 
reveals that while the Green Paper only mentioned pairing twice, it appeared in its 
successor no less than 16 times. At this time Brigadier Sam Evans also stressed the 
importance of: ‘Formalised pairing between a regular and a reserve unit [was the] the 
important first step… to deliver integrated capability.’358 Clearly, there had been a 
change in emphasis. This had been caused by close analysis of how the few previous 
successful reserve sub-unit deployments had been managed, and was complemented by 
considerable input from regular units on how best to operate with reserve sub-units.359 
Viewing the White Paper in the context of the evolution of FR20 is instructive because 
it highlights how organisational frictions and realities caused a number of the main 
objectives of FR20 to be revised downwards. Decisively, the White Paper recognised 
that in reality the ability to deploy formed reserve units – either at the sub-unit or 
battalion level – hinged on close relationships and collective training with regular units, 
and that this would take time to deliver. This revision hinted at a realisation within 
government that, aside from recruitment, implementing FR20 would not be as 
straightforward as originally envisaged. 
Hammond’s speech to Parliament on 3 July also unveiled details of the 
structural and functional transformation of the soon to be re-named Army Reserve. This 
involved the disbandment of nine major reserve units, with their sub-units either 
withdrawn, re-roled or re-subordinated in the order of battle. Crucially, eight of these 
were logistics units, with a further three RLC regiments designated for re-roling. 
Importantly, in terms of this study, one of these was 155 Transport Regiment which has 
since become 165 Port and Maritime Regiment. Furthermore, the White Paper created 
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four new REME and two new intelligence battalions. One of these, 105 REME, is also 
closely examined later in this study. This disbandment and re-roling of logistics units 
was central to Army2020’s desire to outsource routine logistics capabilities, such as 
transport and port duties, to the reserves to relieve the burden on the regulars. 
Simultaneously, the creation of new specialised REME and intelligence units 
represented the desire to tap the civilian workforce to enable the surge of logistic 
capabilities during periods of increased demand. As such, the transformation of the 
Army Reserves itself not only followed the post-Fordist approach, but it would be most 
profound in the logistics component. Indeed, within both Army2020 and FR20, it also 
represented an attempt to transform reserve logistics capability along post-Fordism’s 
core-periphery, SCM and JIT principles.  
There is a wider point to be made here about FR20’s launch, as it informs its 
subsequent trajectory. The combined effect of the consultation and planning processes 
meant that the FR20 plan had been almost two years in the making. While this delay 
was certainly not helped by an overburdened MoD and army staff whose priority was to 
implement Army2020, it may have also reflected institutional reluctance in parts of the 
army to endorse the plan and changing political objectives inside government. 
Nevertheless, the net effect of this delay was that by its release in July 2013 some of the 
political momentum behind FR20 was already dissipating. This was evidenced by the 
fact that the policy was launched just before Parliament’s summer recess, and was not 
deemed of sufficient importance for the Prime Minister to launch it. Instead Hammond 
did so, and he laid most of his emphasis on the investments in reserve equipment, 
remuneration and welfare, and the closure of TA bases, rather than the ‘hard’ military 
capabilities required of routinely deployable sub-units. This approach also helped garner 
cross-party support for the reforms, even if there was scepticism about the wider 
defence cuts. As such, Wall described the unveiling of FR20 as a ‘soft launch’ with 
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neither Cameron nor Hammond keen to invest their political capital to publicise the 
plan, perhaps aware as they were already of its shortcomings and the related political 
risk.360 This, of course, provides one explanation for the initial failure to attract recruits 
in the numbers required. 
The Politics of Numbers 
If the Cameron government hoped that the publication of the White Paper would settle 
the reserves issue and buy it some time, it was to be disappointed. Less than a month 
after its publication, and despite a £3 million investment in a new reserve recruitment 
campaign, leaked army reports highlighted that the Army Reserve’s strength had 
dropped by 5.3 percent and that recruitment was 50 percent below target, with yearly 
manning targets unlikely to be met.361 Of particular note was the loss of senior NCOs 
who were not prepared to deploy more frequently. Meanwhile, the outsourcing of the 
army’s previously internal, localised recruitment system to business management firm 
Capita also came under attack, with Brazier again leading the criticism.362 Signifying 
his continued distrust of the army, he also blamed the Training and Recruitment branch 
for the failures.363 Perhaps unsurprisingly, rumours abounded at this time that the army 
wanted the reserves plan to fail. Indeed, a regular officer closely involved with 
Army2020 planning has confirmed that elements in the army did want this to happen, 
believing that if FR20 failed the political will for cutting the regulars would 
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evaporate.364 The fact that army reports detailing the problems with reserve recruitment 
were leaked to the media at this time supports this assertion, whilst again highlighting 
the role of the media in FR20’s development.  
The recruitment problem was now becoming acute. Indicating the drive to 
outsource military capabilities, in March 2012 Capita had signed a £440 million 
contract to introduce a centralised, automated, and more efficient recruitment system 
that would free up 800 military personnel. However, in another indication of the ad hoc 
evolution of FR20, the contract had been negotiated before the policy was confirmed 
and therefore did not foresee such a rapid expansion of the reserves (in another political 
twist, Hammond blamed Francis Maude – founder of Policy Exchange and now Cabinet 
Minister responsible for streamlining the civil service – for this oversight).365 
Information technology systems were also found wanting, while the paradox that a more 
deployable reserve required greater medical screening and hence decreased the number 
of reserves became painfully clear.366 The situation was not helped by the fact that in 
2010 the newly-elected Conservative government had banned recruitment advertising, 
thereby reducing inflow and eventually creating a serious recruitment ‘pinch’ by the end 
of 2012. As 2013 progressed, the media recognised that the cornerstone of the 
government’s defence policy was failing and focused intensely on the reserves 
recruitment issue, routinely reporting the MoD’s quarterly personnel reports.367 By 
October, the government was facing growing criticism not only from the Labour 
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opposition and former senior officers,368 but also from its backbenches, where former 
defence secretaries Fox and Malcolm Rifkind lent their support to a group led by John 
Baron that was now calling for a review of the cuts to the army in the wake of the poor 
reserve recruiting figures.369 Perhaps in recognition of the growing threat of a 
backbench revolt, at this time Francois was appointed Minister of State for the Armed 
Forces, with responsibility for army plans. 
Matters came to a head in mid-November 2013 when Baron tabled a bill in 
Parliament calling for a delay to the army cuts until the reserves could meet its 
recruitment targets. In a sign of the deep divisions within the Conservatives over FR20, 
Baron received the support of 22 Tory rebel MPs, as well as the backing of most of the 
Labour opposition. The local political dynamic of the Baron rebellion is also 
noteworthy: he is a former member of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, whose second 
battalion was to be disbanded in the next round of redundancies. With the forthcoming 
vote attracting heavy media attention, both Hammond, Houghton and Wall reiterated 
their support for the plan, with Hammond stressing that any delay in implementing 
FR20 would send a ‘negative signal’ to reservists, and, somewhat ironically: ‘make the 
whole agenda into a political football.’370 However, the night before the vote Hammond 
met with Brazier – who was appears at this stage to have still favoured Baron and, as 
the driving force behind FR20, commanded respect on the issue from other Tory 
backbenchers – in a bid to defuse the situation. In this meeting Brazier demanded an 
                                                 
368 The Times (27 October 2013) ‘Ex-Army head calls for cuts to be paused’, available at 
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/defence/article3905727.ece; The Guardian (3 July 2013) ‘Army 
reservists to get military pensions and healthcare benefits’, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/jul/03/army-reservists-military-pensions; both retrieved 
28 July 2016; The Times, ‘Flawed plan to boost TA could put Britain at risk, critics warn’; Sky News, ‘Army 
Reserve Numbers Drop In Blow To MoD’. 
369 The Times (15 November 2013) ‘Numbers fall in Territorial Army despite major recruitment drive’, 
available at http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/defence/article3922085.ece, retrieved 28 July 
2016; The Daily Telegraph (25 October 2013) ‘Army may have to backtrack on use of reservists, former 
Defence Secretary warns’; Sky News, ‘Army Reserve Numbers Drop In Blow To MoD’. 
370 BBC News (20 November 2013) ‘Army Reserve rebellion in prospect among Tory MPs’, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-25012907, retrieved 28 July 2016.  
 125 
 
annual external audit in return for his support for Hammond, which the latter acceded 
to.371 It is unclear if Brazier was also promised the Minister of Reserves post at this 
meeting as well, but it is significant that within months of coming out in support of 
Hammond he had been appointed to the position. While Brazier’s deep knowledge and 
passion for the reserves would make him a natural choice, one senior officer has 
described Brazier’s subsequent promotion in July 2014 as a ‘political move’ designed to 
give the outspoken backbencher ownership of the reserves problem and hence ‘shut him 
up.’372 Whatever the truth behind Brazier’s appointment, it is clear that once he became 
responsible for implementing FR20 he became far more supportive of it.373  
 The Tory rebellion highlighted the mounting political costs of FR20. Over the 
course of the next year, intense political and media focus on the reserves recruitment 
issue continued as numbers failed to rise. In January 2014 the Defence Select 
Committee raised serious concerns over the ability of the Army Reserve to meet its 
2018 manning target, while in June the National Audit Office (NAO) concluded that 
current recruitment trends suggested ‘that it could be 2025 before the trained strength of 
the reserve is increased to 30,000.’374 That same month, the government’s own internal 
watchdog, the Major Projects Authority (MPA), gave FR20 a red rating, indicating that 
it believed the delivery of the project ‘appears to be unachievable.’375 Unsurprisingly, 
this view was supported by Baron, who called FR20 ‘a cynical “balance sheet” exercise 
by the MoD’.376 In July the first audit of the MoD External Scrutiny Team (EST) 
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criticised the implementation of FR20.377 More damagingly, the 2014 report by the 
NAO on FR20 also noted that: ‘We have not seen evidence that the feasibility of 
increasing the number of trained reserves within the planned timescale, needed to 
provide the required capability, was robustly tested.’378 And two months later the Public 
Accounts Committee concluded:  
‘It is astonishing that the Ministry of Defence went ahead with plans to cut 
back the regular Army by 20,000 and increase the number of Reservists 
without testing whether this was doable and without properly consulting the 
Army itself.’379   
It also noted how the changes to the Capita contract had incurred additional costs of £70 
million, considerably reducing the contracts projected savings and hence the rationale of 
outsourcing recruitment.380  
With both Cameron and Hammond’s political capital heavily invested in the 
project, questions in Parliament on the transparency of, and delays in, publishing 
reserve recruitment data,381 resulted in increasing political involvement in the 
recruitment issue that ‘almost distracted the army in a perpetual quest for data.’382 A 
growth plan was initiated and another further recruitment drive took place in July 2014, 
but with numbers failing to rise, the subsequent  major relaxation of the age limit caused 
derision of the Army Reserve as a ‘Dad’s Army’.383 Faced with this reality, Hammond 
then appears to have delayed the requirement to reach its 30,100 target until the end of 
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the financial year 2018 (April 2019).384 Meanwhile, by mid-2014, Cameron and 
Hammond had detected that the political risk of the reserves was not diminishing and 
therefore decided to ‘let it go.’385 Indeed, by July 2014 Brazier had been appointed 
reserves minister and Michael Fallon had replaced Hammond as defence secretary. 
Interestingly, Fallon’s first announcement regarding FR20 was to change the accounting 
criteria for what military posts counted as Army Reserve service, adding about 1,000 
personnel to the organisation’s trained strength. While this change could be 
organisationally justified, the adjusting of these metrics also had clear political 
benefits.386  
With the political heavyweights divested of FR20, the numbers game also 
appears to have contributed to the beginning of a re-assessment of the role expected of 
the reserves in late 2014. After a change in senior personnel in the MoD, the first 
indication of a potential shift in policy came in October 2014, when Carter, now CGS, 
appeared to undermine the whole rationale behind FR20, stating: 
‘It doesn’t really matter how large your Army is, the nation would be the worse 
for not having a Reserve. A Reserve is what it sounds like; it's there for worst-
case…The sense that there is an obligation to be routinely and regularly used is 
not how I would see this being used. It is there for worst-case. It's certainly not 
there to mitigate the reduction in regular numbers.’387  
This comment directly contradicted Fox’s, the White Paper’s, and Hammond’s position 
that Army Reserve would be used ‘routinely’ to do tasks that were once the ‘exclusive 
domain of the regulars.’388 Crucially, it highlighted the dissonance between FR20’s 
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political and organisational survival origins on the one hand, and the reality of 
delivering a more deployable reserve on the other.  
Carter also highlighted the ‘equilateral triangle between [the reservist’s] 
employer, his family and himself. What you have to do is explain it’s here for worst 
case – and keep that triangle absolutely in balance.’389 This comment is interesting as it 
provides a clue as to why Carter was now backing away from a more operational role 
for the reserves. With the latest recruitment figures about to be revealed in headlines as 
‘shocking’,390 and many of the larger employers still worried that the FR20 plan would 
drastically increase the demands placed on reservists, Carter’s reappraisal was 
apparently aimed at both the employer lobby, and at attracting more recruits. Carter 
himself hinted at this, stating their would be a ‘refinement’ in the army’s message in 
order to emphasise to recruits that service would not impinge too heavily on civilian 
life: ‘that’s what we’ll do, we’ll explain it in the right way’.391 Further supporting this, 
at around this time Carter launched a ‘Darwinian’ approach to establish the 
sustainability of unit structures and locations, essentially giving reserve units a year in 
which to recruit above established strength in order to confirm their sustainability.392  
There were other likely factors at play beyond recruitment. As the new CGS, Carter was 
untainted by the past political battles over army cuts, and FR20 itself, and as 
Army2020’s architect also came with his own political capital. The recruitment failures 
and the mounting criticism of this in the media and from the oversight committees gave 
him a strong evidential base from which to begin to justify a change of position, while 
the fact that both Cameron and Hammond had divested their own political capital from 
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the project – effectively leaving the more interested Brazier to oversee it – meant that 
there was less political will to resist this change of message in the first place. 
With recruitment and retention figures beginning to rise, by mid-2015 Brazier 
was confident that ‘current strengths are running ahead of schedule’393, and while 
progress has been made, politicians and senior officers such as Fallon and Houghton 
continued to stress that FR20 will take time to implement.394 Indeed, one senior officer 
heavily involved in the FR20 process has stated that the timescale for the reforms is 
unrealistic due to the ‘complete underestimation of the neglect of the TA in terms of 
underinvestment’.395 Against this backdrop, sustained criticism of the reduction in the 
size of the army has also continued, especially after it emerged that the army had 
reduced to below the 82,000 target three years faster than anticipated, forcing the MoD 
to rehire retired personnel, and causing media reports that the British armed forces had 
been left in ‘chaos’.396 Although the EST stated in its June 2015 report, that: ‘Our 
assessment is that FR20 remains on or near track for delivery’ it also remained cautious, 
while only days later it was reported that the MPA had again given FR20 a red score, 
indicating that ‘successful delivery of the project appears to be unachievable.’397 With 
the reduction in the army complete, but the reserves still badly under-recruited, the 
sustainability of the Army2020 deployment model, and in particular the Army 
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Reserve’s increased contribution from roule four onwards, remained in question. 
Indeed, at this time Baron stated the Army2020 and FR20 was ‘a plan that has produced 
a capability gap in the short term and will prove a false economy in the long term and 
we will live to regret it.’398 For his part, Fox has also said that FR20 was ‘badly 
synchronised’.399  
Not that this is surprising given the past attempts to transform the reserves. One 
senior army officer heavily involved with the reserve recruitment process has stated that 
the FR20 timescale is ‘fundamentally flawed’ and, when seen in the context of past 
periods of reform, is in fact a ‘20 year transition’.400 Similarly, Wall has spoken of the 
need to take a strategic view of the timeline and that the ‘army should differentiate 
between the short-term numbers game, which is a political plan, and establishing 
[FR20] properly so it stands the test of time and is a system that has the resilience to 
work well in a crisis.’401 Unsurprisingly, in the army’s view, the pairing of regular and 
reserve units is central to this, not only in terms of delivering reservist capability but 
also in terms of fostering better relationships and offering reservists better opportunities. 
Moreover, the deployable sub-unit requirement still raised questions about politicians’ 
risk appetite for deploying formed reserve units into high threat environments. This is 
compounded by the fact that reserve commanders are less experienced due to shorter 
qualifying courses and therefore, conceptually at least, are a greater risk than their 
regular counterparts. Given these recruitment and risk issues, at a meta-organisational 
level there are therefore clearly frictions concerning the implementation of FR20.  
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Conclusion: Politics, Strategy and Organisational Survival 
As this chapter has shown, politics and ideology have played a crucial role in the 
debates about FR20 and its subsequent organisational evolution. These political origins, 
located within the backbench of the Conservative party and closely related to the weak 
position of the Prime Minister, quickly fused their political goal of reinvigorating the 
reserves with economic arguments about the need for a cheaper, smaller land force 
capable of meeting a diverse array of global threats. This in turn led to FR20’s renewed 
emphasis on the expansion of the Army Reserves and its integration with the regular 
army.402 However, along the way, politics, economics, stakeholder rivalry, strategy and 
organisational resistance have all continued to profoundly shape FR20, with strong 
lobby groups in Parliament, the army, the reserves and the media contesting the 
rationale and vision for this transformation. At each stage of FR20’s evolution there 
were clear policy changes due to tensions between these groups and the dissonance 
between desired political outcomes and organisational realities. Indeed, for all of 
FR20’s modernity and professed originality, the fundamental factors curtailing reserve 
reform – that of recruitment, budgets and strategy – appear to have remained 
remarkably constant. However, it is clear that in the current context, the highly 
contested political situation was unique to the period and the major source of 
transformation. Meanwhile, recruitment remains as, and arguably more, important to the 
development of the reserves as it did in pervious eras. While the exact context may 
change, the numbers game has constrained the ability to transform the reserves and 
hence shape its future use and structure, and that of the army.  
Perhaps more importantly, the current system of placing units on five year 
rotations and tiered readiness cycles has political benefits. By locking units into a 
deployment, recovery and training cycle, ‘which is how people defend against the civil 




service, the treasury and officials’403 it becomes increasingly difficult to reduce the 
army any further without seriously threatening the coherence of the post-Fordist 
rotational system. Army2020, and within it FR20, therefore not only provides the kernel 
for which to expand on in a national emergency, it is also an insurance policy for the 
organisation against further defence cuts. Herein lies its originality. It is not only a 
solution to economic and strategic pressures that are similar to those of the past, but also 
a buffer against future politician’s desire, and ability, to further reduce the size of army. 
Such a political view of British military capability is perhaps even more applicable to 
the reserves, with its attempt to integrate formed sub-units into the Army’s readiness 
cycle. At considerable political and economic cost, FR20 has all but guaranteed the 
Army Reserves’ organisational survival. These costs have included further damage to 
that identified in British civil-military relations during Blair’s premiership, and also, as 
Chapter Six will discuss, forced politicisation of the army at the grass-roots level.404 
Nevertheless, FR20’s underlying political goal, the reinvigoration of the reserves, has 
arguably already been met. But it remains to be seen if it will deliver the military 
capability originally envisaged. This fact may highlight the most important reason for 
the current transformation.  
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Post-Fordism and the Transformation of Military Logistics 
 
So far, I have examined the historical cases of reserve reform and the political context 
of FR20 in order to contextualise the current transformation. However, it will also be 
remembered that FR20 placed heavy emphasis on the domain of logistics. It will be 
remembered that as the policy stated ‘Greater reliance will be placed on the Reserves to 
provide routine capability… primarily in the areas of … combat service support (such 
as logistics…)’, it is therefore necessary to understand how military logistics have 
developed in the 21st Century.405 Indeed, this attempt to transform the reserves and 
especially its logistics component cannot be understood without recognising the drastic 
changes in how logistics is delivered. Consequently, it is necessary to discuss the 
evolution of logistics in significant detail before examining the specific new methods of 
organising and delivering logistics in the reserves. Thus, in this chapter I explore the 
wider processes driving the recent development of Western military logistics in order to 
understand the wider organisational context for FR20, and ultimately, the reserves 
logistics sub-units examined later in this study. It is crucially important to situate FR20 
within the wider post-Fordist conceptual approach to military logistics as the policy 
vastly increased the capability requirements expected of reserve logistics sub-units, and 
hence the need for greater professionalism and cohesion within them. Furthermore, the 
post-Fordist approach to logistics not only immediately affects the sub-units examined 
in this study through the processes identified in this chapter, it also provides a 
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historically novel solution to the recurrent organisational problems experienced in past 
periods of reserve reform I outlined in Chapter Three.  
In this chapter, I make two arguments. Firstly, I draw on the existing post-Fordist 
literature to provide a conceptual framework for understanding the recent 
transformation of Western military logistics. In doing so, I challenge the classical 
literature on military logistics to show how much of what has been written on the 
subject is either out of date and lacking sociological theory. Secondly, I combine this 
post-Fordist framework with the transformation literature to show how these changes 
have occurred through the simultaneous processes of centralisation; supply chain 
management and outsourcing; using core and periphery forces; and by adopting a 
networked approach to logistics. Throughout, evidence is provided from US, British and 
NATO military logistics structures and practices. The relevance of the US’ adoption of 
a post-Fordist approach to logistics is critical. As I will show, it has predominantly led 
the way in this regard, subsequently influencing both the UK and NATO to follow their 
‘best practice’. The conclusion argues that a logistics transformation has occurred, is 
ongoing, and that what academics have termed post-Fordism is a useful conceptual 
framework to understand it. Indeed, it argues that such is the scope and nature of this 
transformation that it has had a profound impact on Western military force structures, 
and ultimately, their strategic flexibility.  
Since the end of the Cold War, numerous authors have identified a major shift in 
the nature of modern conflict and a transformation in the organisation of Western 
military forces.406 Replacing inter-state conventional conflicts, insurgencies, proxy and 
civil wars, and terrorism have come to dominate the character of the ‘new wars’ the 
West has fought. Meanwhile, enabled by the advanced technology of the Revolution in 
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Military Affairs (RMA), smaller, more professional, capable, and agile combat forces 
are orienting themselves toward a more diverse set of expeditionary missions in more 
operationally challenging locations around the globe.407 These trends have been 
accompanied by the simultaneous growth in the privatisation of Western militaries.408 
While debate remains over the extent of some of these changes,409 in almost all cases, 
the focus of the works that examine these military transformations has been on combat 
forces.  
Writing in the The Sources of Military Change, Chris Demchak was one of the 
first to consider the conceptual, systematic, and organisational implications associated 
with the integration of the information technologies (IT) associated with the RMA into 
Western doctrines. For Demchak, at the systematic level, this IT-enabled transformation 
has the potential to make combat forces more fragile rather than robust. She argues that 
‘the long term-structural effects of the emergent worldwide change in military 
organisation, based on information technology, are not well understood,’ and that 
operational effectiveness depends on fewer surprises.410 This, in turn, is reliant on less 
complexity, greater advanced knowledge, and better responsiveness through 
redundancy. But IT systems in fact function to enable a way of operating in opposition 
to these requirements.411 Thus, Demchak argues there is a ‘poor systems fit’ between 
modern military organisation and reality, and she places the blame for this on the failure 
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of the military to adopt a network approach needed to underpin advanced IT use, and on 
the ‘strongly US tendency to inappropriately and incompletely transfer private firm 
lessons to public task environments.’412 As a result, Demchak argues that militaries that 
have transformed around RMA principles will be prone to the ‘emergent surprises’ 
associated with complex systems.413 Demchak’s analysis is highly interesting as it not 
only represented an early attempt to understand the systematic impact of the RMA, it 
also tied the adoption of its principles to the military’s emulation of civilian businesses. 
However, Demchak only considers combat forces in her analysis, thereby leaving open 
the question of if and how logistics systems and practices have transformed, and if so 
what are the implications of such a transformation?  
Despite this focus on combat forces, strategists, military commanders, and 
theorists throughout the ages have all remarked on the importance of logistics in 
successful combat operations and, ultimately, in implementing strategy.414 As General 
Omar Bradley’s oft-cited quote that ‘Amateurs study strategy and tactics, professionals 
study logistics’ highlights, in the professional military, combat commanders themselves 
view the study of logistics as fundamental to the success of operational plans.415 
Although the last decade has witnessed intense military activity, and at times strong 
media focus on Western military logistics failures, international relations and military 
sociology scholars have generally shown little interest in military logistics. While those 
academic works that do exist on contemporary military logistics note that ‘dramatic 
change’ has occurred in the past 20 years, they also state this change remains 
understudied.416 Moreover, much like the RMA, it is important to situate the start of the 
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British transformation of military logistics within its US context. As I show in this 
chapter, the British military has consistently mirrored the US example in terms of 
adopting new logistics concepts and doctrine. Similarly, it is also important to 
understand that this logistics transformation is not unique to the British and US 
militaries; NATO, and non-NATO states are also adopting post-Fordist approaches to 
organise their logistics and wider force structures. 
Military Logistics Literature 
After decades of neglect, military logistics is beginning to receive scholarly attention. In 
2009, Michael O’Hanlon detailed the budgetary and logistics constraints on US military 
strategy and force projection.417 In 2012, Matthew Uttley and Christopher Kinsey 
discussed the importance of logistics in warfare, applying the British principles of 
logistics to contemporary conflicts. They argued that ‘the inherent nature of defence 
logistics… has remained constant since the era of ancient warfare’ and that ‘the steps 
required to construct and operate a logistics system have remained conceptually simple 
and timeless’.418 Very recently, Mark Erbel and Christopher Kinsey have argued that a 
distribution-based Revolution in Military Logistics (RML) has indeed occurred, and 
reiterated that military logistics has a deeply reciprocal relationship with strategy,419  
while Eugenio Cusumano has also outlined how logistics constraints shape 
operations.420 John Louth has provided detailed analyses of the problems with current 
British defence logistics and argued that increasing operational complexity must be 
embraced in finding solutions to these problems.421 Interestingly, David Shouesmith has 
noted how this complexity is a function of the changes in the nature of the modern state 
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and its military forces, and how they should be used.422 Meanwhile, Mikkel Rasmussen 
argues for closer integration of civilian business strategy and organisation in Western 
militaries.423 However, while these recent works indicate that scholars are converging 
on the topic, I would contend that they lack a conceptual framework for explaining the 
recent changes in military logistics, and make no attempt to explain the wider processes 
that have led to these changes.  
As a result, and despite earlier works on military logistics,424 Van Creveld’s 
Supplying War is still viewed as the seminal work on the subject. In it, Van Creveld 
investigates logistics in predominantly European land campaigns from the 16th Century 
to the 1944 Allied invasion of Normandy. For Van Creveld, the method of supplying 
armies during the period 1560-1715 was essentially feudal, based on Ancien Regime 
society, and in arguing that the military logistics system could not change until society 
changed, Van Creveld implicitly acknowledges that military logistics is fundamentally 
related to wider modes of production.425 This analysis chimes with other scholars who 
have examined how methods of supplying armies often influenced the development of 
the European state.426 However, in his subsequent chapters, Van Creveld challenges the 
orthodox view of the three-phased development in military logistics systems. The first 
two of these phases were identified by Clausewitz, who labelled the evolution of the 
depot system and the subsequent return to foraging under Napoleon ‘revolutions’ in 
supply and maintenance.427 The final phase emerged in the 20th Century as military 
forces in the industrialised era became increasingly reliant on continual supply from the 
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rear. In challenging the veracity of these phases with detailed evidence from each 
campaign, Van Creveld follows a contrarian impulse that has defined much of his 
career. 
In perhaps his most controversial chapter examining the highly detailed, 
synchronised and sophisticated Allied logistics plan for Operation Overlord, Van 
Creveld argues that this plan did not survive contact with the beaches, and that 
improvisation was key to keeping the allies supplied.428 Indeed, for Van Creveld, 
improvisation defines successful military logistics. Despite an acknowledgement of the 
need for preparation,429 Van Creveld’s central, and perhaps counter-intuitive argument, 
is that these preparations’ impact on operations is limited and does not always equal 
success. He states that flexibility, resourcefulness and determination can overcome 
logistics weaknesses, and in doing so, he argues that continuity – in the form of 
logistical improvisation – is the defining characteristic of military logistics through the 
ages.430 Decisively, Van Creveld remains unconvinced that systematic improvement in 
military logistics is possible as ‘the results of the only comprehensive effort which was 
made in this direction [were not] particularly encouraging.’431 This is a contentious 
position. While it downplays the importance of military logistics planning and systems 
in the outcome of the campaigns Van Creveld examines, it also contradicts the opinions 
of many modern commanders on the importance of sound logistics preparations.432 It 
can also be argued that Van Creveld’s reasoning introduces an element of academic 
nihilism to the subject, for if improvisation is decisive, what is the point of studying 
military logistics doctrine and systems?  
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Despite its original contribution, Supplying War has been critiqued by a number 
of scholars, including for its skewed sampling.433 Thomas Kane has launched a 
sustained challenge to Van Creveld’s suggestion that logistics preparations are 
‘futile’434 by examining campaigns from the Second World War to the onset of the 
RMA. In all these cases, Kane details how careful attention to logistics planning and 
execution acted not only as an operational force multiplier, but also how such 
preparations gave military forces better strategic choices which, ultimately, allowed 
these forces to undermine their adversary’s strategy.435 Thus, for Kane, and 
subsequently Erbel and Kinsey, ‘logistics is the arbiter of opportunity’.436 He states that 
‘supply preparations not only help determine the character of a war, they are affected by 
the outcome of that determination.’437 Thus, logistics preparation and strategic outcome 
are inherently interlinked, and cause and effect can flow both ways. Crucially, in 
challenging Supplying War’s final assertion that the human intellect cannot fully 
understand war and thus strategy,438 Kane argues that not only is logistics preparation 
an often decisive factor in military operations, but, critically, an understanding of 
military logistics is the first step toward understanding an adversaries’ strategic intent.  
Both Van Creveld and Kane also address the potential impact of the RMA on 
military logistics. Writing in a 2004 post-script to Supplying War, Van Creveld 
correctly identifies how computerisation and JIT logistics allow the fine-tuning of 
logistics capabilities with operational needs, and how modern armies now negotiate 
contracts for services on the free market.439 However, somewhat lazily, he then 
concludes that there has been no fundamental shift in military logistics since the Second 
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World War as the main method of supply is still predominantly based on road transport 
and intensive industrial modes of production.440 Indeed, Van Creveld clearly states that: 
‘It does not appear as if the nature of logistics has undergone or is about to undergo a 
fundamental change’.441 Kane similarly stresses continuity over change in rebutting 
claims that better information technology will ‘obviate much of [the need for] 
logistics’442 and predicts that future forces will need several reliable supply lines to 
maintain the superior logistics capabilities that confer decisive strategic advantage. 
Van Creveld’s position that logistical improvisation, determination and 
flexibility are decisive certainly has merit: flexibility remains a principle of logistics in 
NATO militaries.443 Van Creveld is also correct that most supplies are still shipped by 
road. Meanwhile, Kane, and Erbel and Kinsey, are correct in arguing that logistical 
preparation affects strategic performance. And all these authors’ are correct in 
identifying that the RMA will affect future logistics. However, all these classic works 
lack a conceptual depth. Van Creveld and Kane lack a theoretical framework for 
understanding logistical transformation and do not attempt to link this transformation 
with changes occurring in wider society. Both fail to discuss medical logistics, which 
are included in Western definitions of military logistics and growing in strategic 
importance. Decisively, Van Creveld explicitly states that he is unconcerned with ‘any 
abstract theorising’.444 As a result, his emphasis on improvisation ignores profound 
changes to Western logistics systems in the last twenty years. His argument that the 
modes of production are the same as they were in 1944 is simply incorrect. While 
Kane’s assessment of the RMA’s impact on logistics is more considered, it leaves open 
the question of what exactly has changed in the 14 years since his work was published, 
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and how this change has occurred. Similarly, Uttley and Kinsey’s arguments about the 
enduring nature of the principles of military logistics have been superseded by events: 
the US, UK and NATO have all since revised many of their principles in line with the 
post-Fordist approach.445  
Industrial Logistics and the Origins of Transformation 
While Yoko et al. state that the term logistics emerged out of the Napoleonic post of 
‘Chief de logis’,446 Rutner at al. argue it first appeared at the time of the American Civil 
War. Whatever the exact truth, it is clear that the growth of the term is linked with the 
development of mass armies and the increasingly complex methods of keeping them 
supplied. In charting the evolution of logistics thought, Rutner et al. posit that while the 
practice of logistics originated in the military, ‘civilian logistics and supply chain 
management surpassed military logistics at some point after World War II.’447 This 
view is supported by John Kent and Daniel Flint, who have examined the business 
logistics literature to describe the evolution of modern logistics in terms of six key 
phases. The first phase is farm to market logistics which describes the transfer of goods 
from point of production to point of sale. By the start of the Second World War, Kent 
and Flint argue that this era had been largely eclipsed by ‘segmented functions’ 
logistics. The primary focus at this time was on the functions that distributed goods, 
with heavy emphasis on in-bound out-bound transportation, warehousing, wholesaling 
and inventory control, coupled with a reliance on the combustion engine to produce 
greater efficiencies.448 Steven Simon has described this as the Fordist logistics model, 
based on a static supply chain ‘in which the manufacturer contracts with a supplier to 
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make and deliver material to the facility, where it is stockpiled.’449 Kent and Flint argue 
that this era was heavily influenced by the military logistics practices of the Second 
World War that continued to be utilised by businesses until the early 1960s. Similarly, 
Rutner et al. see the US Army’s use of rear logistics bases in the European theatre 
(which Van Creveld argued were inefficient) as the ‘precursor to the modern 
distribution centres used by the world’s largest firms.’450 For these authors, military 
logistics was the source of change in business logistics during this period, thus 
highlighting the link between the two, and how military logistics was at the vanguard of 
logistics thought during this period. Crucially, the main body of Van Creveld’s analysis 
of current military logistics is firmly based on evidence from this era and as a result, this 
is where the utility of his contribution ends. 
However, Kent and Flint argue that the era of segmented functions was followed 
by the development of ‘integrated functions’ in the early 1960s. This describes the trend 
toward viewing independent logistics functions holistically as part of a wider, 
interdependent system. During this period, as the business environment became more 
dynamic and competitive, there was shift in emphasis from physical distribution to a 
‘total cost’ approach to all parts of the logistics process, with a growing emphasis on 
information systems, services, marketing, and a wider realisation that one size of 
product did not fit all. This era coincided with the beginnings of post-Fordist modes of 
production, and these developments were advanced during the subsequent era Kent and 
Flint term ‘customer focus’ in the 1970s and 1980s. This involved a shift in primary 
focus toward the end user of the product, and toward maximising profits rather than 
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minimising costs.451 Link node concepts of logistics, and greater emphasis on operations 
management and management science also emerged during this era.  
Supporting this analysis, in The Box Marc Levinson shows how the introduction 
of the 40-foot standardised shipping container from the 1960s onwards revolutionised 
business logistics and led to the beginnings of globalisation. Moreover, Levinson, and 
Richard Olson and Thomas Scrogin, note how the US military’s adoption of a 
containerised logistics during the Vietnam War helped solve the problems of supplying 
over 500,000 soldiers from only one deepwater port.452 While it must be noted that the 
quick but partial adoption of containerisation caused serious backlog and wastage 
issues,453 Olson and Scrogin show how the subsequent adoption of this simple 
technology and its accompanying new principles of inventory in–motion, rapid 
movement, and minimum handling and storage of supplies ‘transformed operational 
planning.’454 Levinson, and Yoko et al. also argue that the US Navy’s insistence on the 
40-foot standardised container at a crucial time in its introduction helped cement it as 
the cornerstone of modern business logistics, while simultaneously contributing to the 
growth of the Japanese and southeast Asian economies.455 Thus, these authors show that 
although business logistics practices led the way during this period, the vast scale and 
cost of the US military effort in Vietnam meant that the relationship between military 
and business logistics was bi-directional, with each influencing the development of the 
other. 
With the onset of the eras of ‘logistics as differentiator’ and ‘behaviour and 
boundary spanning logistics’ from the 1980s onwards, the relationship between business 
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logistics and military logistics became uni-directional. The realisation that highly 
synchronised JIT logistics systems could increase commercial returns first originated in 
the production practices instigated by the Toyota firm during the mid-late 1970s in 
response to inflation and a stagnating Japanese economy.  Thus, reducing waste – in the 
form of stocks, workforce, and production times – was the crucial motivator for the 
introduction of these practices. The basic premise of JIT holds that ‘no product should 
be made, no component ordered, until there is a downstream requirement.’456 One of the 
central tenets of JIT logistics is SCM, which by viewing the procurement, supply and 
distribution functions as a single system, aims to ‘establish control of end-to-end 
process in order to create a seamless flow of goods.’457 By increasing control of the total 
supply chain, costs can be reduced and profitability increased. With better control, the 
supply chain is more flexible to respond to changes in demand or supply. Crucially, 
however, the SCM approach is based on stable assumptions of demand and supply that 
were a product of the relatively stable strategic and market environment during the Cold 
War. As a result, SCM systems are dynamically flexible, but ‘only within the set 
structure of their existing supply chain design.’458 
Coupled with a greater understanding of the benefits of inter-organisational 
efficiency and reverse logistics within an increasingly globalised economy, SCM’s 
cross-functional approach was central to the new JIT logistics procedures that were 
adopted by other Japanese and US firms in the early 1980s.459 Meanwhile, rapidly 
changing customer demands encouraged outsourced production and services to allow 
firms to respond to the demands of the market.460 Rutner at al. have also identified how 
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the deregulation of the transportation industry in the US and a growth in mergers of US 
firms began the wider trend toward decentralised organisational structures and flatter 
hierarchies in industry.461 At the same time, logistics became central to production 
operations; streamlined and efficient logistics systems became viewed as decisive in 
conferring competitive advantage. Kent and Flint show that recognition of this principle 
continues to grow today, and that an understanding of the benefits of co-operation 
between firms is leading to great inter-firm and inter-functional cooperation and 
coordination of logistics efforts to increase both efficiencies and flexibility.462 As 
demonstrated by some major courier firms’ sharing of European distribution centres,463 
boundaries between functions and firms are decreasing as they pool their resources 
more than in the past. Similarly, the increase in service response logistics and the 
introduction of performance-based contracts have blended production and servicing 
functions as never before. The underlying motivation for all these changes is that 
strategic alliances across the entire supply chain allows organisations to better adjust to 
changing customer demand whilst limiting costs.  
It is therefore clear that modern business logistics has transformed in the last 30 
years as the global economy and modes of production have evolved. What is also clear 
is that the nature of the isomorphic relationship between military and business logistics 
has reversed, and then been strengthened, since the Second World War. Moreover, as 
Rutner et al. and Flint and Kent show, there is an identifiable time-lag between the 
introduction of new business logistics practices, their appearance in business logistics 
publications, and then their adoption by military logisticians.464 Thus, since the 1960s 
Western militaries, isolated from the business world and traditionally protected from 
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market competition, have been slower to change their logistics practices than 
commercial firms.  
Adaption, Innovation, and the Legacy of Cold War Military Logistics  
During the Cold War, NATO’s strategy for deterring Warsaw Pact forces was based 
around the positional defence of Central Europe. This saw a significant proportion of 
combat forces based in forward positions in West Germany in order to fight a 
conventional, high intensity defensive war. These forces were to be supported by 
reinforcements held at varying degrees of readiness moving to predetermined positions 
in a ‘layer cake’ defensive plan, as shown in Figure 1.465 Significantly, each nation was 
responsible for the logistics in their own sector, and each sector utilised linear lines of 
supply. To sustain such large, forward-positioned forces, NATO accepted stock levels 
were for 30 days of combat supplies. As a result, formations such as 1 British Corps 
organised their logistics at successive levels using the traditional ‘echelon system’, with 
stores held at frontline units, then forward storage sites, then at rear depots and finally 
larger quantities held in storage in ports such as Antwerp.466 This structure meant that in 
the event of hostilities, the main logistics plan was based around the forward movement 
of stocks, with combat forces’ controlled withdrawal along predetermined lines of 
communication gradually reducing supply lines. NATO’s strong understanding of the 
Warsaw Pact’s doctrine and tactics thus shaped its pre-determined defensive plan and its 
accompanying logistics plan.467 Moving pre-arranged levels of stock forward at pre-
arranged times along secure lines of communication in rear areas meant that there was 
little need nor desire for complicated asset tracking or inventory management systems, 
while the logistics structure itself remained functionally segmented with little 
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integration of resources or joint planning.468 Indeed, the CGS, General Sir Nick Carter, 
has eloquently surmised the nature of warfare and logistics at this time:  
‘When I grew up in the Cold War, it was straightforward. We were at four 
hours’ notice to move, we sat in our barracks in Germany, we knew where all 
our equipment was, we knew where our deployment positions were and we 
were ready to go for a very clear and present threat that we understood.”469 
In short, notwithstanding differences in the availability of strategic airlift and force 
posture, the logistics system of NATO in the Cold War was quite similar to that utilised 
by the Allies during the European campaign of 1944-5 in that it was predominantly 
depot and truck-based, and lacking an efficient holistic and systematic approach. 
Figure 1. NATO ‘layer cake’ defensive plan. 
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Despite the end of the Cold War and the introduction of some early post-Fordist 
practices, Western military logistics in the 1991 Gulf War remained organised around 
the Cold War echelon system. Although the campaign was expeditionary in nature, the 
Coalition still could deploy and build up its forces in secure areas away from the 
frontline in Kuwait. These forces were likewise supplied by secure logistics bases and 
lines of communication, and the combat operation was directed against a linearly 
deployed conventional enemy (the Iraqi army) using defensive tactics to hold national 
territory. Due to this operational reality, the US logistics system operated out of the 
Saudi port of Jubail, through Al-Qaysumah base, and then moved goods onto divisional 
logistics bases. To keep the 700,000 US troops supplied, 18 trucks per minute, 24 hours 
a day, seven days a week passed on the main supply route.470 Thus at first glance it 
appears the Cold War model still applied to Gulf logistics.  
However, the overarching impression of the US logistics operation given by the 
officer responsible, Lieutenant General William Pagonis, is of a logistics system 
innovating and adapting under the pressure of sustaining such large forces in the desert. 
Contrasting the emergence of RMA combat technologies, Pagonis notes that the lack of 
asset tracking systems resulted in massive unused stockpiles,471 while he states that the 
whole logistics plan and detailed schedule was still recorded in paper format in a single 
‘red book’ binder.472 Pagonis also tells how he had to develop logistics planning cells 
during deployment to assess logistics requirements, analyse activities and draw up 
contingency plans, indicating that these cells were an innovation rather than determined 
by logistics doctrine. Pagonis’ account also indicates the emergence of some post-
Fordist thought in Western military logistics at this time. He refers to combat soldiers as 
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his ‘customers’,473 and also describes how the up-arming of the Abrams tank with the 
new 120mm gun was achieved by the movement of the entire production line from the 
US to Saudi Arabia and the adoption of round-the-clock production, thus indicating a 
growth in contractor flexibility.474 Similarly, the massive logistical needs of the US 
Army forced Pagonis to meet demand through local sources where possible. He details 
how vehicles were mass-rented from Saudi firms by open market negotiation rather than 
confiscation, noting how the Saudi’s often took advantage of the US Army’s demand to 
manipulate prices.475 
The British experience in the Gulf War paints a picture of a military adapting 
Cold War logistics doctrine to a new environment in a similar fashion to that of the US. 
The lasting impression given by the commander of British forces, General Rupert 
Smith, is of a logistics plan that struggled to maintain and supply an armoured division 
in the Gulf and one that may have not survived contact with a more competent 
enemy.476 The British Army’s Gulf logistics plan followed Cold War doctrine in its 
adoption of echolened rear bases and three lines of supply to support a linear battle.477 A 
single theatre supply area, known as the Force Maintenance Area (FMA) was initially 
established at Jubail, and supplies were trucked to a Forward Force Maintenance Area 
(FFMA), and then to a Divisional Maintenance Area for distribution to frontline units 
along secure lines of communication. Each echelon had their own contingent of 
engineer, transport, logistics and medical units, and the FMA also had a team dedicated 
to procuring local supplies and services. Smith notes that he had to battle with the MoD 
to be given command of the FMA, indicating Cold War planners’ reluctance to allow 
the force commander to fully integrate strategic logistics with operations. Just in case 
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(JIC) logistics was still practiced, with the FFMA stockpiled with enough supplies to 
sustain the division in combat for at least ten days.478  
However, the UK logistics effort also suffered from poor inventory and asset 
tracking procedures, with stores held in depots in Germany since the end of the Second 
World War frequently missing or unserviceable.479 Some weapons platforms, like the 
new Challenger tank and Warrior AIFV required desert upgrades in theatre; a task that 
was completed with the deployment of specialist teams from the British firms who built 
them.480 Meanwhile, the mechanical spares system was ‘overwhelmed’ due to a lack of 
asset tracking systems.481 Indeed, asset tracking was a major flaw across British 
logistics, with a single medical officer forced to examine each container at Jubail in 
order to find critical medical supplies.482 Movement control IT systems were also 
incompatible: in the words of one British logistics officer, this resulted in manual 
information gathering ‘using stubby pencil, T cards and the most famous… computer of 
all, fagpacket [becoming] the day to day tool of the mover.’483 While the use of roll-on, 
roll-off ships allowed the rapid unloading of supplies, as in Vietnam, the need for 
internal cranes on these vessels also became quickly apparent given the lack of quayside 
cranes, as did the need for integral military crane capacity to unload container trucks in 
land.484 Similarly, Smith highlights how many ships were loaded to capacity to reduce 
costs rather than in the order their stores would be needed for operations, thus 
hampering tactical flexibility.485  
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Nevertheless, there is also evidence that British logistics was evolving during 
this period. Smith highlights the utility of logistics liaison officers when fighting in a 
coalition. He also personally oversaw the development of an armoured reserve logistics 
battlegroup to negate the dangers of operating on insecure lines of communication once 
the offensive inside Iraq had begun, a scenario that directly contradicted British logistics 
doctrine at the time.486 Meanwhile, new transport technologies, such as the 
Dismountable Off-Load and Pick-Up System (DROPS) logistics truck also significantly 
increased the speed and flexibility of British logistics operations. 
Although there were some signs of modernisation, the Gulf War highlighted that 
Western military logistics were still fundamentally based on the echelon system of re-
supply in secure rear areas and on JIC logistics practices. The same system was 
followed in the US and UK deployment on NATO’s subsequent Balkan missions, and 
the British deployment in Sierra Leone. Indeed, it appears that the gap between business 
logistics and military logistics during this period was at its widest, and despite attempts 
to centralise of logistics command, exemplified in the development of the joint-force 
US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) between 1989-2004, functional 
segmentation remained. There also appears to have been little change in military 
logistics practices. US and British military logistics organisations had been relatively 
insulated from organisational change due to a large budget and the need to counter a 
single, constant existential threat in the Cold War. But by 1999, with shrinking military 
budgets and the desire for a smaller, more globally deployable military to address 
increasingly diverse threats, it became apparent that their military logistics systems were 
far behind the curve. In February 1999 the UK began centralising control of logistics in 
its new Defence Logistics Organisation, whose main task was to streamline defence 
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logistics structure, reduce stock costs and manage procurement reform.487 The same 
month in the US, a military commander called for a distribution-based ‘Revolution in 
Military Logistics’ (RML).488 Heeding this call, in 2000 Deputy Defense Secretary John 
Hamre issued a ‘Logistics Transformation Plan’. This called for a total modernisation of 
US logistics command and practices. In the directive, Hamre stated:  
‘Logistics transformation must be rapid... We must drive down our cost (e.g 
pipeline, maintenance and logistics footprint costs) as we leverage emerging 
technology to increase the visibility, accuracy, and speed of logistics operations 
without compromising out effectiveness.’489 
Despite these prior attempts to reform military logistics in both the UK and US 
the 2003 Iraq War highlighted major shortcomings in both nations’ logistics systems. 
These failures became embedded in public perceptions, with headlines such as ‘Families 
of dead soldiers can sue MoD over inadequate kit’; ‘Lack of helicopters put injured 
troops at risk’; ‘US soldiers lack best protective gear’ and; ‘Thousands of Army 
Humvees Lack Armor Upgrade’; indicating media interest in these failures.490 Reacting 
to public concern, a House of Commons inquiry into British preparations for the 
invasion of Iraq noted that as: ‘a result of a combination of shortages of initial 
stockholdings and serious weaknesses in logistics systems troops at the frontline did not 
receive sufficient supplies in a range of important equipment including enhanced 
combat body armour’.491 A British Commanding Officer during the initial war fighting 
phase went further, describing the delivery of logistic support to frontline operations as 
‘woefully inadequate’.492 The impact of the failure of unresponsive ‘brute force’ 
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logistics based on JIC principles was not only felt by British troops. A US Congress 
investigation found that in the first month of combat operations, the defense department 
temporarily ‘lost track of $1.2 billion in materials shipped to the Army, encountered 
hundreds of backlogged shipments, and ran up millions of dollars in fees to lease or 
replace storage containers because of backlogged or lost shipments.’493 Other 
inefficiencies identified included port congestion, improper sequencing of combat units 
and their support, excess costs and the disrupted flow of units and supplies into 
theatre.494 Clearly, Western military logistics were failing, and the perception was they 
were failing because they had not adopted industry best practice. As the conflict in Iraq 
continued, the need for more cost-efficient logistics became increasingly important and 
both the American and British militaries began to transform their logistics systems in 
line with post-Fordist principles.  
Centralisation  
While the presence of neo-liberal governments in both the US and UK who were 
committed to outsourcing state functions to business is important to understanding the 
wider drive for military logistics efficiencies,495 more specifically, the media coverage 
of early logistical failures in the invasion of Iraq and the resulting political pressure to 
address the issue ahead of presidential elections forced US Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld to prioritise logistics transformation. In September 2003 Rumsfeld began the 
process of centralisation, designating the Commander, US Transportation Command 
(USTRANSCOM) responsible for all distribution across US defence. In defining 
USTRANSCOM as the Distribution Process Owner (DPO), Rumsfeld ensured it 
became ‘the single entity to direct and supervise execution of the Strategic Distribution 
system’ in order to ‘improve the overall efficiency and interoperability of distribution 
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related activities – deployment, sustainment and redeployment support during peace and 
war.’496 Rumsfeld himself had experience of transforming ailing businesses by 
streamlining procedures and reducing workforces in line with post-Fordism, and his 
initiative was informed by his awareness that the entire US defence distribution pipeline 
needed to be properly linked and synchronised to produce the most cost effective means 
of supply. In short, it had to emulate private sector logistics. To this end, he designated 
USTRANSCOM’s four-star general as the single, unified commander for all defence 
distribution, and outlined a four year plan to change organisational structures and 
upgrade IT systems to give complete oversight of the distribution system. Paradoxically, 
enabled by centralised and standardised IT systems, the decentralisation of decisions 
throughout the distribution pipeline encouraged the logistical flexibility to respond 
quickly to frontline demands.497 The centralisation and standardisation of logistics 
practices under USTRANSCOM continued in 2004 when the organisation became the 
manager of all US defence logistics information technology systems. In 2006 it was 
made responsible for identifying, recommending and supervising implementation of all 
global sourcing solutions.498 Decisively, at this time USTRANSCOM adopted the 
civilian Supply Chain Operations Reference Model (SCORM) which identifies core 
institutional processes and tailors production-supply chains to meet these processes.499 
The British military also increased the pace and scope of centralisation in 
response to the shortcomings of Iraq. In 2004, the Defence Logistics Transformation 
Programme (DLTP) was launched with the aim of increasing the effectiveness, 
efficiency and flexibility of logistics support across UK defence. It appointed a single 
                                                 
496 Available at http://www.transcom.mil/about/briefHistory.cfm retrieved 20 November 2014. 
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Defense Supply Chain,’ unpublished thesis, 5, available at www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA437047, retrieved 4 March 2016. 
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joint four-star officer, the first Chief of Defence Materiel. The DLTP began the process 
of centralising defence materiel and resources, and created centralised centres of 
excellence for the repair and maintenance of major weapons platforms.500 While the 
DLTP did increase effectiveness, most notably with the introduction of the centralised 
JAMES whole fleet management and the VITAL asset tracking systems, it was 
primarily centred on cost-reducing efficiencies, and, with outsourced support from the 
McKinsey firm, it eventually delivered savings of £952 million.501 A renewed focus on 
effectiveness came with the introduction of the Defence Logistics Programme in 2006. 
This sought to increase coherence, velocity and precision across logistics through the 
centralisation of command and control, and the updating and centralisation of IT 
systems.502 Emulating the US, 2007 saw the merger of Britain’s two defence logistics 
organisations, the Defence Logistics Organisation and the Defence Procurement 
Agency, into a single entity, Defence Equipment & Support. Responsibility for 
operational logistics was also centralised in the Permanent Joint Headquarters J4 
division and within the theatre-deployed Joint Force Logistic Component 
Headquarters.503 Meanwhile, a single centralised inventory system for the whole of UK 
defence, the Management of Joint Deployed Inventory (MJDI), was commissioned to 
provide one platform to link previously incompatible asset tracking systems. MJDI aims 
at total asset visibility to enable British defence to move to a fully JIT logistics system. 
It will lead to a profound reorganisation and flattening of hierarchies in British logistics 
units, and also in a reduction in combat units’ logistics personnel, thereby delivering 
efficiencies. Meanwhile, NATO logistics command has also begun centralising, 
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although at a much slower pace. In 2011, member states agreed to reduce and reorganise 
the alliance’s logistics structure into the NATO Procurement and Support Agency 
(NSPA). This combined four former NATO logistics commands into one. 
Another major example of ongoing centralisation in British defence particularly 
pertinent to this study has been the recent implementation of the ‘Defence Estate 
Rationalisation’ programme. The 2010 SDSR identified the need for rationalisation of 
property owned by the MoD in order to save running costs, and primarily recommended 
the sale of surplus land and buildings that could be undertaken quickly. To achieve this, 
the Army Basing Plan was announced in March 2013.504 This plan influenced FR20, 
which outlined the centralisation of Army Reserve units in larger barracks and the 
closure and subsequent sale of smaller sites. Of the 334 TA sites around Britain in 2013, 
FR20 designated 26 to close, most of which were done so on the grounds that the units 
that occupied these locations were ‘under-recruited.’505 As is discussed in Chapter Six, 
this sale of the some of the defence estate, coupled with the centralisation of equipment 
stores in larger bases under the Whole Fleet Management approach, has had major 
impacts on some of the sub-units in this study. Supporting the argument made in the 
previous chapter, and the evidence provided in the next chapter, this decision was also 
politico-ideological, reflecting as it did the Conservative government’s desire to reduce 
state spending overall. Indeed, this became especially obvious after they gained a 
majority in the 2015 general election, and quickly introduced a second round of 
rationalisation in March 2016. This included the potential sale of ten sites facilitated by 
relocating of regular units from their barracks into centralised super-garrisons. This 
marked a major departure from simply selling under-used sites or relocating reserve 
units, as the ‘release’ of these sites is expected to generate £1 billion through land sales. 
                                                 
504 Ministry of Defence (2013) Defence Estate Rationalisation Update, available at 
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It was also designed to complement the Conservative government’s house building 
scheme by contributing ‘up to 55,000 homes to support wider Government targets’ by 
2020.506 Clearly then, the British government has adopted centralisation in earnest.  
Integrating the Core and the Periphery 
As in the combat arms, a core, specialised logistics workforce is now being established 
in Western militaries. Enabled by better training and technology, these core logistics 
organisations are professionalising the study and practice of logistics. Highlighting a 
major shift in institutional goals, this new core is increasingly specialising in the 
management of logistics IT systems and contracting. For example, the US Army’s 
Materiel Command is expanding the training of its cadre of in-service contracting 
professionals to increase the capability of the Army to understand and engage with its 
contractors.507 The establishment of Logistics Contract Management Course run by the 
Defence Logistics School in Deepcut indicates that British forces are doing the same.508 
In a further sign of professionalisation, the US Army has consolidated previous logistics 
learning environments with the opening of its own logistics university in 2009. This 
now runs over 211 different specialised logistics courses.509 Similarly, the introduction 
of MJDI in the British Army will be enabled by the specialist support of 262 Combat 
Service Support Signals Squadron to higher command. The full roll-out of MJDI will 
change logistics structure at the unit level, with new Logistics Support Detachments 
(LSDs) embedded with each unit. These detachments will consist of a team of four 
‘professional logisticians’ trained by the RLC, and will replace the old system of each 
unit providing their own non-specialist logistics staff.510 Crucially, the smaller LSD core 
will significantly reduce the number of logistics-related personnel in each unit, and will 
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deploy with its parent unit, resulting in significant changes to the way army units are 
supported. Meanwhile, the, UK, US and NATO have also been careful to maintain core 
logistics functions deemed central to operational effectiveness. For example, Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal remains a highly specialised competency that is well funded across 
these organisations, as represented by the establishment the Counter-IED Centre of 
Excellence in Madrid, and three other logistics-related centres.511 
Meanwhile, as part of wider defence cuts, the US and Britain have had to 
sharply reduce their logistics forces’ size whilst attempting to maintain their capability. 
These cuts have often focused on the logistics component precisely because it is 
perceived that much of the non-core logistics capability can be provided by a periphery 
workforce.512 To reduce costs, many expensive and traditional logistics functions 
needed during large mobilisations have been allocated to reserve forces, who have 
simultaneously been increased in size in a bid to maintain capability. For example, 
while the Army2020 transformation reduced the British Army’s logistics personnel by 
about 30 percent, the complimentary transformation of the Army Reserve forces has 
increased the reliance on reserve logistics units to deliver the capability to meet surges 
in demand, and led to the creation of many new reserve logistics units.513 Indeed, 
reservists now constitute six of the 13 REME battalions.514 While the UK’s reserve 
logistics component size has therefore been increased (but not necessarily filled), the 
capabilities it provides have generally remained toward the lower end of the skill 
spectrum in their respective fields; for instance, the majority of reserve RLC units are 
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involved in transport and movement. Those units that do have a more specialised 
function, such as the Operational Support Group which provides a standby core of 
specialist logistics staff, have been formed with the specific aim of incorporating 
previous military or civilian skills into reserve capability to reduce costs.515 As such, the 
delegation of lower skilled logistics functions to reservists, coupled with the desire to 
tap the specialised ex-military or civilian workforce, indicates the dualistic nature of 
modern military logistics structural reliance on the periphery. 
However, both the centralisation of command and the division of labour 
between the core and the periphery have been further accompanied by the near 
simultaneous adoption of the ‘total cost’ approach to force structure and readiness in 
Western militaries. The closer integration of the core and the periphery is underpinned 
by the total cost concept, and SCM practices that strive for the flexibility to respond to 
consumer demands whilst keeping running costs down.  UK defence is currently being 
re-organised around the ‘Whole Force’ concept that became fully operational in April 
2014. This is focused on ensuring that the product – which in the military sense is seen 
as manpower – consists of ‘the right mix’ of ‘Regulars, Reserves and Contractors to 
produce the greatest effect in the most cost-effective manner.’516 For example, the total 
British deployed force on Operation Herrick in Afghanistan between 2010-2014 
consisted of almost 78 percent regulars, nearly 20 percent reservists, and less than 2.5 
percent contractors and civil servants.517 By achieving a more ‘balanced mix’ in the 
future – itself a term that appears to have originated in the energy industry – UK 
                                                 
515 For example, 2 Operational Support Group Royal Logistic Corps provides the capability in the UK. 
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defence planners hope to retain capability and flexibility whilst decreasing expensive 
manpower costs. The Whole Force concept is enabled by operational planning 
assumptions, tiered levels of force readiness, and a commitment to better train and equip 
reserve forces. Indeed, the logistics element, the new Total Support Force (TSF), 
follows the same approach. The TSF comprises a ‘pre-planned mix of military, civil 
service and contractor personnel held at appropriate readiness to provide progressive 
levels of support in the UK and on operations.’518  
In 2012, the much larger US Army also instigated the ‘Total Force’ policy 
aimed at better integrating the Army, National Guard and Army Reserve components 
below the divisional level. Specifically, these reforms standardise reserve readiness with 
those of the Army, and place responsibility for validating this readiness with Army 
command.519 It adopts a standardised deployment schedule across the total force and 
orders the streamlining of reserve mobilisation procedures. Under analogous fiscal 
pressures, and following advice from business management firm Price Waterhouse 
Coopers, the Irish Defence Forces also introduced a ‘Single Force Concept’ in 2012.520 
German, French, and NATO’s defence structures have not yet adopted the concept, 
predominantly due to ongoing reserve transformation in the case of the former and 
political issues in the latter two, but the recent adoption of the ‘total cost’ approach by 
some Western militaries represents a profound change in the way in which not only 
their logistics, but also their wider military forces, are organised, resourced and 
deployed. In the US and UK in particular, the change has occurred in a similar time 
frame due to similar budgetary pressures and strategic appraisals. Crucially, coupled 
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with the centralisation of logistics commands and the division between core and 
periphery logistics functions, the adoption of the integrative ‘total cost’ approach in 
Western militaries signals the end of the segmented function logistics of Van Creveld’s 
era. 
SCM and Outsourcing 
The success of the total cost approach relies on two decisive criteria being met. Firstly, 
there must be a comprehensive understanding of demand, and secondly there must be an 
understanding of how this demand will be met. Forecasting and supply are thus crucial. 
At the strategic level, Western military logistical demands are set by force structure and 
strategic appraisals, such as the SDSR and the Quadrennial Defense Review. At the 
operational level, logistics forecasting is demand-based. This has changed little since 
the Second World War. However, the supply side has changed dramatically with the 
introduction of SCM principles and systems into military logistics. Indeed, without the 
transparency and oversight of supply encouraged by SCM principles, the integrated 
total force concept would be impossible to implement. 
British logistics practices are now heavily dependent on SCM systems. After the 
2003 Iraq deployment, the McKinsey consultancy firm was heavily involved in 
introducing SCM procedures across British defence, with a particular focus on 
increasing delivery reliability whilst decreasing wait time. Numerous procedural 
inefficiencies were identified, as was the need to update IT systems. One of the most 
noticeable changes under the SCM approach occurred in relation to unit stores. Under 
the previous segmented approach, units held 30 days of stores in contingency. However, 
by linking existing demand data with engineering analysis and the experience of 
Quartermasters, standard stores and bespoke ‘priming equipment packs’ are now kept 
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within the supply chain, giving far more flexibility.521 Reflecting the desire to move to a 
wider SCM footing, in 2005 the Joint Supply Chain concept was introduced by the 
Ministry of Defence to ‘cover the policies, end-to-end processes and activities 
associated with receipt of stocks from trade to their delivery to the demanding unit and 
the return loop for all 3 Services.’522 
Similar changes have been underway in the US. In May 2003, the DoD 
published its Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation outlining the conduct of 
future joint logistics. This regulation introduced SCORM, and at its core was an 
awareness that US defence logistics needed to be more responsive, reliable and 
consistent to adapt to the evolving global environment whilst delivering the best value 
for money.  In 2007, the first of three phases in the introduction of SCM, the Joint 
Supply Chain Architecture was initiated, and in 2010 it was institutionalised.523 The 
most recent DoD manual on SCM procedures instructs the military to ‘monitor and 
adopt or adapt emerging business practices to provide best-value, secure materiel and 
services, improve DoD supply chain performance, and reduce total life-cycle systems 
cost.’524 Industry is therefore clearly seen as in the logistical vanguard in the US. While 
NATO is yet to adopt a total force structure or a full SCM approach, its logistics 
updated principles indicate the impact of SCM concepts on its doctrine.525 
Coupled with the outsourcing of logistics capability to reservists, the British 
Army’s new Total Support Force puts a similar emphasis on contractors. Crucially, the 
new TSF structure states that: ‘the use of non-military personnel will [provide] most if 
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not all logistics functions rear of the Theatre Support Group by roule 4 of an enduring 
operation.’526 Therefore, the British Army’s most recent doctrine is to – as much as is 
possible – delegate rear logistics functions to the private sector by the second year of a 
deployment. This doctrine also states that reliance on Contractor Support to Operations 
will increase in relation to the smaller size of the army due to recent cuts.527 Indeed, 
British logistics doctrine and procedures now details the different types of contractor 
support to the TSF, and to codifies the relationship between the army/MoD and 
contractors.528 Decisively, it states that early engagement with long-term contractors 
during operational planning is required, and that contractors should be included in the 
whole spectrum of these plans, from force generation, to deployment, sustainment and 
force protection. Meanwhile, there has also been a transformation in the nature of 
outsourced contracts. With the support costs of complex weapons systems now 
exceeding the cost of development and production by two to three times over their 
service life,529 Andreas Glas et al. have shown that Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) 
contracts are becoming increasingly common in Western militaries as a method of 
reducing these costs. For example, PBL can mean that a civilian firm is contracted to 
deliver a required amount of flying hours on an airframe, rather than hours of 
servicing.530 Similarly, in their analysis of outsourced contracts in NATO’s mission in 
Afghanistan, Christiaan Davids et al. show that while member states often conducted 
independent sourcing, pooled operational sourcing through the former NAMSA 
structure was also commonly used.531 The pooling, sharing and prior negotiation of 
outsourced logistical services in the US, UK and NATO indicates the increasingly 
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privatised nature of military logistics, and adaption to constrained fiscal realities. 
Meanwhile, the fact that outsourced contractors are now involved in military planning 
marks a potentially significant change in the relationship between the private sector and 
the military, while PBL has the potential to change the nature of contractor support to 
operations in the future.  
But the privatisation of logistics on operations has had other profound impacts. 
Most notably, the deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan saw the largest number of 
civilian contractors ever used, many of whom operated in comparatively insecure rear 
areas. The British government has not published extensive data on its use of contractors 
on operations, but Cusumano reports that in the counter-insurgency phase of the Iraq 
war the British deployed 8,600 troops and at least 3,500 contractors. Similarly, in 2009, 
Britain’s 9,500 troops in Afghanistan were supported by at least 6,500 MoD contractors, 
and this may have peaked at 10,000.532 Thus contractors contributed at least 40 percent 
of Britain’s total force in both Iraq and Afghanistan. As Cusumano notes, the British 
reliance on contractors was politically useful as it meant troop caps could be 
circumvented in these unpopular wars.533 For its part, in 2007 the US military employed 
180,000 contractors either directly or indirectly in Iraq, while it had 160,000 troops in 
theatre.534 Of these contractors, 21,000 were American, 43,000 foreign and about 
118,000 Iraqis.535 While the US use of contractors for logistics ‘beyond the last mile’ 
was also partly caused by the political desire to limit force size in Iraq, both its and the 
UK’s case nonetheless underscores the massive privatisation of military logistics. 
Meanwhile, the fact that the second and third largest winners of US contracts in Iraq 
were both Kuwaiti firms,536 and that General David Petreaus had to re-organise local 
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contracting in Afghanistan due to corruption allegations,537 highlight not only that 
modern Western militaries have emerged as economic powers in their own right, but 
also a growing realisation that the awarding of contracts to local suppliers can aid or 
undermine reconstruction and economic growth depending on how it is conducted. In 
modern conflicts, military logistics practices – previously undertaken predominantly by 
military forces – can now be incorporated into plans to enable strategic outcomes 
through their generation of economic activity. Similarly, Western militaries, no longer 
confined to sourcing nationally, have demonstrated their ability to leverage the 
globalised economy through outsourcing with major implications for Western 
strategy.538  
The Emerging Logistics Network 
Very recently, the focus on the supply chain has been replaced by the realisation that 
more networked logistics will be a crucially important enabler in future conflict. Indeed, 
even before the introduction of JIT and SCM, US commanders were aware that the 
ultimate goal of these processes was a ‘seamless logistics system that ties all parts of the 
logistics community into one network of shared situational awareness and unified 
action.’539 As its latest logistics doctrinal publication, Joint Defence Publication 4.0 
(JDP 4.0) indicates, the British military is now taking steps to move beyond SCM by 
creating a fully networked logistics system which encompasses more than just the 
supply chain. Highlighting this, according to one senior officer responsible for 
transforming British Army logistics, ‘networking is the new buzzword’.540 As JDP 4.0 
states, ‘Logistics stretches across a network of nodes with multiple processes, through 
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which personnel and materiel flow and services are provided’.541 Thus, the whole 
British military and accompanying international logistics system is now .conceptualised 
as a ‘support network’ of interconnected nodes of suppliers, consumers, maintainers and 
storers. This network approach seeks to eclipse SCM by moving beyond the supply 
chain to a more expansive view of all supporting producers, services, and partners 
whilst simultaneously allowing supplies to be moved ‘forward and backward and 
sideways’ between nodes.  Rather than only moving supplies forwards toward the end 
user: ‘the network spreads the load’ associated with potentially stove-piped supply 
chains by allowing storage within its nodes, thereby reducing logistic drag.542 
Contrasting the logistics overlay of NATO’s ‘layer cake’, Figure 2 clearly shows that in 
a globalised world, it is recognised that the British military’s supply network itself must 
be global. This new network must also be enabled by better information technology, 
with JDP 4.0 stating that:  
‘Network enabled capability for Logistics enhances logistic information usage 
by providing and managing information in a timely and secure manner. The 
capability enables better decision-making. Network enabled capability for 
logistics is potentially a force multiplier and should form a fundamental 
element of logistic operational planning.’543 
 
 However, this network-enabled capability must be supported by ever more complex IT 
systems with open architecture across nodes – a situation which is yet to be reached. 
Moreover, to be effective, a fully networked system also needs accurate consumption 
and environmental data which is largely missing at present. Thus, at present, the British 
Defence Support Network is still under development; it is not yet a fully networked 
strategic supply system. 
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Figure 2. The British Defence Support Network 
 
Nevertheless, the introduction of the MJDI and Total Asset Visibility Minus 
(TAV-) systems across British defence is another good example of an emerging 
logistics network. A major part of the Logistics Networked Enabled Capability 
programme and the Future Logistics Information Services project, MJDI will replace 
the stockpiling and stove-piping associated with segmented function logistics across all 
units and formations, leading to a truly networked logistics IT system. MJDI will allow 
for the total global visibility of all stock up to unit level, and therefore better asset 
management. It will also be interoperable with the new TAV- which uses tagged 
barcodes on vehicles, containers and pallets that can be read by radio frequency up to 
100 metres from where they are located. This allows the automatic logging of all stores 
and supplies as they pass through TAV- nodes, in stark contrast to the experience of the 
Gulf and Iraq Wars. This visibility, linked with the MJDI system, will allow demand to 
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be judged in near real-time, and allow logistics planners to move stocks from one unit to 
another based on priorities and requirement data within the system, rather than solely on 
the demands of the units.544 Crucially therefore, by ‘turning every unit into a secondary 
depot’,545 MJDI will create a distribution network across British defence, with every 
node in the network able to see what is in the system and where it is at any time. 
Compared to the segmented functions system, MJDI has the potential to completely 
transform both the structure and procedures of British defence logistics, bringing them 
in line with business best practice. 
An interesting example of the emergent network approach to operational-level 
logistics is the US-led creation of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to supply 
the Afghanistan surge of 2009. The NDN was established for mainly geopolitical 
reasons as the traditional method of supplying forces in Afghanistan using the Karachi-
Khyber Pass-Kabul route was vulnerable to both attack by insurgents and thieves, and 
closure by the Pakistani authorities. Moreover, in early 2009 up to 90 percent of US 
military surface cargo moved via Pakistan,546 with the insurgents involved in lucrative 
rackets in Karachi and often paid by NATO contractors to let their convoys through.  To 
diversify its supply route, after a series of diplomatic initiatives in 2009 the US and 
NATO began using the most commonly used route of the NDN, which ran by rail from 
Baltic ports, through Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan to the northern Afghan 
border. Supplies were then loaded onto trucks and driven to Mazar-e-Sharif and via the 
treacherous Salang Pass into Kabul. Another branch of this route ran further east, 
through Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and into Kunduz. In total, these routes involved US 
shipping firm Maersk, various Baltic and Russian railway operators, and numerous 
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haulage companies in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan, as well as 
the establishment of US logistical bases in many of these countries. A second shorter, 
southerly NDN route later opened that ran from the Georgian port of 
Poti, via Baku, Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan before 
arriving at the Afghan border at Termez. Another route ran via Mongolia, creating a 
more robust network of supply lines into Afghanistan by 2012 (see Figure 3). Indeed, 
such was the scale of the NDN that some policymakers proclaimed the logistical 
network as ‘a modern Silk Road’ that would bolster local trade through local purchases 
whilst increasing Western influence in the region.547 
The benefits of a network approach to supplying forces in Afghanistan was 
highlighted in November 2011 when the Pakistani government forbade NATO supplies 
from entering its territory after a number of its soldiers were killed in NATO airstrikes. 
As a result, by February 2012, 85 percent of NATO fuel supplies and over 40 percent of 
non-lethal stocks were entering Afghanistan via the NDN.548 However, while the NDN 
offered logistical continuity and flexibility, this came at a price: by January 2012 it was 
costing the Pentagon an extra $87 million per month to supply via the NDN rather than 
through Pakistan.549 Moreover, the fact that the operational supply network was spread 
across former Soviet countries caused their own logistical and geo-political problems. 
For example, most participating nations specified that all cargoes consisted of non-
lethal supplies, leaving lethal cargoes to be flown through Russia. Following US forces’ 
eviction from Uzbekistan’s Karshi Khanabad airbase in 2005 for US criticism of 
President Islam Karimov, the US outsourced logistics at the country’s Navio cargo 
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airport to Korean Air, as this was more politically acceptable to both sides. 
Simultaneously, Uzbek Airways signed a commercial contract to fly northern European  
Figure 3. The Northern Distribution Network 
 
NATO member states’ supplies into Afghanistan.550 In June 2012, protests erupted in 
Ulyanovsk after Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev signed a decree allowing 
NATO to use a nearby airbase nearby as a transit hub, and the base was never used.551 
Similarly, Uzbek and Kyrgyz officials complained about the poor economic impact of 
the NDN. Indeed, a 2011 US Senate report stated that of the $40 million the US had 
spent on local goods in NDN countries since 2010, 51 percent was purchased in 
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Kazakhstan, 39 percent in Georgia and only 9 percent in Uzbekistan, indicating major 
disparities in economic benefits compared to each countries’ strategic position.552 
Clearly, the network approach to logistics gave the US and NATO a robust and 
flexible supply route in Afghanistan, and represented a major change from using single 
theatre entry points to supply forces. However, in keeping its forces supplied in a 
distant, landlocked country, surrounded by states outside their traditional sphere of 
influence, US and NATO logistics were at the mercy of geo-politics. This marked a 
fundamental difference to logistics in previous conflicts. While both the US and NATO 
did possess strategic air lift capabilities that could bypass the NDN, the cost of air 
freight, at $14,000 per ton, was prohibitively expensive for all but the most vital of 
cargoes.553 This indicates that if expeditionary campaigns fought in isolated and 
geographically diverse locations increase, the traditional single lines of supply through 
allied or host nations will face both growing geopolitical and cost pressures. However, 
given the commercial nature of modern transnational logistics networks, geo-politics is 
not always decisive in determining their success. It is noteworthy that although NATO 
and Vladimir Putin’s Russia suspended almost all co-operation in the wake of the 
Ukrainian crisis, the NDN continued to operate at full capacity as NATO forces back-
loaded supplies and equipment from Afghanistan.554 It is perhaps telling that the 
business benefits of modern military supply can trump geo-political rivalry. 
Innovation and Adaption: FOBs and CLiPs  
While it is therefore clear that a major change in the way military logistics is structured 
and managed at the strategic and operational levels has occurred, there is also evidence 
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to suggest that Western military tactical logistics practices have adapted to the modern 
battlefield. As the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have been defined by insurgencies 
operating in predominantly non-linear battle spaces, Western forces increased their 
reliance on the Forward Operating Base (FOB). Although the FOB concept itself dates 
back to the British Army’s isolated imperial outposts, faced with unconventional 
insurgent tactics that emphasise surprise attacks from within the population – often on 
unsecured supply routes – Western militaries resorted to static, forward, defendable 
bases in recent expeditionary conflicts. Given the lack of clear frontlines between 
opposing forces, the FOB system relied on supply from theatre bases, such as Shaibah 
Logistics Base in Iraq, or Camp Bastion in Afghanistan, which were heavily defended 
and preferably sited far from the population. However, this meant that – unlike in the 
rear areas of linear battlespaces – these bases could not take advantage of existing 
infrastructure, such as water, electricity and roads, and were often situated far from the 
FOBs. As a result, these bases had to create their own water, energy and fuel 
infrastructures, and although supplying smaller forces, the logistical burden was 
therefore greater. Indeed, one British logistics officer has described the task of 
constructing Camp Bastion, the largest logistical base since the Second World War, as 
similar to building ‘Aldershot with Gatwick [airport] bolted on… in the face of a lethal 
insurgency in a landlocked country.’555 
Due to similar tactical pressures, beginning in Iraq, and most notably in 
Afghanistan, the system of FOBs and smaller COBs (combat outposts) significantly 
altered both operational and logistical plans. Erbel and Kinsey have also noted the 
logistics problems in the Helmand campaign, but did not discuss the FOB supply 
system in detail.556 Robert Egnell and Anthony King have both examined how the 
British ‘ink-dot’ operational plan relied on FOBs to disperse limited forces across large, 
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unsecured areas of Helmand province.557 While these provided a defendable and secure 
base for troops in often highly volatile areas, most of the FOBs were unable to mutually 
support one another. Coupled with this, vast areas, including main supply routes, could 
not be adequately secured with the small forces involved. While the British FOB-based 
operational approach in Helmand has been heavily criticised,558 Leonard Wong and 
Stephan Gerras have argued that with the insurgent threat seemingly everywhere and 
nowhere, the safety of the FOB, with its better food, chance of rest and its provision of 
technologies to communicate with families, has changed Western soldiers’ experiences 
of war.559 Yet precisely because of the supplies needed to feed and defend a FOB, and 
the services expected in them, the FOB has created its own logistical challenges.  
Most obviously, the FOB system resulted in the flattening of the conventional 
hierarchical echelon logistics system with secure supply lines, which was largely 
replaced by a more nodal method of resupply. For example, while a company in a FOB 
would usually first request re-supply from its own chain of command, the fact that 
almost all commands and their respective stores were usually co-located in the main 
theatre base, rather than at different points in an echelon, meant that it was usually 
quicker and easier to receive supplies compared to the old echeloned system. This 
centralisation of logistics command and stores in theatre was also accompanied by a 
centralisation of the means of delivery. Despite Van Creveld’s assertion that helicopters 
were unlikely to affect logistics due to their cost,560 support helicopters were frequently 
pooled between different nations and commands at bases to provide greater re-supply 
capacity and flexibility. Re-supply road vehicles were frequently co-located as well. 
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Instead of supplies travelling up one unit’s echelon system, often a single logistics 
convoy dropped supplies off at a series of different units in different FOBs before 
returning to the main logistics base. Although the basic principles remained the same,561 
in Afghanistan nodal logistics distribution replaced the linear echeloned supply system. 
While the use of support helicopters to re-supply FOBs is an obvious method of 
negating insurgents’ use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and small arms 
attacks on logistics convoys, it remains one of the most expensive means of logistics 
delivery. As a result, traditionally lightly-armed logistics convoys have vastly increased 
their firepower whilst simultaneously up-armouring.562 This has led to what could be 
termed the ‘combatification’ of tactical logistics in modern conflicts, highlighted by the 
increasing use of Combat Logistics Patrols (CLPs). Known colloquially as ‘clips’, CLPs 
have become enshrined in British logistics doctrine as the favoured method of operating 
in insecure areas.563 These convoys can stretch for miles and often consist of over 200 
heavy vehicles travelling distances of up to 200 kilometres through insurgent 
territory.564 Vehicles usually consist of up-armoured military trucks like the new, crane-
equipped British MAN Supply Vehicles, accompanied by other specialist logistics 
vehicles such as the OSHKOSH series of transporters. For force protection, these 
vehicles are now accompanied by the heavily armed and armoured MASTIFF or MRAP 
protected mobility vehicles, containing fighting troops. At the head of the convoy, an 
anti-IED roller vehicle can be used to detonate pressure plate devices. Tanks and AIFVs 
can also accompany the convoys. This upscaling for combat has not only clearly 
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transformed supply operations, it has affected the training and posture of logistics 
soldiers who now may need to fight their way through to FOBs. In Afghanistan, the 
tactical threat forced Western militaries to quickly procure these vehicles in large 
numbers and at considerable cost, but it also altered the nature of combat operations in 
the FOBs themselves. With CLPs occurring every week to keep FOBs supplied, the few 
available combat troops were frequently detailed to secure the main supply routes for 
hours each time the convoys passed.565 Such was the money, time, and lives expended 
on resupplying the FOBs that, to paraphrase Clausewitz, in many respects ‘it was as if 
whole [British] war-engine had ventured into the enemy’s territory in order to wage a 
defensive war for its own existence.’566 Complimenting Wong and Gerras, others have 
identified the increasing logistical demands of modern RMA-equipped militaries, with 
Erbel and Kinsey in particular detailing how logistics constrained British operational 
choices in Afghanistan.567 This is on such a scale that the tail can wag the dog, with 
profound implications for tactical, operational, and ultimately strategic flexibility. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how the current dominant mode of production, post-Fordism, is 
a useful conceptual framework for explaining recent military logistics transformation. In 
doing so, it is clear that in emulating business practices, the UK, US and NATO have 
transformed their logistics doctrine, systems and procedures since the Gulf War. 
Military logistics has been commercialised and civilianised through the processes of 
centralisation; integrating the core and the periphery; outsourcing and SCM; and the 
emergent logistics network. Enabled by advances in technology, these processes 
continue to occur, often at different paces and to different extents across these 
militaries, but all following broadly similar goals and trajectories.  I would contend the 
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cumulative effect of each of these processes has resulted in the most profound change in 
military logistics since the introduction of the combustion engine. Furthermore, with the 
adoption of the whole system approach to both military logistics and wider military 
forces, it is clear that the potential impact of each process is heavily dependent on the 
introduction of the others; for example, centralisation enables networks, networking can 
enable outsourcing capacity. As a result, the whole systems approach is creating a 
logistics system, but also a wider force structure in the West, that relies on high levels 
of integration to generate the most efficient capability from smaller organisations within 
tighter time frames. This transformation has important implications for both the military 
logistics literature and the future of military logistics itself. 
 It is patent from this analysis that one of Van Creveld’s central arguments – that 
improvement in military logistics is impossible – is incorrect. That the British and US 
militaries have improved the efficiency and responsiveness of their logistics, especially 
since 2003, is clearly evident. His other major assertion that improvisation is the 
fundamental characteristic of successful logistics ignores the major impact that 
meticulously planned, long term IT systems, new contracting, outsourcing and core-
periphery approaches are having on modern logistics. Even Van Creveld’s last 
remaining credible assertion – that forces still rely on supply from the rear and trucks to 
bring these to the front – has been and will continue to be eroded by the introduction of 
new technologies, the dispersal of combat forces, and the networked and nodal logistics 
system that is likely to be required to support them. As much as Van Creveld has given 
to the study of military logistics, this author would contend that such is the nature of 
recent logistics transformation that much of Supplying War is now out of date and 
conceptually flawed. 
Following Demchak’s and Farrell’s work on combat forces, it is clear that the 
British and US militaries have closely emulated business best practices in transforming 
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their logistics. Following Grissom and Foley et al., it is also clear these top-down 
emulations of civilian business logistics have been accompanied by bottom-up tactical 
adaptions. FOBs and CLiPs demonstrate how British forces’ logistics have also 
transformed to meet the conditions of the modern battlefield. Thus, the transformation 
literature appears to hold across military functions. More broadly, Western militaries’ 
adoption of post-Fordist principles has interesting implications for the future. For one, 
new technologies such as swarm delivery drones, 3-D printing, high velocity 
distribution from mobility balloons, automated convoys and robotic delivery systems, to 
name but a few, are likely to further ‘challenge the paradigm of the truck’.568 The RML 
will continue to evolve with technology and strategic circumstance. Important evidence 
of this is provided by the recent re-evaluation of military logistics principles in Britain, 
the UK and NATO. For its part, the British Army is currently juggling how to 
logistically plan for future expeditionary contingency operations and the possibility of 
major interstate conflict, whilst simultaneously reducing costs and building robust 
networks with its industrial base to provide a potentially strategic edge.569 Emphasising 
this point, General Carter recently stated that ‘the reality is that we can deliver military 
capability differently if we do so in partnership with industry.’570 
At the operational level, the future operating environment that the British Army 
is preparing for will likely involve ‘contingency at distance’ – the initial rapid 
deployment of a battlegroup-sized force into an uncertain environment at the end of a 
potentially stretched supply chain/network.571 While the focus on the divisional level 
discussed in Chapter Nine does raise questions as to whether an echelon system would 
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be adopted again during a major inter-state war, the fact that states like Russia 
increasingly operate ‘in the grey’ area between conflict and peace would suggest that 
there is unlikely to be a full return to the days of safe rear zones behind clearly defined 
front lines. Like insurgency, hybrid forms of warfare will pose a major risk to rearward 
supply lines, requiring road resupplies to be equipped to fight whilst also driving the 
introduction of some of the new delivery technologies stated above. The increasing 
dispersal of ground forces in response to new technologies will likely further contribute 
to this. Indeed, the British Army’s recent Joint Force 2025 plan to create two ‘Strike 
Brigades’ capable of deploying ‘rapidly over long distances’ and of ‘sustain[ing] 
themselves in the field’ (itself a nod to the successful French intervention in Mali), also 
implies a light logistical footprint enabled by new technologies, contractors, and 
perhaps a greater reliance on local sourcing, rather than a return to the echelon 
system.572 Thus, while the wider logistics principles underpinning the echelon system 
may remain, they will likely continue to inform distributed logistics. Distributed, nodal, 
logistics seems here to stay. Thus, CliPs and FOBs are unlikely to be historical 
anomalies, especially as the more resilient defence support network materialises. 
Conversely, adaptability and flexibility are likely to become even more important as 
new threats and technologies emerge. Despite the importance of new logistics concepts 
and systems, it must be stressed that the principles of foresight; agility; cooperation; 
efficiency; and simplicity underpinning British tactical logistics are also unlikely to 
change.573 Indeed, notwithstanding the introduction of MJDI and the adaption of FOBs 
and CliPs, as is discussed in Chapter Eight, at the tactical level many logistics practices 
have been relatively untouched by post-Fordism, which as this chapter has shown, has 
predominantly transformed logistics management and structures.    
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Crucially, however, the structure in which FR20 has been affected, through a 
complex, outsourced, rotational system, is a profoundly post-Fordist solution to these 
old problems. This restructuring of Britain’s land forces around what academics have 
termed post-Fordist principles also raises interesting strategic implications. As will be 
discussed in the next chapter, by adopting the ‘Total Cost’ approach to solve the 
demands of less supply of, but potentially equal or greater demand for, ground forces, 
the plans’ leveraged nature means that it lacks the structural flexibility to respond to 
strategic shocks. Army2020’s rotational system is simply not designed to deal with 
these kind of shocks; there is very little slack in the system at present, certainly not 
enough to allow the army to conduct two simultaneous medium-sized operations, as it 
did in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2006-2009, nor crucially, to conduct division-plus 
operations.574 It is arguable therefore that Army2020 is based on the central strategic 
assumption that there will be enough warning time before a major conflict that requires 
an army of hundreds of thousands, rather than tens of thousands, of troops. To generate 
a force this size would require conscription, and these conscripts would likely be trained 
by cadres of regulars not engaged in fighting.575 In this context, similar to Haldane’s 
plans, the Army Reserve would likely reinforce the rest of the regulars to buy time for 
conscripts to be trained. In Lamb’s opinion, it is for this reason that the reserve 
component remains potentially very important: ‘What the reserve gives you which the 
regular cannot do is scale… so if you've got the need to enlarge on the unexpected, truth 
of the matter is, scale sits with a reserve, not the regulars.’576 As such, at the strategic 
level, Army2020 and FR20 are, by their very design, limited. Even with the integrated 
reserves component, and the availability of an ex-regular reserve of 35,000 troops with 
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three years’ experience,577 Army2020 essentially provides a core around which a much 
larger conventional army required for national defence could consolidate. Decisively, it 
offers the potential for cheap, scalable mass. Interestingly, this indicates an acceptance 
of the benefits of a more Fordist mode of generating military capability in the event of a 
national emergency. Indeed, it appears that the British military are cognisant of the 
limits of post-Fordist-based force structures.   
However, supporting Demchak, at the strategic level, the adoption of JIT 
processes and the accompanying SCM approach in military logistics has potentially 
profound consequences for the West. Kane has presciently noted that while JIT ‘may be 
a useful slogan for business management... it is a dangerous philosophy for defence.’578 
While JIT procedures are cost effective and efficient, operational effectiveness is the 
final and deadly standard against which military logistics systems must ultimately be 
judged. Coupled with questions over the impact of JIT on logistics performance there 
are growing concerns about the nature of the SCM approach to logistics which underpin 
JIT principles. Recently, Martin Christopher and Matthias Holweg have argued that 
since 2008 ongoing price turbulence across a number of key market indicators has 
undermined the basic assumptions of the SCM approach. Crucially, they argue that due 
to this greater volatility, ‘supply chain practices may no longer fit the contexts most 
businesses operate in – primarily because these practices were developed under 
assumptions of stability that no longer exist.’579 Although SCM possesses some 
flexibility, it does not possess the structural flexibility needed to respond to the major 
changes in the market, which is occurring in the current era.580  
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Whatever the relationship between the markets and the strategic situation, it is 
clear that since the end of the Cold War the world has become less stable. Yet, at 
precisely the time when complexity and uncertainty are increasing, many Western 
militaries are downsizing whilst adopting total force concepts and structures in an 
attempt to maintain capabilities. Clearly, there are advantages to organising integrated 
forces at tiered levels of readiness, but the re-structuring of these forces is, like the SCM 
approach the total force concept mirrors, based on clear strategic assumptions of supply 
and demand. There is little slack left in this more efficient system. Conventional and 
hybrid threats are increasing and the total force model may not be up to the challenge of 
meeting them. Indeed, there is already some evidence that Western logistics planners 
are refocusing on the JIC system the case of another conventional war.581 In 
transforming not only their military logistics systems, but also their entire force 
structure and readiness around post-Fordist principles, Western militaries are now more 
vulnerable to strategic shocks that could negate the assumptions on which much of the 
recent logistics transformation is based. Indeed, the British military’s embrace of the 
Defence Support Network indicates an appreciation of the potential vulnerability of 
SCM identified by Demchak. At the strategic level, it remains to be seen whether a fully 
networked logistics system, with enough slack and stockpiles to ensure redundancy, can 
be implemented before the assumptions underpinning SCM are fully tested. However, 
in the next chapter I turn to examine the impact of the processes of the post-Fordist 




                                                 






FR20 at the Logistics Sub-Unit Level: Delivering 
Capability? 
 
The previous three chapters discussed the historical evolution and the political origins 
of, and the logistics concepts and processes underpinning, FR20. I showed how this 
post-Fordist approach is significantly different to how the British Army, and by 
extension the TA, practiced logistics in the past. As a result of outsourcing logistics to 
the Army Reserve, its logistics units’ missions are now more demanding than in the 
past. In order to understand capability, culture and cohesion in these units, it is crucially 
important to understand this changed nature of their organising principles and missions. 
The next three chapters examine the impact of FR20 on reserve logistics sub-units. As 
will be remembered, it is at the sub-unit level that FR20 originally envisaged the most 
profound changes to Army Reserve capability and deployability. Similarly, one of the 
greatest areas of risk for FR20 was deemed to be the reserve logistics component, as 
this required significant organisational changes as a result of the policy. This chapter 
discusses how the changes outlined in FR20, and the organisational frictions these have 
created, have impacted a selection of reserve logistics sub-units. In particular, these sub-
units’ experiences of what I term the ‘hard’, capability-related impacts of FR20 are 
examined. These are the interrelated issues of recruitment, equipment and training. 
Combined, these factors will ultimately determine whether sub-units can deliver the 
capability required of them under FR20. Throughout this chapter, how organisational 
transformation has been shaped by the post-Fordist approach to military logistics, and 
been implemented, is analysed. The conclusion argues that while some sub-units may 
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prove able to provide the required capability, most are unlikely to do so on schedule, 
and will be unable to provide an enduring capability for some time to come.  
To understand the capability FR20 requires sub-units to deliver, it is important 
to first outline these sub-units’ specific transformation as a result of the policy. The 
outsourcing of regular army logistics capability to the reserves as directed in Army2020 
and FR20 resulted in a number of major structural changes to the reserve component, 
including the disbandment of some logistics and infantry units, the creation of new 
logistics units and sub-units, the re-location of others, and crucially, the re-roling of 
some from one trade to another. As such, for some REME and RLC reservists, FR20 
represented not only a complete change in the nature of their military specialist trade 
(trade training), but also a change of the location in which this was usually conducted. 
Within the RLC reserves, transport units bore the brunt of these changes. The REME 
also experienced major structural changes as the old system of Light Armoured 
Detachments (LAD) – a small team of specialist mechanics attached to other units – was 
replaced by a new centralised system based around the REME reserve battalion. 
Simultaneously, the rationalisation of the British defence estate saw the closure of 
reserve centres and the centralisation and co-location of units in larger bases. 
Although there had been consultations and the drip-feeding of information 
before FR20 was formally unveiled in July 2013, all the selected sub-units had begun to 
be affected by the policy at the grass-roots level by the summer of 2014. This was when 
sub-units were informed of the date by which they had to deliver the IOC expected of 
their newly formed or re-roled sub-units. The IOC date varied from 2016-2017 between 
sub-units, and it was earlier than the FOC date at which these units are to be fully 
manned and trained. While the demand on each sub-unit varied in terms of the number 
of fully trained reservists they were required to deliver and at what stage of the tiered 
deployment cycle (organised into ten, six-month roules) this must be done, as a general 
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indicator FR20 required these logistics sub-units to deploy 8-12 members to each roule. 
However, some sub-units may rotate this requirement with other sub-units in their 
regiment depending on the requirement after a certain date. Interestingly, none of the 
selected sub-units were expected to deploy as a fully formed unit, but to contribute a 
much smaller number of troops. Combined with other sub-units, a reserve RLC 
regiment would aim to deploy about a platoon’s worth of reservists, while the REME 
requirement was greater, with a Field Company required. Clearly then, in the case of the 
reserve logistics component, reservists will be deployed in smaller groups than the sub-
unit. This was also found to be the case in other infantry regiments and taken together, 
this evidence supports the previous evidence on how FR20’s original goal of deploying 
formed reserve sub-units has been adjusted as the policy developed. 
Apart from their capability requirement, the nature of organisational 
transformation within the selected sub-units also varied considerably. For example, 165 
Port and Maritime Regiment – responsible for the specialist loading and unloading of 
ship-based supplies in ports and onto beachheads – was expanded to become the largest 
reserve regiment in the RLC.582 To fulfil this new capability, new squadrons were added 
to its order of battle. 232 Squadron (Sqn) – which had been part of 155 Wessex 
Transport Regiment and was manned by soldiers with advanced heavy vehicle driving 
qualifications – was directed to re-role to the port and maritime trade. This latter role 
required a completely different skill set to load, pilot and unload the Mexeflote sea-
landing raft. However, it would remain in its Bodmin, Cornwall base. Meanwhile, 142 
Vehicle Squadron, which, as part of 166 Supply Regiment was a nationally-recruited 
driving and maintenance unit based in Grantham, Lincolnshire, kept its trade but was 
moved to Banbury, Oxfordshire to become part of 165 Port and Maritime Regiment. 
142 Squadron also incorporated a large number of former highly skilled Royal Signals 
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reservists who had served near Banbury but whose unit had been disbanded as a result 
of FR20. Further north, 157 Transport Regiment was expanded, with the raising of 398 
Transport Squadron in Queensferry, Wales. Simultaneously, the Wrexham-based A 
Company of 3 Royal Welsh Regiment was told it to was be disbanded, leaving its 
soldiers the choice of a long commute to stay as infanteers, or a switch to the newly 
formed 398 Squadron closer to home. Meanwhile, as part of the establishment of the 
new 105 Battalion REME reserve, one of its four new sub-units, 160 Field Company, 
was established at existing premises in Bridgend, while another, 130 Field Company, 
was established in Taunton. Both will centralise previous LADs in these regions, but 
130 Fd Coy faces a much tougher task in reaching its established strength as there were 
fewer LADs in its catchment area, thereby limiting the number of already trained 
specialists it can draw on. With all LADs incorporated into new battalions, the re-
structuring of REME reserve units was therefore slightly different to those in the RLC. 
Complicating matters, individual reservists with long distances to travel to these new 
sub-units frequently opted to join a differently traded unit nearby.583 As such, the scope 
of the transformation within these reserve logistics sub-units was often profound, and 
represented some of the greatest organisational challenges posed by both FR20 and 
Army2020. Indeed, the army high command’s awareness of the ‘high risk’ nature of this 
reserve logistics transformation is precisely why it is so worth of study here.584 Given 
the different organisational changes experienced by different logistics sub-units, it is 
unsurprising that the data revealed varying experiences in the scope, nature and impact 
of FR20. However, using NVivo software, a number of significant themes emerged.  
 
                                                 
583 Numerous interviewees highlighted the importance of location in determining their choice of unit 
and complimentary quantitative research has revealed that 55percent of RLC but only 32percent of 
REME reservists chose their units due location. Bury, P. (2015, unpublished) ‘Report on Recruitment and 
Retention’ prepared for CD CSS, 12 January 2015. 
584 Interview 12. 
 187 
 
FR20 Change Management 
One of the first group interview questions asked respondents about how the 
organisational transformation of their sub-units had been managed. It is important to 
note here the initially high levels of uncertainty concerning the future of many logistics 
sub-units as FR20 planning took place during 2012-13. Many sub-units were aware that 
they were being considered for reorganisation, but were not certain of the date by which 
this was to occur, nor its exact extent. Given the scale of the changes happening within 
the wider army as a result of Army2020, and the knock-on effect this had in terms of 
determining the required reserve capability, numerous interviews with sub-unit 
commanders indicated that they were only informed of their final transition plan in 
December 2013.585 This uncertainty was reflected in soldiers’ experiences of how 
change was managed in their sub-units. For example, in one RLC squadron, the 
collective response was: 
Moderator (Mod): ‘How do you feel the changeover was managed in terms of 
the creation of this unit?  
Respondent (R) 1: I can’t fault it. I think it worked really well. 
R2: I agree. 
R3: Yes. 
R4: Once they decided, it was a bit messy, because they split... 
R5: We all knew the end goal. I personally thought it was all alright. 
R2: The final result was good.’586   
A REME sub-unit reported a similar experience: 
Mod:  ‘It went smoothly? 
R1: Yes. 
R2:        … I’ve found it alright so far, to be honest. 
R3:        I thought we were definitely kept in the loop. And in fairness to [the 
OC], he kept us up to date regularly, what was going on, even the 
things he wasn’t sure on, he was coming back to us and telling us, 
“Right, I’ll get back to you on that, let you know what’s happening.” So 
yes, I was pretty informed, to be honest. We knew what was coming, 
didn’t we? 
R3: …Yes. What they said was happening has happened.  
R1: Yes, it was managed really well.’587  
 
                                                 
585 Interview 3; Interview 5. 
586 Interview 1. 
587 Interview 7. 
 188 
 
However, representative of the wider sample, even in sub-units that had positive 
experiences, some individuals who had joined from different parent units felt they had 
‘got lost in the wash’ due to a lack of information being provided by their chain of 
command.588 Other reservists reported much more negative experiences: 
R1:       ‘Very poorly, it was done.  
R2: We all found out on Facebook. 
R3: I was told in an email… 
R4:        … The unit we left, as soon as they said we were going… There was 
no, “Thank you very much.” It was just like: “You’re going. That’s it. 
That’s the end of this.” There was no transition period… Since I’ve 
been here, you’re welcomed in and it’s been an easy transition.  
R1: … I think it was poorly conducted from the [original unit] side.  
Mod:  At what level? 
R1: All.  
R4: At a very high level.  
R3:   I thought it was poorly done. I think it came from further up than 
regiment and battalion. I think it went up higher.’589  
It is therefore evident that some parent units and newly formed sub-units were better 
than others at keeping their soldiers abreast of developments. 
Prior to the research, discussions with the one-star officer responsible for 
delivering the logistics capability outlined in both Army2020 and FR20 indicated his 
belief that leadership would be an important explanatory factor in determining sub-unit 
experiences of transformation.590 This was supported by the data. This discussion in one 
sub-unit is instructive: 
R1: ‘[Our boss] was a part of the FR2020 team so he was real pro. 
R2:  It [successful transition] was down to [the OC’s]... Enthusiasm.  
R3: He was very good in that respect. 
R1: I wouldn’t say just enthusiasm. 
R4: [His desire for an] MBE. 
R1: No. He wanted to make it work. 
R1: Both for himself and for his blokes, I think. 
R4: …He did want to make it work. He didn’t want it to fail. 
R1: He wanted this squadron to succeed… He wanted the squadron to be 
the best it possibly can. 
R3: And he has worked. This squadron has worked. 
R4: He’s put the effort in. 
R1: A squadron twenty miles down the road with very few new people in it 
has not worked. It’s down to the person...it’s the personalities who run 
the squadron. 
                                                 
588 Interview  1. 
589 Interview  5. 
590 Interview, Brigadier Mitch Mitchell, CD CSS, Andover, 29 April 2014. 
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R1:  … He doesn’t want failure. 
R5: None of us in here want failure. 
R3: And I think to answer your question, it was probably mismanaged by 
people higher, more senior to him and he’s managed to keep the flak 
from us.'591 
The comments above underscore reservists’ perceptions of the central role of leadership 
and personality in not only implementing FR20 at the sub-unit level, but also in 
protecting lower ranks from organisational friction caused by top-down transformation. 
The comments on the MBE are also instructive as they highlight the perceived 
relationship between mid-level commander’s support for organisational transformation 
and the benefits this will have for their careers. Similarly, soldiers’ recognition of 
potential individual reward as providing a motive for commander performance – and the 
rejection of this motive by other senior ranks – highlights the potential friction for 
commanders between delivering top-down transformation effectively and managing the 
longer-term interests of soldiers. Another interview revealed the possible source of this 
theme in the sub-unit and how readily junior ranks are willing to support leaders with 
their best interests at heart: 
R1: ‘Our boss here stood out in front of everyone and said, “I’m going to 
forego my MBE if I get the things that you guys want,” and at that 
point we were like, “Sound.” It’s a bit of a joke here, though, that he 
wants his MBE.’592 
Other sub-units reported similar levels of satisfaction with their commanders’ 
management of change, and officers who ‘jumped the gun’ or ‘got ahead of the game’ 
by enacting transition as soon as it became clear what was required were frequently 
praised.593 In terms of the transformation literature, mid-level leadership was therefore 
crucial to the perceived success of organisational change. Indeed, the role of these 
commanders may be more important in the reserves’ case than in the regular army, due 
their part-time nature which means that these units have fewer points of contact with the 
senior regular leadership that instigated the transformation.  
                                                 
591 Interview  2. 
592 Interview  1. 
593 Interviews 1, 5, 7. 
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While most sub-units recorded relatively positive experiences of leaders 
managing change, there were a number of negative responses. Most of these were 
clustered around one sub-unit in particular that had been disbanded. Most of these 
reservists later joined the RLC or REME. For example:   
R1:  The CO never spoke to us and the RSM never spoke to us… [They 
never said], “This is the decision we’ve made and this is why we came 
to this decision that you will be disbanded.” So that was very poorly 
done. 
R2: We still don't know why we’ve been disbanded now.  
R3: It was bad man management from a commanding officer and RSM. 
R4: I think it went through parliament quite late, didn’t it? 
R3: Well, it was still through parliament. The CO could have called us and 
still explained the decision. I know he had no choice, but he still didn’t 
speak to us, did he? He still blanked us. 
R5: … Then the [parent unit] were just, like, “Well, if you come you’re not 
getting travel. We’re not going to put a minibus on for you,” so I 
personally felt quite let down.  
R6: Yes. I agree.  
R5: After spending ten years with them. 
R7: … The CO was just, like, “It’s closing. Deal with it. If you want to 
[sub-unit in same unit in different location], you can. If you don't want 
to, it’s up to you.” Whereas the REME said, “Come across to us. If you 
don't want to, just make sure you stay in.”’594 
These experiences were repeated by senior ranks from the same unit:  
R1:  ‘So, you know, these guys have served 20-odd years as a [specialism] 
and then to be told, in one fell swoop, “You will no longer be 
[specialism]. However, what you can do is you can go to the RLC.”’595 
Supporting the central role of leadership, these negative experiences of transition were 
largely blamed on individual commanders, with the lack of information and a sense of 
betrayal evident. However, it is also noteworthy that an understanding of the political 
nature of FR20 was repeated within this sub-unit as an explanatory factor for poor 
leadership. There was a palpable sense in the junior ranks’ discussion that their original 
sub-unit had been disbanded due to regimental politics and the wider, politically-
imposed nature of FR20. The above quotes therefore indicate a perception that some 
commanders were relatively powerless in resisting organisational change imposed by 
the ‘higher-ups’, be they the military chain of command, or politicians. Similarly, there 
was recognition and resignation amongst these reservists that higher command’s 
                                                 
594 Interview  5. 
595 Interview  6. 
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preferred option was for individuals from their disbanded sub-unit to join an under-
recruited, newly-formed logistics sub-unit – rather than continue their specialism in 
their original unit – in order to make FR20 a success.  
In terms of how top-down military change was actually implemented at the 
tactical level, 232 Transport Squadron were unique amongst the selected sub-units as 
the chain of command directed which unit and trade they were to become as a result of 
FR20. Interestingly, soldiers in this unit did not appear disappointed by the fact that 
they were directed to change, while others in the same regiment were given a choice of 
new unit. Indeed, individuals in most of the other sub-units were given the choice of 
joining at least three other units which varied by trade. In the case of the disbanding or 
re-roling sub-units, such as A Coy, 3 Royal Welsh, or 142 Sqn, 166 Supply Regiment, 
this meant that these units hosted different events in which diverse units from the Army 
Air Corps, Intelligence Corps, REME, and RLC all pitched to attract transferees. Most 
respondents who experienced this were impressed that they were given a choice rather 
than being simply directed to join a new unit. For example, in 142 Sqn:  
(Mod):  ‘Were you guys happy with the way that was done, instead of it being 
directed, you had a degree of choice? 
All: Yes. 
R1: It was good. 
R2:  They put on, like, showcases, which was pretty quality.  
R3: It was amazing.  
R2: The Army Air Corps brought in helicopters and everything. 
R1: Yes. We had a look at life. I felt like a school kid again.  
R3: You went round all these different units going, “These are the 
helicopters. This is a tank. 
R2: You’re never going to drive this!”596 
Humour aside, reservists originally from 3 Royal Welsh were visited by four units with 
different specialisms, while a reservist in another sub-unit responded: 
‘The RLC gave a better presentation to people to come across. They sold it 
better. That’s why so many of us came over.’597  
 
‘FR20’s been ok for us. Initially when it came in people were worried, but their 
lives as Craftsmen have changed little, maybe even improved.’598 
                                                 
596 Interview 1.  
597 Interview 5. 
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Similarly, some soldiers in 160 Field Coy REME were pleased that on the disbandment 
of their various LADs they were given a choice between joining the RLC, or remaining 
in the REME but moving to a centralised location. Of the selected sub-units, there was a 
trend that a core majority of transferees came from one unit. These were complimented 
by individuals from an array of other units who usually chose their new unit due to its 
proximity. Nevertheless, highlighting the varied experiences of individual reservists 
within these sub-units, and how many sub-units have incorporated individuals with 
different specialist skills keen to keep their location or trade, a medic reported: 
R1: ‘Yes, it was managed really well. We obviously got told we were 
transferring across. 
Mod: Offered or told? 
R1: Told. 
Mod: You were told, there was no other option? 
R1:      It was a little bit different for us... We just changed the brigade. We are 
still a unit; we’ve just stayed obviously the same. There was no 
change.’599 
Overall, while most sub-units were offered a choice of new unit, this was accompanied 
by a sense of lack of real choice in some cases, and simple top-down direction in others.  
Given that FR20 was a top-down imposed transformation, that most disbanding 
sub-units were offered a choice of future unit is highly interesting. Primarily it indicates 
the chain of command’s awareness of the importance that location and trade have on 
reserve service, and in particular soldier retention. Simply designating sub-units to new 
locations or trades and expecting the majority of their strength to accept this was viewed 
as risking reservist retention, and this policy only appears to have been followed in one 
case where the sub-unit remained in location anyway. As such, from the outset, the 
transformation was undertaken with the goal of keeping as many reservists as possible 
satisfied, and hence retained, during the re-organisation. That such a quasi-market 
approach to future service was adopted, and that other units were then so keen to pitch 
to potential transferees, highlights the increasing realisation amongst commanders that 
                                                                                                                                               
598 Interview 9. 
599 Interview 7. 
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unit strength – reliant on recruitment and retention – would become a core measure 
against which they would be judged as FR20 progressed. However, the significance of 
the availability of choice is deeper than simply the desire for well-manned sub-units. It 
also points to fundamental difference between how the reserves were re-organised under 
FR20 compared to the regular army under Army2020. For regular units, far less 
attention was paid to the impact that re-roling, or a change of location, could potentially 
have on retention. For example, 1 Royal Irish was directed to leave 16 Air Assault 
Brigade and take on the new light mechanised role without offering its soldiers the 
choice to move unit or take on a different specialism. Such a directed re-organisation is 
common in the regulars, and when compared to that of FR20, highlights the greater 
emphasis on choice given to part-time volunteers who can leave service at any time 
compared to their full-time counterparts. Thus, the element of choice in the FR20 re-
organisation highlights not only the need to recruit and retain reservists from the outset, 
but also the variance between how regular and reserve change management was effected 
due to the different nature of their service. 
Main Effort: Recruitment 
The expansion of the reserves is a central tenet of FR20, and as discussed in Chapter 
Four, due to arguments between the army’s senior leadership and politicians about how 
quickly this could happen – and subsequent recruiting problems – reserve recruitment 
has become both a politicised and controversial issue. It is also become the benchmark 
by which the media judge FR20’s progress. It is therefore highly worthy of examination 
at the sub-unit level. During the numerous visits to army headquarters, regimental 
headquarters and squadron lines to arrange and conduct individual and group 
interviews, it was possible to read the concept of operations slides that are customary 
for commanding officers to display in their units along with Part 1 Orders. These slides 
provide an interesting insight into their respective units as they succinctly contain the 
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commander’s mission statement for the unit and the scheme of manoeuvre for how this 
mission will be achieved. Central to the basic concept of operations is the identification 
of the main effort, which sets the unit priority for the next year, or for the commander’s 
time in charge (usually two years). What was highly interesting viewing a number of 
these slides across commands and trades during 2014-16 was that, without fail, the main 
effort in each unit was recruiting. Crucially, this indicated that most of the activity the 
respective sub-units were conducting was therefore related to recruiting. Furthermore, 
on these visits, usually within two minutes of meeting the officer commanding – and 
indeed other ranks – they would mention their squadron’s strength and recruitment. 
Indeed, as a former regular, I was often quickly asked if I wanted to join the sub-unit. 
This evidence gives some context as to how pervasive the ‘numbers game’ mentioned in 
the last chapter had become at the sub-unit-level.600 
 FR20’s central emphasis on recruitment and its major impact on squadron 
activity after transition were evident in the group interviews. Indeed, the perception of 
recruitment’s primary, indeed defining, importance to FR20 was repeated frequently: 
R1: ‘I don't believe there's any change... 
R2: The biggest thing's been a big push on recruitment.’601 
 
R1: ‘At this stage of the game, I don’t think there’s a lot of difference 
between this and the re-org in ‘96. The only difference is the actual 
emphasis on recruiting.’602 
 
Another senior rank in the same unit concurred:  
R2: ‘we are carrying on as we did when we got re-org’ed the last time. 
There’s not enough emphasis on trade and actually bringing us up to 
fulfil that role. But there is emphasis on actual recruiting to get 
numbers up. So if we can get numbers in the door, then I don’t know 
where they’re going to take it from there. But the emphasis is on to get 
numbers through the door.’603 
 
                                                 
600 Interviews 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. 
601 Interview 10. 
602 Interview 2. 
603 Interview 2. 
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This focus on recruiting raised a number of related issues. Perhaps most importantly, as 
the quote above indicates, all ranks across numerous sub-units supported the assertion 
that with recruitment as the main effort, the balance between it and individual and 
collective training had been upset: 
R1:  ‘Mainly we’re doing recruiting and nothing else. 
R2: Recruiting’s everyone’s business.’604  
 
R1: ‘We haven’t really done any of that, [training with regulars] really, 
have we? We’ve had one or two little weekends.  
R2: No. It’s just more the regiments getting used to the new system.  
R3: I think it’s because our main aim is recruiting still.’605 
 
R1:  ‘My whole time is me helping them through their recruit process. I 
haven’t got time then to be going to do my training. So yes, although 
we get extra days, a lot of my days are going towards recruiting, not 
man training days.’606 
 
R1: ‘I think the balance is slanting [toward recruitment].  I think without a 
doubt it's been recruitment, recruitment, recruitment… yes, recruitment 
is number one priority for most reserve units; however, it's closely 
followed by retention and trade training.’607 
 
R1:  ‘To get us to our 30,000 before 2020, which is where, I think, the 
emphasis is, as opposed to making us a better unit to actually support 
the people that we are supposed to support. 
R2:  Yeah 
R3: It’s changed slightly this year, hasn’t it?  
R2: It has, yeah. 
R3: I mean, 2015, all of a sudden, they’ve realised, if they don’t put some 
trade on then nobody is going to go anywhere [i.e their careers will not 
progress].’608 
 
As the last quote highlights, soldiers in some sub-units did perceive the lack of training 
had begun to be addressed, but it is clear that FR20’s drive for numbers, initially at 
least, created friction between recruitment and training to deliver capability. Clearly, 
senior command knew that it would take time to expand the reserves, and that collective 
training to confirm capability would necessarily follow this expansion. However, the 
problems recruitment has posed in terms of time and effort highlight an organisational 
paradox inherent in FR20 between expanding sub-units and delivering quality training 
                                                 
604 Interview 1. 
605 Interview 8. 
606 Interview 5. 
607 Interview 4. 
608 Interview 2. 
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that ultimately retains existing soldiers. The prevalence of this issue was confirmed in a 
follow-up interview in 2016. The quotes from the below interview are particularly 
indicative as they are taken from one of the most positive sub-units in 2015, which was 
now fully manned a year later. Here, the emphasis on recruitment was still viewed as 
negatively impacting trade training and ultimately, retention: 
R1:  ‘It’s been nice to have a group and start having more people coming 
through. So that has been a big positive. At one point it was pretty 
much all full screws and nobody else… 
R2:  [but] there’s no retention 
R3: And training aids for the boys, for the workshop floor. Welding 
training aids. Everything. [First aid] training aids. There’s nothing here 
really is there? 
R4: Weapons is a nightmare… 
R3: There’s just no way of teaching anything 
R4: This is across the board. 
R5:  … we’ve got no training aids to teach the new crafties coming through. 
R1: …Just the bare bones of what the unit should have and nothing 
more.’609 
 
Thus, the lack of trade training and its impact on retention was still widely perceived as 
being caused by a lack of basic equipment in reserve centres. As another soldier stated: 
‘Our recruiting target is over the 100 percent mark, but keeping them interested is 
another thing.’610 
 The emphasis on recruitment in the reserves has created other organisational 
problems. Numerous reservists cited the saturation of recruitment teams from different 
reserve units competing for the same recruits in their region as an example of an 
uncoordinated wider approach to recruitment. The drive to recruit in ethnically-diverse 
areas was also seen as unsuccessful in those sub-units which had attempted to do so.611 
The quote below emphasises the lack of planning and resourcing of recruitment activity 
at the sub-unit level:  
‘We’ve still got Army Reserve recruitment teams who are not trained, not 
equipped, setting up army recruitment stands with white vans. Who are we 
recruiting for? What are we doing? Are we recruiting for Ford or Vauxhall, 
because that’s what we’re selling? We’re not marketing it correctly. We’re not 
                                                 
609 Interview 8. 
610 Ibid. 
611 Interviews 1, 2, 3, 6. 
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providing the training for the recruiting teams and we’re not being selective 
enough in those who are recruiting for us. We’re not looking to attract the main 
target audience. Standing in a high street on a Wednesday afternoon with a 
white van and a gazebo is not going to recruit people for the Army Reserve.’612 
This lack of recruitment resources in recently raised logistics sub-units is particularly 
interesting because, given the high risk nature of their transformation, their centrality to 
FR20, and the difficulty reserve logistics units usually have recruiting compared to the 
combat arms, it might have been expected that they would have received extra support. 
This has clearly not been the case. Crucially, the lack of resourcing of recruitment 
activity was widely perceived as resulting from the outsourcing and centralisation of 
recruitment to Capita. As one senior NCO in another sub-unit explained: ‘I wanted to 
get £50 to put up our details on the boards at the [local rugby team]. The loops we had 
to go through with Capita… it simply wasn’t worth it.’613 Similarly, reservists in other 
sub-units were aware of the initial problems and delays the Capita contract had caused 
in reserve recruiting,614 indicating a collective wariness about its centralisation in 
general. Indeed, again highlighting the ad hoc nature of FR20’s development, when the 
Capita contract was originally negotiated it did not envisage the reserve piece, which 
relies on local activity to a much greater extent than the regular army.615  
 Similarly, the perception within most sub-units was that the emphasis on the 
quantity of recruits had come at the expense of their quality. An RLC senior rank 
summarised the general attitude best: ‘Yes. This unit’s conversion rate is good. It’s 
about quantity. Really it should be quality.’616 Within this theme, a number of issues 
were identified, the first of which concerned new recruits. Some reservists believed that 
new recruits were less suitable for military life than in the past due to increasingly 
                                                 
612 Interviews  6, 14. 
613 Interview 14. 
614 Interviews 10, 1. 
615 Interview, Major General Dickie Davis, 27 February 2015. 
616 Interview 10. 
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sedentary lifestyles,617 others that recruits were too young.618 Another squadron noticed 
that recruits were younger, more likely to be female, and that they had provided some 
‘brilliant’, committed new members.619 Others were more outright in their criticism, 
specifically focusing on how physical standards had been dropped in order to increase 
recruitment: 
R3: ‘I work in recruitment, on a Tuesday night, there are people down there 
now [in the recruitment process] that shouldn’t be. There’s absolutely 
no way.  
R2: They’re just keeping them there for a numbers game 
R1: The big one that I’ve noticed is because it’s such a numbers game, the 
amount of fucking dross that we’re getting through the door, that they 
suddenly say, “Right, that’s recruitment, you’ve got to bend over 
backwards for them,” you just think, “Why am I wasting my fucking 
time?”... Some of them can’t even do press ups or sit ups. They can’t 
even lift their own bodyweight. 
R3: … You’re probably talking less than 50percent that we reckon will 
actually be able to go through it [the recruitment process]. 
R1: … These guys should be able to turn around and say, “Look, come 
back in three months’ time when you’re fit.” 
Mod: The way it used to be [before FR20]? 
R2: Yes. 
R1 Back then… you had the authority to do that, whereas now... I’ve 
spoken to all high ranks saying, “Look, it’s not going to happen.” “Put 
it in a letter.” So I put it in a letter and nothing happened.”620 
However, perhaps reflective of the more specialised skills required of their trade – and 
the higher aptitude scores required during soldier selection – the attitude was noticeably 
different in REME squadrons.   
R1:  ‘I don’t think the quality of the recruit is any different to how it’s 
always been, to be honest… The only difference is the [unit] they are in 
and the type of training that they are doing… But the guys coming 
through the door, as long as they are eager and they fit certain criteria 
[mechanical aptitude], then it doesn’t matter…’621 
 
R1: ‘Well, we do go for quality. We know we cannot just take anybody 
on… You’ve got to take people on with some form of mechanical 
electrical knowledge. Even if he fixes or restores his own cars at home. 
He’s got a foundation there of some sort. We’ve tried it before with 
people who were non-mechanic... 
R2: And it shows.’622 
Overall, therefore, RLC reserve squadrons appeared to be more concerned about the 
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quality of recruit they were attracting, while REME companies appeared to be insulated 
from this because mechanical aptitude was a recognised requirement for successful 
service. Although there was recognition that ‘some good ones have come through’623 
soldiers across the REME and RLC stated that some of these had been lost due to 
problems with the outsourcing of the reserve recruitment process, which some still 
perceived as too slow despite recent attempts to expedite it.  Another reason for the 
failure to retain suitable recruits was the successive nature of modular training which 
can force a recruit who misses an important weekend to wait up to six months for 
another, thereby delaying their individual advancement.624 
 The commitment and the ability of new recruits – and indeed existing reservists 
– to meet the minimum required professional standard for reserve service was related to 
this quantity versus quality debate. This minimum standard was perceived to be the 
completion of the required Military Annual Training Tests (MATTS) as directed by the 
army. The inability of some reservists to compete these was a particular source of ire, 
further indicating the dichotomy between FR20’s emphasis on quantity and delivering 
reservists of the expected professional standard: 
R1: ‘The Reserves, as a whole, are treated with kid gloves. “We don't want 
to upset them because they might leave.” I say bollocks to that… if 
they’re fucking old and they can’t do the fucking job get rid of them. 
  
R2: Exactly. That is a massive smack in the face… if you can’t pass your 
MATTS and you’re not physically fit then why the fuck should you get 
your £2000 [bounty] a year like everyone else does that puts the effort 
in?  
R3: It all goes back to numbers.  
R4: If you did that, you’d get a few leaving. You need people on the books. 
It doesn't matter if they’re fat.’625 
The quote above highlights how the numbers game has caused the retention of reservists 
who are failing to meet the required standards. This issue of the physical fitness of 
recruits and reservists, and in particular logisticians whose primary role is not combat, is 
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likely to continue as the twice annual Personal Fitness Test has been extended to all 
reservists as a result of FR20 (including previously low readiness logistics sub-units), 
creating further potential friction between the professional standards of the regulars and 
retention in the reserves.626 Related to the collective desire for committed, professional 
members, another commonly expressed opinion concerned the quality of ex-regular 
transferees attracted by the £10,000 bonus – paid over three years – for joining the 
reserves. This incentive, introduced in 2014 after it was clear former regulars were not 
transferring in the expected numbers, has been successful in increasing ex-regular 
recruitment. However, it is not without controversy 
‘The ex-regulars are coming in because they are thinking: “Wicked, we are 
getting £10,000 over a period of [three] years”… And then they are not turning 
up for training. They’ve come in to do their bare minimum… we really want 
the regulars because we need to glean from them and learn from them. But they 
see it as now it’s an easy bus ticket… and then what are we getting out of it?’627 
This reservist again highlights the expectations of professionalism and commitment she 
expects of those in the reserve. Furthermore, the belief that some ex-regulars were not 
committed to the reserves due to the monetary incentives on offer was repeated in a 
number of other interviews.628 While discussed in detail in Chapter Eight, it is worth 
noting here that the fact that some reservists felt aggrieved at the commitment of some 
regulars is itself indicative of the growing professionalism of the reserves. 
 Striking the right balance between recruiting committed reservists, and offering 
the right pecuniary benefits to attract and retain them, has become an increasingly 
important issue given the controversy over recruitment quantity and quality. Since 2013 
the government has spent tens of millions of pounds on recruitment campaigns that have 
struggled to gain traction. It has therefore introduced substantial joining bonuses to both 
ex-regulars and new recruits, who are offered £300 on attestation and a further £2000 
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after completing their first years’ training commitment. Following previous research,629 
and at the request of the army, a quantitative examination of reserve RLC and REME 
soldiers’ reasons for joining was undertaken to compliment this study. The data 
revealed that a greater percentage (76 percent) of the statistically-significant sample 
joined for institutional, intrinsic reasons – such as to be challenged or to serve their 
country – compared to occupational, extrinsic reasons, such as for pecuniary benefits 
and occupational development (63 percent).630 Crucially, institutionally-motivated 
soldiers were found to have longer career intentions and were more committed to 
reserve service.631 This data was supported by the interviews: 
R1: ‘Pretty much people just walked through the gate beforehand, didn’t 
they? 
R2: Yes. They had to find us.  
R1: I think that was the difference. They wanted to come and find you. 
Now we’re going into town going, “You can walk and you can breathe. 
You’ll do… Sign this bit of paper, son.”’632  
 
R1: ‘It's all well and good recruiting someone, but if they're: "Mmm... I 
don't know if I want to do it." You want someone who really wants to 
do it - like I really wanted to do it - then they'll do it. If they're half-
hearted people, they will fall out, they won't want to do it. And there's 
not many people that I think that really want to do it. You have to 
think... I always look for the next challenge. That's what I do. That's 
how I am.’633 
 
R1 ‘The whole point of this [FR] 2020 is surely about saving money. Let’s 
take a couple of steps backwards. How much is it really costing with all 
these financial incentives that are coming in? Are they really, on the 
long-run, going to save money?  
R2: After three years, are they [new recruits and ex-regulars] going to stay 
in? 
R1: Exactly my point being is, these “retention [bonuses]” … are not really. 
They’re sweeteners, not retention, because, once that money runs out, 
are people going to [leave]... whereas you’ve got the mainstay of the 
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reserve… 20-odd years, 30-odd years down the line and we haven’t 
had any incentives to make us stay. Do you see what I’m saying?’ 634 
These reservists clearly believed institutionally- and intrinsically-motivated recruits are 
required in the long term. When the arduous courses elite regular units such as the 
Parachute Regiment and Royal Marines use to select the best soldiers are considered – 
which only offer minor monetary benefits if completed – this belief appears particularly 
credible. However, the institutional-occupational distinction is not mutually exclusive. 
One reservist remarked how she ‘joined for the experience but now it’s about the 
money’,635 while another senior rank adroitly argued:  
‘When… you actually tell them what they can get out of it: licenses, this, that 
and the other, it's a massive eye-opener. But it's the way we sell it… they don't 
go deep enough in actually saying: "Look. You get paid for this. You get this, 
you get that." And people say, "Oh, money shouldn't come into it." Of course it 
does. This is Cornwall. It does count as an income to a lot of the guys. Nature 
of the beast... The majority of people in Cornwall are on low income, minimum 
wage. Well, if you can top that up being in the Army Reserve then all well and 
good. And that's what happens.’636   
Pecuniary and development benefits clearly play a major role in recruiting and retaining 
reservists. The question is therefore about where the right balance lies between 
institutional and occupational recruitment models. The fact that some regulars’ 
motivations were perceived as circumspect due to the bonuses on offer, and that 
compared to the past, recent recruitment campaigns have highlighted the (increased) 
material benefits of service, raises interesting questions about the long term 
commitment of reservists recruited by campaigns that stress occupational benefits. 
Indeed, there is an awareness amongst senior officers of the potential risks of the 
occupational recruitment model. 
 Another major sub-theme was the degree to which soldiers perceived the 
recruitment drive as resulting from politics. This was related to a lack of confidence in 
the Army Reserve’s ability to recruit to its FR20 target strength.  
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R4:  ‘I don't think they’re doing enough to make it a success. I think that 
people have actually used this for political gain and... they’re not really 
supporting. They’re not investing. 
R1: …The politicians have got it wrong… To attract young people into [the 
Army Reserve], it’s a real challenge. They [young people] don't 
understand it. They don't know what it is.  
R2: They [politicians] put a lot of weight on all the regulars that they 
kicked out on joining the TA and it hasn’t happened.  
R3: No military boss is going to cut their army. It’s got to be an opinion of 
the politician, hasn’t it?’637 
  
R1 ‘What they wanted, I think, was all the regulars made redundant and 
join the TA, but that hasn’t happened. That’s what they wanted. Then 
they ha[d] to say, “We’re going to get 30,000 regulars,” but that’s not 
going to happen. 
R2: Politicians are causing all this. They call all the shots and we just have 
to say… “Yes, sir.” “No, sir.” That’s what it comes down to.’638 
The quote above is also noteworthy for an awareness of the failure of regulars who had 
been made redundant to join the reserves in the expected numbers due to the initial lack 
of incentives on offer, further supporting previous arguments about the ad hoc evolution 
of FR20.  Meanwhile, the political theme was repeated frequently across ranks and sub-
units: 
‘Everyone in the army knows this plan is politically driven.’639 
 
‘The 30,000 in seven years is pie in the sky.’640 
 
‘Yeah, we recruit to our targets... But will we reach it [full sub-unit strength] by 
[2019]? No.’641 
Senior ranks were also aware that total sub-unit membership did not reflect real, trained 
strengths: 
R1:  ‘It’s not accurate, either.  
Mod: What isn’t? The recruiting?  
R1: The numbers. We’ve got 72 people on the books, because we’ve got 72 
members, but of that I would say there’s only 40 percent that turn up, 
and they’ll get their certificate of competence at the end of each year. 
So, in actual fact, from a squadron of 70, there’s only 40 people.  
R2: That is your true strength.’642  
Although significant given FR20’s emphasis on numbers, this finding is not as 
controversial as perhaps it first appears. In the 1980s Walker recorded that TA turnout 
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varied between 40-70 percent of total strength and that most units had a ‘hard core’ of 
about 40 percent.643 The interviews revealed that this situation suited some sub-units as 
it gave them a greater allocation of Man Training Days (MTDs; the metric by which 
funds are allocated to units and which ultimately determine training) to be utilised by 
core members.644 Another sub-unit noted problems in retaining these new recruits.  
R1: ‘You have loads of people coming in, and may get into the unit, and 
then very few stay. They just... 
R2: Well, we have as many go as we do come in the door. 
R3: Yeah, that's right. 
R1:  … We could have a battalion here. The amount of people I've seen in 
seven years come through these doors, and started, actually got into the 
regiment and uniform, and signed up, and even some of them have 
gone up to the basic training and finished all that. And they're just... 
gone.’645 
While the same problems were not replicated across the sample, overall there was a 
general trend that RLC squadrons were less optimistic about their ability to recruit to 
full strength by 2019, despite the effort these sub-units had expended to date. REME 
squadrons were generally more positive about their ability to get to full strength. While 
overall experiences were mixed, it is clear that major issues remain concerning recruit 
quality, commitment and retention in some of these sub-units. 
 However, the most controversial finding concerned the reporting of sub-units’ 
strengths. With a 40 percent core of regular attendance, in most reserve units another 30 
percent attend once a month and the remainder rarely. Usually, once a reservist has not 
attended for six months, they will be struck off the sub-unit books and the discharge 
process instigated. However, this study revealed numerous cases where sub-units had 
been instructed by higher command to keep personnel who had not attended for over 
one – and even two years – in order to show their strengths were rising and hence 
support the narrative that the Army Reserve is growing as a result of the recruitment 
drive. One example from the fieldwork is particularly instructive. Arriving at a sub-unit, 
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I was shown its personnel roster displayed on the wall by a concerned senior soldier. Of 
the approximately 50 reservists on it, one third were highlighted in yellow as not having 
attended a parade for a year. The soldier explained: ‘Some of these haven’t attended in 
two years or more. We’ve been told not to shit-can anyone ‘cause it looks bad on 
stats… we’ve got to keep these on our books to make our stats look good… If I went to 
the papers with this they’d have a field day.’646 The soldier explained that he understood 
the direction to effectively ‘cook the books’ had come down from higher command in 
the past year, but that it would be reversed soon. It was not the aim of this research to 
uncover who issued this direction, nor when, but the general finding was supported by 
numerous other sources. As these soldiers explained in separate interviews:  
‘The other thing, I think, especially the senior ranks, because they know more 
and they've been around more, is the deceit that is put on the news channels 
that “we've recruited this many” and we know all these numbers aren't true. It's 
creative accounting at its very best, because we are here in a squadron of 110, 
120, and there's how many people tonight? 12? 10 percent.’647 
 
R2: ‘The problem is it’s that bit of paper there and it’s “how many numbers 
are on that bit of paper in that book?” 
R1: It’s just so wrong. 
R2: That’s what it boils down to. Somebody will open that and go, “Oh, 
your books are looking good.”’648 
 
R6:  ‘From what I see of it, there are a lot of paper soldiers on the books in 
the Reserves. 
R2: Yes.  
R6: Half the people who are actually on the books, which the government 
figures are on target, they don't exist.  
R1: But … there’s not a commanding officer who’s in charge of a Reservist 
unit who’s going to go, “Ah, not turned up. Strike off the books,” or, 
“Not suitable. Strike off the books.”649  
Similarly, questioned on recruitment, an officer in a different sub-unit offered the 
following analysis: 
‘It’s quantity over quality. And to be honest it’s forcing us to play politics. We 
say our strength is higher than it really is and the Chain of Command pass that 
up. Of course they know it too… it’s forcing us to be political really.’650 
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A recent newspaper report corroborated this data with evidence from other units, with 
‘senior military sources’ also stating that reservists who fail their fitness or weapons 
handling MATTs were not being discharged, supporting the evidence presented 
above.651  
             These are significant findings for a number of reasons. Most obviously, they 
indicate that some units have been directed to report inflated strengths in the full 
knowledge that in reality up to a third of this strength are not active members. It also 
indicates that the chain of command, in areas where it has not directed this to happen, is 
still complicit in it. However, perhaps most worryingly, it indicates the degree to which 
sub-units and, perhaps the chain of command, have been forced to support what is an 
inherently political plan. In doing so, it raises major questions about transparency in 
Army Reserve strength figures. Perhaps more worryingly, as the officer above hinted at, 
this practice is blurring the traditional – and legal – line between politics and service in 
the armed forces, thereby making some senior soldiers and officers uncomfortable with 
the manner in which they are supporting FR20.   
Equipment, Training and the Limits of Post-Fordism 
FR20 pledged to invest £1.2 billion in Army Reserve equipment and training over ten 
years and in order understand whether sub-units were becoming more capable, 
reservists were asked whether they perceived increased levels of equipment and training 
in their sub-units as a result of the reforms. Strachan and King have both shown how 
training is crucial to understanding cohesion and effective performance in the 
infantry.652 While basic specialist infantry drills are relatively easy to conduct with 
soldiers and personal weapons – and RLC and REME reservists do learn basic infantry 
skills – the availability of equipment, and especially vehicles, on which to train is 
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particularly important in these sub-units as without them realistic trade training is 
difficult to conduct. Thus, the availability of vehicles to regularly train with is central to 
retaining the specialist skills and knowledge required for these sub-units to collectively 
deliver the capability outlined in FR20.  
One frequently occurring theme was the lack of vehicles and equipment 
available to at sub-unit locations: 
R1: ‘From a training perspective, here on a Tuesday night we don't have a 
chance to do anything for vehicles. Skills training, yes you can do that 
here. You could probably do with more kit like pistols.’653  
 
R1: ‘We get the basic uniforms, but we haven’t got the main kit like trucks 
and weapons and radios. We still haven’t got that.  
R2: We’re still a bit Dad’s Army 
R3: We’ve got nothing. When we first started, we were doing infantry 
lessons, skills, but with no weapons. The equipment is there. We just 
can’t get hold of it full-time. 
R2:  …We’ve already lost a year’s training [because we] still [had] no 
trucks.’654 
 
R1: ‘We’ve only been affiliated since November [2013]... Before that we 
weren’t on the actual map. So now we… can start getting this kit. So it 
will come eventually. 
R2: I manage the equipment here. At the moment, we hold barely any 
equipment within the squadron. Is that a regimental fault? I don't know. 
So, as to equipment, no, we beg steal and borrow from the other 
squadrons. We’ve got minimal equipment just to keep the squadron 
afloat…’655 
While there was an acknowledgement that equipment would become available as 
transition progressed – and there was clear evidence of this during the research 
project656 – it was clear that this had had an impact on numerous sub-units to date.657 
However, soldiers in a REME field company did note the better availability of 
equipment since FR20 and the positive impact this had had on training, indicating that 
experiences varied in this regard:  
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‘I’ve been in seven or eight years and it [was] always Bedfords or Land Rovers 
you’d be working on… The operational kit has started rolling through now, 
which never used to happen.’658 
Meanwhile, following the rationalisation of the defence estate, the lack of infrastructure 
in reserve centres was another theme that indicated problems with the synchronisation 
of transition. This appeared in numerous interviews:  
‘…the infrastructure wasn't in place.  We're now a year down the line… 
they’ve announced that there's going to be something like a couple of million 
pounds worth of new equipment that the reserves will have. We've got, on our 
account at the moment, 40 weapons only.  We're still waiting for the equipment 
to come…  Things like that [haven’t] been handled well.  I think any unit going 
into a location, the infrastructure should be in place.  The equipment table 
should be in place.  Then, the troops come in.  To get the troops in first, and not 
have the infrastructure in place, is not great.’659  
The fundamental thing that was wrong when we first started was that by the 
time we started we had no infrastructure whatsoever.’660 
Other soldiers succinctly commented: 
‘The Army’s come up with this master plan. The stuff should have been there 
before we came over.’661 
 
‘The fundamental thing that was wrong when we first started was that by the 
time we started we had no infrastructure whatsoever.’662 
Other units reported an initial lack of showering facilities that hindered physical 
training, while a lack of offices was also a problem.663 The fact that a number of centres 
did not have Defence Intranet terminals was also problematic as it made conducting 
personal administration tasks more difficult.664 However, other units saw the beneficial 
aspects of estate rationalisation, and the centralisation of units this had caused:   
R1: ‘[It] was very hard for command and control, unit cohesion, and 
everything like that.  It was very difficult.  Now, it's been under one 
unit…   
Mod: It's centralised? 
R1: Yes.  It is so much better.  You're recruiting for one location.  You’ve 
got a commander control in one location.  Everything is centred around 
here.  So, that's been a big bonus.’665  
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There was also a large degree of acceptance, and patience, that these infrastructure issues 
were an initial result of the reorganisation and that they would eventually be resolved.666   
 However, it was interesting to note reservists’ perceptions that many problems 
with equipment availability were the result of centralising kit whilst outsourcing its 
management to civilian firms. This was apparent across RLC and REME sub-units and 
occurred without respondents being asked directly about the effects of centralisation or 
post-Fordism in general. For example: 
R1: ‘Apparently the British Army doesn’t own any low loaders [heavy 
transporters] now. It sold them all. 
R2: Yeah. [Outsourced] Contract. 
R3: Mr. Witham [civilian military equipment sales firm] will now sell them 
back to us at twice the cost and get another MBE for it. 
R4: It won’t be Withams. It’ll be [other firm] who do the delivery. They’ve 
got the contract.’667 
 
R1: ‘The one thing that seems to be a little bit confusing is they’re 
downsizing the regulars, expanding the reserves, but they’re 
downsizing the size of the [vehicle] fleet…. If people are going to go 
down the [centralised] whole fleet management side, forget it. They’ve 
tried that before. It’s a bag of shit… I’ve been here 30 plus years and 
I’ve seen all fleet management tried many a time before.  
R2: Plus whole fleet management works for regs because – this is the regs 
and the reserves thing again – because [if] you’re deploying out this 
weekend, you need five vehicles. That’s five drivers, plus a driver to 
drive those drivers to get those vehicles. Do you know what I mean?’668  
The frictions created for reservists by centralised equipment stores and outsourcing was 
repeated in other sub-units:  
R1: ‘The thing is though, for us to do a trade training weekend, we've got to 
go all the way… up to Marchwood… They've got a hell of a hike to get 
up there. 
R2: You spend most of the time travelling, don't you? 
R1: That's a lot of time travelling.’ 
R3 I've also heard that Marchwood was being sold. 
R1: They have. They've sold it. 
R2: They've sold it, and so the military are only going to get limited hours 
using it. 
R3  And we don't know how that's going to affect the equipment and kit 
that's up there, whether that's all going to go, whether we're not going 
to get it, or whether it's going to come to Plymouth.’669  
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The reference to the sale of Marchwood Sea Mounting Centre to civilian port 
management firm Solent Gateway in October 2015 is particularly interesting in terms of 
the post-Fordist approach. The port is under-used in peacetime and as a result the 
government expects to generate revenues by allowing Solent Gateway to use it for 215 
days per year. The remaining 150 days’ use is shared between the regular and reserve 
port and maritime RLC units who train and unload vessels there. While the contract was 
in part negotiated by the regular RLC officer responsible for the port at present, the 150 
day limit has raised concerns over availability of the port for reservists, given they do 
not usually train during the week when the regular units would be using their allocation 
of days. As such, the outsourcing of the port was designed more with the regular, rather 
than the reserve employment model, in mind. 
The interviews also revealed problems with the plan to outsource maintenance 
tasks from the regulars to the newly centralised reserve REME battalions as part of the 
integrated whole force concept: 
R1 ‘…they’re trying to run it [equipment maintenance] like a regular 
battalion…We just haven’t got the manpower. It cannot be done.  
R2: Production’s limited during the week because we’re only there for a 
couple of hours Wednesday nights. So you can’t undertake big tasks if 
they need the kit.  
R2 I think they sold it to us originally that this is obviously all aimed at 
keeping competencies up for the tradesmen… But me personally, I 
think that we’re doing less now than we were when we were [as LADs] 
with the other regiments. 
All: I’d agree with that.’670 
Clearly, centralisation, outsourcing and the attempt to better integrate the reserves 
following the network approach indicate that the adoption of post-Fordist principles is 
having major impacts on these sub-units’ ability to train and, within the REME at least, 
also on the regular’s expectations of them to share the maintenance burden. 
In sub-units that reported a lack of equipment and/or infrastructure, this was 
seen as a major obstacle to delivering routine collective trade training: 
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Mod:  ‘How do you think the move, then, and the transition has affected 
training? 
R1: Dramatically.  
R2: Yes, because the vehicles... the biggest seller for an RLC transport unit 
is vehicles… They want to do training in the Man SV [truck]… 
However, what they [reservists] require is the vehicles for them to 
drive. If they haven’t got their vehicle to drive, then they’re going to 
start to walk [i.e leave the unit].  
R3: …We’re not just planning for training at the minute. We’re planning to 
collect kit so we can train.’671 
This last quote underscores the problems caused by centralised equipment stores for 
reserve sub-units. 
R1: …Due to the lack of kit, Tuesday drill nights are becoming repetitive. 
We are running out of subjects that we can actually cover. There’s only 
so many times, without practical training, that you can deliver 
theoretical training on a drill night… 
R4: For me, the infrastructure problems will have an effect on recruiting, 
because a young man, young woman, will come into here, 
predominantly they are employed in all different types of sectors, some 
with different educational standards. They walk in and they have a little 
look at this building. ‘Do I want to be part of this organisation?’ Yes, 
we can mask things up. When they chat to other people... we’re meant 
to be attracting people, not taking people back to a throwback from the 
80s. They will not go into a working environment that is below 
standard.”672 
While these senior NCOs’ comments, and those in other sub-units,673 underscore the 
relationship between equipment, infrastructure and training, soldiers in the same unit 
also highlighted the importance of being able to collectively and routinely train in their 
specialist trade in order to prevent to the loss of skills learnt on individual qualification 
courses. 
R1:  ‘It’s alright smashing out the courses, but unless you all get together, 
and not just over a weekend, [collective sub-unit competency will not 
improve].  
R3: You can’t really develop if, again, you haven’t got the kit. So it’s all 
going to come back to kit, by the way.’674 
As such, the lack of equipment was seen as a crucial impediment to conducting 
collective training, and it combined with the emphasis on recruitment activity to further 
threaten retention. As discussed below, while the success of FR20 in RLC and REME 
sub-units will ultimately rest on their ability to provide enough individuals trained to the 
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required level of trade specialisation, individuals across ranks and sub-units expressed 
that the lack of routine collective trade training was causing skill-fade and low 
confidence.675 Due to FR20’s tiered readiness system, as long as individual reservists 
have the right course qualifications, this could be addressed during mobilisation before 
operations, but it is clear that the longer sub-units are left without equipment the more 
likely it is to negatively impact both morale and collective readiness.  
 Despite the problems a lack of equipment was causing, a number of sub-units 
did report improved training opportunities in the wake of FR20: 
‘Now we are part of a battalion, our training is more REME orientated, whereas 
before, because we were part of a Royal Engineers regiment and we would go 
training with them… we just sort of fell in alongside them and did what they 
were doing, whereas now… because we are part of a battalion, our training is 
more focused on us and the stuff that we need to do and need to learn.’676 
 
‘I think we’re more capable of doing the job, because we’ve got more resources 
now, more manpower...’677 
 
‘One thing I’ve noticed is you get more opportunities to do more live 
taskings… it used to be up to a few years ago…  “No, you can’t go.” “I’m not 
letting the TA go on that.” Whereas now, for these port tasking groups, they 
can’t get enough guys to go on it so it ends up with 50percent regulars, 
50percent reservists.’678   
 
Given that FR20 aimed to increase the capability of these sub-units, these quotes 
indicate that progress is being made with training despite the difficulties outlined above, 
and there was evidence that access to equipment was improving as the research 
progressed.679  
A related issue concerned the conduct of training with regulars. FR20 stated that 
reserve units would be paired with their regular counterparts to achieve better 
integration under the Whole Force concept. Interview groups were therefore asked their 
thoughts on pairing and whether they had conducted frequent training with the regulars 
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since FR20 was introduced. Complimentary quantitative data revealed that within the 
wider RLC/REME reserve population some of the most negative attitudes to reserve 
service were related to the amount of training undertaken with regulars,680 but responses 
were more varied across the sub-units that were interviewed. Some units that had 
trained with regulars were satisfied with the quality of training and how they had been 
treated by their paired units;681 others reported few opportunities to train but blamed this 
mainly on transition;682 while some sub-units had negative experiences of working with 
regular units.683 While this variance is to be expected and likely reflects both reserve 
sub-units’ differing transition schedules and the different command climates within 
regular units, increasing regular-reserve collective logistics training opportunities was 
identified by the army as a key method of delivering both better integration and reserve 
retention in the wake of quantitative data collection. The evidence presented here 
compliments this data in this regard, and suggests that more could be done on the issue. 
   Despite the importance of collective training to deliver capability – both in 
reserve centres and with the regulars – the fundamental determinant of whether sub-
units will successfully re-trade on schedule rests on their ability to train, or re-train, 
individuals to the standard required of their rank in their new specialism. As a result, the 
ability of sub-units to get reservists on specialist trade courses is central to the success 
of their transition. Without individuals trained to the required standard, these sub-units 
simply cannot provide the required number of trained personnel to deliver the increased 
capability expected under FR20. As such, courses are critical to understanding the 
trajectory of transition in sub-units that have re-traded; they are the building blocks of 
sub-unit capability. Although there was some evidence of problems with the availability 
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of RLC courses in particular,684 across the sub-units there was a general 
acknowledgement that FR20 had dramatically increased course availability to 
members.685 For example: 
‘I think, since we’ve been here, the support’s a lot better. I think personal 
development’s a lot better…’686 
 
‘The PSIs [Permanent Staff Instructors] have done fantastic by getting people 
on courses.’687 
 
‘It’s still in-hand. We’re mainly smashing through getting people the right 
licences. As soon as they’ve got the right licences, we’re getting them on the 
trade courses to get them to that level. Again, it takes time.’688 
 
‘[The availability of courses is] a good thing that should be publicised more, I 
think. If you’ve got the time to put in to it, you’re going to near enough get 
what you want out of it.’689 
Numerous other sub-units were equally complementary about their regular PSI’s efforts. 
However, at an organisational level, given that individual proficiency provides the 
foundation on which sub-unit capability rests, the better availability of courses post-
FR20 is to be expected.  
Nevertheless, the interviews and fieldwork revealed major frictions associated 
with re-training entire sub-units that indicate serious, and perhaps fundamental, 
weaknesses in the FR20 plan to transform these units. Of these issues the most serious 
concerned the tiered progression of specialist trade courses that are tied to the rank 
structure. For example, to qualify as a Sergeant in a port unit, a reservist would be 
expected to have completed their class B3 course indicating that they can safely operate 
numerous heavy vehicles used to load and unload ships in a number of conditions, and 
direct their safe use as well. To get this qualification a reservist would have first had to 
complete his class B1 qualification course, gain two years’ experience in trade and 
complete complimentary modules, then complete his B2 (perhaps as a Corporal), wait 
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another two years and complete further modules, before finally completing his B3 and 
qualifying as a port Sergeant. In the current system, this would take a reservist a 
minimum of six years if completed as quickly as possible. Re-roling sub-units has 
therefore created a situation whereby higher ranks – those vital NCOs with deep trade 
experience upon whom sub-units rely to deliver training and capability – must now 
learn a new trade. They are effectively in a rank without the relevant professional skills 
demanded of their trade. While the training problem was less severe for junior soldiers 
who simply follow the new trade progression, given the timelines involved in gaining 
trade experience and relevant qualifications, and the pressures on reservists’ time, the 
depth and scale of transformation in sub-units that have been directed to re-role cannot 
be overstated.  
 Overall, the difficult reality of re-trading reservist logisticians was starkly 
apparent in sub-units that had re-roled. The interviews below provide context for the 
impact these changes have had on both individual members of these sub-units, and 
collective capability: 
R1:  ‘You’re doing your B3, your B2, your B1. You’re probably looking at 
about five or six years. 
R2: Whereas we’re all a little bit screwed, those that have come across from 
the Signals. I was a Class 2 CS [Communications Specialist] op[erator] 
and now I’ve had to go all the way back to the very beginning to sit my 
B3 course. I can’t get promoted to full screw [Corporal] until I’ve got 
B2 upgrade and I’ve got my HGV licence. I’ve got a job. How on earth 
can I ever fit this in? 
R1: Just to do the track licence that’s one week plus three weeks in 
Bovington. So that’s four weeks you’ve got to take off. That’s 
impossible. 
R2: …They’ve worked it out that it would take us a couple of years to go to 
the next level.  
R3: That’s providing you’ve done all the courses. 
R2: So we’re in a situation where we’re pretty fucked. 
R4: Which… when they sold it to us, that wasn’t actually explained. 
R5: It is a really good trade. There is lots of opportunities and it’s good fun, 
but to get there... 
R1: The best position to be in, coming across, would be as a private. 
R6: I’ve come across [as a private]… So I did two weeks [last year]. This 
year I will do two weeks VS. Then I’ll be in the same boat as everyone 
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else. Once I’ve got that class 3, how do I get to class 2 if I can’t take 
four weeks off of work at a time?’690 
 
R1 ‘You're starting from scratch…  
R2: [It will take] Anything between four or five years getting back to a B1. 
But you've got to be rank structured as well. 
R3: And you have to have the time.’691 
 
‘We’ve got a lot of guys that have come in that are not role-specific, so they 
need to be beefed up to the training levels required. The soldiers that are 
transferred across [in trade], that’s a given, but we’ve also got soldiers coming 
in through the door. Now, when we make the offer, we say, ‘Come and join us, 
you’ll do your training. You will then go and get your driving licence. You’ll 
be converted across.’ So we’ve got quite a big backlog of training that needs to 
be done. We can’t organise sub-unit training during training times because we 
haven’t got the kit on-hand. There’s a certain amount of hours that people need 
to do behind wheels to prove competency, to make sure that they’re road legal. 
I really don't think the higher echelons understand the training bill for a 
Reservist to get in, in his or her 27 days, because that is what they’re committed 
to.’692 
Apart from the importance of the sheer amount of time required for reservists to re-
trade, the loss of experience and knowledge – and an acknowledgement that this cannot 
be gained simply on courses – were also frequently highlighted: 
R1:  ‘For me, as a full screw RLC now, you’ve lost nine years’ experience. 
So when somebody asks you something, you honestly don't know. 
R2: We’ve got a long way to go, but we need the kit to do that.  
R1: The courses might be [there] but the experience won’t be…’693  
 
‘By the book, we’ve got people that are already trained, but they don't have the 
knowledge. They’ve done the courses. Fine. The knowledge takes time. It’s one 
thing doing a B3 course or a B1 course, but until they’ve been on the ground 
and done the exercises, then they’re not going to have the experience.’694 
This need for further training and deep experience is enshrined in the qualification 
process itself, but in order to expedite this process it appeared that reservists may be 
allowed to attend courses without gaining the required amount of experience. As 
alluded to, such a practice is not without risk and, paradoxically, may actually increase 
the gap in real-term capability between the regular and reserves that FR20 was designed 
to decrease. 
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As highlighted above, the need to re-train soldiers, and in particular NCOs, may 
also negatively affect their careers. While a two-year dispensation was initially given to 
NCOs in new trades that don’t have the relevant qualifications in the wake of FR20 
implementation,695 re-trading was seen as potentially detrimental to their promotion:   
R1: ‘In this squadron, if you look around the different ranks, there is only 
possibly three people who are qualified to move to Staffy [Staff 
Sergeant], one person who is qualified to move to Warrant Officer, and 
that’s because they came across with their trades already intact. But the 
guys who have come across are in an unfortunate position where they 
miss out.  
R2: In limbo. 
R3: Career failed. 
R4: Well, they are not career failed because everyone has to go through 
same retraining progress so it’s not a career fail. In my personal 
opinion, it’s not, because you’ve got five or six seniors who all have to 
go through the same training process.’696 
The diverging opinion expressed by the last respondent is interesting as it suggests that 
as the re-trading has affected all senior ranks uniformly, the competition for promotion 
between them has therefore remained the same. While true, this view does not 
appreciate that this practice effectively delays these ranks’ promotion, pay and seniority 
compared to if they had remained in trade. This was explained by one senior rank:   
‘And the transition side, actually... I will say, and I am positive about the 
transition…. [But] personally, one of the biggest knocks was promotion, from 
senior NCO, probably corporal, up... Because the way the trade is, to get from 
B3 to B1, it's six years. So… a sergeant, that was a B1 transport sergeant, could 
be staffy [staff sergeant] within two years of a sergeant. But realistically a B3 
to a B1 [maritime skilled] ganger, six years. So that sergeant, now, has got to 
stay a sergeant for six years… so this is going to be a long while… six years to 
get class 1. We've got to have a class 1 on a Mexeflote…’697 
Similar views were expressed in other units that had re-traded.698  
 It is also interesting note how the need to re-trade was viewed by some senior 
ranks as indicative of the limits of the Whole Force concept in general, and how the 
reserves remained separate from the army in particular. For example:  
R1 ‘If it’s supposed to be one army, you’ve actually achieved a rank. And 
with that rank, you’ve got additional management experience. 
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Management experience is supposed to cut across the army and it 
doesn’t seem like that has actually been taken into account. So we are 
not one army. We are still the individual corps.  
R2: I think you’ve hit in on the head. We’re not one army. We never will 
be. 
R3: That’s right. 
R1:  … This new strapline of one army doesn’t work because it’s not one 
army…. It can’t be. It physically can’t be because we are on two 




‘They say it’s one army but it’s got two separate pay scales’700  
 
What is clear from the above comments is that FR20 has created extensive 
organisational friction in these sub-units concerning the realities of re-trading and its 
impact on careers. During the research period, it became clear that higher command was 
aware of the scale of challenge re-trading already qualified NCOs posed. Although 
much uncertainty remained, there were suggestions that trade-qualified NCOs would 
keep their old trade and be promoted without the required trade specific courses.701 In 
this scenario, junior soldiers would continue to train for the new trade, while seniors 
would not be required to do so. Sub-units would therefore lack experience of their trade 
at the senior rank level, and without help from other units this would clearly affect 
collective training. Either way, the juxtaposition between re-trading to deliver the 
required operational capability and correctly managing career progression cannot be 
easily solved. While on the one hand the re-trading issue underscores the considerable 
organisational friction that FR20 has generated between the delivery of collective 
capability and the correct career management of reservists, on the other it indicates that 
transformation in these sub-units is almost certain to take longer than FR20 originally 
envisaged. Again, given the history of the previous periods of reform this is hardly 
surprising.  
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Can these sub-units deliver? 
What do the above findings tell us about the impact of FR20 on these sub-units to date? 
Clearly, sub-units have had different experiences, and generally it was noticeable that 
those that had experienced the least amount of organisational change appeared to be the 
most content about FR20. It is also important to stress that by the completion of 
research in summer 2016, FR20 was only a little over half way through its projected 
lifespan. The interviews also revealed that many soldiers had not passed final judgement 
on FR20 yet: 
‘In a couple of years’ time, we'll know whether the plan was a good one or not, 
probably too early [now].’702 
‘There’s lots of changes going on, but it’s a bit early to say whether they’re for 
the better or for the worse. [So far] I think they’re better, from a REME point of 
view, simply.’703 
 Interestingly, this last position had noticeably changed a year later in the same unit:  
Mod:  ‘Do you think in your experience FR20 has been positive? What’s the 
general consensus? 
R6: Mixed.  
R2: Mixed.  
R6: I think it’s good for the fact that we bring in loads of people in and get 
the numbers up, but I think it’s bad for retention.  
R2: Lots of stuff that should be happening is now slipping, like the kit and 
the training aids and stuff like that.’704 
As a result, although this chapter utilised longitudinal data, the long term nature of 
FR20 limits the ability of this chapter to provide a definitive answer about the policy’s 
impact on the sub-units in question. Nevertheless, a general sense of what FR20 has 
achieved to date, the rate of change, and its future trajectory, can be ascertained.  
Recruitment, equipment and training are some of the most important ‘hard’ 
factors that will determine if these sub-units can deliver the operational capability 
required by FR20. To ascertain whether those in the selected sub-units thought this 
possible given FR20’s impact to date, respondents were asked whether they believed 
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FR20 would ultimately prove successful. Again, there were mixed responses, with the 
following opinion from an NCO in a sub-unit that had not re-roled reflective of others 
commonly aired: ‘On paper they’ll succeed, whether you’ll see a huge difference on the 
ground is another matter.’705 Meanwhile, it was widely acknowledged that re-traded 
sub-units had become ineffective as a result of FR20, and it would take years to re-
develop this in a new trade. As one officer remarked:  
‘So for six years, if we're lucky, we will be ineffective or we'll need to borrow 
the senior guys [from other sub-units in the same regiment]. How does that 
help unit cohesion, integrity and all that stuff? It doesn't. Like I said, we're 
never going to have a ganger, a sergeant, because it's six years, [but] we can 
probably end up providing, with help from [other sub-units]. We could then put 
all our resources together and provide... But as a squadron, independent, with 
the manpower we've got, and the trade [issue]... We can't do it.’706 
This belief that their sub-unit would not ultimately prove able to provide the FR20 
capability requirement was repeated in other sub-units, but it was also challenged:  
R1:  ‘We’ve still got a long way to go.  
R2: Will we be able to [provide] 40 personnel? No.  
R3: I disagree. I personally think by 2017 we could have 30 odd people 
ready to deploy.  
R2: They would be deployable. They have done the courses. They’ll have 
the fitness, but... 
R1: It’s the knowledge. 
R2: Experience.  
R4: You need to be competent before you can be deployed, because 
otherwise you’re putting people at-risk. They will go at-risk. They will 
then have a really bad time…  
R3: I understand that… To gain the experience, they need the kit and 
equipment. My argument is yes I would say, by 2017, we will have 
between 30-odd people ready to deploy, as long as we have the 
equipment to put them on the road and ready for deployment.’707 
 
‘No, we’re not ready. We’ve only been formed six months and next year 
they’re expecting us to be at high readiness state. No. Definitely not.’708 
 
R1: ‘We will be in the same position we are in two and half years. 
R2: I don’t think we will. 
R3: If things don’t change, then yes we will. 
R2: But we’re changing that now. 
R4: We could do it [deploy a section] now. 
R1: … In two and a half years, we’ll still be able to deploy a section 
R2: But it would be top-heavy. 
R3: … It would be top-heavy because of our trade.’709 
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This identification of the ‘top-heavy’ nature of sections refers to the deployment of 
senior ranks in junior positions in order to provide capability. As such, it reflects the 
perceived inability of sub-units to fill each section with the required trade skills relevant 
to rank. Critically, it indicates that, because these sub-units would be forced to deploy 
more of their senior ranks in the first roules of a deployment, their capacity to continue 
to deliver the same capability in subsequent roules would be severely limited. It 
therefore indicates potentially major problems in the tiered readiness system within 
which these sub-units are meant to provide capability. As an officer elucidated: 
 [This sub-unit must provide] a half section for roule one and then a full 
section for roule two, three and four, right up to eight. Now, [there] is 
an interesting mathematical conundrum at this point… because I'm 
supposed to have five years' worth of [deployable reservists], and I've 
only got four.  So my last two roules, either I cover them with the first 
two or… we can train specialists in that length of time, so that my ninth 
and tenth roules are covered by people who are not yet through the 
door…  [But] I would actually say it [the tiered readiness cycle] is a 
wise idea.  It's something that can work.  We cannot do it on existing 
philosophies, but I think we've done quite well in adjusting 
philosophies to make things happen.  Am I capable now of delivering a 
section?  Probably, yes.  Am I able to deliver a section, plus a section 
into the barrel for six months' time? Probably, yes. But beyond that, I'm 
going to work quite hard and I know that.  It's something that I've 
known for over a year.  And we're making great progress. But, as 
regards Full Operation Capability, I don't think we'll ever get it, 
because it means that everybody has to be trained all the time.’710 
Interestingly, officers and soldiers in other sub-units also identified this weakness in the 
roule system, but were less positive about their ability to bridge the capability gaps they 
identified in the sixth year of a deployment.711 Such a finding raises serious questions as 
to the long term sustainability of the reserves logistics components contribution to the 
Army2020 deployment system, and, more generally, of the Whole Force Concept. 
To gain an accurate picture as possible of the impact of FR20 to date, items on 
this topic were also included in the surveys, which were distributed to a wider sample 
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that was less weighted toward units which had undergone organisational transformation. 
The results of this section in the survey were more positive than those from the group 
interviews, but still some of the least positive opinions expressed in the surveys overall. 
Perhaps the most important baseline statistic concerning the impact of FR20 to date is 
recorded in the item concerning respondents’ optimism that the reforms will increase 
their sub-unit’s capability. On average 54 percent said they ‘Agreed’ or ‘Strongly 
Agreed’ with the proposition, 30 percent ‘Couldn’t Say’, and 16 percent said they 
‘Disagreed or Strongly Disagreed’. In terms of perceptions of sub-units becoming better 
at their job as a result of FR20, the jury is still largely out, as 43 percent stated they 
‘Couldn’t Say’, while 38 percent ‘Agreed’ or ‘Strongly Agreed’. Only about 32 percent 
agreed that there had been better equipment as a result of FR20, and this item recorded 
some of the least positive results in the entire survey, suggesting that the flow of better 
equipment into sub-units has been moderate at best. In terms of FR20 delivering better 
integration with the regulars during training there were slightly more positive results, 
with 33 percent stating that they agreed this had occurred in their sub-unit. However, 24 
percent of both cap badges recorded ‘Disagree’ or ‘Strongly Disagree’ responses. 
Supported by other findings above, and previous research, this indicates that increasing 
training with the regulars has not been fully met yet. 
Despite the varying experiences of transformation and differing opinion on its 
likelihood of success, this chapter has shown that FR20 has already had major impacts 
on the sub-units examined. Many of these were foreseen at the outset of FR20 
implementation; some have been unintended. Overall, how the policy was implemented 
has created considerable organisational frictions in these sub-units, with many long-
term issues still outstanding. FR20’s emphasis on recruitment has come at the expense 
of training, which, paradoxically, can pose a threat to retention. The numbers game has 
also raised questions about the quality of recruit and whether they will remain 
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committed to service with these sub-units in the longer-term. Perhaps most importantly, 
the need to recruit to target for political reasons has caused accounting practices to 
develop that lack transparency and have ultimately forced commanders to play politics.  
The impact of certain post-Fordist logistics structures and management 
processes on equipment, infrastructure and even recruiting in these sub-units has also 
been evident. The centralisation of logistics equipment, especially vehicles, has reduced 
the amount of training time for many sub-units on a number of their key equipment 
platforms, whilst also increasing the complexity of, and human resources needed to, 
conduct trade training. Similarly, the evidence suggests that within this sample, the 
Whole Force Concept is yet to be fully implemented, with reservists concerned about 
the lack of availability of equipment and training with the regulars. Meanwhile, the 
centralisation of reserve sub-units in larger base locations has resulted in improved 
command and control in some sub-units, but also infrastructure and recruitment 
problems in others. The sale of Marchwood port is particularly instructive as it indicates 
the negative impact that rationalising military infrastructure can have on reserve units 
whose time is more limited. Similarly, the centralisation and outsourcing of the 
previously localised reserve recruitment process to a civilian firm has caused major 
impediments for the reserves. While some of these issues are being addressed, overall 
the evidence suggests that while the post-Fordist approach to logistics may deliver 
efficiencies for the regular army, it has not been designed or implemented with the 
reserves in mind, it may create more problems than it solves. It is arguable that, given 
their part-time nature and more local dispersal, the post-Fordist approach is far less 
efficient and useful to reserve sub-units than it is to their regular counterparts. 
Despite FR20’s promises of investment, many sub-units are therefore suffering 
from a lack of equipment and infrastructure, and this has negatively impacted training. 
While there was an acceptance in the sub-units that equipment and infrastructure issues 
 224 
 
are being addressed, that they existed was perceived as a result of poor management by 
higher command and the politically-imposed nature of FR20. This failure to resource 
these logistics sub-units from the outset has clearly impacted positivity about FR20 in 
the selected sub-units, and is related to the ad hoc nature of FR20’s development. 
Decisively, this chapter has also shown that in sub-units that have re-roled, re-trading 
has created a situation whereby some sub-units are likely to take six years or more for 
them to deliver even their IOC. While some sub-units may be able to deliver IOC on 
schedule, real transformation in many sub-units is likely to take longer than the April 
2019 date by which FR20 is due to be completed. Similarly, even if reservists are 
pooled at the unit level in order to deliver the required capability for initial deployment 
roules, such are the organisational challenges created by FR20 in these sub-units that 
many of them will lack the capacity to sustain their contribution to later deployments, 
thereby jeopardising the tiered, rotational readiness structure, not only for reservists in 
these sub-units, but also in the regular units they are designed to support. And this is 
notwithstanding the longer-term issues for reserve sub-units identified within the 
rotational system itself. As a result, in the case of the reserve logistics sub-units studied 
in this chapter, it currently appears that they many are unlikely to be able to deliver the 
capability required under FR20 on schedule. While some, especially REME companies, 
will, and most are likely to meet demand of at least their first allocated roulements, 
given the scope of the organisational changes experienced, it appears that many will 
struggle to provide the enduring capability envisaged by FR20 – and upon which the 








Sub-Unit Perceptions of Cohesion, Readiness and FR20 
 
The last chapter presented qualitative evidence from sub-units on their ability to meet 
the capability requirements set by FR20. This chapter uses the Standard Model to 
examine quantitative data from a wider sample of reserve logisticians to assess 
perceptions of cohesion and readiness, experiences of FR20 to date, and the impact of 
these experiences on cohesion over time. The research presented in this chapter has 
three aims. Firstly, sub-unit cohesion, readiness, and experiences of FR20 are examined 
at both the individual and sub-unit levels to gain an understanding of reserve 
logisticians’ perceptions of these issues. Secondly, advanced statistical analysis is 
undertaken to isolate background characteristics to inform policy makers, and show 
how reservists’ perceptions of cohesion influence readiness and morale. Finally, three 
sub-units with high internal consistency are then used to measure how the FR20 reforms 
impacted these perceptions over time. Throughout, in order to compliment the 
qualitative data presented in the next chapter, I make comparisons with data from a 
regular infantry and a regular logistics sub-unit to elucidate differences between reserve 
and regular perceptions of cohesion.  
Following previous cohesion and readiness research in a number of Western 
armies, this chapter presents the first known quantitative research specifically focusing 
on perceptions of cohesion and readiness in the British Army Reserve. The issue was of 
direct interest to the Capabilities Director, Combat Service Support, who is the senior 
officer in charge of delivering logistics capability across the British Army, and who 
part-financed the surveys undertaken on his behalf. Two levels of analysis are used. A 
statistically significant sample of the RLC/REME population is utilised to illustrate 
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perceptions in this wider group, while eight sub-units where survey response rates were 
the highest were also selected to provide data at the sub-unit level of analysis. The sub-
unit level was utilised as it provided more stable sample groups for longitudinal 
comparison. The aim was to produce statistically significant findings reflective of the 
wider Army Reserve RLC and REME population. This could then be used to inform the 
chain of command on the impact of FR20 in reserve logistics sub-units where some of 
the organisational changes outlined under the transformation have been the most 
profound. While the sample was statistically representative in the first tranche of data 
collection in 2015, in 2016 responses were much lower, and thereby it should be 
stressed that the longitudinal sub-unit comparisons, while internally highly statistically 
valid, are only indicative to, not representative of, the wider REME/RLC population. 
The findings concerning sub-unit changes overtime therefore represent an initial sketch 
of British Army regular and reserve cohesion, rather than a definitive conclusion. 
Importantly however, the results of the 2015 data are all representative of the wider 
population. 
The Standard Model of Cohesion  
Military group cohesion is complex and difficult to measure, with many definitions and 
level of analysis issues. The cohesion debate and the different methodologies associated 
with each side of it have been discussed in the literature review, as has the widespread 
acceptance amongst cohesion academics that it is essential for successful military group 
performance. The review also revealed a lack of quantitative data on cohesion and 
readiness amongst the British reserve in general, and the logistics component in 
particular. This chapter seeks to address this gap in the literature. To do so, it draws on 
previous quantitative cohesion studies conducted in the US and other Western militaries 
to examine cohesion using the Standard Model. A useful classical definition of cohesion 
under the Standard Model has been provided by Guy Siebold: ‘The level of unit 
 227 
 
cohesiveness is defined as the degree to which mechanisms of social control operant in 
a unit maintain a structured pattern of social relationships between unit members, 
individually and collectively, necessary to achieve the unit's purpose.’712 While King 
has challenged this view713, and his approach is used in the next chapter, in this chapter 
the Standard Model is used to measure cohesion. Following Siebold’s definition, three 
basic components of unit cohesion were originally identified: horizontal, vertical, and 
organisational. Each component was conceived of having an affective (emotional or 
feeling, known as social cohesion) aspect and an instrumental (action or task, known as 
task cohesion) aspect. The components of small unit cohesion listed with their affective 
and instrumental aspects, respectively, are: (a) horizontal cohesion (peer bonding and 
teamwork); (b) vertical cohesion (leader caring and leader competence); and (c) 
organisational cohesion between soldiers and their units (pride and shared values, and 
attainment of needs and goals). More recently, a fourth component, institutional 
bonding – referring to the ties between group members and their wider branch of service 
and with similar aspects to the organisational component – has been argued to exist.714 
Within the Standard Model, leadership and shared organisational goals have been 
shown to be strongly related to organisational and peer bonding in particular.715 
Standard Model Cohesion Components  
 Affective Instrumental 
Horizontal Bonding Peer Bonding Teamwork 
Vertical Bonding Leader Caring Leader Competence 
Organisational Bonding Unit Values & Pride Unit Rules & Norms 
Institutional Bonding Army Values & Pride Army Rules & Norms 
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715 Bartone, P., and Kirkland, F. (1991) ‘Optimal Leadership in Small Army Units’, in R. Gal and A. 
Mangelsdorff (eds) Handbook of Military Psychology, Chichester: Wiley; Griffith, J. (2002) ‘Multilevel 
Analysis of Cohesion’s Relation to Stress, Well-Being, Identification, Disintegration and Perceived 
Combat Readiness’, Military Psychology, 14(3). 
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Two main instruments, each involving questionnaire items asking soldiers about their 
perceptions of cohesion, are used to measure each aspect of each component.716 Siebold 
and Dennis Kelly’s Platoon Cohesion Index (PCI) is considered to be the conceptually 
clearest way to measure cohesion at the platoon or sub-unit level. The 20-item 
questionnaire PCI is a shortened version of the 79-item Combat Platoon Cohesion 
Questionnaire (CPCQ) developed after extensive research on behalf of the US Army in 
1986-87,717 and clusters items onto scales to measure each aspect of each component, 
with scales composed of two items each.718 Analysis has shown that three factors are 
formed and there is one factor for each cohesion component. Interscale correlations 
range from .6 to .9, with the most typical being about .7. All of these components have 
been significantly correlated with subsequent group performance in numerous 
studies.719  The PCI and its variations have also been used to measure cohesion in 
surveys of units in the US, Israel, Norway, Canada and Finland.720 The results of the 
PCI have matched commanders’ assessments of their unit’s cohesiveness, and have also 
been shown to have predictive validity with unit performance on training exercises.721 A 
recent study conducted on behalf of the MoD – with advice from occupational 
psychologists – on the impact of females on combat units in the British Army also 
                                                 
716 Siebold, G. and Kelly, D (1988) The Development of the Platoon Cohesion Index, Washington: Army 
Research Institute. 
717 Siebold and Kelly, The Development of the Combat Platoon Cohesion Questionnaire; Marlowe, D. 
(1985) ‘New Manning System field evaluation’ (Tech. Rep. No. 1). Washington: Walter Reed Army 
Institute of Research, Department of Military Psychiatry. 
718 Siebold and Kelly, The Development of the Platoon Cohesion Index, 5. 
719 Beal, D. et al. (2003) ‘Cohesion and Performance in Groups’; MacCoun and Hix,‘Cohesion and 
performance’, in National Defense Institute, Sexual orientation and US military policy: An update of 
RAND’s 1993 study,  Santa Monica: RAND, 141-142; Mullen, B. and Copper, C. (1994) ‘The Relation 
between Group Cohesiveness and Performance: An Integration’, Psychological Bulletin, 115, 210-227. 
720 Salo, M. (2011) United We Stand – Divided We Fall, Helsinki: Department of Social Research, 
University of Helsinki; Gal, R. (1986). ‘Unit Morale: From a theoretical puzzle to an empirical illustration--
An Israeli example’ Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 16, 549-564; Siebold, G. (1996) ‘Small unit 
dynamics: Leadership, cohesion, motivation, and morale’ in Phelps, R. and Farr, B. (eds), Reserve 
component soldiers as peacekeepers, Virginia: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioural and Social 
Sciences. 
721 Siebold and Kelly, The Development of the Platoon Cohesion Index. 
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utilised the longer CPCQ method.722 As a result, both the CPCQ and the PCI are tried 
and tested methods used to measure unit cohesion; the shorter PCI was utilised in this 
study for brevity. The second instrument is the questionnaire used by James Griffith on 
his research in the US Army, which Griffith adapted from long-standing survey research 
on unit cohesion in the US.723 However, Griffith’s cohesion scales are arguably less 
accurate than the PCI for measuring cohesion, and a slightly adapted version of the PCI, 
modified to reflect the sub-unit level, is used in this study. 
While there is strong evidence for an association between cohesion and 
performance, the relationship is bi-directional, i.e positive performance can increase 
group cohesiveness. However, in this study, positive performance is viewed as a desired 
outcome of the FR20 reforms. Therefore, data reporting increases in sub-unit cohesion 
due to better performance does not invalidate but rather strengthens the findings. 
Similarly, it is worth noting that these high quantitative associations between cohesion 
and performance fall short of full causal links: unit cohesion is too complex and 
dependent on a myriad of difficult-to-quantify variables to prove causality. 
Interestingly, a review of the standard model literature revealed a limited number of 
longitudinal studies of cohesion.724 Of most importance to this study is Siebold’s 
examination of cohesion in US Army and National Guard units before, during and after 
their deployment on peacekeeping mission in the Sinai. This study used scales 
measuring cohesion and morale derived from the CPCQ in a similar fashion to the PCI, 
and compared mean scores on each scale over time. A similar approach is followed 
here. 
                                                 
722 Berkshire Consultancy (2010) Study of Women in Combat – Investigation of Quantitative Data, 
available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27404/study_woman
_combat_quant_data.pdf , retrieved 7 September 2016. 
723 Griffith, ‘Measurement of Group Cohesion in US Army Units’, 162. 
724 One exception is Siebold, ‘Small unit dynamics.’ 
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Meanwhile, military readiness can be defined as the ability of military forces to 
fight and meet the demands of the national military strategy. At the sub-unit level, 
readiness refers to the unit’s ability to carry out assigned missions. Despite numerous 
other definitions of morale,725 this study uses that provided by Ingraham and Manning, 
and also used by Reuven Gal: ‘A psychological state of mind, characterised by a sense 
of well-being based on confidence in the self and in primary groups.’726 While Griffith’s 
1988 paper on group cohesion in US Army units does not provide as accurate a measure 
of cohesion as the PCI, it is very useful in terms of expanding on soldiers’ perceptions 
of unit readiness and morale not directly addressed in the PCI. Specifically, it included 
19 items from the Combat Readiness Morale Questionnaire (CRMQ) developed by Gal 
to measure soldiers’ perceptions of group and individual readiness and morale in the 
Israeli Defence Forces,727 as well as other items previously used by the US military. 
Crucially, Griffith has shown that measures of sub-unit readiness, such as soldier 
morale, confidence in leaders, willingness to deploy, and confidence in weaponry and 
equipment have also been shown to be strongly influenced by perceptions of unit 
cohesion.728 Griffith also reported positive relationships between soldiers’ perceptions 
of cohesion and levels of individual morale. To ground the data in previous research and 
allow comparisons to be made, similar items measuring readiness and morale were 
adopted in this study. 
Finally, to gain an accurate picture of the impact to date of FR20 on 
respondents’ sub-units, it was necessary to generate a sub-set of items specifically 
addressing this issue. Other sub-sets consisted of items concerning reservists’ 
                                                 
725 See Gal, ‘Unit morale: From a theoretical puzzle to an empirical illustration’. 
726 Ingraham, L. and Manning, F. (1981) ‘Cohesion: Who needs it, what is it, and how do we get it to 
them?’ Military Review, 61(6). 
727 Gal, ‘Unit morale: From a theoretical puzzle to an empirical illustration’. 
728 Griffith, ‘Measurement of Group Cohesion in U.S Army Units’, 162. 
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experiences of working with the regulars, and items asking about the importance of 
professional performance vis a vis social bonds in reserve logistics sub-units. 
It will be remembered that the survey hypotheses was discussed in Chapter Two, 
while survey design and scale validity details are in Annex A. The research aims and 
hypotheses are presented again here for clarity. Based on the overview of the Standard 
Model literature, this study set out to achieve the following: 
a. For the first time, gather cohesion and readiness data at the individual and 
sub-unit levels from RLC and REME reservists, complimented by data on 
their experiences of working with the regulars and on the impact of the FR20 
transformation to date.  
b. Use three RLC sub-units to examine the impact of FR20 on their perceptions 
of cohesion and readiness over time. 
c. Compare data between RLC and REME sub-units and both regular RLC and 
infantry sub-units to initially examine any differences between reserve and 
regular sub-unit cohesion. 
d. Determine whether the PCI is an accurate and useful tool when applied to 
the British Army Reserve and whether it may aid 360-degree reporting. 
Hypothesis 1: Reservists’ perceptions of cohesion and readiness should increase as a 
result of the FR20 transformation as the force professionalises and better equipment, 
training, and resources are directed toward the reserve logistics population in general 
and specific sub-units in particular.  
Hypothesis 2: Following previous research, sub-units with higher cohesion should 
report higher levels of readiness and morale. 
Hypothesis 3: Given the importance of social bonds in the reserves (See Chapter Eight), 
reserve sub-units should display higher scores for affective (social) bonds on the PCI 
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scales than their regular colleagues. Conversely, regular sub-units should report higher 
instrumental (task) bonds.  
Table 1. 




Total Volunteer Reserve,  including Army Reserve 
Gp A 
Gender     
Male 87 % 86.9 % 
Female 13 % 13.1 % 
Age Gp     
18-24 9.1 % 15.2 % 
25-34 25.8 % 31.2 % 
35-44 27.2 % 25.8 % 
45-54 33.5 % 23.3 % 
55-64 4.4 %  4.5 % 
Rank     
Officers 11 % 17.8 % 
Other Ranks 89 % 82.2 % 
Source: MoD Statistics, Reserves and Cadets: June 2015 
Sample Characteristics 
In terms of ranks, over half (52 percent) of respondents were Privates, Lance Corporals 
or Corporals, with a further 27 percent Sergeant – Warrant Officer Class One. Officers 
were under-represented at statistically significant levels. 51 percent of the sample had 
GCSEs, and 38 percent had some college education or above. In terms of time in 
service, the distribution was skewed toward longer serving (older) soldiers. 20 percent 
had served 0-3 years; 25 percent 4-9 years; 13 percent 10-15 years, and 43 percent had 
served over 16 years. 
To generate a total cohesion score to enable easier longitudinal comparison, a 
scale was created to include all the PCI cohesion scales. Details of the cohesion 






Table 2.  
PCI item loading on scales 
Cohesion Component Scale  Platoon Cohesion Index Items 
Horizontal Bonding (HB) 




HB-Affective, Leaders (HB-A,L)  
 
 
HB-Instrumental (HB-I)  
 
3. Privates/Craftsmen trust each other in this 
sub-unit; 4. Privates/Craftsmen in the sub-unit 
care about each other 
 
7. Leaders in this sub-unit trust each other; 8. 
Leaders in this sub-unit care about each other 
 
5. How well do Privates/Craftsmen in your sub-
unit work together to get something done? 6. 
Privates/Craftsmen in this sub-unit pull 
together to perform as a team. 
Vertical Bonding (VB) 





VB-Instrumental (VB-I)  
 
9. Privates/Craftsmen in this sub-unit can get 
help from their leaders for personal problems; 
10. Leaders and Privates/Craftsmen in this 
sub-unit care about each 
 
11. Leaders and Privates/Craftsmen in this 
sub-unit train well together; 12. Leaders in this 
sub-unit have the skills and abilities to lead 
Privates/Craftsmen on operations 
Organisational Bonding (OB) 
OB-Affective, Values (OB-A, V)  
 
 














OB-Instrumental, Goals (OB-I,G)  
 
1. Privates/Craftsmen in this sub-unit uphold 
and support Army values; 2. Leaders in this 
sub-unit set the example for Army values. 
15. Privates/Craftsmen play an important part 
in accomplishing the sub-units mission; 16. 
Privates/Craftsmen/JNCOs are proud to be in 
this sub-unit 
13. Privates/Craftsmen in this sub-unit know 
what is expected of them; 14. In this sub-unit 
the behaviours that will get you in trouble are 
well known 
17. How satisfied are the 
Privates/Craftsmen/JNCOs in this sub-unit with 
the time for family, friends and personal 
needs? 18. How satisfied are 
Privates/Craftsmen/JNCOs with social events 
in this sub-unit? 
19. Privates/Craftsmen/JNCOs in the sub-unit 
feel they are serving their country; 20. 
Privates/Craftsmen/JNCOs in this sub-unit 
have opportunities to better themselves. 
 
The means and standard deviations for the reserve logistics sample at the individual 








Individual Means and Standard 
Deviations of PCI scales 
Scale Mean  
(out of 10) 
 
Std Dev 
HB-A 8.01 1.33 
HB-A, L 8.00 1.42 
HB-I 8.43 1.28 
VB-A 8.14 1.30 
VB-I 8.12 1.23 
OB-A, V 8.19 1.21 
OB-A, P 8.31 1.23 
OB-I, A 8.08 1.24 
OB-I, N 7.38 1.40 
OB-I, G 8.04 1.26 
 
The means of each of the cohesion components present the average score at the 
individual soldier level on each of the scales. The standard deviation shows the amount 
of variance from the mean that should be expected. As each scale was created from two 
items, the mean score throughout the 2015 PCI survey was about four for each item, 
indicating relatively high perceptions across all the components of cohesion. This is an 
important baseline statistic. It indicates that, allowing for differences in coding, levels of 
perceived cohesion amongst REME and RLC reservists are similar to those recorded in 
Siebold and Kelly’s research, and subsequent studies of both regulars and reservists.729 
In terms of informing policy, this indicates that in general, and despite substantial 
organisational changes within some of the sub-units surveyed, these soldiers’ 
perceptions of their sub-unit’s cohesion remain relatively high. Indeed, they are 
comparable to those recorded in regular forces. Overall, these reservists’ perceptions of 
cohesion were therefore positive in 2015. 
Of note is that the Organisational Bonding, Needs, scale recorded the lowest 
scores, indicating that reservists are less satisfied with their amount of time off and 
social events than other areas of cohesion. More positively, the highest recorded scores 
                                                 
729 Siebold and Kelly, The Development of the Platoon Cohesion Index; Siebold, ‘Small unit dynamics: 
Leadership, cohesion, motivation, and morale’. 
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concerned the Horizontal Bonding, Instrumental, scale which records perceptions of 
lower ranks’ levels of team work. This finding was supported by high scores in the 
Organisational Bonding, Affective, Pride scale which measures lower ranks’ pride in 
their sub-unit and their positive contribution to sub-unit missions. Both Vertical 
Bonding scales also displayed high means, indicating that leadership in the sub-units is 
generally perceived as strong and that the relationship between ranks is good. However, 
perceptions of inter-leader relations were comparatively lower, perhaps reflecting 
personality clashes amongst leaders in some sub-units. In terms of the renewed effort to 
inculcate army values in the Whole Force, the results indicate that this is not a problem 
area amongst REME and RLC reservists, with relatively high levels of agreement with 
the items concerning leaders setting the example in regards to values, and lower ranks 
upholding and supporting these values. At slightly lower levels, the Organisational 
Bonding, Instrumental, Anomie, scale shows that perceptions of discipline are relatively 
high. 
Individual Perceptions of Sub-Unit Readiness and Morale 
This section presents the sample responses to a selection of the sub-unit readiness and 
morale items used by Gal, Vaitkus and Griffith. Again, overall, the results showed 
relatively high levels of readiness and morale, with few major differences between the 
RLC and REME. About 33 percent of the sample thought that their sub-unit’s readiness 
was in the high categories, 48 percent in moderate, and 17 percent in the low categories. 
The distribution of scores was slightly skewed toward higher perceptions of sub-unit 
readiness, indicating more positive attitudes. Nevertheless, the fact that the majority 
reported moderate over high readiness is noteworthy, especially when compared to the 
PCI scales in which the average response was usually in the high category. One 
explanatory factor could be that as members of reserve sub-units, these soldiers are 
more aware of their more limited readiness, and of their sub-unit’s tiered readiness as 
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determined by the Army2020 training and deployment cycle. Interestingly, soldiers’ 
perceptions of their individual readiness to fight if necessary was significantly higher 
(49 percent in both cap badges responded ‘High’) than perceptions of sub-unit 
readiness. Almost 70 percent of respondents said that their sub-unit’s togetherness was 
in the high categories, while 61 percent said that the same of their sub-unit’s skills in its 
main military role. Taken together, these statistics provide positive indications of 
aspects of readiness that complement the affective and instrumental results of the PCI.  
A similar number of respondents (66 percent) also stated that their sub-unit’s 
morale was in the high categories. This is another important baseline statistic, and 
coupled with the fact that only three percent rated their sub-unit morale as ‘Low’ and 
none as ‘Very Low’ indicates high levels of sub-unit morale across the sample. This is 
especially positive given the organisational changes many of the sub-units have 
experienced as a result of FR20.  High levels of personal morale were also recorded (71 
in high categories), in stark contrast to recent data on morale in the regular army.730 
However, of note was a 17 percent difference between the cap badges in the ‘High’ 
category. This was subsequently identified by the chain of command as potentially 
warranting further investigation.  
Supporting the PCI scale scores, generally high levels of confidence in sub-unit 
readiness across a number of other variables were recorded. This included high levels of 
confidence in the sub-unit’s major equipment systems (56 percent), although of note is 
that on average 35 percent said their confidence in this regard was ‘Moderate’. In terms 
of individuals’ confidence in their ability to do their job on operations given the correct 
pre-deployment training, 87 percent reported ‘High’ or ‘Very High’ levels of 
                                                 
730 Ministry of Defence (2016) Armed Forces Continuous Attitudes Survey 2016, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/523875/AFCAS_2016
_Main_Report.pdf, retrieved 21 September 2016. 
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confidence. 83 percent reported similar levels of confidence in the ability of their sub-
unit to perform on operations given sufficient pre-deployment training.   
These high levels of confidence are particularly important given the introduction 
of the tiered and cyclical force readiness structure for the reserves under FR20, and the 
results indicate that logistics reservists are confident that the new system will provide 
the requisite training for them, and their sub-unit, to deliver to the required standard on 
operations. This is a positive indicator, and it appears to be an interesting wider 
endorsement of the broader FR20 tiered readiness plan for the reserves. The slightly 
lower levels of confidence in the sub-unit’s ability to do job on operations compared to 
individuals’ ability complements the other results on readiness and morale discussed 
below, where individual scores are usually higher than at the sub-unit level. This is 
supported by previous research and is likely reflective of the greater number of factors 
that impact at this level, including personalities, degree of training of other members, 
unit leadership etc.  
Experiences of FR20 and Working with the Regulars 
The next section examines individual responses to the five items concerning 
experiences of FR20 to date, and the 12 items addressing experiences of working with 
the regulars. Overall, the results showed lower levels of agreement than with the 
cohesion, readiness and morale items. There were generally higher levels in the ‘Can’t 
Say’ category, and higher percentages disagreed. While the ‘Agree’ category generally 
remained the second most popular choice amongst the sample, indicating that 
perceptions of the impact of the transformation are relatively positive, the fact that the 
‘Strongly Agree’ percentages were relatively low indicate there is probably more to be 




Perhaps the most important baseline statistic concerning the impact of FR20 to 
date is recorded in the item concerning respondents’ optimism that the policy will 
increase their sub-unit’s capability. In 2015, responses to this item were skewed toward 
positive scores, indicating overall optimism that the reforms will prove successful. On 
average 54 percent said they agreed with the proposition, and 30 percent ‘Couldn’t 
Say’. In terms of perceptions of sub-units becoming better at their job as a result of 
FR20, 43 percent of respondents stated they ‘Couldn’t Say’, while 38 percent were in 
the agree categories.  
In terms of the introduction of better equipment as result of FR20 only 32 
percent of both cap badges agreed with the proposition. REME reservists were 
significantly less positive than their RLC colleagues about the introduction of better 
equipment as a result of FR20, and this item recorded some of the least positive results 
in the entire survey, further suggesting that the experience of better equipment into sub-
units as a result of FR20 has been mixed. In terms of FR20 delivering better integration 
with the regulars during training, just over a third agreed this had occurred in their sub-
unit. However, there were relatively high levels of mid-point scores, and 24 percent 
disagreed. Supported by other results above, and the evidence presented in the last 
chapter, this indicates that opportunities to train with regulars could be increased 
further.  
The items concerning experiences of working with the regulars in the last 12 
months had a smaller sample size (n= approx. 210) as a result of the exclusion of 
soldiers who did not have relevant experience. The first item asked whether working 
with the regulars had increased soldiers’ confidence in their individual skills. 55 percent 
were in the agree categories. Slightly lower levels of agreement (46 percent) with the 
regulars’ impact on sub-unit competence were recorded, with higher levels in the ‘Can’t 
Say’ category (44 percent). 65 percent agreed that working with the regulars was a 
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valuable experience, while on average 68 percent agreed they liked working with the 
regulars. Both of these items recorded some of the highest levels of agreement in this 
subset. 
Background Characteristics as Predictors of Cohesion, Readiness, and Personal 
Confidence 
First it was necessary to statistically analyse the relationship between background 
characteristics, cohesion, sub-unit readiness and morale, and personal confidence 
outcomes. Separate multiple regression analyses, each corresponding to one of these 
outcomes, were therefore conducted. Factor analysis and scale validity are detailed in 
Annex A.  Results are displayed in Table 3 below. 
*p < .05, two tailed; **p < .01, two tailed; ***p < .001, two tailed.  
In terms of cohesion, background characteristics explained only three percent of 
the variance, indicating that these have only a minor impact on perceptions of cohesion. 
There was a relatively minor but significant difference between sub-units’ perceptions 
of cohesion (-.15, Sig =.19). This is expected and is significant to the wider population. 
It also confirms that soldiers’ own experiences of their sub-units are more important in 
shaping their perceptions of cohesion than any other background characteristics, 
Table 3.  
Regression Analyses in which Soldier Background and Sub-Unit Predict 
Cohesion, Sub-unit Readiness and Morale, and Personal Confidence 
Predictor Variables Cohesion 




  Unstandardised coeff. B   
Male -1.12 .39 .40 
Age -.70 .12 .18 
Single .92 1.26* .27 
Education -.62 -.18 -.13* 
Rank .20 -.23*** .06 
RLC 2.62 .68 .07 
REME (correlation) -.01 -.02 -.01 
Sub-Unit -.15* -.02 .00 
Cohesion  .34*** .15*** 
R2 .03 .46 .38 
F, df               7, 386           8, 381    8,385 
 =               1.93            39.90*** 29.10*** 
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including education, which has previously been shown to have a highly significant 
predictive ability with RLC and REME soldier satisfaction.731 Further supporting 
previous evidence that better educated soldiers are less satisfied with reserve service, 
there was a relatively strong association between higher levels of education and lower 
perceptions of cohesion at relatively significant levels (-.62, Sig = .06).  
Following Griffith, in order to determine cohesion’s unique contribution, 
separate multiple regressions were then conducted, first with only background 
characteristics included and then with scores from the Total Cohesion scale (see Table 
4.1) added and regressed onto both the Sub-Unit Readiness and Morale, and Personal 
Confidence scales. With Total Cohesion excluded from the regression, the most 
important background characteristic was sub-unit, which had a small but significant (-
.07, Sig =.037) association with perceptions of cohesion and readiness. 
With Total Cohesion added, the total variance explained (R2) by the model 
jumped from seven percent to 46 percent. This result compliments those of previous 
studies in combat forces, and highlights that reservists’ perceptions of sub-unit cohesion 
is very strongly related to their sub-unit readiness and personal morale. This was also 
borne out by the relatively strong association at highly significant levels (.34, Sig = .00) 
between cohesion and readiness and morale. This supports hypothesis 2.  
In terms of Personal Confidence, with the Total Cohesion scale added to the 
regressions, the total variance explained (R2) by the model also jumped from 4 percent 
to 38 percent, further supporting hypothesis 2, and indicating that perceptions of 
cohesion are also very important in explaining personal confidence. Indeed, cohesion 
had the strongest and most significant association with personal confidence (.15, Sig 
=.00). Being better educated was also negatively associated with personal confidence at 
                                                 
731 Bury, P. (2016) ‘Recruitment and Retention in British Army Logistics Units’, Armed Forces and Society, 
available at http://afs.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/07/21/0095327X16657320.abstract . 
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significant levels (-.13, Sig = .05). This is likely due to the fact that better educated 
soldiers are more critical of their own abilities and the provision of personal equipment. 
It also supports previous research showing that better educated RLC and REME soldiers 
are less satisfied with most aspects of reserve service.732 
Overall, and supporting previous research, this statistical analyses underscores 
the importance of cohesion in explaining sub-unit readiness and morale, and personal 
confidence. In terms of background characteristics, when combined with previous 
research, another important finding is the negative effect that more education has on 
perceptions of both cohesion and personal confidence. There is clear and growing 
evidence that targeting this group could lead to better satisfaction, retention, and 
cohesion across the reserve RLC and REME population. 
Selected Sub-Unit Perceptions of Cohesion, Readiness and Morale 
The next research question was to examine the difference in perceptions of cohesion 
between certain sub-units. In order to do this, eight sub-units were selected from those 
with the highest response rates. Some of these sub-units had experienced considerable 
organisational change as a result of FR20. These units were then contacted to ascertain 
their average trained and untrained attendance on drill nights. In consultation with the 
army, this figure, rather than the total trained and untrained strength, was decided to be 
a more accurate indicator of the sub-unit population size from which respondents were 
drawn and the ad hoc reality of reserve attendance. Average attendance ranges from 30-
50 percent of actual sub-unit strength. Table 4 below indicates the eight sub-units that 
were chosen for further analysis, and details the organisational changes certain sub-units 
are undergoing as a result of FR20. The relatively low numbers of respondents in the 
sub-units impacted their confidence interval, but this is to be expected for smaller 
groups.  
                                                 
732 Bury, ‘Recruitment and Retention in British Army Logistics Units’.  
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Next, the selected sub-units’ responses to the PCI scales and the Total Cohesion 
scale were examined, as shown in Table 4.1 on page 243. Most of the sub-units 
displayed high levels of cohesion across all the components, and the average total 
cohesion score was 80/100. This is a good baseline metric for understanding cohesion in 
these sub-units, and, given the scale of the organisational change some of these sub-
units have undergone, this a positive outcome that may indicate that perceptions of 
cohesion have not been too adversely affected by FR20. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy 
that the PCI identified that reservists’ satisfaction with time off and time for social  
Table 4.  
Selected Sub-Unit Responses 
Unit - Sub-unit Responses = 
208 






101 REME - 
127 
26 77.5 9.5  
102 REME - 
147 
19 79.1 10.5  
150 RLC - 216 19 47.5 16.5  
152 RLC – 
220* 
47 (2016 = 44) 223^ NA Re-roled from 
Transport to Fuel 
156 RLC – 
236* 
21 (2016 = 16) 95.5 4.7 Re-roled from 
Transport to 
Supply 
157 RLC – 
580* 
35 (2016 = 31) 89.7 5.4  
165 RLC - 266 22 36.7 16.8 Re-roled from 
Transport to Port 
and Maritime 
167 RLC - 111 19 57.6 14.9  
17 PM – 51  73 94 5.5  
1 RI – A Coy 50 77 11.66  
*Sub unit used in 2016 longitudinal comparison, only 2016 n given. 
^220 Sqn responses far exceeded average attendance and represented 55.3 percent of total 
strength, with a 9.6 confidence interval. 
events, had the lowest of all the component scores.  
  Interestingly, although only indicative results, neither the regular logistics sub-
unit, nor the infantry sub unit had higher total cohesion scores than their reserve 
counterparts. However, when sub-unit results on the separate bonding scales are 
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consulted a number of patterns emerge. Firstly, both regular units’ low scores on the 
Organisational Bonding Instrumental, Needs, scale are important as they are 
significantly lower than the reserve units and have heavily negatively impacted these 
units’ total cohesion score. Clearly, these regular units perceive more strongly that they 
do not have enough time to spend with families or socialise together, highlighting the 
increased workload associated with full-time service. Such a finding also shows the 
utility of the PCI in identifying issues in sub-units. Secondly, and supporting hypothesis 
3, both regular sub-units reported lower perceptions of Horizontal and Vertical 
Affective Bonding, and higher perceptions of the Horizontal and Vertical Instrumental, 
and Anomie scales than the mean scores for the reserve logistics sub-units. While this 
would initially appear to indicate that there are lower bonds between regular soldiers 
and their leaders, in fact when taken in tandem with the regulars’ higher instrumental 
component scores, this actually may suggest the greater importance of task cohesion 
and an awareness of the discipline system in the regulars. This supports the analysis in 
the next chapter. 
In order to examine Sub-Unit Readiness and Morale and Personal Confidence at the 
sub-unit level, firstly the mean and standard deviations for the eight selected sub-units 
in 2015 were calculated and are presented in Table 5 below. Of note are the relatively 
high levels of sub-unit readiness and morale recorded amongst the selected sub-units, 
supporting the evidence presented above. The average score per item on the scale was 4, 
a very similar score to those recorded on the PCI. Personal confidence scores were 
comparatively lower than those on the sub-unit readiness and morale scale. As expected 
given its low cohesion score, and ongoing re-roling, 266 Sqn 165 RLC recorded the 
lowest readiness and morale score. It also recorded the second lowest personal 




Table 4.0  
Sub-Unit Cohesion Scores on Cohesion Scales with 2016 Longitudinal Scores on *Selected Sub-Units 
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Table 5. Selected Sub-Unit Responses to Readiness and Morale and Personal 
Confidence 




Mean / Std Deviation - 2016 
101 REME – 127 (26) 28.80 / 3.16  16.81 / 1.83  
102 REME – 147 (19) 28.89 / 4.52  16.06 / 2.16 
150 RLC – 216  (19)  26.79 / 5.59 16.72/ 2.02 
152 RLC – 220*  (47) 29.20 / 4.47           29.88/ 5.21 16.87 / 1.97         16.26/1.90 
156 RLC – 236*  (21) 28.70 / 4.53           27.81/ 5.52 16.53 / 2.27         16.29/2.66 
157 RLC – 580* (35) 29.59 / 4.58           28.93/ 3.44 16.46 / 1.84         16.86/2.03 
165 RLC – 266  (22) 23.68 / 5.18 16.40 / 2.20 
167 RLC – 111  (19) 28.42 / 4.61 17.26 / 1.69 
Average Mean 2015-2016 28.00                       28.87 16.64                    16.47 
17 PM – 51 (73) 25.16 / 5.92 14.54 / 3.04 
1RI – A  (50) 31.10 / 3.58 16.96 / 1.70 
 
Interestingly, and again only indicative given the small sample size, results for 
the regular infantry sub-unit indicated much higher perceptions of sub-unit readiness 
and morale, and personal confidence than either its regular logistics counterpart, or 
those in the reserves. While this result needs to be corroborated by further data, one 
possible explanatory factor is this infantry unit’s higher readiness demands, and/or the 
greater awareness of readiness and morale as a result of the increased collective training 
burden associated with infantry units as discussed in the next chapter. 17 Port and 
Maritime Regiment’s low scores, especially in personal confidence, was identified as 
possibly warranting investigation by the chain of command. 
Sub-Unit Level Perceptions of Working with Regulars and the Impact of FR20 
In order to gain an understanding of the relationship between the 12 items concerning 
respondents’ experiences of the FR20 reforms and working with the regulars, it was 
necessary to conduct another EFA, as detailed in Annex A. Once the factors had been 
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identified and scales confirmed, to examine the relationship between background 
characteristics and the Working with Regulars and Impact of FR20 scales, separate 
multiple regression analyses, each corresponding to one of these outcomes, were 
conducted. Predictor variables were soldier background characteristics and sub-unit. In 
terms of experiences of working with the regulars, overall there were no major 
differences between RLC and REME cap badges, and sub-units. Single soldiers were 
strongly associated with better experiences of working with the regulars at moderate 
levels of significance to the wider population (1.57, Sig = .05). This is similar to other 
scale scores indicating single soldiers’ higher perceptions of morale and readiness and 
could conceivably be due to higher levels of motivations and fewer conflicts between 
reserve service and family life.  
In terms of soldiers’ experiences of the impact of FR20 to date, higher ranks 
were associated at high levels of significance with lower scores on this scale (-.15, Sig = 
.036). This is to be expected as higher ranks will have more military experience and 
arguably a wider organisational context within which to compare the current reforms. 
Next, to illustrate how the selected sub-units scored on the Working with Regulars and 
Impact of FR20 scales, the means and standard deviations were calculated. These are 
presented in Table 6 below. 
The average sub-unit score on Working with Regulars was 25.5 out of a possible 
35, with the response per item score (3.6) indicating that the average answer 
Table 6.  
Selected Sub-Unit Responses to Experiences of Working with Regulars and Impact of 
FR20 
Unit - Sub-unit (N) Working with Regulars 
/35 
Impact of FR20 
/25 
Mean / Std Deviation – 2016  
101 REME – 127 (26) 26.77 / 4.42  17.40 / 2.45  
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102 REME – 147 (19) 22.92 / 6.57  17.16 / 3.62  
150 RLC – 216  (19)  23.17 / 4.82  15.82 / 2.86  
152 RLC – 220*  (47) 25.76 / 5.03            25.28/ 4.50 17.13 / 3.12       17.50/ 3.63 
156 RLC – 236*  (21) 23.30 / 3.95            26.57/ 5.62 16.58 / 3.39       14.73/ 4.95 
157 RLC – 580* (35) 25.78 / 4.24            26.71/ 5.14 17.24 / 3.03       16.55/ 2.75 
165 RLC – 266  (22) 28.63 / 2.20  15.55 / 2.52  
167 RLC – 111  (19) 27.28 / 4.68  16.47 / 2.67  
Average Mean 25.45                      26.19 16.67                 16.26 
 
was slightly weighted toward ‘Agree’. This indicates that most sub-units thought that 
working with the regulars was a positive experience, and clearly some sub-units had 
better experiences than others, as detailed above. Of particular note is that although (or 
perhaps in spite of the fact that) 266 Sqn 165 RLC recorded lower levels of cohesion, 
readiness and morale, and personal confidence, it recorded the highest score on this 
scale. This is very interesting as it suggests that positive experiences of the regulars are 
not necessarily influenced by perceptions of cohesion, readiness and morale, and 
personal confidence. In short, these experiences may be viewed as a separate factor, 
removed from sub-unit climate, by sub-unit members. Meanwhile, there were generally 
lower levels of agreement that FR20 was having positive impacts on the selected sub-
units. The average sub-unit score on Impact of FR20 was 16.7 out of 25, with the 
response per item score (3.3) indicating that the average answer was weighted toward 
‘Can’t Say’. Crucially, this indicates that respondents in the selected sub-units remained 
very much undecided about the real impact of FR20 on their sub-units in 2015. 
Perceptions of Cohesion, Readiness and Morale, and FR20 over time 
A major research interest was to ascertain if sub-unit perceptions of cohesion, readiness 
and morale, and experiences FR20, were changing as FR20 progressed. In terms of the 
three sub-units selected for longitudinal comparison between 2015-2016, it is 
noteworthy that the mean total cohesion scores remained relatively stable, but that in 
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one sub-unit this had dropped by about 4 percent. A Paired Samples T Test revealed 
that the difference in cohesion scores over time amongst these three reserve sub-units 
was just at the limits of statistical significance (sig=.41, t=.72, df=73). This indicates 
that cohesion scores have changed by a small but significant amount in both directions 
and supports the qualitative data presented in Chapter Six on the mixed impact of FR20 
to date.      
In terms of these three sub-unit scores on the Sub-Unit Readiness and Morale, 
and Personal Confidence scales there were no significant changes in the mean in either 
(Sig=. 65, t= .48, df =77; Sig=.81, t=. 2.4, df =82, respectively). This further supports 
the qualitative data in Chapter Six, and the quantitative cohesion data above, that there 
has been little significant change as a result of FR20 over 2015-16. Although these 
results are indicative only, they do suggest that FR20 is failing to increase cohesion and 
readiness and morale in a significant manner, contrary to hypothesis 1.  
Conversely, a paired T Test with the 2016 data for the three selected sub-units 
indicated significant positive increases in the mean scores (8.79 at a 95% confidence 
level, Sig=.00, t=11.25, df=40) in these units’ attitudes to working with the regulars 
since 2015. This likely reflects more exposure to the regulars, and positive experiences 
during this increased exposure. As such, this data supports some of the qualitative data 
presented in the last chapter that FR20 is increasing reservists’ exposure to the regulars. 
Conversely, there was a decrease in confidence that FR20 would deliver increased sub-
unit capability over the same time period, at similar levels of significance (-9.81 mean, 
Sig= .00, t= -8.22, df =32). Importantly, this contradicts the data presented for the wider 
sample in Chapter Six, and indicates that in the three sub-units examined longitudinally, 
confidence in FR20 has declined since 2015. When combined with the lack of 
significant data concerning growth in cohesion, readiness and morale, this supports my 
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argument that FR20 is struggling to increase logistics sub-unit capabilities, but as 
discussed in the next chapter, is making progress with integration with the regulars. 
Conclusion 
This chapter set out to examine reservist logisticians’ perceptions of cohesion, readiness 
and morale, and experiences of FR20 in a representative sample of RLC and REME 
reserve sub-units. It then conducted advanced statistical analysis to determine the 
relationship between cohesion, readiness and morale, and attitudes to FR20 amongst 
reservists. Finally, it examined three of these sub-units’ responses longitudinally to get 
an initial indication of the impact FR20 was having on these perceptions.  
The chapter has shown that perceptions of sub-unit cohesion, measured at both 
the individual and sub-unit levels, were relatively high amongst RLC and REME 
reservists in 2015. This is a positive outcome that highlights that, in 2015, the FR20 
transformation and the organisational frictions these created appeared to have not too 
adversely affected cohesion levels within this population. Complimenting previous 
research, higher education levels were found to have a significant negative impact on 
perceptions of cohesion and readiness. At the individual level of analysis, an 
examination of the components of cohesion revealed that the highest scores were 
recorded in lower ranks’ perceptions of team work. This finding was supported by high 
scores in scales measuring lower ranks’ pride in their sub-unit, and their positive 
contribution to sub-unit missions. Clearly, the fact that two of these three high-scoring 
scales measure instrumental or task-oriented cohesion, rather than affective cohesion, is 
interesting as it suggests that working together to complete tasks (and hence fulfil 
operational requirements) is where these reservists perceive their sub-units are most 
cohesive. More broadly, when indicatively compared with regular sub-units it is clear 
that perceptions of social cohesion are higher in reserve sub-units than in regular units, 
 250 
 
while those of task cohesion are lower. Again, this research is not conclusive given the 
smaller regular sample size and further research is needed to prove hypothesis 3, but the 
initial evidence does support the qualitative data presented in the next chapter that social 
cohesion is more important in reserve service.  
In terms of RLC and REME reserve sub-unit readiness, in 2015 the majority 
rated it moderate, but two thirds rated their sub-unit’s morale as high. Only a small 
percentage rated their morale as low. Supporting previous research and hypothesis 2, 
levels of cohesion amongst REME/RLC reservists explained the most variance in 
perceptions of sub-unit readiness and morale, and personal confidence. This underscores 
the importance of cohesion in delivering military capability, not only in regular forces 
as detailed in previous research, but also in reserve logistics sub-units.  
In terms of the impact of FR20 to date, in 2015 just over half the sample agreed 
that FR20 would increase their sub-unit’s capability. Generally, when compared to 
scores on other scales, there were less positive perceptions about the impact of FR20, 
especially concerning the provision of better equipment to sub-units. In 2015, most 
respondents were undecided about the actual impact of FR20 on their sub-unit. 
Nevertheless, high levels of agreement with both individual and sub-unit ability to 
perform on operations given sufficient pre-deployment training were recorded.  
In 2016 however, the three sub-units selected for longitudinal comparison 
registered significantly lower levels of confidence in FR20 increasing their sub-units’ 
capability, potentially indicating that the policy is struggling to have a major positive 
impact. Conversely, by 2016 the indications were that FR20 had significantly increased 
reservists’ exposure to the regulars. There was only a minor change in cohesion, and no 
significant changes to perceptions of readiness and morale, nor personal confidence in 
the three sub-units, thereby raising questions as to the impact of FR20. 
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Although some of the data presented here is only indicative, overall the 
quantitative data appears to support the argument that FR20 is failing to deliver hard 
capability, but is delivering better exposure to the regulars for these reservists. It does 
appear to be increasing integration, and hence cultural affinity with, the regulars. But 
the picture is mixed. FR20 has failed to have a significant impact on cohesion, readiness 
and morale, and personal confidence in some of these sub-units to date. Supporting the 
findings of the last chapter, this especially concerned the provision of better equipment. 
Meanwhile, sub-units’ confidence in their ability to deliver the capability required by 
FR20 appears to have dropped over time.  
Finally, the ability of the PCI to identify potential issues within these sub-units 
is important. As the PCI is a short and easy survey to disseminate and collate, it may 
help contribute to better leadership, more cohesive units, confirmation that army values 
are being imbued, and the identification of potential problems in a fast, transparent and 














FR20 and Cohesion 
 
In The Combat Soldier – the most in-depth examination of professionalism’s impact on 
combat forces to date – King argues that the intensive collective training associated with 
professionalisation has gone beyond the mere transformation of Western forces’ 
effectiveness to fundamentally alter the nature of social relations between their 
soldiers.733 Drawing on Max Weber’s concept of status honour in uniting groups, and 
the threat posed to these groups by the heightened individualism of Emile Durkheim’s 
anomie, King shows how both of these have imbued military practice with a moral force 
– a professional ethos – that unites military groups.734 Thus, expanding on Huntington’s 
identification of the importance of ‘corporateness’ amongst the professional officer 
class – in essence their shared commitment and sense of community – King argues that 
the enhanced emphasis on training and collective action in the professional infantry 
instils a common obligation to perform effectively, not just amongst officers, but 
combat soldiers as well. For King, ‘professional comradeship’ based on effective 
performance has replaced the classical sociological understanding of cohesion based on 
interpersonal bonds.735 Professionalism has superseded love as the source of main 
source of cohesion in the infantry.  
Although a later study by King and I examined how ‘cold professionalism’ 
influences, and is influenced by, the heightened social and emotional bonds of 
                                                 
733 King, The Combat Soldier, 339.  
734 Ibid, 341.  
735 King, The Combat Soldier, 350. 
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combat,736 thereby partly reconciling the classical cohesion literature with that on 
professional militaries, the recent cohesion literature has focused exclusively on the 
battlefield performance of combat forces. In fact, with a few notable exceptions, the 
majority of the cohesion literature to date has focused on infantry soldiers.737 This 
leaves open the question as to whether the nature of cohesion in logistics units is the 
same as in the infantry. Moreover, to date, the focus has been on professional regular 
forces, leaving further uncertainty about how reserve forces – with less time to train 
intensively and therefore, theoretically at least, lower skill levels – generate and sustain 
their cohesion. Indeed, neither the wider reserve literature, nor that on the British 
reserves in particular, has conducted a detailed examination of reserve cohesion, nor the 
impact of professionalism upon it.  
Both Kier and Farrell have discussed the importance of normative, cultural 
aspects in explaining military transformations, but neither sought to investigate how 
culture and cultural emulation manifest themselves at the micro-level. Both approaches 
were also top-down and concerned regular combat forces. In this chapter, I discuss the 
distinctive nature of reserve logistics units in order to examine the FR20 transformation 
from the bottom-up. Firstly, I compare the nature of cohesion in logistics forces to the 
infantry, using field observations of the selected sub-units as an evidential base. Upon 
clarifying this issue, the central question of FR20’s impact on cohesion and 
professionalism within reserve logistics sub-units is discussed from a qualitative 
perspective. The subjects include the persistence of social cohesion; the demise of the 
‘drinking club’; the rise of professionalism; and the unique nature of reserve discipline. 
I suggest that, following Chapter Six, although many of these sub-units are unlikely to 
                                                 
736 Bury, P. and King, A. (2015) ‘A Profession of Love? Cohesion in a British Platoon in Afghanistan’ in 
King, A. (ed) Frontline: Combat and Cohesion in the Twenty-First Century, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 213. 





deliver the full capability required of FR20 on schedule, in many areas the 
transformation is slowly but profoundly changing the culture of, and social relations in, 
the Army Reserve. 
Logistics and Reserve Cohesion 
In order to assess the impact of FR20 on these sub-units’ cohesion, first it is necessary 
to briefly examine the nature of logistics and reserve cohesion in general. King’s work 
on the importance of intensive, repetitive, standardised training in explaining cohesion 
is also supported by those of Ben-Ari et al, and Strachan. For these authors, cohesion 
relies not on interpersonal social bonds between soldiers, but on the effective 
performance of the military group. Both Ben-Ari and King examine infantry platoon 
training in great detail, arguing that standardised words of command and individual 
battle drills, coordinated at the collective level, are central to explanations of successful 
combat performance. Indeed, King’s work on infantry combat techniques illustrates the 
importance of minute, almost esoteric, movements such as the position of the thumb 
when firing, and the need to ‘bob’ around corners to reduce angles in urban combat.738 
For him, such techniques are indicative of the resources, knowledge and time devoted to 
training in the professional infantry. Such minutiae are important because, when 
implemented correctly at the individual level, and crucially, co-ordinated at the 
collective level, they reduce the risk of fatalities. One of King’s observations is 
therefore that the threat of death in combat as a result of the failure to execute drills 
correctly provides another powerful explanatory factor in explaining successful 
collective infantry performance. 
 Most logisticians, however, are not trained to the same standard in infantry 
techniques. Despite the need for increased infantry skills when operating in non-linear 
                                                 
738 King, The Combat Soldier, 320. 
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battlespaces where insurgents threaten supply convoys, most logistics soldiers’ primary 
role lies elsewhere. Unlike in the infantry, where different units share the same 
standardised skills and training techniques, in logistics units the skills required of 
personnel are as varied as the logistics functions themselves. In the British Army these 
functions are myriad. Logistics units are responsible for transport and movement; port 
and maritime operations; explosive ordnance disposal (EOD); air dispatch; catering; 
cleaning; and post duties, amongst others. Meanwhile, REME craftsmen specialise in 
the repair and maintenance of numerous vehicles and airframes. There is therefore a 
vast difference in the skill set required of logistics soldiers, not just compared with the 
infantry, but also between their respective trades. Moreover, there is a difference 
between logistics trades requiring high levels of co-ordinated collective action – such as 
port and maritime and air freight – and others that are perhaps more reliant on 
individual skills, such as EOD, REME, transport and catering. This distinction is 
important in understanding the nature of cohesion in logistics units. 
As its name suggests, 165 Port and Maritime Squadron RLC is specialised in 
two trades, the former being the loading and unloading of cargo in ports and 
beachheads, the latter referring to the delivery of cargo and vehicles on seaborne rafts. 
The port trade requires substantial skills to operate a wide variety of heavy plant, 
including forklifts, trucks, bulldozers, and mobile and specialised 40-ton cranes. Often, 
the driver of the vehicle is assisted by a senior rank who directs operations through 
standardised hand signals and words of command, highlighting that King’s arguments 
on the importance of these in explaining infantry performance are applicable to certain 
logistics trades.739 Such action also requires detailed practical knowledge of how to load 
and secure all types of cargo for movement by road or sea. While the maritime trade is 
                                                 




also concerned with the transportation of cargoes, their main operating platform is the 
Mexeflote raft, which can carry over 220 tons. The skills involved to operate this are 
varied. Highly trained engineers (usually a sergeant or corporal) are responsible for 
piloting the raft and repairing its engines, whilst another NCO is responsible for the 
overall safe loading of the Mexeflote and pilot instructions to the engineer. Junior ranks 
are responsible for securing the cargo correctly using numerous different lashings, and 
the safe landing of the Mexeflote as it moors or beaches. Thus, individually and 
collectively, the skills required in this logistics unit are vastly different to those 
expected of the infantry. 
Figure 4. 165 Port and Maritime Squadron conducting training on various Port trade equipment. 
 




However, for each soldier to be qualified at the requisite level as a port or 
maritime ‘operator’, the level of individual expertise in their relevant field is similar to 
that of the same rank in the infantry. Sergeants and corporals are qualified to operate 
numerous heavy plant machines, acquiring highly detailed knowledge about their 
capabilities and safe operating requirements. Like the infantry, these individual skills 
are learnt through in-unit training, on qualifying courses and through wider experience. 
The level of skill and responsibility for junior ‘port ops’ who, as a private or lance 
corporal drive a 12-ton bulldozer, are in some respects greater than the equivalent rank 
in the infantry. In the maritime trade, apart from the highly skilled engineers who must 
be proficient at piloting the Mexeflote in a variety of sea states and environments, the 
crew must have a detailed knowledge of the raft’s capabilities, the cargo plan, and hand 
signals. Lower ranks must also be versed in the quick and safe securing of cargo to the 
vessel.  
In both trades, the ability of individuals to operate quickly but safely is viewed 
as indicating the mastery of the required skills. Indeed, their sub-units’ effectiveness is  





Figure 7. A gang practise securing a pallet of ammunition for a forklift driver. 
   
often judged by the speed in which they can safely unload and load cargoes.740  
Interestingly, slow unloads or accidents are perceived as indicating a lack 
professionalism, not only by those in the sub-units themselves, but also by other 
units.741 While the level of danger these soldiers operate in is usually much less intense 
than the infantry, and hence the stakes and operational pressure on personnel are usually 
lower, the importance of the tempo of operations and avoiding casualties to logisticians’ 
professional status shares some similarities with the infantry.  
Moreover,  in the case of 165 Squadron, effectiveness and hence professionalism 
is achieved by repeated drills and training to improve both the individual and collective 
speed with which port ‘gangs’ and Mexeflote crew can complete their task. For 
example, securing different cargoes with different lashings is repeatedly practiced, with 
each gang member responsible for different duties and areas. The pace at which this 
team collectively works affects the forklift driver who is waiting to move the load once 
it has been secured to pallets. Similarly, it is not unusual for Mexeflote crews to spend 
days conducting numerous landings at piers and beaches during training. As with the 
port gangs, these require the competent performance of individual drills taught by 
repetition, such as mooring techniques and standardised words of command and hand 
                                                 




signals, supporting King’s observations about the importance of the latter in explaining 
elite infantry performance.742 These in turn contribute to the rapid and safe collective 
performance of the Mexeflote crew. While there is admittedly not the same degree of 
choreographed group action, in a similar way to the infantry’s repetition of section 
attacks or close quarter battle techniques, logistics trades requiring collective action 
train repeatedly to be effective. In the case of the port and maritime trade – and any 
others requiring collective action – the safe execution of individual actions provide the 
foundation for effective collective performance. Indeed, it appears that Strachan’s and 
King’s observations on the source of effective performance in the infantry also explain 
effective performance in many logistics units. Despite the different collective action 
problems presented in logistics trades, the solutions to them are remarkably similar to 
those in the infantry. Perhaps unsurprisingly, successful collective logistics performance 
shares the same fundamental characteristics as in the infantry.    
However, the sources of cohesion in individual-focused logistics trades may be 
different. These trades, such as transport, EOD and the REME, are much more reliant 
on individual skills than collective drills for effective performance. Their emphasis on 
individual action raises the question as to whether the recent literature accurately 
describes the nature of cohesion amongst these trades. Without the need for coordinated 
group action, the dense obligational bonds caused by training that King and others 
observed in the infantry may not be as important to understanding their cohesion. 
Indeed, numerous reservist and regular soldiers identified the difference between the 
individual nature of their trades and the infantry. While some noted how the RLC had a 
less hierarchical rank structure, others the ‘more robust’ culture in the infantry 
                                                 
742 King, ’The Word of Command’. 
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compared to the RLC,743 the most telling observation was made by two transport 
officers who elucidated on their sub-unit’s experience:  
R1:  ‘Because it's more of a singleton trade, maybe they don't get the 
teamwork and the team spirit?’ 
R2: ‘I think… [individual] training is almost damaging because of the fact it 
is a singleton trade it is quite common that we deploy one person or two 
on a tasking, whereas I'd much prefer to deploy a section, because that 
enhances cohesion.  But of course, it's not necessarily the workload 
requirement for a section to become operationally effective.’744 
These observations are especially interesting as they appear to indicate a view that 
individual traded units suffer from a lack of cohesion. In fact, these officers suggest that 
cohesion is a group attribute distinct from operational effectiveness. In sub-units where 
taskings are performed by individuals, successful performance is viewed as distinct 
from cohesion. Importantly, this cohesion is defined in social terms. Of course, by their 
very nature, both the classical and revisionist cohesion literature are primarily 
concerned with group activity. But this distinction between cohesion in collective and 
individual logistics trades in the professional era must be made in order to understand 
the wider impact of FR20 in these sub-units. The fact that cohesion is not necessarily a 
prerequisite for successful performance in individual trades adds nuance to King’s 
definition of cohesion in professional militaries as equating successful performance. In 
logistics units, individuals can perform military tasks successfully without group 
membership. Successful group performance does not always explain effective military 
performance.  
 The fact that some trades are individual by nature and others require collective 
action has major implications for how reserves logistics soldiers generate and maintain 
their cohesion. For King, the cohesive bonds in the professional infantry are formed by 
intensive training and commitment to their profession.745 Following Leon Festinger, he 
                                                 
743 Interviews 5, 6. 
744 Interview 3. 
745 King, The Combat Soldier, 374. 
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also notes that the density of interactions amongst infantry soldiers is important; 
propinquity matters.746 However, intensive training requires large amounts of time 
unavailable to part-time regulars. With less time to train and often shorter qualifying 
courses, there is also a skills deficit between most regulars and reservists. Meanwhile, 
the part-time nature of reserve service suggests that the density of interactions in sub-
units with both individual and collective action trades is also less than the regulars. 
Thus, in reserve logistics groups requiring collective action, social cohesion may still be 
very important. It would be expected to be even more so in individual trades. However, 
FR20, by its very nature, is attempting to professionalise the reserves through increased 
training in order to better integrate them with the regulars and prepare them for routine 
use on operations. This creates an interesting problem in terms of the cohesion 
literature. On the one hand, today’s reserve logistics units may be more reliant on social 
bonds than the regular professional infantry. On the other, the professionalisation of the 
reserves could be changing the nature of social relations in these units and hence the 
sources of cohesion within.     
 One final discussion is needed here on the impact of post-Fordist approach to 
logistics on the skills and cohesion of the logistics units examined. Although I have 
detailed that the term post-Fordism mainly refers to strategic and operational 
management processes and structural issues, there was some evidence that post-Fordist 
innovations will eventually have an impact on logistics skills at the tactical level. As 
discussed in Chapter Five, the most obvious example is that the nature of modern 
conflict and the adoption of the nodal FOB system reliant on CLPs has forced 
logisticians to hone their combat skills to a higher degree than in the past, resulting in a 
greater emphasis on military skills in logisticians’ pre-deployment training programmes. 
Another example concerns the MJDI system. While it still has some teething issues to 
                                                 
746 Ibid, 351. 
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be resolved, when fully introduced and integrated with TAV-, soldiers reported that it 
should significantly quicken vessel unloading by alleviating the need to manually stock-
check and process items before onward transportation.747 The introduction of MJDI was 
also acknowledged to begin a radical change in the structure of RLC support to combat 
units and hence changes in the career structures and training of RLC soldiers, who will 
now have fewer postings to combat units.748 However, the need to attend MJDI 
specialist courses in order to operate the system has itself provided other opportunities 
in this regard, highlighting the ongoing specialisation within the ‘core’ logistics 
component. Outside of MJDI and other IT enabled software systems, and the impact of 
centralisation and outsourcing on training discussed in Chapter Six, there was little 
evidence that post-Fordist logistics was changing skills at the tactical level in the units 
examined. Nevertheless, this will likely change as new technologies emerge to support 
the distributed logistics model; for example a road transport unit could conceivably be 
re-roled to operate delivery balloons in response the full automation of road vehicles. 
While such changes could force the source of certain units’ cohesion to change, with 
more emphasis on individual rather than collective skills, overall the nature of cohesion 
in logistics units is unlikely in the short-medium term to differ from the 
individual/collective paradigm outlined above. Nevertheless, automation and robots 
may also ultimately render many logistics skills, and hence units, redundant, depending 
on task complexity and threat environment.  
The Persistence of Social Cohesion 
While Leonard Wong, and Bury and King, have shown how interpersonal bonds still 
contribute to effective performance in the professional infantry, there has been no 
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748 Interview 23. 
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detailed examination of cohesion in the reserves since professionalisation.749 In his 1990 
study, Walker briefly discussed cohesion in the TA, highlighting the importance of 
‘drill hall club’ social cohesion. For Walker, this referred to the beers usually enjoyed in 
messes by reservists after weekday training at their sub-unit location, and he opined that 
the ‘activities at the drill hall club are perhaps as important as the evening training 
itself.’ Crucially, he noted that the social cohesion built ‘the regimental esprit and unit 
identification critical for sustaining not only combat units, but also volunteer reserve 
units in which cohesion is a precursor for encouraging men to turn out for training.’750 
He also observed the importance of social events for generating cohesion and how 
reservists ‘social life begins to revolve around the unit’.751 For Walker, interpersonal 
bonds remained central to understanding TA cohesion in the late 1980s. Of course, 
when Walker was writing, only social cohesion had been identified. As a result, the 
question remains if, as the Army Reserve professionalises, social cohesion remains as 
important as it did in the past.  
In order to assess the impact of FR20 on cohesion, first the nature of cohesion in 
the selected sub-units must first be considered. One occasion observed during the 
fieldwork was particularly instructive. As I arrived at a newly-formed REME unit on a 
weekend, they were preparing ‘a social’; a Hawaiian-themed party for that evening. 
Already the chef had improvised a large barbeque from an old barrel outside the 
kitchen, while other soldiers were busy setting up a limbo bar for games. A paddling 
pool with water toys was set up nearby. It was clear this was an attempt for new 
colleagues to have fun and socialise together. When I was introduced to the officer in 
charge, I commented on the effort that had gone into the evening. He responded: ‘We 
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have to get them together and do this sort of thing to build up the unit.’752 While it is to 
be expected that the officer who organised the event would understand its objective, it 
was very interesting to note afterwards the degree to which the importance of social 
cohesion in the sub-unit was recognised by all ranks.753 Indeed, this was directly related 
to cohesion by a respondent without prompt: 
R1:  ‘…There’s always something going on … that sort of [social] activity. 
Like this weekend we all got together. It’s a bit hard at the moment 
because it’s like going to a new school; you are getting to know 
everyone over all again. It’s weekends like this, which is a bit of a jolly 
really... But it’s good… they want us to gel. 
Mod: So is that the focus this weekend, just to get together as a group? 
R1: Well the focus is company cohesion. 
R2: Yes, it is. 
Mod: Wow. 
R2: Yes, yes. And that’s why they are making a massive effort with the 
Hawaiian night. It’s not just so we can just get bladdered – well it is – 
but the idea of it is so [two former detachments now centralised in the 
new sub-unit] just start gelling a bit more.’754 
 
‘I think it [socialising] plays a vital part… because it’s where you sit down and 
talk and get to know each other. I said to the guys, when we first moved over to 
the battalion, in a way I felt like a new recruit again, because you got to know 
everybody in the regiment that we were with, then you leave that and start off 
with a completely fresh set of guys, so you sort of feel like a recruit again 
because you don’t bloody know anybody. So yes, the social side of it is, I 
think, vital.’755 
 
This use of socialising to generate and maintain interpersonal bonds in sub-units created 
by FR20 was also reported in other units, where there were interesting distinctions made 
by former infanteers: 
Mod:  ‘Do you think the Army Reserve delivers on that social element in 
general?  
 R1: Yes. This year [since joining their RLC sub-unit], anyway. 
R2: With the infantry, you didn’t get much of that, compared to the [Royal 
Logistics] Corps. So I’ve seen a lot more fun activities than 
beforehand.’756 
Another junior soldier made a similar point about adventure training activities.757 
Interestingly, these comments were all recorded in individual-skilled sub-units. Taken 
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together, this evidence suggests that socialising together is consciously viewed by 
commanders and soldiers alike as central to generating solidarity in newly-formed and 
established units. It also indicates that individual trade-focused logistics units may rely 
more on socialising for generating their cohesion than the regular and reserve infantry 
who collectively train more frequently. Indeed, the evidence suggests that interpersonal 
bonds may be more important for understanding reserve logistics cohesion than the 
literature on the professional regular infantry recognises. 
   To specifically examine the importance of social cohesion in the reserves, all 
interviewees were directly asked about the value they placed on the social element of 
their service. The social element was left for respondents to define and describe as they 
wished; some referred to time spent socialising in the bar, others the bonds between 
colleagues. However, across ranks, the unanimity and strength of response was notable: 
‘The social element, I think, is important.’758 
 
R1: ‘It’s key. If you don't have the social element... it can’t be all work and 
no social, because it is a lifestyle. The guys do deserve to get rewarded 
and there needs to be a balanced work/social environment. 
R2: ‘The guys are giving up their free time. They don't have to be here. So 





‘That’s a massive thing.’761 
 
R1: ‘Hugely important. 
R2: Got to be. Yeah, massively.’762 
 
‘It's important. It's important for... a bit of an army lifestyle, isn't it? You've got 
to have that.’763  
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Clearly, the social aspect of reserve service itself – that which generates and sustains 
interpersonal bonds – is deemed very important to logistics reservists. Primarily, it is 
viewed as a vital part of these soldiers’ service in and of itself, but also as a balancing 
reward for part-time volunteers’ commitment to training and other duties. Moreover, 
this social element, with its organised events and socialising in the bar after duties, was 
also stated to be reflective of the regulars. As other ex-regulars and reservists 
elucidated:  
R1: ‘I joined the reserve after leaving the regs because I was missing the 
craic with the boys, the laughs, the banter… 
R2:  One of the best things about the regs is the social life, you know, your 
summer balls and your Christmas balls. Again, regular social events… 
seem to have carried over to the reserves as well.’764 
 
‘That's why I joined, really, [to] meet new people.’765 
For these reservists, social events in the reserves are normalised by reference to similar 
practices in the regulars. Moreover, the social element provided a primary joining 
motivation for these soldiers. Indeed, the complimentary surveys revealed that 86 
percent of RLC and REME reservists had joined to make new friends in the military, 
one of the top two most cited reasons for joining.766 Overall, this data indicates that time 
spent socialising together is very important for reservists’ motivations for joining, and 
most importantly perhaps, for wider social solidarity in their sub-units.  
 However, the importance of social cohesion in these sub-units goes beyond a 
shared appreciation of the solidarity generated by simply socialising together. In fact, 
many units described the nature of their social relations in terms of being a ‘family’. 
Interestingly, some of the most cohesive and professional regular infantry units in the 
British Army also describe themselves as ‘family regiments’.767 This is usually 
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interpreted as indicating dense associative patterns and strong interpersonal bonds 
across ranks, coupled with long histories of regimental service amongst certain families, 
and the often regional identity of the unit and its members. Regular British family 
regiments are therefore traditionally viewed as being highly socially cohesive. 
Decisively, this can be exclusive of, or complimentary to, professional competence. A 
similar family motif was consistently repeated in interviews with reserve sub-units: 
R1: ‘We actually formed a very tight knit family. 
R2: A lot of infantry regiments work. They don’t work because they are 
soldiers, that they are tradesman or whatever. They work because - 
R3: They are family. 
R2: - they are such a good family group… My old infantry [unit], it was 
like having 500 brothers. 
R1: But it is like being in an infantry regiment here, where you’ve got that 
family atmosphere. People looking out for one another... 
R3: What’s your opinion, [NCO name], because you’re part of the building 
that has stayed? 
R4: Well, I’ve been here a long time. I’ve seen a lot of change. But it is one 
big family. You can share your problems with people.’768 
The above quote is highly illustrative. Firstly, it displays an awareness of the influence 
dense, familial-like bonds can have in infantry regiments ‘that work’; that are effective. 
Indeed, this NCO is making an explicit association between strong interpersonal ties 
and effective unit performance. Secondly, these reservists’ perception of family appears 
to be slightly different from the regulars. Their unit’s ‘tight knit’ family is described as 
being based on ‘looking out for one another’ and ‘sharing problems.’ Reservists from 
other sub-units echoed these sentiments almost exactly:  
R2: ‘There is a massive sort of family vibe thing. 
R3:  It is a proper family job up here.’769 
 
‘Basically it’s like, I suppose, you can call it somewhat an extended family sort of 
thing.’770 
 
‘I don’t see these lots as mates. They’re more as family.’771 
 
Interpersonal relationships are therefore frequently described in profoundly social 
terms; they frequently surpass civilian friendship to become deeper, familial ties.  
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Crucially, these attributes match almost exactly those identified in the primary group 
explanation of cohesion by Shils and Janowitz.  
Other reservists remarked on the importance of these relationships to their 
continued service: 
R1: ‘When I look back to mates who I’ve met through the TA, it is a big 
thing. I go out and socialise more with people from here than what I do 
with any of my work colleagues... I love being round the people here.  
R2: Aww!  
R3: It’s not mutual, though. [Laughter].’772 
The first respondent’s assertion that his reserve colleagues are his civilian friends and 
that he chooses to socialise with them outside of duties is interesting. Indeed, such is the 
depth of this social/emotional bond that he professes his love for them. This expression 
results first in tenderness from a female colleague, but is quickly followed by ridicule 
by a male, indicating both the uniqueness of the confession and the unease amongst 
other group members at directly expressing the depth of the social bonds between them. 
This, of course, indicates their importance, and similar observations were made across 
other sub-units: 
R1:  ‘Most of my mates now that I can call my mates are these guys here. 
Civvy lads who I went to school with, I say hello to them, but these are 
my mates.’773 
 
R1: ‘I, personally, quite enjoy coming down here for the friendship and that 
sort of stuff.  
R2:  They always have the bar open, even if there's only a few of us. We'll 
have a chat. 
R3: …You've got to get on with who you're working with, haven't you?’774 
While these quotes provide further evidence of the importance that socialising together 
is perceived to have on in these sub-units, it is important to note here that collective 
training also plays a major part in generating social solidarity amongst reservists. The 
stress of training often builds interpersonal bonds through shared hardship and reliance 
on others. Professional training is conducive to social bonding in its own right. Thus, 
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with FR20 pledging to increase training, the social bonds generated by socialising 
within the reserves would expected to be strengthened further. However, the last quote 
above is particularly indicative about reserve cohesion. In The Combat Soldier, King 
describes how some Royal Marines’ rescued a comrade that they did not like who was 
wounded and pinned down by enemy fire.775 King argues that this represents the 
importance of professional comradeship over interpersonal ties; elite professional 
infanteers do not need to ‘like’ each other to perform effectively. Crucially, the reservist 
above seems to indicate that harmonious social relations are desired, if not required, in 
his sub-unit. Interpersonal bonds appear to matter more to reserve logistics units than 
they do in the elite infantry. 
 One simple definition of cohesion is the ability of the group to stay together 
under stress,776 and there is also ample evidence to suggest that social bonds remain a 
key motivating factor for remaining in the reserves. The centrality of social cohesion 
was highlighted by one NCO, who stated: ‘I think if there hadn’t been a bit of social 
[life], I would have handed my kit in two years ago.’777 Thus, the social element of 
service is often a critically important retention factor. Indeed, it was responsible for this 
soldier remaining in service despite the organisational frictions he experienced as a 
result of FR20. Another reservist went further:  
‘It’s the thought that if I do leave or whatever, I am going to be jacking [letting 
down] on my mates or the other people there. And you’d miss it because you 
would want to know what they’re doing. And I think that’s what keeps you 
coming back even though it’s been really bad.’778 
For this NCO, social bonds are described as the central reason for his attendance at sub-
unit training events, but also for his continued service in the wake of poor experiences 
of FR20. Crucially, he describes his motivation for remaining in service in terms of a 
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strong sense of social obligation, to avoid ‘jacking on my mates’. Moreover, this is 
explained in emotional rather than professional terms; that he would miss his colleagues 
and not knowing what they were doing. An officer in a different unit elucidated on why 
the reservists under his command frequently attended training: ‘They’re mates… so if 
they don’t turn up its: “Where were you?”’779 Thus, complimenting the importance of 
the social aspect of reserve service for reasons for joining, it appears that interpersonal 
bonds provide a central explanation for reservists’ frequent attendance at training and 
their long term retention. Moreover, the nature of social relations between these 
reservists has consistently been described as those of friendship, or more profoundly as 
family. As the data in Chapter Seven shows, this appears to differ somewhat in regular 
infantry units, and in contrast to the cohesion King describes, it is perhaps not too far to 
suggest that in these logistics sub-units social bonds provide a strong motivating factor 
for effective individual performance. Social cohesion appears to be more important in 
these units than in the regular and elite infantry King examined.  
The Decline of the Drinking Club 
Referring to civilian groups, John Bancroft has outlined how alcohol can be used to 
heighten ‘group cohesion and solidarity’,780 and in a later work on British officer corps, 
I outlined the importance of the consumption of alcohol in generating their social 
solidarity.781 Walker also noted this amongst TA officers in particular.782 In fact, the 
social cohesion-generating function of collective alcohol intake has long been 
recognised by the British Army, and is reflected in the very cheap alcohol available in 
mess bars and NAAFIs in almost every barracks. Given the greater emphasis on social 
cohesion in the reserves, it is therefore perhaps not surprising that in the past the TA 
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was often perceived as a ‘drinking club’. This term was ubiquitous and often used 
derogatively, but it indicated a view held across the regular army, in some reserve units, 
and amongst knowledgeable civilians, that socialising in the TA was emphasised over 
training.  
The ‘drinking club’ theme emerged as a major descriptor for differentiating 
between the pre- and post-FR20 reserve army. The following quote not only highlights 
the centrality of alcohol to the TA experience in the past, but also supports the 
arguments made about the importance of individual skill in effective collective 
performance in logistics units, in this case the precursor to 165 Port and Maritime 
Regiment: 
‘In the days of the National TA, the [reservist] dockers used to come down and 
unload the ships to give 17 [Port and Maritime regiment - the regulars] some 
time off. They’d come down for two weeks [their annual training camp], but 
because they were professional dockers they could unload in half the time 17 
could. So each ship would be done by lunchtime and they’d spend the rest of 
the time in the Corporal’s Mess getting hammered. The Mess used to take more 
in those two weeks than in the other 50.’783 
However, this drinking club ethos was not confined to logistics units. Another former 
infantry reservist reported a similar experience: 
‘When I first joined in ‘97, my God, we used to jump on a 4-tonner [truck], go 
to Thetford and knock back three or four crates of lager, jump off, rock up, 
harbour, and you’re out on exercise all weekend. It was a drinking club.’784  
Both REME and RLC reservists echoed this sentiment: 
‘When I first joined the TA… it was a bit of a drinking club. We were all out 
on the lash every weekend, all together, and all having a good time.’785 
 
‘There were a lot of lads… all they were interested in doing was getting in the 
Sergeant’s Mess at night and getting pissed and rocking up the next day 
stinking of ale. When you’d try to do any trade training they were that rough 
[they couldn’t do it].’786 
 
‘Back in the ‘80s… it was a drinking club…. When I was with the regulars, the 
TA was scum.’787 
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‘In the early 90s it was a drinking club.’788 
Clearly, a widespread perception exists that TA activity was often centred on the 
consumption of alcohol to the detriment of training activity. Socialising with alcohol 
was a priority in the past. This, of course, provided easy means by which the 
professional regulars – themselves no strangers to drinking culture – could denigrate 
their TA rivals. Indeed, such is the prevalence of this motif for the pre-FR20 reserves 
that it indicates how the ‘drinking club’ label became a byword for describing the 
perceived unprofessionalism of the organisation in general. Crucially, however, it also 
shows how today’s reservists have internalised the values of the professional regulars, 
thus indicating the importance of regular values in setting norms in today’s Army 
Reserve.  
Despite the continued existence of the drinking club metaphor, there is much 
evidence that perceptions of its continued validity are waning. This was widely 
perceived to be a result of the gradual professionalisation of the TA since 2003, and 
more recently, as a direct result of FR20. The following responses are representative: 
Mod:  ‘Do you think it’s [the drinking club ethos] changing in the reserves? 
All: Yes. 
R1: Big style.’789 
 
‘It was a drinking club. Now it’s not.’790 
 
‘It used to be a drinking club, even two years ago it was. The boys would come 
for a beer the chance to get away from their wives.’791 
For the respondent above, a regular soldier attached to the reserves, the introduction of 
the FR20 was critical to the decline of the drinking club ethos. Furthermore, numerous 
reservists directly made the link between this and increasing professionalism:  
‘The level that you have got to be at, the [professional] standard, it’s not a 
drinking club now, which it used to be.’792 
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‘It has moved on somewhat in the last 30 years and it is a more professional 
unit than it used to be. But it is still down to the attitude of the people of the 
regular army.’793 
 
‘It wasn’t just the TA [that was a drinking club]. The regulars were just the 
same. For one reason alone: that was the culture that we lived in.’ 
The last two quotes are especially informative as they attempt to explain the TA’s 
drinking club ethos as a reflection of the dominant culture at that time in both the 
regular army, and wider society. Despite the prevalence of the drinking club motif, 
numerous interviews indicated that while this was seen as a valid label to describe the 
TA’s lack of professionalism in general, it was not applicable to their sub-units in 
particular.794 This, of course, not only highlights the sensitivity of some sub-units of 
being tarnished with this label; it also indicates their desire to be viewed as 
professionals.  
While the increased training standards associated with FR20, and the policy 
drive to reduce drinking in the regulars have no doubt contributed to the general decline 
of the drinking club,795 there was a recognition that this culture needed to be explicitly 
addressed in some sub-units in order for this to happen. As one officer commented: 
‘We have definitely professionalised as a unit. With the drinking club, there was a 
culture to break, and we have… The message went down that you’d better be ready for 
duty in the morning or standby.’796 A senior officer elucidated that he had introduced a 
‘dry weekend rule’ in order to underline that reserve service in his unit would not be 
tied to the consumption of alcohol.797 Another officer in the same unit commented on 
the effect this had already had: ‘Yeah, it is changing. And if that means some of the old 
and bold turn to the right and march off, then so be it… maybe that’s not such a bad 
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thing.’798 Numerous other interviews supported this assertion that over recent years – 
either directly through the chain of command or indirectly by more subtle changes in 
sub-unit culture – those who saw reserve service only in terms of recreational drinking 
were being ‘weeded out’.799 Other sub-units reported a decline in social events in the 
wake of FR20. Whether this was intentional or not was not revealed, but most 
reservists accepted it as the price of professionalisation; there is now less time for 
social events as the focus is on training.800  
Although they are widely viewed as complimentary and – in the TA’s case – 
intertwined, there is a distinction between social cohesion and alcohol consumption. 
This was made by a number of reservists. One NCO stated that the Army Reserve of 
today ‘is a social club mainly, not a drinking club’801 thereby affirming the decline of 
the centrality of alcohol consumption but also the remaining importance of 
interpersonal bonds to reserve cohesion. Another officer elucidated:  
‘I haven’t noticed a decrease per se, there’s still the social side to army 
drinking, but a lot of time after training we’d go to the bar and everyone has a 
Coke…the bar’s ambience and the extra time we have there on top of training 
is good for getting J1 [personnel issues] done. So in terms of social cohesion, 
it’s important, even if people aren’t drinking.’802   
 
For this officer, the Mess remains an important site for generating and sustaining social 
solidarity, even though the consumption of alcohol is rarely the focus. Indeed, without 
alcohol, the distinction between mess activity and professional duty appears to be 
increasingly blurred, allowing as it does administrative issues to be addressed and 
thereby enhancing sub-unit effectiveness. Supporting this, another officer spoke of how 
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‘a lot of networking is done up in the messes’.803 As such, the drinking club may be in 
decline, but the club itself remains profoundly social, and indeed, professionally useful. 
The Rise of Professionalism 
Asked whether social cohesion had previously been based around the consumption of 
alcohol, one NCO stated: ‘I think it was… the new way – the [regular] army way – is 
about courses.’804 While this quote underscores Chapter Six’s findings on the increased 
availability of courses as a result of FR20, it also points to something more profound. 
This chapter has already shown how FR20’s drive for professionalisation has resulted in 
a concerted move away from alcohol-based social cohesion. As the NCO above 
suggests, the new professionalism of the reserves is increasingly based on that of the 
regulars; on training and competency. The processes by which reserve logistics sub-
units are professionalising, and their implications, are closely related to understanding 
cohesion in these sub-units, and the overall impact of FR20. They are therefore worthy 
of further examination here.  
In reserve logistics units, qualifications gained through attending courses, and 
importantly, operational experience, are increasingly viewed as the standard by which 
individual reservists judge themselves vis a vis the regulars. This new, more 
professional attitude appears to have gradually percolated into the TA during the 
increased deployment of reservists on operations in the 2000s. As one officer surmised:  
‘Part of this change of culture is stemming from the two major operations that 
we've had to run over the last ten years or so. I don't think the army reserve, or 
TA as it was then, was in a particularly good state [then].  I think the culture 
was massively wrong... But we fought through that, and a lot of people have 
done tours in both theatres, some even double or triple [tours]. And I think 
there's a lot of respect that's been generated because of that…’805 
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Indeed, some reservists described the TA at this time as a ‘liability’ to the regulars.806 
This sentiment was echoed in other sub-units and across ranks, as the quote below 
shows: ‘When I was in the regulars years ago - when it was the Cold War - the TA was 
a joke. It’s got more professional since 2003.’807 Again, this reservist’s disassociation 
from the old, unprofessional TA is notable, but, underpinning FR20, the importance of 
post 9/11 operations on reserve professionalism is clearly viewed as a critical source of 
transformation. As such, at an organisational level, working with the regulars has 
professionalised the reserves in and of itself. 
However, perhaps most importantly, the increased exposure to the regulars on 
operations has imbued a growing perception amongst reservists of their service being a 
job. The government’s 1978 Shapland Report on the TA noted that although service in 
the organisation was ‘demanding hobby’ it was a hobby nonetheless.808 In the late 
1980s senior officers also admitted to Walker that reserve service was a distant third 
priority after family and work life.809 While that order of priority may remain, the 
conception of service in the Army Reserve appears to be changing. This is occurring in 
two distinct ways. Firstly, with the increased training burden, reserve service is now 
viewed as a job, albeit usually a part-time one, with the accompanying level of 
commitment and attention to detail required: 
R1:  ‘Even in the six years that I’ve been in, it’s gone from being a hobby 
to being a part-time job. You wouldn't miss your full-time job so you 
can’t miss your part-time job either. 
R2:  … [It’s part-time but] It’s still a job.’810 
In tandem with the decline of the drinking club, reserve service – despite being part-
time and still more reliant on social cohesion than the regulars – is not viewed as a 
hobby anymore. The second distinct way the reserves are drawing closer to the regulars 
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concerns individual reservists’ performance in their role. Increasingly, reservists must 
be individually competent enough to ‘do their job’. The importance of individual 
competency in order to work alongside the regulars safely and effectively was 
repeatedly emphasised:  
‘You have to be at that standard. You cannot think that you can rock up to a 
[regular] unit [not at their standard], because you’ve got to remember who you 
are representing as well.’811 
 
‘It’s just getting the experience of being deployed, having the confidence and 
the experience.’812 
 
R1:  ‘I did three tours. Kosovo 2000/2001, Iraq 2003/2004 and I’ve just 
done a year in Guam… As long as you can do the job, no problems. 
R2: … You need to prove yourself you can do the job.’813  
The ability to fulfil their role competently on operations alongside the regulars is the 
final standard by which these reservists judge their own professionalism. Another 
explicitly commented on how the regulars’ performance acted as the yardstick by which 
he and others measured his own professional competency: ‘You test yourself a bit… in 
your mind they [the regulars] benchmark against someone of the regular rank 
equivalent.’814 While the fact that the reserves could never hope to have the full 
capability of the regulars due to its part-time nature was recognised,815 doing your 
individual job to the standard of the regulars is now seen as the benchmark for 
competency in training, and that which must be achieved on operations. For most of its 
members, the Army Reserve is now a part-time job. For others it is a full-time job. 
Interestingly, the ‘Do Your Job’ ethos that is emerging in the reserves exactly replicates 
those of some of the most successful professional sports teams. 816  
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One reason for this resonance is this ethos is imbued with a deeply personal 
commitment to the correct execution of individual duties in order to benefit the team. In 
doing your job, personal and collective status is therefore at stake. Supporting King’s 
observations on status honour in the elite infantry, there are signs that army reservists 
are becoming increasingly aware of the need to earn and maintain their professional 
status by the measures defined by the regulars. While sensitivity about the regulars’ 
perception of reserve professionalism no doubt existed before the post-2003 
deployments, it appears that greater exposure to the regulars on operations, and more 
recently as a result of the better integration of FR20, has increased this sensitivity. As a 
result, across all the sub-units there was a desire, sometimes explicit but often latent, to 
be viewed as being as capable as the regulars. Again this was usually compared with 
reference to individual performance on operations. This desire to match the 
professionalism of the regulars in order to maintain not only their own status and that of 
their sub-unit, but also by extension, the reputation of the Army Reserve, was most 
forthrightly put by an ex-regular: ‘We have to be at that standard because otherwise we 
are letting ourselves down.’817 Other members of the same unit elucidated: 
R1: ‘I mobilised with 3LSR [Logistic Support Regiment] to Afghan in 
2013… We had to be up to the standard of a regular soldier. We had 
to… Because you don’t want to turn up to that unit looking like a bag 
of shit, not knowing what you are doing. 
R2:  Got a bit of a bad rep, haven’t we?’818 
Indeed, the professional reputation of individual reservists or their sub-units appears to 
be very important to most reservists:     
R1 ‘They [the regulars] hate us. We’ve got such a bad name because of 
these guys. 
R2: Because of the old [sub-unit] was so dodgy and cut corners... they 
made so many mistakes. 
R3: They coated [Camp] Bastion in fuel.  
R1: Now we’re [new sub-unit], when we go down there people are, like, 
‘Oh, who are you with?’ ‘We’re with [new sub-unit],’ all excited and 
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happy like little puppies and they’re, like: ‘Err… fuck off,’ because of 
stuff that happened. We’ve inherited their bad reputation.’819 
This quote is interesting as it not only highlights the lack of professionalism before 
FR20, but also the increasing sensitivity to the enduring impact of bad reputation as 
closer integration is undertaken in its wake. Another interview revealed an incident 
where a regular infantry platoon commander had been forced to move two reservists out 
of his unit for their consistent failure to perform to the expected standard on patrols in 
Afghanistan. These soldiers’ conduct embarrassed their fellow reservist colleagues.820 
As these negative experiences show, professional reputation clearly matters deeply to 
these reservists. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that this sensitivity to status may be 
particularly pronounced amongst junior ranks, who are potentially less sure of their own 
abilities.  
The surveys also revealed some interesting findings. 44 percent of respondents 
agreed that they worried a lot about meeting the expected professional standard in their 
sub-units, with 33 percent disagreeing. By comparison, a regular infantry sub-unit 
recorded 50 percent in the category, and 22 percent disagreed. Interestingly, 52 percent 
agreed that it was more important to be a good soldier than to be liked, with only 15 
percent in the disagree category, indicating the importance of professional values. This 
figure almost matched (54 percent agreement, 10 percent disagreement) that recorded a 
regular infantry sub-unit, and was supported by another question concerning the risk of 
‘deviant cohesion’ that Donna Winslow identified can be a problem in units with too 
high levels of social cohesion and not enough discipline.821 Asked whether it was more 
important ‘to be “one of the lads” than a good soldier’ in their sub-unit, 68 percent 
disagreed, and only 12 percent agreed. There therefore appears to be a strong awareness 
                                                 
819 Interview 1.  
820 Interview 5. 




of the limits of social cohesion that are balanced with the need to be a professional. 
Thus, there has been a gradual permeation of the regulars’ ethos and norms into the 
reserves. This has been furthered by the transfer of ex-regulars into the Army Reserve in 
the wake of FR20. The reforms are therefore gradually shaping reservist attitudes, 
bringing them in line with those of the full-time professionals. Nevertheless, for the 
majority of reservists, the regulars are the final arbiters of their professionalism. 
Given this widespread sensitivity to regular perceptions, the potential damage to 
individual and collective status caused by poor performance can be expected to motivate 
reservists in a similar manner to the status honour King observed. While this may still 
be much more pronounced in elite infantry, it does appear that most reservists have 
become more sensitive to their professional reputation as a result of closer integration 
with the regulars. Evidence of this was also revealed in reservists’ positive experiences 
on operations, where being mistaken for a regular was a recurring story told to indicate 
individual competence. One officer recounted a regular colleague asking if a reservist 
under the former’s command was TA. When he replied that she was, he received the 
comment: “I just automatically thought she was so professional that she was a 
regular.”822 Accounts such as this were repeated frequently, and were always told with 
palpable pride. For example: ‘The guys that I was on tour with didn’t even realise I was 
TA until about a month before we were leaving theatre, and they went, “What, you are 
TA? I didn’t realise you was TA.”823 Professionally therefore, the best thing for a 
reservist is to be mistaken for a regular on operations due to their performance. Meeting 
or exceeding the performance expected of a regular on operations is thus the gold 
standard for a reservist. Thus, in performing like a regular, a reservist can become an 
honorary professional. Moreover, this hard-earned professional status is not always 
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temporary. Reputation has been established and as long as it is maintained by 
performance, it will be continue to be acknowledged in the reservist’s network. This 
was revealed by many reservists who cited the much more welcoming response from 
regulars with whom they had deployed and proved themselves to. For these individuals, 
their hard-earned reputations allow them access to the coveted professional status group 
policed by the regulars. Similarly, as we have seen, poor performance can result in long 
term ostracism by the regulars 
By better integrating the reserves with the regulars, FR20 is slowly instilling a 
professional culture in the sub-units in this study. This is evidenced by reservists’ desire 
to distance themselves from the drinking club motif; an increasing awareness of the 
standards expected on operations; a widely held view that reserve service is no longer a 
hobby; and greater sensitivity about their personal and collective professional reputation 
which must be earned and maintained by competent performance. In short, reservists 
increasingly see the regulars as the benchmark for performance and seek their approval, 
which confirms their own status. However, while these processes indicate the reserves’ 
rising professionalism, there is ample evidence to suggest that it has not met the 
standard the regulars expect. Supporting Connelly’s recent findings on the limits of 
integration, reservists found regular attitudes to them as frequently less than positive, 
but slowly changing:  
R1:        ‘I deployed with the infantry in 2007. Trust me. It hasn’t changed. 
R2: It was a lot worse, I think.’824 
 
‘They hate us.’825 
 
R2: ‘I think it’s going to take a lot longer for the Regular Army to 
recognise the Reserve. To see how competent they are. It’s going to 
take a few more years.  
R3: … [But it] has changed a lot over the last couple of years.’826 
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Some were much more positive, stating: ‘They were brilliant to us’ or ‘It does work. 
There's a mutual respect there’,827 while numerous others pointed out that the success of 
sub-unit integration depended heavily on the command culture in the units concerned 
and on personal relationships.828 As with sub-units’ experiences of FR20, the mixed 
responses support the importance of the command environment in this regard. As such, 
despite progress, there appears to be some way to go before reservists perceive regular 
attitudes to them to have changed considerably. Indeed, this is supported by the results 
of the 2016 ResCAS survey which found that only 32 percent of Army Reservists felt 
valued by the regulars.829 
Nevertheless, despite gradual professionalisation, the importance of social 
cohesion still persists. In order to examine the extent to which sub-units had 
professionalised, the group interviews asked the blunt but pertinent question whether 
‘unit members viewed each other as professionals or mates first?’ The responses below 
are indicative: 
All: ‘Mates. 





R3: Family, yes. 
R4: Family, definitely. 
R5: Yes, yes, yes, definitely.’831  
 
Mod:  ‘Would you be mates with someone who is below the expected 
standard of their rank and their experience? 
R1: No. 
R2: Yeah, we are. The thing is, we all have to help each other out.  
R3: It's still a family. 
R4: … You work as a family, I think. Once you're in here, you're family.’832
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R1: ‘No. We’d be friends. 
R2: But not in the same way.’833 
Other RLC and REME reservists were asked in a complimentary survey whether they 
would be friends with a colleague who was ‘not up to the required professional 
standard’. Surprisingly, 70 percent agreed or strongly agreed that they did, indicating 
the locus of cohesion in these units.834 While the same percentage was recorded in a 
regular logistics sub-unit, in a regular infantry sub-unit this was only 50 percent. The 
overwhelming majority of not only logistics reservists, but also an indicative sample of 
regulars, therefore continue to describe the nature of the relationships with their 
comrades in profoundly more social terms than in the infantry. This seems to suggest 
that despite ongoing professionalisation, social cohesion remains central to 
understanding the associative patterns between most of these reserve logisticians. But as 
the quote above indicates, there were some who did not view their relations in the same 
way, but in the more professional terms that have been identified in the elite infantry, 
where failure results in acute and immediate ostracism.835 Indeed, amongst higher ranks 
with more responsibility there were more qualified, if broadly similar, responses: 
R1:  ‘That’s a fine line because some of us have worked together 20 years.  
R2:  In this room, mates.  
R3: Can you not switch off from being a mate to a professional soldier 
when you need to?  
Mod: You can, of course, yes.  
R3: I can be friends with so-and-so, and when it comes to Friday night we 
turn into a professional soldier.’836  
 
‘They’re kind of linked and it’s quite hard to distinguish between a mate and a 
good soldier, because if they were a wank soldier would you be their mate? No, 
because you’d probably be embarrassed.’837 
 
R1: ‘It depends what the situation is. If we're together in bar, it's mates. But 
when we're here on a Wednesday night, and we're doing stuff, it is 
                                                                                                                                               
832 Interview 10.  
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834 Survey data collected 2015. 
835 King, The Combat Soldier.  
836 Interview 6. 
837 Interview 1. 
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professionals. It's got to be professionals. Ex-regular and all that, 
you've got to be professional.’838 
This understanding of professionalism as situationally-dependent is not unexpected 
given the literature on how reservists negotiate their identity. But it does indicate that 
notions of professionalism amongst these soldiers, and hence the sources of cohesion, 
are more fluid than in regular forces. It appears that even amongst more senior reservists 
and ex-regulars, interpersonal bonds still remain important, and that in the reserves 
professionalism can be switched on and off as required.   
Discipline 
In The Combat Soldier, King explicitly links the rise of professionalism in regular 
armies with a change in the sources of their discipline. Citing numerous historical 
examples, King argues that Western conscript armies of the early-mid twentieth century 
relied heavily on the threat of punishment to maintain battlefield discipline and 
encourage combat performance.839 In modern professional armies, however, he argues 
that discipline is much more reliant on the self-discipline of soldiers. This is due to the 
increasing importance of status honour, and the threat of professional shame amongst 
volunteer soldiers who do not perform to the expected standard. In contrast to a lack of 
official punishment, King detailed the often serious sanctions applied to group members 
who fail to perform effectively, such a Parachute Regiment soldier ostracised for poor 
performance in training and a Royal Marine publicly ridiculed for similar conduct in 
combat.840 For King, the intensive collective training conducive to heightened 
professional obligations between soldiers has changed the nature of military discipline 
                                                 
838 Interview 11. 
839 King, The Combat Soldier, 362-375. 
840 King, A. (2015) ‘Discipline and Punish: Encouraging Combat Performance in the Citizen and 
Professional Army’, in King, A. (ed) Frontline: Combat and Cohesion in the Twenty-First Century, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
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in some Western armies. Indeed, in a later publication he contended that: ‘A new 
paradigm of military discipline seems to have emerged.’841  
Interestingly, given King’s deep knowledge of elite forces, neither of these 
works cite Thomas Thornborrow and Andrew Brown’s fascinating case study of 
discipline and identity in the British Parachute Regiment. Like King, for these authors 
the aspiration to be an elite ‘Para’, and the threat of professional and social ostracism for 
failing to meet the expected standards, are central to explaining the high levels of self-
discipline and individual performance in the unit.842 Crucially, they show how the desire 
to conform to the heightened professional behaviour expected in elite regular units 
functions like a Foucauldian panopticon to monitor interactions and encourage 
performance.843 Echoing King’s observations about the threat of group ostracism for 
performance failures, this occurs to such an extent amongst the Paras that even 
experienced senior ranks reported status anxieties during routine duties.844 Thus, for 
both King, and Thornborrow and Brown, self-discipline and surveillance – both based 
on professional competence – are crucial to understanding performance motivations in 
elite and regular infantry units.   
However, neither of these important works addresses the nature of discipline in 
non-infantry forces, nor in a reserve force that is gradually professionalising. In 1990, 
Walker noted that, due its volunteer history and ethos, TA discipline was ‘lax’ and ‘ad 
hoc’ compared to the regulars.845 One TA officer’s comment at this time is illustrative: 
‘there was a dull indifference to discipline, but a wonderful loyalty to duty’.846 This 
quote indicates that at this time formal punishments were rarely resorted to and instead 
                                                 
841 Ibid, 112. 
842 Thornborrow, T. and Brown, A. (2009) ‘Being Regimented: Aspiration and Identity Work in the British 
Parachute Regiment’, Organization Studies, 30(4):364-5,367-8. 
843 Thornborrow and Brown, ‘Being Regimented’, 364-5,367-8.  
844 Ibid, 365. 
845 Walker, Reserve Forces and the British Territorial Army, 71. 
846 Ibid.  
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there was a high degree of self-discipline. The decisive fact that – despite ongoing 
integration with the regulars, and in contrast to them – every Army Reserve parade is 
still voluntary suggests that the nature of discipline may still be somewhat different 
from the full-time professional regulars.  
The lower enforcement of military discipline in the reserves was frequently 
commented upon by reservists, and nearly always in reference to the application of 
Army General Administrative Instruction (AGAI) 67 system which governs both 
regular and reserve forces. For example: 
R1: ‘The AGAI system is there, but we don’t need to use it. 
R2: We have AGAI’ed people in the past. 
R3: You don’t need it.’847  
 
R1: ‘I think that’s [discipline] one of the biggest differences between the 
two.  
R2 It’s much more relaxed, yes.  
R3: More relaxed but the job still does get done.  
R4: I think the job gets done better, personally.  
R5: Obviously you need the discipline and all that in the regulars, but it is 
slightly relaxed [in the reserves].’848  
 
R1:  ‘If you try and do discipline like you would in the [regular] battalion, 
you would not have people turn up. 
R2: … it's always going to be like that in the Reserve. You've got to have 
that...’849 
 
These groups consisted of a number of ex-regulars, adding credibility to their claims 
that there is a different mentality to discipline in the reserves, but that the ‘job still gets 
done’. Moreover, AGAI 67 action was widely perceived by these reservists to be 
resorted to much more frequently in the regulars as their contractual and legal 
obligations compelled them to military duty and discipline in a way that, whilst also 
applicable to reservists, is simply unenforceable in reality. A regular adjutant (the 
officer responsible for discipline) attached to a reserve unit also supported these claims:  
‘Discipline is different… the AGAI system is a blunt sword to be honest. The 
thing is, every parade is a voluntary one, and using the discipline system is 
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848 Interview 8.  
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contrary to what you are trying to achieve. But it is used and we do use it. You 
don’t get it for in-surbordination or [bad] turnout; those incidents occur less 
than in the regs. To be honest, most of the discipline issues are alcohol-related, 
like the regulars.’850 
Other reservists noted the difference between reserve infantry and logistics units. 
R1: ‘Discipline’s slightly different. The infantry was more disciplined. 
Here it’s...  
R2:  A bit more laid-back. 
R3: Relaxed.  
R1: To be honest with you, sometimes you’d rather have the infantry than 
here… you knew where you stood…  
R2:  It’s a different culture. The RLC tend to be more trade-specific whereas 
[the] infantry is more... it’s a different ball game, really’851 
Somewhat contrasting King, and Thornborrow and Brown’s, arguments these views are 
interesting as they indicate that these logistics reservists still perceive discipline in the 
regulars, and in the infantry, in the traditional terms of punishment, rather than the 
emergent paradigm of self-discipline. This acknowledgement reflects the reality of the 
regulars’ different terms of service. 
 If the punishment system is not as frequently resorted to in the reserves, then 
how is discipline maintained? Unsurprisingly, the lack of use of the official discipline 
system compared to the regulars was consistently normalised by reference to the 
reserves’ own distinctive discipline. For instance:   
‘It's a different mentality. I've got recruits, I can't drag them around the floor 
because they won't come in. I mean, they do do things wrong. I'm not one for 
shouting and bawling at people. I don't like being shouted and bawled at at 
work.’ 852 
 
R1: ‘That’s always been the best thing about the TA, isn’t it? 
R2: …That’s the difference in mentality in the TA and the regs. A regs 
bloke would be like: “Get a fucking grip, sort your life out,” and beast 
them until they get it right. 
R3: ….There’s much more competition for promotion in the regs. Guys 
want to look better than somebody else… 
R4: They’ll want to shine by dropping somebody else in the shit.’ 853 
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For these reservists, discipline is perceived as reflecting a different mentality based on 
the identity of being a weekly volunteer for duty. This is conducive to a reluctance, 
perhaps more prevalent in logistics units, to robustly enforce standards through verbal 
and physical punishments associated with the traditional discipline of the regulars. As 
the last quote suggests, the lack of professional competition in the reserves is one reason 
for this. Another is that, without enforceable discipline, social cohesion is more 
important in encouraging correct behaviour and, ultimately, turnout in the reserves. This 
highlights recognition that resorting to the discipline system indicates the breakdown of 
social harmony which, as has been noted, are crucial for working relationships. The 
quote below is instructive: 
R1:  ‘If one of your brothers makes a FUBAR [Fuck Up Beyond All Recognition], 
how do you deal with it? 
Mod: You’re going to tell him. 
R1: And that’s what it’s like here. Sort of: “Come on. Don’t let the rest of the 
family down,” sort of thing... You don’t want the rest of the family to suffer 
for a simple mistake…’854 
Maintaining the reputation of the unit is notable here, as is the deeply social terms in 
which this reputation is conceived. But related to this, the respondent is also suggesting 
that the informal enactment of social bonds – of social obligation – is used to encourage 
performance. Similarly, another NCO stated: ‘We tend to try and sort things out at a low 
enough level’;855 that colleagues discipline each other informally for bad behaviour. 
Taken together these points are highly interesting as they suggest that reserve discipline 
may in fact be closer to that of the professional regulars than the reservists above 
initially acknowledged. In a similar but slightly different way to that observed by King 
and Thornborrow in elite units, the power of interpersonal bonds can encourage 
performance in the reserves. 
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However, reservists were cognisant of the fact that the need for social solidarity 
has its dangers. ‘I think we should AGAI more people because the discipline sometimes 
is a bit close… Because we are volunteers and we all know each other, sometimes we 
do get a bit wishy-washy.’ Similarly, they noted how, like the regulars, informal 
punishments were much less robust, or ‘colourful’, than in the Cold War-era TA. 856 
Nevertheless, there was a general sense that, despite the reluctance to use the discipline 
system, the reserves are still disciplined. According to one sub-unit commander: ‘There 
are far less discipline problems… [but conversely] there's less discipline in the reserves, 
and that's not because we're shying away from it, it's generally because the guys want to 
be here, they volunteer to come here, and they don't want to burn their bridges.’857 This 
quote again highlights the perception that that reservists who volunteer for each parade 
generally have better self-discipline compared to some regulars. Similarly, the greater 
maturity of reservists in general and therefore a greater sense of trust between 
commanders and the ranks was frequently reported. Given the importance of social 
cohesion in these units, it was interesting to note how ex-regulars related this trust-
based discipline to social events involving alcohol: 
‘I think there’s a little bit of a trust element as well. Generally the age of the 
reservist is slightly older than a Regular soldier. They know their boundaries, 
particularly with drink, whereas sometimes I find that it’s very... verging on 
insulting where people [regulars] are actually monitoring and issuing you a can 
of Coke during your Christmas dinner because you’re not deemed old enough 
or responsible enough to consume alcohol at six o’clock in the evening.’858  
As another regular officer commented:  ‘Yes, we can trust them… they don’t take the 
piss as much.’859 Trust, therefore, seems to play an important part in explaining 
discipline in the reserves. While this trust may rest more on social rather than 
professional obligations – and it is certainly different from Ben-Ari’s ‘swift trust’ 
generated in diverse regular units by standardised training procedures – it nonetheless 
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exists. Indeed, reservists’ recognised maturity also indicates the central importance of 
self-discipline in building this trust.  
The importance of this maturity in explaining reserve discipline was also evident 
in how reservists dealt with unit members who performed badly. As detailed by 
Thornborrow and Brown, and King, and alluded to by a reservist previously, in the 
regulars the punishment for poor performance is frequently social and/or professional 
ostracism. Professional status brings with it the threat of professional shame. In the less 
professional reserves, the opposite appears to be the case. Faced with less time to train 
and therefore varying degrees of skill, instead of excluding failing members from the 
group, most reservists view such individuals as the target for development and 
encouragement rather than ire and exclusion: 
R1: ‘We always help each other out. If someone’s struggling with 
something... 
R2:  Find out why.  
R3: Help them. 
R4: Find out why and help them. There’s always a reason why. You can’t 
be good at everything. You can be good at one thing and you could be 
better at another and what you do is you look at people who have got a 
strong point, put somebody maybe who’s not so strong with them, and 
off you go.’860 
 
R1:  ‘You sort of help them out, don’t you?  
R2:  … It will be us helping them along and to better them. They could be 
shit at this, but then by the time we’ve finished with them they’d be 
awesome at it.’861 
Clearly then, unlike their more professional colleagues, there is an innate awareness 
amongst reservists of their professional limitations. As the costs of professional failure 
are not as high as in the regulars, a more conciliatory approach focused on rehabilitation 
and mentoring is usually followed, in stark contrast the some elite infantry units.  
Taken together, the lack of use of the AGAI system, the different mentality of 
self-discipline and trust, and the more conciliatory approach to poor performance 
suggests that discipline in the reserves is different to the regulars. This is perhaps 
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unsurprising given the former’s reliance on social cohesion, and as a result interpersonal 
bonds likely have greater regulatory power than would be expected in the regulars. But 
this situation also stands in contrast to discipline in conscript armies, which while they 
relied heavily on social cohesion, also used the punishment system frequently. Reserve 
discipline appears to be a hybrid of that discussed in the cohesion literature, blending 
the new professional paradigm of self-discipline with a reliance on social cohesion’s 
traditional interpersonal relationships for enforcement. Hence the paradox in reserve 
discipline: On the one hand, the AGAI system is not used as it destroys the social 
cohesion upon which discipline relies. On the other, it is not needed precisely because 
social bonds act as a disciplining mechanism when self-discipline has failed. But while 
FR20 may increase the risk of individual and professional shame through better 
integration with the regulars, given the distinct nature of reserve discipline, it is unlikely 
to solve this paradox by 2019. Nor, as the evidence suggests, does it need to. 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the nature of sub-unit culture in terms of cohesion, 
professionalism, and discipline in order to determine the impact of FR20. In logistics 
units that require collective performance, cohesion remains similar to that in the 
professional infantry and is based on personal and collective drills. Successful execution 
engenders successful group performance. In singleton logistics trades, cohesion is 
viewed in predominantly social terms, distinct from performance. Despite this important 
distinction between trades, overall it is clear that social cohesion remains central to 
explanations of why soldiers join, attend training, and remain in the reserves. It also 
encourages performance. Given that reservists have less time united as a group, social 
cohesion therefore appears to be more important in the reserves than in the regulars, and 
it is likely – and indeed wise – for it to remain so. However, its nature is changing as a 
result of FR20. In the past it was based on alcohol, but the drive for professionalism has 
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led to the decline of the drinking club. More frequently, collective socialising does not 
always involve drinking. Conversely, professional cohesion, based on training and 
courses, is growing. Due to greater exposure to the regulars in training and on 
operations, the reserves are gradually professionalising by emulating their regular 
colleagues’ culture and attitudes towards competence. This is most obvious in 
reservists’ conceptions of their service as a job, their recognition that operational 
effectiveness represents the standard at which they should be judged and their 
widespread acceptance that the regulars have the right to judge them. Their growing 
sensitivity to individual and collective reputational damage, and their desire for 
professional status, provide further indicators of the slow percolation of professional 
culture into the reserves as integration with the regulars continues under FR20. As 
discussed in the next chapter, it is important for the reserves’ long term survival that this 
occurs by emulation and integration rather than assimilation. Meanwhile, reserve 
discipline occupies a unique position between the professional and social worlds, reliant 
as it is on both self-discipline and social bonds. Given the voluntary nature of reserve 
service, this is unlikely to change anytime soon. The same is true of the social source of 
cohesion in these sub-units. Nevertheless, FR20 is gradually encouraging a more 
professional culture in these reserve units. Given the serious issues concerning their 
ability to deliver the required capability, it may be that this becomes one of FR20’s 
most enduring successes.   
Finally, in terms of the transformation literature, this chapter has shown how the 
Army Reserve’s cultural emulation of the regulars has occurred at, and been shaped by, 
micro-organisational factors. In trying to emulate the regulars’ competency-based 
professionalism, reservists have begun to gradually change their traditional 
organisational culture and adopt some of the attributes of the regulars that define them 
at the micro-level. However, the part-time nature of reserve service, the resulting 
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differences in the locus of cohesion between reservists and regulars, and the nature of 
singleton logistics trades has limited their ability to fully emulate the regulars. The 
differences in the associative patterns that generate and sustain cohesion and 
professionalism between the regulars and the reserves has therefore shown the 
importance of bottom-up factors in influencing cultural transformation. It seems 
obvious, but the micro-level organisational reality of different cohesive sources, 
themselves related to organisational nature, can limit the degree to which military 


















FR20, Transformation and Society 
This thesis set out to examine the historical, organisational and conceptual origins of 
FR20; these origins’ impact on FR20 on reserve logistics sub-units; and what this 
outcome tells us about professionalism and cohesion in reserve logistics units and the 
wider transformation of the Army Reserve. To address the gap in the literature on 
reserve and logistics forces, I primarily drew on the post-Fordist literature. Within this 
approach, a number of other literatures and methods were used to examine different 
aspects relating to FR20. Here, a brief summary is perhaps worthwhile. In the third 
chapter, I examined the past periods of top-down reserve reform to show how these 
were cyclically influenced by similar economic, strategic and recruitment factors. These 
were usually accompanied by politico-ideological arguments to support the 
organisational changes which followed, while the actual reforms themselves were often 
hindered and delayed due to stakeholder resistance and organisational frictions in both 
the army and the reserves. Following Allison and Kaufmann, I therefore argued that 
transforming the reserves has proven a difficult endeavour historically. 
 In Chapter Four I examined the origins and evolution of FR20 policy, detailing 
how it emerged in the backbenches of the Conservative Party and was supported by 
elites for their own political reasons. These political origins resulted in serious army 
resistance to the transformation and an opportunistic plan that, despite numerous 
revisions during the policy formulation process, resulted in an overly ambitious, 
unplanned, top-down attempt at transformation. However, by including the reserves in 
the army’s deployment schedule, FR20’s overarching political raison d’etre was met; 
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the survival of the TA was all but guaranteed. Chapter Five provided the post-Fordist 
organisational context for explaining FR20’s impact on reserve logistics sub-units. In 
doing so, I conceptually contributed to the literature on military logistics by detailing 
the post-Fordist principles that have informed, and the practices and processes which 
have shaped, the transformation of US and British military logistics. I argued this post-
Fordist transformation has occurred primarily at the strategic and operational 
management and structural levels, but that tactical logistics practices have also adapted 
toward a more non-linear logistics system. In doing so, I challenged the classical 
literature on military logistics for being in many respects out of date. Decisively, I 
showed how the post-Fordist approach has been absorbed beyond simply military 
logistics functions to shape wider British and Western force structures and, in their 
drive for efficiencies, had also increased their potential vulnerability to strategic shocks. 
Taken together, chapters three to five answered the first part of the inter-related research 
question. 
   Ultimately, as Chapter Six discussed, the outsourcing of logistics capabilities 
usually held in the regulars as a result of Army2020 and FR20 increased the burden on, 
and created major organisational frictions in, many of the logistics sub-units examined. 
Some of these had to undergo profound transformation as a result of the new policy, 
including changing roles and locations, or being formed from scratch. Positive impacts 
of FR20 were revealed, including the increased availability of professional courses, and 
greater opportunities to deploy and train with the regulars. But there was also evidence 
of frustration with the overemphasis on recruiting activity, concerns about recruit 
quality, and of units being ‘forced to play politics’ over their recruitment figures. 
Meanwhile, the post-Fordist centralisation of equipment stores and defence estate 
rationalisation were found to be negatively impacting reserve training activities. Most 
importantly, however, combined with poor recruitment figures, given many of the sub-
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units’ need to re-role and the very heavy re-training burden this created, evidence was 
provided that many of these sub-units did not believe they could meet the capability 
required of them under the Army2020 deployment cycle. Thus, extensive organisational 
frictions were undermining FR20’s drive to outsource hard military capability to these 
units. Chapter Seven undertook the first quantitative cohesion and readiness research in 
the Army Reserve. Among the logistics component, it found that perceptions of 
cohesion and readiness were generally positive but had not changed significantly in 
some sub-units as FR20 progressed. Importantly, there were significantly lower levels 
of confidence in FR20 increasing their sub-units’ capability over time. Conversely, the 
policy had made progress in increasing reservists’ exposure to the regulars. These 
findings supported the argument that FR20 is failing to deliver hard capability, but is 
delivering better integration with the regulars in the sub-units examined. Chapters six 
and seven therefore addressed the second part of the research question.  
 More broadly, the data in Chapter Seven also indicated that perceptions of social 
cohesion amongst reserve logisticians were higher than in regular units, who, 
conversely, had higher task cohesion scores. This supported my arguments in Chapter 
Eight that the nature of reserve logistics cohesion is different to that of the regular 
infantry. Indeed, Chapter Eight qualitatively examined the nature of logistics and 
reserve cohesion using the selected sub-units as an evidential base in order to assess 
FR20’s impact on the cultural-normative aspects of cohesion, professionalism and 
discipline. At the tactical level, apart from an increased infantry training requirement for 
logisticians operating on unsecure lines of communication, the post-Fordist logistics 
was found to have had relatively minor impact on skills to date, but there was an 
acknowledgement that future technologies could change current structures, specialisms 
and individual skills considerably. Addressing the recent literature on cohesion, I argued 
that, like the infantry, collective action provided an important explanation for effective 
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performance in logistics trades requiring coordinated teamwork, but in other ‘singleton’ 
trades it appeared that, contrasting King, collective group action is not always critical 
for successful military performance. This also suggests that classical cohesion – that 
reliant on interpersonal bonds – was more important in individual trades. Similarly, the 
evidence suggests that social bonds remain a crucial reason for reservists joining, 
attending training, and remaining in service, and that reservists classify the nature of 
their relationships with their comrades in the terms of ‘mates’ and ‘family’. Despite the 
continued importance of social cohesion, as a result of increased deployments since 
2003 and FR20, it is clear that there has been a significant decline in the drinking club 
and an important rise in professional culture and ethos. This professionalism was 
acknowledged to emulate, and is closely policed by, the regulars, and was evidenced in 
the increasing understanding of reserve service as a part-time job where both individual 
and collective professional status was at stake. As such, FR20 is having a major impact 
on the professional culture of these units, but perhaps less so on the fundamental nature 
of their cohesion due to the differing nature of reserve service. Finally, I used this 
evidence to posit that inherent bottom-up, micro-level factors such as the source of 
cohesion can limit the ability of military organisations to emulate those they wish to. 
 However, there are broader conclusions to be drawn from these arguments, and I 
wish to explore these in the following sections of this conclusion. Firstly, I examine 
some of the wider organisational impacts of FR20, and what this may mean for reserve 
service in the future. I also discuss how the army has eventually reconciled a politically-
imposed and problematic transformation with the political desire to reinvigorate the 
Army Reserve. Secondly, I discuss what FR20’s ‘partial transformation’ of logistics 
sub-units tells us about the transformation literature. I then analyse the experience of 
FR20 in terms of recent British civil-military relations, before finally drawing some 
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wider conclusions about FR20 and modern British society. Taken together, chapters 
eight and nine answer the final part of the research question. 
An Emerging Division 
The enduring nature of reserve service has been described as an ‘equilateral triangle’ 
characterised by commitment to the military, family, and employment by both Carter 
and Wall.862 Both are therefore keenly aware of the need to carefully balance these in 
order to maximise the reserve’s enduring contribution to Britain’s overall military 
capability. Indicating the importance of this triangle, other research projects are 
currently examining how reservists balance work and family life and manage identities 
as a result of FR20.863 Indeed, Edmunds et al. have already identified the increasing 
demands of the post-FR20 reserves on its member’s time, labelling it one side of an 
‘iron triangle of greedy institutions.’864 As a result, these authors call for greater support 
from the military for families and employers in the wake of a more operational role for 
the Army Reserve. But crucially, they do not discuss the wider impact this integration 
and operationalisation of the reserves is having within the Army Reserve itself. 
  In fact, there is evidence to suggest that the greater individual and collective 
training burden placed on the reserves is altering the nature of service in the Army 
Reserve itself. This change is being driven by a number of factors related to FR20: the 
growth of Full-time Reserve Service posts; the opening of regular posts to reservists; the 
better availability of courses and deployments; and the increased sensitivity to 
professional status due to integration with the regulars. Complimenting it, and very 
important in areas of low employment, has been the availability of better monetary 
rewards for reservists who are not in full-time employment. This greater demand on 
                                                 
862 Interview, Wall 10 May 2016; Interview, Carter, 11 May 2016. 
863 ESRC-funded projects, vailable at http://www.future-reserves-research.ac.uk/tag/esrc/ retrieved 14 
July 2016. 
864 Edmunds et al., ‘Reserve forces and the transformation of British military organisation’, 131. 
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reservists’ time is threatening the equilateral triangle to such a degree that it is 
challenging the traditional, part-time nature of reserve service. Indeed, this has been 
identified by reservists themselves: 
R1: ‘Most people get [the four weeks needed to undertake driving course] 
as holiday allowance for the whole year. So how - unless the likes of 
yourself, as a student - or you’re self-employed and you can go, “Ah, 
fuck it, I’ll take three months off and go and do...? [can you do it]”  
R2: You could smash it and probably have a great laugh with it, whereas if 
you’ve got a 9-5 [job], this is pointless.’865 
This sentiment was frequently repeated: 
R1. ‘I would say to anybody thinking of joining reserves, if you're in full-
time employment, think about it carefully… Most people get 28 days 
holiday a year, that's it, and if you do join, you might do it for a year 
and give up all your time, but then after that, you might start getting a 
bit tired of giving up every day you have spare to do reserves.’ 
Mod: So the demand on your time is quite... 
R2: The biggest thing. And I said, as soon as they turn it to 40 days - 
Mod: If they did. 
R2: - if they did, I'd be going [leaving].’ 866 
 
These quotes highlight the increased burden on reservists’ time as a result of FR20, and 
the limits of their willingness to accept this. Similarly, during the research it became 
clear that certain reservists, mainly the unemployed and self-employed, are able to 
commit the most time to the reserves. While this is not new in and of itself, the fact that 
they were then best positioned to take advantage of FR20’s increased opportunities to 
attend courses and deploy– with the subsequent impact on career progression – was 
identified as creating a new imbalance in some sub-units between those in civilian 
employment (and who were the traditional backbone of the TA) and those who are not. 
Indeed, as a senior NCO in full-time employment elucidated: ‘I'm disadvantaged to 
people that don’t work. There's no way I can compete.’867  
The greater monetary benefits on offer and the impact of the recession further 
support the evidence of an emerging division between part- and full-time reserve 
                                                 
865 Interview 1. 
866 Interview 10. 
867 Interview 11. 
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service. Indeed, it appears that a core of reservists able to commit more time may be 
developing. As the reservists below remarked: 
R1:  ‘Yeah, it's always the same people go away. 
R2: It's always the same ones that go away. 
R3: At the moment I've stopped work for a bit so I can actually get my days 
in. I've actually stopped working so I can get my days in.’868 
Supporting these quotes, numerous sub-unit commanders identified that certain 
individuals, due to their ability to commit more time, were reaping the benefits of the 
increased opportunities, at the expense of some of their colleagues who could simply 
not spare the time to do likewise.869 There were also reports of part-time reserve officers 
who had worked for a full month (un-deployed) due to the need for those in command 
appointments to work more closely with the regulars. Similarly, another reservist 
reported: ‘We’re getting less and less bounty hunters as well, who just turn up the 
minimum for the bounty. They’re kind of getting shipped out generally.’870 Thus, it 
appears that one of the impacts of FR20 has been to begin to divide the Army Reserve 
between those who, for primarily reasons of available time, are drawing closer to the 
regulars and with it increasing their professionalism, and those who cannot. It is perhaps 
not too much to argue that a split is therefore beginning to occur. While it is certainly 
true that the reserves have always catered to those with more time commit to service 
and those with less, it appears this division has been accentuated by FR20’s emphasis 
on courses and increased capability. Indeed, it is arguable that the reserves are no longer 
a fully part-time organisation; some elements, especially its officer and SNCO corps, 
are being drawn into full-time reserve service. In its pursuit of a reserve integrated into 
the Whole Force, FR20 is thus beginning to challenge the traditional notion of what 
reserve service means by assimilating elements of the reserves into the regulars. 
Following King, it is possible to argue that this division is concentrating increasingly 
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869 Interview 11. 
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professional and full-time reservists into a core that is much closer to the army, while 
the traditional part-timers remain at the periphery. This threatens the traditionally 
distinctive nature of the reserves as a part-time volunteer organisation and could, 
conversely pose a threat to its long-term health as an institution. Indeed, there is 
evidence to suggest that already this is causing friction and some resistance. As one 
NCO reflected on the traditionally part-time nature of the reserves: ‘We are never going 
to be the same as them, and we shouldn’t expect to be.’871 Given the need to maintain 
the reserves ‘equilateral triangle’, it remains to be seen if this trend is sustainable, and 
what affect it will have in the long term. Recognising this fact, both Brazier and General 
Carter are aware of this danger, and have stressed the need for integration over 
assimilation, thereby recognising both the limits of the Whole Force and the 
distinctiveness of the reserves. Indeed, there are signs of a move away from other 
formerly central tenets of FR20.  
SDSR 2015 and the Divisional Level as an Organisational Solution 
Following Carter’s October 2014 remarks indicating that the Army Reserve’s role was 
‘for the worst case’ and that the message to potential recruits and employers would be 
‘refined’ as discussed in Chapter Four, in February 2015 he elucidated on his apparent 
re-appraisal of FR20’s original goals. At a speech at Chatham House, he outlined his 
position that: ‘the obligation if you join it [The Army Reserve] is for training only… we 
are not going to use it regularly and routinely, as perhaps was suggested a couple of 
years ago. Rather, it is there in the event of a national emergency.’ He went on to state: 
‘That means it's much more straightforward, I think, for an individual to be a member of 
the Army Reserve…’872 At first glance, such a volte face represented a complete 
                                                 
871 Interview 2. 
872 General Sir Nick Carter, Comments made at Chatham House brief, 17 February 2015, available at 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150217QBritishArm
y.pdf , retrieved 11 May 2016. 
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reversal of the intended role of the reserves to that envisaged by FR20. Indeed, taking 
Carter’s October 2014 and February 2015 comments together, he appeared to be saying 
that the Army Reserve’s role was much more similar to that of the old TA – a strategic 
reserve – rather than an operational reserve. This, of course, undermined another central 
tenet of FR20, and, initially at least, created further confusion as to what exactly FR20 
is meant to achieve. Perhaps more significantly, it also seemed to be recognition of the 
enduring organisational paradox that a more deployable reserve means a less recruited 
one. 
However, the reality is rather more nuanced, and the 2015 SDSR is crucial to 
understanding Carter’s position. Released in October, the 2015 NSS and SDSR differed 
markedly from its predecessor. Most notably, the threat from international military 
conflict was prioritised, while instability overseas, public health and natural disasters all 
moved into the Tier One threat bracket, having previously been Tier Two or unlisted in 
the 2010 SDSR. Overall, the 2015 SDSR increased the emphasis on the threat of a 
conventional war with a major power – predominantly in response to Russian 
aggression in the preceding five years – whilst also stressing the need for increased 
national resilience. Interestingly, the general erosion of international order and resulting 
chaos also made a more significant appearance, indicating a realisation that some of the 
stable planning assumptions underpinning Army2020 had been reconsidered.  
The 2015 SDSR committed the army to be capable of quickly deploying a larger 
expeditionary force of 50,000 (compared with around 30,000 planned in FF2020) by 
2025.873 Crucially, it set out that the army would be expected to deploy a ‘war-fighting 
division optimised for high intensity combat operations.’ This division ‘will draw on 
two armoured infantry brigades and two new[ly created] Strike Brigades to deliver a 
                                                 
873 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review, 29. 
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deployed division of three brigades’.874 According to Carter, this top-down strategic re-
orientation caused a change in the army’s planning assumptions. Decisively, the 
SDSR’s focus on the new quickly-deployable warfighting division meant that the 
regulars would now provide the majority of its forces. This, of course, has major 
implications for the Army2020 readiness structure, based as it was on Reactive and 
Adaptive Forces of integrated regular and reserve components to deliver ‘an enduring 
operation at medium scale in perpetuity.’875 Moreover, the emphasis on resilience also 
requires that the regular army ‘to be at higher readiness in greater numbers to deliver 
UK national resilience,’ such as flooding relief. 876 While the exact implications of this 
re-orientation for the Army2020 structure and readiness cycle are still being examined 
by the army, it is clear that at the highest level the focus on enduring operations and its 
supporting ‘harmony guideline’ is being replaced by the need to rapidly deploy greater 
mass on the battlefield and the principle that the nature of the task should be assessed 
and then the appropriate tour length and interval determined.  
This fundamental shift away from some of Army2020’s guiding principles is in 
its early stages – planning is being undertaken under the banner of ‘Army2020 Refine’ 
– but there is evidence to suggest that it will considerably affect the role of the reserves 
outlined in FR20. According to Carter, the army now intends to restructure the reserve 
into three echelons organised to support the army’s new main goal of war fighting at the 
divisional level.  Crucially, contrasting the regular and routine deployment of reservists, 
the reserves will now be tasked with providing the basis for reconstitution and 
regeneration of the regular army within this model, whilst also being available to 
support the regular’s re-organisation for other tasks, such as an enduring operation or 
                                                 
874 Ibid, 31. 
875 General Sir Nick Carter, ‘Opening Remarks’, at RUSI Land Warfare Conference’, 28 June 2016, 2, 
available at https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/160628-lwc16-cgs-opening_keynote_jb.pdf, retrieved 14 
July 2016. 
876 Interview, Carter, 11 May 2016. 
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national resilience. Similarly, while this new design does not preclude the deployment 
of formed sub-units and units, it is no longer viewed as essential as under FR20. 
Instead, the army has committed to routinely offer opportunities for reservists who are 
available to deploy, either collectively or as individuals, on operations and other tasks, 
when required. But decisively, according to Carter, reservists’ ‘can deploy on operations 
and exercise if they can spare the time, but their minimum obligation is for annual 
training now,’ thereby indicating a major shift in emphasis from FR20 that reflects an 
acknowledgement of the organisational difficulties of implementing the 
transformation.877  
Three major categories of workable roles are now being considered for the 
reserves to support the regular’s re-orientation to the war fighting division. This first 
category includes specialist units and individuals utilising their civilian skills, such as 
medical and intelligence experts. The second represents the majority of the Army 
Reserve and covers generalist combat, combat support, and combat service support 
units that will be trained collectively to a standard that is achievable from within an 
average allocation of 40 annual man training days. The last group consists of primarily 
specialist combat units such as the reserve parachute and special forces units, that due to 
their ethos and training, are available at higher readiness to deploy collectively. 
According to Carter, this more bespoke and flexible method of deploying the reserves 
better reflects the realities of their ability to recruit and train to full strength, and hence 
their readiness levels: ‘It is a more plausible role and a more plausible narrative.’878 
However, in stating that the pattern of reserves deployment will be ‘voluntary except at 
best effort’, this indicates that, from an organisational perspective, Army Reserve 
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mobilisation will be a hybrid of that of the traditional TA and that originally envisaged 
by FR20.  
It therefore appears that very recently there has been a concerted move away 
from Army2020’s planning guideline that the reserves would be deployed routinely and 
regularly at the sub-unit level from roule four of an enduring operation. The fact that 
these two central tenets of FR20 have been revised indicates that they were not based on 
the organisational realities of the TA/Army Reserve. It also supports the findings in 
Chapter Six of the major issues sub-units had recruiting to strength, the availability of 
equipment to train on, and ultimately delivering the ‘hard’ capability required of them 
outlined in Army2020 and FR20. Indeed, it appears that many of these grass-roots 
organisational issues were repeated across the Army Reserve, and that the high 
command was well aware of them, often from the outset. Nevertheless, due to the 
political origins of FR20, and the political appetite at the time to implement it, after first 
cautioning against the plan, the army’s leadership did ultimately make a major effort to 
effectively implement FR20. In one respect, this recent policy revision therefore 
represents an acknowledgement that the army was right about the major difficulties 
associated with creating a more deployable reserve. 
There are signs that FR20 has been revised due to other organisational frictions. 
The most prominent of these is, of course, recruitment. Encouragingly, by December 
2016 the Army Reserve’s trained strength had markedly improved to 26,300,879 but 
again a large proportion of this increase is explained by changes to accounting metrics. 
In this vein, very recently a new policy of including Phase One-trained (i.e basic 
trained) soldiers on the total trained strength of the army and the reserves was 
                                                 
879 UK Armed Forces Monthly Service Personnel Statistics December 2016, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/584256/Monthly_ser
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introduced.880 In terms of the reserves, this was justified as meeting a recommendation 
of the EST to rapidly increase trained strengths, and by reference to the fact that 
reservists and regulars do not need to be trained to Phase Two to conduct numerous 
national resilience tasks.881 Nonetheless, as with other changes to recruitment metrics 
detailed in Chapter Five, while justifiable, such a move also had clear beneficial 
political and organisational outcomes by increasing the numbers on the books by 2,500. 
Thus, taken together, around 3,500 out of the reported growth of the Army Reserve is 
due to changed metrics. Similarly, as identified in Chapter Six, there are also concerns 
regarding recruit quality. Interestingly, this and the difficulty reaching recruit targets is 
likely to cause the NAO’s recommendation that new entrant recruits for the financial 
year 2016-17 should total 8,000 be revised downward.882 In effect, such a revision 
would represent an acknowledgement that the 30,100 trained strength by 2019 target is 
unrealistic and may not be achieved. It would appear that another of the major tenets of 
FR20 has been adjusted due to organisational friction.  
A further example concerns budgets. Although FR20 pledged £1.2 billion to 
reinvigorate the Army Reserve between 2013-23, it is not clear how much of this has 
been spent to date. Indeed, following the concerns in sub-units that training budgets are 
being cut identified in Chapter Six, the reserves, as of summer 2016 it appeared that the 
army is preparing for at least two further years of tight fiscal constraints. While a 
reduction in training budgets for the reserves can be justified by the argument that the 
newly integrated reserve force cannot be prioritised over other components of the 
Whole Force,883 it does appear to run counter to FR20’s pledge to increase investment 
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in the reserves, and in collective training in particular. Here it is interesting to note the 
final analysis of the 2015 EST report:  
‘Although not within the reporting period we feel obliged to point to an 
emergent potential risk to the programme. We are acutely aware of the current 
tautness the Defence budget, with significant risk in many programmes. Any 
further budgetary pressure resulting from the 2015 Comprehensive Spending 
Review, if realised, is likely to have a direct bearing on the Services’ ability to 
deliver FR20 – whether as a consequence of direct cuts to the programme or 
indirectly though reductions in activity which exacerbate recruiting and 
retention risk.’884 
It appears that these fears were well-founded. While there is no available evidence that 
these cuts have impacted recruitment yet, conceivably reduced training activity could 
cause retention problems, especially given FR20’s original commitment to investment 
and training. Of course, as the EST’s conclusion highlights, the blame for this can 
hardly be put on the army. But the fact that the army is confident enough to justify 
cutting the reserve budget hints that practical considerations may finally be trumping 
political ones, which in turn highlights the decreased political attention on the issue. 
Indeed, it is perhaps noteworthy that after the fall of the Cameron government in June 
2016, Brazier resigned as reserve minister in July. 
However, it is important to stress that these recent revisions do not mean FR20 
has been abandoned. Far from it. Despite the need to ‘manage resources efficiently’ 
across the Whole Force, transformation of the Army Reserves is continuing with strong 
emphasis on collective training and opportunities to train and deploy with the 
regulars.885 The system of pairing units – the army’s own practical solution to 
increasing reserve capability – remains crucially important to both the regulars and the 
reserves and a central part of reserves policy. Complimenting the evidence from 
logistics units on the increased availability of deployments, reserve combat and non-
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combat forces are being deployed much more frequently in the past, predominantly in 
lower threat environments. For example, reserve infantry platoons and company groups 
have deployed to Cyprus, the Falklands and Ukraine recently, indicating the army’s 
commitment to offering opportunities and deploying the reserves post-FR20. Moreover, 
reservists in a REME sub-unit reported the availability of training deployments to 
Cyprus, Germany and Canada in a 12-month period, with three opportunities to deploy 
to the latter.886 This marks a major change from the opportunity to deploy in the TA. 
Crucially, these deployments provide a means by which reserve professional standards 
should gradually increase, itself conducive to better mutual understanding and, 
ultimately, the respect of the regulars. This workable method of better integrating the 
reserves is also being complimented by other efforts that support FR20’s political aim to 
reinvigorate the force and ensure its organisational survival by making it more capable. 
For example, young officer training has been made more flexible to better fit reservist 
circumstances, and new career paths that allow them to serve at regimental duty and on 
staffs introduced. Similarly, training for all ranks is being made more modular to fit the 
unique position of reservists.887 Combined with these reforms, efforts to open up the 
coveted command appointments in regular units to reservists are being made, indicating 
a step-change in how the regular high command view the best reservists’ contribution. 
Other measures are being made to introduce career management models that better 
reflect the realities of reserve service. Another signal of intent is the appointment of a 
reservist Major General to the Executive Committee of the Army Board, giving the 
reserve component more clout in terms of recognition, resourcing and policy making. 
Both Carter and Brazier have stressed that the ultimate health of the Army Reserve will 
be determined by the re-establishment of a well-recruited, trained and vibrant officer 
corps. Taken together, these changes indicate that, supporting the findings in Chapter 
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Eight, some of FR20’s most enduring successes will likely be in steadily changing the 
relationship between the reserves and the regulars, and with it the slow inculcation in 
the reserves of a more professional ethos based around that of the regulars but 
respective of the distinctions between the two. These cultural changes will likely to 
continue to be less obvious than the hard capabilities that the reserves were originally 
forecast to provide, but over time they may be equally as important. Nevertheless, apart 
from perhaps in the category three roles defined above, social cohesion is likely remain 
more important in the reserves due to the different nature of its service and the fact that 
many explicitly join to experience the comradeship traditionally associated with army 
service.    
Given the political battles surrounding its origins, and the criticism FR20 has 
received from numerous quarters, for his part Carter has understandably presented this 
revision of FR20 as primarily caused by the changed demands the 2015 SDSR placed 
upon the army, and in particular the re-emergence of the war fighting division. In the 
context of chapters two and three respectively, this position can be seen as emphasising 
the strategic rationale for organisational reform. There is also an acknowledgement at 
the top of the army that the inability to recruit to strength was threatening the delivery 
of reserve capability to Army2020’s roule four and beyond, thereby threatening the 
overall sustainability of the model. Problems delivering collective reserve capability 
compounded this, whilst paradoxically, the requirement to deploy collectively and more 
often increased the training burden on reservists and threatened to upset the balance 
between their service, employment and their families. Just as in the previous periods of 
reserve reform, major organisational challenges, many rooted in the very nature of 
reserve service itself, not only prevented FR20 from reaching two of its primary goals, 
but these goals in and of themselves in turn threatened the overall sustainability of 
reserve service. Due to these organisational difficulties, and more importantly, the 
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political sensitivity and media interest surrounding FR20’s success, the new emphasis 
on the centrality of the war fighting division and its implications for Army2020 is fully 
understandable. But it may only partially explain the recent revision of the reserves 
policy.  
Unlike its predecessor, the most recent SDSR has been widely praised as a 
comparably strategically sound document that seeks to align ends, ways, and means.888 
However, while the Army Reserve issue is very unlikely to have influenced the 
increased emphasis on major conventional conflict outlined in the SDSR (this was 
based on the National Security Risk Assessment), it is possible to argue that the change 
in emphasis that accompanied it presented the army with a relatively fortuitous 
opportunity to address the major organisational problems FR20 had created. Indeed, 
given the political infighting and recurring organisational frictions that FR20 had 
caused, the 2015 SDSR’s emphasis on the warfighting division offered the army an 
organisational solution by which to extricate itself from the transformation’s most 
ambitious – and clearly unworkable – elements. Most importantly, this solution was 
based on strategic rationale and provided a perfectively justifiable narrative given the 
changes occurring to the army’s role and structure. Crucially, the timing and content of 
Carter’s February 2015 speech, in which he spoke first of the need to fight at the 
divisional level and then directly followed this with his thoughts on the changed role for 
reservists, hints that this organisational solution may have been understood during 
SDSR’s planning phase. That is not to suggest that the army’s emphasis on the division 
was specifically designed in order to organisationally extricate itself from the failing 
elements of FR20 – it clearly wasn’t. Edmunds has detailed the transnational nature of 
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British defence, and with the centrality of divisional level operations being adopted in 
the US for similar strategic reasons, Britain knew it would need to follow suit to retain 
both political clout and interoperability,889 but there was arguably an awareness within 
the army of the political and organisational benefits that such a change in its operational 
posture would have on FR20. This is likely to have been complimented by the growing 
doubt that the Army Reserve could contribute the required capability to the later roules 
of a deployment. By June 2016, in his first public announcement that the rationale 
underpinning FR20 had changed, Carter stated that ‘one of the advantages of these new 
Defence Planning Assumptions [DPA] is it allows us to think more from first principles 
about what the role of the Army Reserve should be.’890 He went on to clarify:  
‘You recall that a year ago, given the [DPA], it [the Army Reserves] was there 
very much to backfill and integrate a regular structure which was designed to 
manage [an] enduring operation in perpetuity. Now it is there for reconstitution 
and regeneration. It is there in the event of a nationally recognised emergency. 
Now that’s not to say that the reservists are not able to take their part if they 
can afford the time and effort to be able to deploy alongside the regular 
components, but they are there in true obligation terms for the worst case. Now 
that is proving to be easier to recruit for.’891 
Carter’s final sentence is particularly interesting. It is therefore not too much to suggest 
that the SDSR, perhaps more by implication rather than design, presented a solution to 
the major organisational frictions FR20 had caused the reserves by calling for their 
regular and routine deployment at the sub-unit level. SDSR 2015, and the rapidly 
deployable warfighting division it called for, has allowed the army to extricate itself 
from the most problematic parts of FR20. Crucially, given its political origins, it has 
allowed this occur with little fanfare or political cost and has and is being explained by 
an altered narrative that can be justified by changed strategic circumstance. 
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Indeed, following this argument and building on that in chapters four and five, it 
appears that less than two years after it was unveiled, in 2015 another key moment in 
FR20’s evolution had occurred. This evolution was again heavily influenced by 
strategy, recruitment and organisational friction; the SDSR’s new vision for the 
deploying an army division provided a relatively unique chance to solve FR20’s 
organisational shortcomings. The content and timing of Carter’s February 2015 
Chatham House speech indicates that the two issues had been linked at this time. 
Similarly, the timing of Carter’s October 2014 remarks on the ‘refinement’ of the 
message to reservists about their regular and routine deployment, appears significant for 
three reasons. Firstly, coming soon after he had become CGS, and hence untainted by 
previous allegations made against the army’s senior leadership of wanting FR20 to fail 
for their own organisational survival reasons, Carter’s remarks can be seen as 
highlighting that a politically neutral re-appraisal of FR20 indicated it was failing in 
some critical areas. Secondly, his October 2014 remarks were likely something of a 
political litmus test, allowing Carter to gauge senior political commitment to FR20. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, this public re-appraisal was supported by practical facts, 
in particular coming just before new figures would once again highlight an inability to 
recruit to strength, thereby seriously undermining FR20’s main goal of increasing 
reserve deployability and highlighting the need to keep ‘balance’ in the reserves.892 This 
is likely to have been complimented by further indications coming up the chain of 
command of the organisational frictions caused by the focus on recruitment activity and 
re-roling at the sub-unit level. Thus, the reserves recruitment issue was constraining its 
ability to provide the organisational output required by Army2020’s deployment cycle, 
and thereby threatening the overall coherence of the plan. Mirroring the lessons of the 
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past, recruitment and other organisational issues interacted with strategic considerations 
to shape the transformation of the reserves at this moment.  
Moreover, as with the past periods of reform, while the issues influencing the 
direction of the reserves have been remarkably constant, the organisational solutions 
adopted to address them have been a product of their own time. The importance of the 
2015 SDSR and the re-emergence of the warfighting division supports this argument. 
Similarly, without the major political input and the context of organisational survival 
that shaped FR20, it is arguable that in the most recent revision of the transformation, 
senior leaders within the army had much more scope to alter course. It appears that 
another key moment in the evolution of the reserves has occurred, one that has returned 
its operational role to much closer to that of TA than originally envisaged, but with a 
much higher degree of integration with the regulars. This arguably reflects a much more 
realistic assessment of the Army Reserve’s organisational nature and what it can 
realistically provide in terms of capability. It also indicates an awareness that the 
fundamentally political goal of arresting the neglect of the reserves has been met, and 
that a differentiation between the need for this and the problems associated with 
outsourcing operational capability to the reserves was due. 
Finally, the re-emergence of the warfighting division has interesting 
implications for the future of the post-Fordist approach to military organisation. Indeed, 
given the similar changes afoot in the US, it suggests that mass is seen as increasingly 
important to future military operations. It also indicates a realisation of the limits of the 
effectiveness (and indeed long term efficiency) of outsourcing to the reserves, and a 
desire to maintain core capabilities within a larger regular army formation whose 
primary role will be fighting conventional or near conventional wars. Interestingly, this 
re-orientation of the army under Carter to an emphasis on mass provides evidence of a 
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tacit awareness of the limits of the ‘Total Cost’ Whole Force approach to organising 
military forces. While it would be wrong to suggest that the re-emergence of the war 
fighting division means an end to the four processes of post-Fordist military 
organisation – it clearly doesn’t – what it does provide is further evidence of the army’s 
realisation that the stable assumptions underpinning rotational readiness and 
deployment structures are not best designed to address strategic shocks. The growing 
risk of a major conventional war, other strategic shocks, and even the decline of 
international order into chaos, requires both greater mass and organisational flexibility. 
Changing perceptions of the nature and scope of threat have driven this return to the 
rapidly deployable division, but it may also mark the start of a re-assessment of the 
post-Fordist military processes and structures that have delivered efficiencies but 
simultaneously reduced strategic flexibility. Indeed, Carter’s statement that the reserves’ 
primary role has returned to providing a strategic reserve for ‘a national emergency’ 
echoes Lamb’s about the reserves’ real utility in providing cheap, scalable mass in such 
an event.  Nevertheless, as Chapter Four showed, in the longer-term, removing the 
reserves from the army’s readiness cycle could make them more vulnerable to defence 
cuts again should the political winds change. 
FR20 as a Transformation?  
The centrality of FR20’s original goal of the transformation of the reserves is difficult to 
deny. The Independent Commission submitted its proposals under the banner of 
‘transforming the reserves’ and mentioned reserve transformation a further eight times, 
calling for a ‘reinvigorated Reserve transformed into an integral component of the 
Whole Force.’893 Although he had referred to reserve transformation numerous times 
                                                 
893 The Independent Commission, 38. 
 315 
 
during the consultation process,894 when introducing FR20 in July 2013, Hammond – 
likely cautious about over promising and under-delivering – stated that the new policy 
aimed to ‘revitalise’ reserve forces rather than explicitly transform them, it will be 
remembered from Chapter One that the document itself clearly stated that ‘FR20 is part 
of the wider Transforming Defence campaign that is aiming to transform our Armed 
Forces and deliver Future Force 2020.’895 It also specifically mentioned reserve 
transformation a further three times. Clearly, the army and the wider defence 
establishment viewed FR20 as a transformative process.896  
The question is then, has FR20 transformed, or is it transforming, the reserves? 
Of course, much depends on the definition of transformation. As Foley et al. have 
argued, military transformation is in fact simply another name for innovation.897 Farrell 
has also distinguished between top-down innovation – a ‘major change that is 
institutionalised in new doctrine, a new organisational structure and/or new technology’ 
– and bottom-up adaption undertaken in response to operational pressures.898 It will be 
remembered that Grissom has argued that for an innovation to be recognised in the 
academic literature it has to have met three criteria. Firstly, ‘an innovation changes the 
manner in which formations functions in the field’; i.e their operational praxis. 
Secondly, the innovation must be significant in scope and impact, a definition that 
Grissom recognises implies a consequentialist understanding. Finally, ‘innovation is 
tacitly equated with greater military effectiveness.’899 FR20’s original goal of creating a 
better trained and equipped Army Reserve, held at higher readiness deploying routinely 
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at the unit and sub-unit level, in order to increase the army’s capability, appears to meet 
all three of these criteria. The unit and sub-unit aims sought to change the way the TA 
had predominantly been used in the field. FR20 itself stated that so profound was the 
cumulative effect of this policy in terms of scope and impact that it represented a 
transformation. And tying the more deployable reserve into the Army2020 readiness 
cycle was designed to increase overall military effectiveness and efficiency. FR20 was 
therefore clearly a transformative attempt to turn the Army Reserve into an operational 
rather than a strategic reserve. So has it succeeded?  
Most of the top-down transformation literature is based on archival research of 
past periods of military change. It is therefore important to note that FR20 is still 
ongoing and that I have used predominantly recent and current data to examine the 
policy. There is potential for its trajectory to change again. Nevertheless, this research 
has revealed that the central tenets of FR20 have been revised downwards since the 
policy was introduced. Most importantly, there has been a major revision of the reserves 
role detailed in FR20. The routine and regular deployment of reservists on operations is 
not going to happen. Instead they will be used for a ‘worst-case’ scenario. As such, the 
fully operational role of the reserves has been modified; although likely to be more 
capable, overall, the model of reserve deployment on operations will remain closer to 
the strategic reserve role of the TA. Similarly, there has been a less obvious but equally 
profound move away from the deployment of reserve sub-unit and unit formations. This 
has been driven in part by the organisational reality that many reserve sub-units could 
not have provided the required capability in perpetuity anyway. As I have shown, this 
bottom-up resistance in turn undermined the overall coherence of Army2020’s 
rotational deployment plan, adding another reason for a revision of reserves policy. The 
effect of a reduced reserves training budget in the years up to the end of FR20 has 
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compounded this. Indeed, given these recent revisions, it seems clear that there will not 
be a major pan-organisational change in how the Army Reserve is used in the field.   
The evidence is perhaps less clear concerning the scope and impact of FR20. On 
the one hand, despite major investments in training, recruitment and equipment, closer 
integration with the regulars, and many more opportunities for reservists, the 
requirement for the majority of the Army Reserve to contribute to the army’s 
operational effectiveness in the manner FR20 detailed is not being pursued. On the 
other hand, these factors are contributing to significant changes within the Army 
Reserve that could increase its military effectiveness in the long term. Following Kier 
and Farrell, perhaps the most important of these changes have been cultural-normative, 
with a greater sense of professional ethos and professional pride emerging that emulates 
that of the regulars. This is supported by the decline of the importance of the traditional 
drinking club and an increasing perception of reserve service as a ‘job’. Through its 
continued commitment to pairing and integration with the regulars, and greater 
availability of courses and deployments, this cultural shift is likely to maintain 
momentum, in the short-medium term at least. Despite the political de-investment at the 
top level of government (which is likely to continue under Theresa May’s premiership), 
for the moment it is clear that the army remains committed to revitalising the reserves. 
Therefore, it is possible to argue that a major cultural change is underway in the Army 
Reserve, and that by encouraging professional standards, this is gradually affecting the 
operational praxis of the organisation as a whole. While the wider impact of 
professional values is different to the cultural emulations discussed in the innovation 
literature, King and others have already argued it to be central to the recent 
transformation of Western European armed forces’ effectiveness and that of the combat 
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infantry in particular.900 As I have shown, given the distinct organisational nature of the 
reserves, and the fact that reserve cohesion is still based on social bonds, inherent 
bottom-up, micro-level factors can limit the ability of military organisations to emulate 
those they wish to. Thus transformation is likely to take longer in the reserves and may 
not be implemented as fully, but nevertheless it should ultimately increase its military 
effectiveness. It appears that one of the criteria for military innovation has indeed been 
met. FR20 has been a partially successful transformation. 
What does this partial success tell us about the academic literature on 
transformation? Most obviously, this study has addressed a major gap in the innovation 
literature by examining reserve, and non-combat, forces for the first time. It has also 
utilised the wider sociological literature on post-Fordism, professionalism and cohesion 
to more deeply understand the nature of the transformative processes at play than in the 
transformation literature. This approach has revealed that, as might be expected given 
the traditionally part-time nature of reserve forces and these organisation’s more limited 
ability to demand its members’ time, there are often more deeply ingrained 
organisational factors resisting change than in regular forces. In the case of the Army 
Reserve, some of these are related to the organisational paradoxes identified in the TA 
by Walker, and more recently articulated by reference to the ‘equilateral triangle’ by 
Wall and Carter. For example, the fact that increased training and deployment demands 
can negatively impact reserve turnout, recruitment, and retention, delineates a major 
difference with the regulars. Moreover, as reserve officers and indeed SNCOs are 
generally less experienced, and have less time for management and administration tasks, 
both top-down and bottom-up transformative processes take longer to effect change. 
Supporting Chapter Three, the nature of reserve organisation and service therefore in 
and of itself makes transformation inherently more difficult than in regular forces.  
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This study also contrasts the consequentialist, even positivist, nature of the 
majority the military transformation literature. It helps reverse that trend by examining 
an uncompleted transformation, and how external top-down political direction failed to 
produce the organisational changes originally envisaged. As I have shown, political 
elites’ plans for the reserves were not grounded in organisational reality but in intra-
party politics. The real impetus behind FR20 came from relatively junior politicians 
with considerable leverage over a new and weak Prime Minister, who were equipped 
with an admirably strong desire to end the neglect of the reserves that they perceived 
would continue if left to the army’s high command. However, these intensely political 
origins also resulted in the army’s initial strong resistance to FR20. Most crucially, as I 
and official reports have shown, the cumulative effect of these origins resulted in an 
initially ad hoc and poorly modelled plan far removed from the organisational realities 
of the Army Reserve. FR20 was therefore adjusted at each step in its development due 
to army resistance and organisational friction in the reserve. Once implemented, these 
frictions ultimately undermined attempts to transform the reserve into an operational 
force. Bottom-up resistance therefore severely limited the impact of central tenets of 
FR20. Complimenting both Catignani’s and Harkness and Kunzerb’s works, the case of 
FR20 and the Army Reserves shows how low-level organisational resistance can curtail 
top-down politically-imposed innovation. It also neatly supports Allison and Kaufman’s 
arguments that broader institutional change is driven by elites, revised by stakeholder 
resistance and organisational friction, and ultimately results in a re-booted version of the 
organisation. Indeed, this perfectly surmises the origins, evolution and impact of FR20. 
FR20 and Civil-Military Relations 
The story of FR20 also raises interesting implications about British civil-military 
relations during this period, which are worthy of brief discussion here. In The Soldier 
and the State, Huntington described and indeed called for the objective civilian control 
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of the military as the most effective way of maintain the armed forces’ capability whilst 
remaining relatively de-politicised from party agendas. For Huntington, professional 
military service should be removed from politics and subservient to the state.901 In 
return for this, government should not interfere in military matters.902 However, 
Janowitz outlined a more subjective model of civil military relations based on his view 
that the large technocratic and bureaucratic US military of the 1950s increasingly 
resembled a modern civilian corporation. As a result, he argued that the military was 
coming under increasing subjective control as it became more reflective of civilian 
society as a whole; it therefore needed to be close to government, politics and society to 
reflect it.903 Much more recently, Peter Feaver has convincingly argued that civil 
military relations in fact resemble a principle agent theory ‘game’ of strategic 
interaction between civilian leaders and military agents. In this model, civilian 
leadership controls the military through monitoring and punishment, and the military 
can either ‘work or shirk’ based on its expectations of punishment.904 Regarding British 
civil-military relations, Egnell has argued political control is highly centralised, 
enabling political control of the military to be conducted with low political costs. 
Because of this ‘low cost of monitoring’ the armed forces, military officers, if mindful 
of their careers, have always had to stay in tune with the wishes of the political 
leaders.’905 For this reason, Egnell argues that British civil-military relations more 
closely resemble the ‘Janowitzean’ model. Edmunds has also noted the complexity of 
British defence policy space, with deep inter- and intra-service divisions over the role 
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and resourcing of the armed forces and the wider impact of political and economic 
interests.906 
 The political origins of FR20 and the army leadership’s initial reluctance to 
instigate the reforms supports Egnell’s view that British civil-military relations are 
closer to Janowitz’s model than Huntington’s. Senior and even junior politicians were 
closely involved in shaping and directing the new reserve policy, often against the 
wishes of the army, who themselves at times were willing to attempt to mobilise public 
support for their position through comments and leaked reports to the media. Thus, far 
from being detached from politics, the army’s leadership was aware of the need to be 
politically savvy in their arguments and narratives to ensure their organisation’s 
survival. Clearly, both Dannatt and Wall had major disagreements with their political 
masters in the defence ministry and wider government over the cuts to the army and the 
reserve plan in particular, indicating the willingness at the top of the army to ‘stand-up’ 
for its interests against politicians intent on overstretching the army in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and reducing its size and capability in the drive for efficiencies, 
respectively.  
Indeed, the case of Dannatt is of particular interest as it was widely 
acknowledged that his poor relationship with Labour Prime Ministers Tony Blair and 
Gordon Brown, and the frankness with which he articulated the army’s interests vis a 
vis government policy during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, ultimately cost him 
promotion to CDS.907 The Labour Government clearly viewed Dannatt as too political. 
Such an outcome, and the fact that some in the MoD later believed that the army’s 
senior leadership wanted FR20 to fail, supports Feaver’s view of the principle agent 
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‘game’ where both sides have leverage over the other in terms of determining careers 
and supporting policies. Indeed, it is interesting to note that Haughton, a supporter of 
FR20, was later somewhat surprisingly appointed CDS having not led his service, as is 
tradition. Similarly, as the principal architect of Army2020, Carter would have done his 
chances of promotion no harm either. Within this ‘game’ context, the role of personality 
in British civil-military relations appears important, given the small size of senior 
circles in the defence community. Following the poor relations Dannatt had with the 
Labour government, his successor, Richards, and Brown were keen to cultivate better 
relations after his departure.908 While intrinsic personalities are clearly important, a 
change of personnel at senior level also often provides an opportunity for one or both 
sides of the British civil-military divide to re-assess their relationship and address them.  
While not explicitly about British civil-military relations, Blair’s Generals 
provided an interesting insight into the nature of predominantly army-government 
relations during and after Blair’s premiership. Numerous generals, including Lamb, 
outlined that the lack of ability of government to clearly articulate its strategy 
undermined the effectiveness of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.909 Meanwhile, 
Geraint Hughes has noted Blair’s interventionist belief that the UK had the manpower 
and resources to act as a global police force alongside the US was ‘absurdly 
grandiose’.910 There was therefore a failure to politically support operations with a 
coherent and achievable strategic vision and the resources to enable this.911 Despite the 
strains that these operations put upon the relationship between the army’s leading 
generals and the rest of government during this period, Lamb, and Strachan, have 
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commented upon the lack of resignations amongst the former.912 For organisational, 
professional, and personal reasons generals remained in post. Similarly, former MoD 
senior civil servant Desmond Bowen noted how the relationship between ministers and 
generals was an unbalanced one, with the latter clearly subject matter experts ‘not 
beyond threatening that they will expose the fact that military advice is turned down, if 
that course is not accepted.’913 Clearly then, both generals and politicians were capable 
of playing politics. The evidence presented in Blair’s Wars therefore further supports 
both Feaver’s principle agent ‘game’ model and Egnell’s argument that British civil-
military relations follow the Janowitzean model with closely integrated military 
bureaucracies competing with other government entities in ways that mirror civilian 
society.  
Nevertheless, in as much as it directly addresses British civil-military relations, 
the context for Blair’s Wars is a sustained period of warfighting and stabilisation 
operations. As I have shown, the drive for peacetime efficiencies and the government’s 
political desire to reinvigorate the Army Reserve and integrate it into the army’s 
deployment schedule also caused major strains between politicians and army generals. 
These were based on peacetime issues of global strategic vision, force structures, 
funding, and the organisational realities of transforming the reserves, rather than 
operational pressures. Crucially, the trend of strained army-government relations 
continued under the Conservative government; only once Carter became CGS was there 
an apparent reversal, supporting my argument about the importance of both personality 
and personnel change in recent British civil-military relations. Indeed, despite the 
traditional view that the Conservative Party is more favourable to the military and 
‘strong on defence’, primarily due to its political ideology concerning state spending, it 
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has overseen the reduction of the British Army to its smallest size since the Battle of 
Waterloo. While size is not in and of itself an indicator of military capability, the fact 
that the most effective army in the world, the US Army, and its British counterpart, has 
recently re-discovered the importance of mass indicates that this may not have been the 
wisest, or most cost-effective, policy in the longer-term. 
Finally, what can the army learn from the experience of FR20? This is a 
question that numerous senior officers asked during the research. On the one hand, the 
army’s senior leadership is legally and morally bound to take the direction of its 
political masters, even if the policy that follows this direction is flawed in places. In 
reality, senior officers have only two options when faced with such direction, either 
implement the policy (wholeheartedly or less so) or resign. In Blair’s Wars Lamb 
denounced the failure of generals who had been found wanting on operations in Iraq to 
resign.914 While the situation concerning FR20 was different in that the operational 
competence of generals was not being tested, it is noticeable that while numerous senior 
officers resigned over the cuts to the army which underpinned FR20, no head of service 
did so.915 This raises the question of the politicisation of the most senior appointments 
within the British defence establishment. Dannatt was accused of ‘playing politics’ 
during his tenure as CGS, while similar accusations were made against Wall and some 
of his team in the army in terms of wanting and allowing FR20 to fail. Of course, 
resigning at the pinnacle of a 30-year career is a difficult decision not to be taken 
lightly. But by not resigning over points of policy they strongly view as detrimental to 
their respective organisations, and indeed national interest, service chiefs essentially 
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passed responsibility for delivering flawed programmes down the chain of command. 
As this research has shown, this has forced some sub-units to play politics themselves, 
increasing politicisation at lower organisational levels, a development that most appear 
uncomfortable about. However, more junior officers have less agency to reject such 
policies already accepted by the army as their careers depend on delivering the mission 
set for them by the chain of command. Numerous interviewees cited that one impact of 
FR20 has been to increase inherent tensions between sub-units who remain dubious 
about some of the changes, and higher commands that are responsible for implementing 
them. Indeed, one question the army asked to be included in the group interviews was 
the degree to which sub-unit personnel trusted the army’s senior leadership in respect to 
FR20, indicating their awareness of the problem. As such, the failure to reject poor 
policy at the top can result in greater politicisation and organisational friction down the 
chain of command. While service chiefs no doubt find themselves in a difficult position 
due to the political consequences of resigning, in order to ultimately protect the 
organisation from flawed policies, and highlight their inadequacies (not to mention the 
strong convictions of the chiefs which would likely win respect through the chain of 
command) perhaps this action could be taken more frequently. It is very interesting to 
note that while a number of army chiefs have been replaced, only one has resigned; Sir 
John French in 1914, as a result of the Curragh mutiny. As such there is a culture in 
Britain of army chiefs continuing to serve despite major disputes with their political 
masters. This has become increasingly prominent since the defence cuts of 2010 and the 
release of the Chilcot report in July 2016. While this culture is embodied by an 
awareness that high rank bears a responsibility to the political system and to the nation 
(and can also be justified by the fact that changes would be pushed through by a 
successor anyway), as this research has identified, such a culture is also clearly not 
without its risks. Similarly, given its rarity, any chief’s resignation could have a major 
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impact on civil-military relations in the wake of their departure. Nevertheless, the lack 
of resignations suggests an unwillingness at the highest levels of the army’s leadership 
to take a career-ending stand over politically-imposed policies, parts of which were 
known to be unworkable. 
There are other, less drastic lessons the army can learn. One major lesson is that 
the TA and Army Reserve have drawn, and will continue to draw on, strong political 
support external to, and at times in spite of, the regulars. The lesson of history is that the 
army therefore prioritises itself and neglects its reserve to its longer-term peril. 
Understanding the political importance of a capable army reserve should be central to 
future senior commanders, and would be ultimately beneficial to the regulars, reservists 
and wider British civil-military relations. Conversely, if service chiefs are going to play 
politics, they may need to get better at it. Another failing concerns the messaging 
behind FR20. As this research has shown, the cutting of the army and the growth of the 
reserves were fused in an ad hoc fashion under Fox. Indeed, Fox himself was later a 
strong advocate for not cutting the army until the reserves were fully manned. But 
allowing the revitalisation of the reserves to be portrayed as simultaneous compensation 
for a vastly reduced army strength represented another mistake by military leaders, and 
indeed their political masters. As Carter has noted ‘it is disappointing that the recent 
debate about the importance of the Army Reserve has too often been confused by the 
conflation of the regular army and the growth in the Army Reserve’.916 In future, more 
careful coordination of transformative processes, and the messaging accompanying 
these, would be beneficial to both the regulars and the reserves.  
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FR20 and Society   
That FR20 aimed for a transformation of the reserves has been proven. But it has 
perhaps been forgotten too easily that it also aimed for a transformation of British 
society. Unveiling FR20, Hammond announced that ‘Above all we [the government] 
seek a new relationship with society.’917 Although all mention of ‘Big Society’ had been 
dropped since appearing in the Independent Commission, FR20 was replete with 
references to its attempt to change British society’s attitude to reserve service. Across its 
pages, it spoke of ‘harnessing the volunteer ethos of society to tap into the best talent 
the country has to offer’ whilst arguing that ‘greater reliance on the Reserves is more 
cost-effective for the nation’ but also requires ‘a greater willingness by society as a 
whole to support and encourage reserve service.’918 Decisively, it stated: ‘What we are 
asking is significant and it will require a cultural shift both in society as a whole and 
within the Armed Forces. This won’t happen overnight; it will take time to achieve.’919 
Clearly, FR20 aimed to transform of the nature of society’s relationship with the 
reserve. 
In terms of the British military, FR20 indicated a departure from the focus on the 
core professional force that had become one of the most defining characteristics of the 
British Army. The nature of this shift had previously been heralded in The Times, 
where, under a headline announcing “The day of the ‘citizen soldier’ has arrived”, Wall 
noted that Britain had depended on the commitment of its citizen soldiers ‘for 
generations’ and called for society to support the growth of the reserves.920 
Interestingly, however, Wall’s use of the term distorted the original meaning of citizen-
soldier. Cohen has defined this as the distinctive motivations of soldiers, their 
                                                 
917 Future Reserves 2020, 7. 
918 Ibid, 10, 8, 13.  
919 Future Reserves 2020, 9. 
920 The Times, (24 February 2012) General Sir Peter Wall: ‘The day of the ‘citizen soldier’ has arrived’. 
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representativeness of wider society, and their primarily civilian identity in the conscript 
US military of the ‘Great[est] Generation’. In contrast, their professional successors are 
volunteers, increasingly unrepresentative of society, and have military rather than 
civilian identities.921 Thus, Cohen concluded that the twilight of the citizen soldier was 
nigh, and it had been caused by the drive for a professional military. In The Combat 
Soldier King adds much evidence to Cohen’s claims, indicating that there has been a 
profound change in US and British combat forces caused by professionalism.922 Thus, 
in calling for the rise of the citizen-soldier in society, Wall, and FR20, were 
emphasising an aspect of a past model of military service without acknowledging the 
distinctive nature of history and society that had shaped these military forces in the past. 
Moreover, both appeared to forget that, as I detailed in Chapter Three, the past 
suggested that increased civilian involvement in the military occurred during periods of 
high threat, and even then conscription was often resorted to.  
There is much evidence that society itself has profoundly changed from that 
which gave us the Great Generation. In Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam details the 
decline of community in America, which he describes in terms of ‘social capital’. This 
refers the common bonds of reciprocity between citizens, which, crucially, are 
independent of market forces. Putnam argues that due to historical and societal factors – 
most prominently the Depression, the New Deal and the Second World War – the sense 
of civic duty was the highest amongst the Great Generation born between 1920-40, and 
has been declining since.923 To back his claims, Putman cites evidence of declining 
voting rates, voluntary organisation membership, and sports playing, arguing that the 
individualism of the ‘baby-boom’ and ‘X’ generations which followed them has led to a 
major, and potentially terminal, decline of community in the US from the mid-1960s 
                                                 
921 Cohen, E. (2001) ‘Twilight of the Citizen-Soldier’, Survival, Summer. 
922 King, The Combat Soldier. 
923 Putnam, R. (2000) Bowling Alone, London: Simon and Schuster, 357. 
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onwards.924 Ronald Inglehart’s works, The Silent Revolution, and Cultural Shift in 
Advanced Industrial Society have provided further quantitative evidence of a decline of 
collective identities related to the state, public life (including religion) and employment, 
and the rise of more individualistic and pluralistic Western societies.925 Interestingly, 
King has used Putnam’s work to argue that Western society as a whole is 
professionalising, and that its militaries are simply reflective of this wider change. 
However, the recent attempt to grow and transform the Army Reserve, sitting as it does 
between society and the increasingly detached professional military, appears to be a 
particularly useful paradigm within which to explore modern British society. 
As has previously been discussed, there was much confidence amongst those 
calling for its revitalisation that the Army Reserve could quickly be recruited to 
strength. Based largely on the observation that Australia could muster a reserve force of 
19,000 from a population of about a third the size of the UK’s, the Independent 
Commission stated that an Army Reserve target strength of 30,000 by 2015 was 
achievable. FR20 revised this date to 2018 (later April 2019), and stated confidently: 
‘The total requirement presents only 0.15 percent of the overall UK workforce and, in 
an historic context, we require only about half the strength of the Reserves as they were 
in 1990.’926 With the other reserve forces removed, as at May 2013, the new Army 
Reserve would therefore represent 0.10 percent of the workforce.927 On the face of it, 
this appeared justifiable: the Options for Change programme had reduced the TA’s 
establishment from 76,000 to 63,500, the latter representing a much higher 0.24 percent 
                                                 
924 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 31-2, 259. 
925 Inglehart, R. (1977)The Silent Revolution, Princeton: Princeton University Press; Inglehart, R. (1990) 
Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
926 Future Reserves 2020, 14. 
927 Office of National Statistics (2013) ‘Labour Market Statistics, May 2013’, available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_3
07508.pdf, retrieved 14 July 2016. 
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of the workforce at the time.928 However, if the Independent Commission had 
conducted further historical analysis it may have been less confident in its target 
strengths. Analysis of the mid-1960s – precisely where Putnam identified the beginning 
of a shift in societal values in the US – reveals much greater TA participation rates. 
Before the Carver-Hackett reforms of 1964, the TA’s trained strength was 107,500, or 
0.43 percent of the workforce at the time.929 The 2013 workforce was almost five 
million more than those in 1965 and 1990, even when this is taken into account, 
between 1964-2013 there has been a 76 percent decrease in the Army Reserves trained 
strength relative to the workforce over this period. Moreover, the workforce metric is 
limited and is masked by the fact that the UK’s population grew 16 percent between 
1965-2015. This would suggest that if society had remained the same as it was in 1965, 
increasing participation rates in the TA would have been very easy. I have already noted 
Caddick-Adams’ argument about the TA’s consistent inability to recruit to full strength. 
More broadly, Strachan has noted that the British military has always struggled to 
recruit volunteers, and also the decline of militarism in British society since the end of 
conscription.930 Edmunds et al. have also correctly identified that Britain’s army and 
reserve army recruitment has historically been closely related to the public’s perception 
of external threat.931 Indeed, one major explanation for the recent difficulties both forces 
have experienced recruiting to strength is the negative impact of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, which have caused greater public distrust of their political leaders and 
questioning of the utility of force in general.932 As Houghton has remarked: 
                                                 
928 Lindsay, C. (2003) ‘A Century of Labour Market Change’, Report for Office of National Statistics, 
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 ‘…rightly or wrongly, the legacy of the conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
been, and still are, hugely challenging. They have affected some people’s 
perception of the beneficial utility of Armed Force, of the competence of [the 
British] Defence [establishment] and the wisdom of past government.’933 
Thus, the shadow of post 9/11 interventions is very important for understanding the 
current context. But it also seems clear that difficulty recruiting the army and its reserve 
to their newer, historically small establishment, indicates that there has been a major 
change in the nature of British society during this since the 1960s as well.  
Indeed, Edmunds et al. have identified that some of the recruitment problems are 
due to changes in British society, and have labelled FR20’s recruitment goals  ‘over-
optimistic, and perhaps even naïve’ for failing to take stock of these.934 In a relatively 
brief discussion, they draw on data from recent British Social Attitudes Surveys to 
argue that the British population born after 1979 in particular have increasingly liberal 
views and a greater preference for individual over collective identities.935 Citing 
evidence of a decline in religious, political, and trade-union activity, they argue that this 
group – predominantly Generation Y or ‘Millennials’– are more sceptical of  collective 
endeavours and ‘suspicious of the institutional conformism required by totalising 
institutions such as the armed forces.’936 Some of these trends are worthy of further 
examination here. For example, in the 1950s the Labour and Conservative parties had a 
combined total of over four million members, today Labour have an estimated 500,000 
while the Conservatives 150,000.937 The average age of Conservative Party membership 
is 68.938 Similarly, only 13 percent of people report going to a religious service once a 
week or more and the Church of England’s own attendance figures also attest to decline; 
                                                 
933 Houghton, N. (2014) ‘Annual Chief of the Defence Staff Lecture’ at RUSI London, available at  
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in 2013 average Sunday attendance figures were just 785,000, half the number that 
attended in 1968.939 Interestingly, this precisely fits the decline of social capital 
identified by Putnam from the mid-1960s onwards, which has been mirrored by 
declining participation in the TA and Army Reserve. While these are nonetheless 
traditional methods of assessing social capital, other trends are emerging. Today the 
National Trust has four million members and Sky TV 10 million subscribers.940 Social 
media use amongst the Y and Z Generation is regarded as contributing to a ten-fold 
increase in Narcissistic Personality Disorder, while there has been a recent decline in 
sports participation and gym use in Britain, indicating that heightened individualism has 
potential pitfalls and as a society we are getting less fit.941 Complimenting Edmunds et 
al, and supporting Putnam’s and Inglehart’s findings, it seems clear that a profound 
change in the nature of British society has occurred. The implications of these changing 
societal values – and indeed changing British demographics – for army and reserve 
recruitment have been identified by Carter, who has made the vision of an ‘inclusive’ 
army that is more sensitive to equality and diversity, and more flexible in terms of 
employment models, one of the major themes of his tenure.942 But while Edmunds et al. 
highlight the changed nature of British society, they do not seek to explain the sources 
of this change. 
Numerous British authors have charted how the post-war political consensus 
which defined the relationship between the British state and its people from 1945-79 has 
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been gradually undone by the neo-liberal political ideology of successive Conservative 
and Labour governments since that date. David Marquand has referred to the post-war 
consensus as lasting ‘from the mid-1940s to the mid-1970s, [when] most of [Britain’s] 
political class shared a tacit governing philosophy which might be called “Keynesian 
social-democracy”’.943 Both Labour and the Conservatives ‘generally accepted [the] 
values and assumptions’ of a ‘three-fold commitment to full employment, to the welfare 
state, and to the co-existence of large public and private sectors in the economy’.944 This 
political consensus had been primarily generated by the sacrifices of British ‘Great 
Generation’ in the Second World War, resulting in Clement Attlee’s famous victory 
over Winston Churchill in the 1945 election.945 Riding a tide of popular support, 
Attlee’s government followed Keynesian economic policies aimed at high rates of 
employment, nationalising public utilities and major industries, and greatly enlarging 
the system of social services, including establishing the NHS. Andrew Gamble has 
argued that the success of the wartime coalition government was also an important 
factor in generating this consensus, while Peter Clarke has detailed how this extension 
of free health care to all citizens also had a moral component, increasing social equality 
between the classes.946 Trade unions also remained critically strong and a major 
influence on politics. In Britain, this post-war consensus involving greater state 
intervention in the economy and the greater provision of social services was accepted by 
both major political parties for over three decades.  
However, in the late 1960s, this consensus began to be undermined by Britain’s 
increasingly poor economic performance, evidenced in the decreasing competitiveness 
of British industry, low growth rates, and, especially after the 1973 oil shock, increasing 
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inflation and unemployment. Cumulatively and gradually, these caused the development 
of an institutional crisis as successive governments’ interventions in the economy failed. 
Marquand argues that these failures began a process of ‘ideological polarisation which 
destroyed the post-war consensus.’947 In his study of the rise of ‘New-Right’, Gamble 
shows how the Thatcherites that embodied this reinvigorated liberalism began to argue 
that the Keyneisan ‘social-democratic polices had led to the morass of inflation, mass 
unemployment, excessive taxation and a swollen public sector.’948 Crucially, Gamble 
argues that: 
‘The particular quarrel of the Thatcherites was with the attitudes and policies to 
which conservatives had become committed in the 1940s and 1950s. It was 
their acquiescence in the social democratic hegemony that they wished to 
change.’949 
These goals started to be realised when Margaret Thatcher was elected prime minister in 
1979 and began pursuing economic policies primarily aimed at reducing inflation and 
de-regulating the markets rather maintaining high employment. Numerous policies 
concerning taxation, local authority reform, and the sale of nationalised industries 
incrementally but determinedly undid the post-war consensus.950 These were couched in 
arguments about rising living standards and efficient economy. These policies led to 
major social changes in the UK, including the breaking of the powerful trade unions and 
the privatisation of industry, but also coincided with rising living standards and more 
rapid, but less stable, economic growth. Meanwhile, the end of the Fordist mode of 
production and growth of information technology diversified and atomised work forces. 
Similarly, the share of income going to the top 10 percent of the UK population rose 
from 21 percent in 1979 to 31 percent in 2009, reversing a deeper negative trend during 
1938-79 (closely mirroring the post-war consensus period) and indicating a 
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concentration of wealth that potentially undermines social fabric.951 These outcomes 
were also linked with rising materialism in the UK – most lavishly embodied by the rise 
of the city after Thatcher’s ‘Big Bang’ de-regulations of 1986 – but also the 
Conservatives’ normative argument about the importance of individual freedom and 
motivation in society. Indeed, Thatcher’s view on the matter is worthy of quoting here: 
‘They are casting their problems at society. And, you know, there's no such 
thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families. 
And no government can do anything except through people, and people must 
look after themselves first. It is our duty to look after ourselves and then, also, 
to look after our neighbours.’952   
Crucially, after the Conservatives lost power in 1997, privatisation continued under 
Blair’s – and indeed sociologist Anthony Giddens’ – ‘Third Way’, reliant as it was on 
the narrative that due to globalisation state intervention in market forces was fallacy.953 
Under Cameron, the reformation of the state’s role in British society deepened and 
quickened. There have been major reductions in state spending in almost every 
department and attempts to further privatise the education and health sectors around 
Adam Smith’s principle of the ‘invisible hand’ in the drive for efficiencies. This time, 
the austerity narrative was utilised to justify the use of this 250 year-old guiding 
principle and masked the political ideology behind it, in spite of the fact it that the de-
regulation of the banks was a major contributing factor to the 2008 global recession. 
Indeed, after the cuts to Britain’s armed forces in 2010-11 many questioned whether the 
state now retained the capability to protect its citizens, indicating that the Hobbesian 
contract between it and the population may be under threat.954 Thus, the decline in 
social capital and the rise of individualism in British society has been accompanied by a 
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gradual, but cumulatively profound, parallel change in the nature of the relationship 
between British society and the state.  
It is perhaps not too much to suggest that the neo-liberal values of successive 
British governments has contributed to the dismantling of post-war consensus 
underpinned by the Great Generation’s sacrifices, the profound re-organisation of the 
British state in the last three decades, and the rise of individualism. This, in turn, 
appears to have curtailed the new Army Reserves’ ability to recruit to (a historically 
minute) establishment today. Of course, it is arguable that the nature of the relationship 
between the British military and citizens also changed with the phased ending of 
conscription and national service in 1960 and the move to professionalism. However, 
based on recruitment and retention rates, if FR20 had been attempted in 1965 – by 
which time conscription and national service had ended and a fully professional army 
established – the figures cited above suggest that the Army Reserve could have filled 
11,000 vacancies in six months to a year, rather than struggling to do so in six years. 
The Conservatives themselves recognised that the relationship between the state and 
citizens had changed in FR20: ‘We all depend on national security; however, most 
people choose not to contribute to it beyond paying their taxes.’955 As a result of the 
pursuit of neo-liberalist policies, paying taxes is increasingly viewed as the sole civic 
duty of citizens. Thus, the Conservative government’s call for a greater volunteer ethos 
representative of the commitment of Great Generation’s citizen-soldier appears 
particularly ironic as not only has society changed fundamentally since then, but it has 
done so as a result of neo-liberal ideals still championed by the very government that 
made the call. The Conservative Party has overseen both the deep reduction of state 
involvement in society, and contributed to a change in social attitudes, yet paradoxically 
expects citizens to flock to the Army Reserve in order to compensate for their defence 
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cuts. It is perhaps significant that this trend has only been reversed with the introduction 
of major monetary incentives, which have in turn raised concerns at the both the senior 
and junior levels about the quality and commitment of personnel recruited under these 
terms.  
In the final analysis, while an undoubtedly well-meaning attempt to end the 
neglect of and revitalise the TA, FR20 appears to have been too ambitious in its attempt 
to routinely and regularly deploy the new Army Reserve at the unit or sub-unit level as 
part of the army’s wider operational readiness cycle. The difficulties that the FR20 
transformation has experienced highlight that the political motivations for 
transformation must be supported by senior and mid-level commanders if they are to be 
successful. They also must not ignore the distinctive institutional character of the 
organisations they seek to transform. In short, they must be fully workable. Politics not 
only drives top-down transformations, it can also limit them by ignoring the reality at 
the bottom of the organisations they seek to transform. If this happens, supporting 
Allison’s arguments, what I label a ‘partial transformation’ may occur, where some 
aspects are successful but others that are not are quietly jettisoned. Meanwhile, I have 
detailed that both logistics and reserve forces transform in broadly similar ways to that 
identified in the extant literature. Overall, by transforming through top-down, bottom-up 
and emulative practices spanning both structural and normative/cultural divides, the 
evidence supports Foley’s et al.’s arguments on the need for complimenting sources of 
military change. Nevertheless, the evidence presented here suggests that transformations 
of reserve forces are likely to take longer to succeed than in regular forces due to the 
their distinctive part-time nature, their potential threat to the army’s organisational 
survival, and their closer proximity to society that brings with it political advantages. 
For this reason, transforming reserve organisations can prove more difficult to reform 
than regular forces. However, there is one final, cautionary observation to be made. As 
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the evidence above suggests, for peacetime military transformations to succeed in 
Western democratic states, they must also be grounded in the realities of modern 
society. Failing to understand how society has been changed by the result of policies 
that themselves sought to transform society, is failing to identify the nature of society 
that can make military transformations successful or not, especially in the case of 
reserve forces. It seems obvious, but ultimately, and even in regular professional forces, 
in an increasingly individualistic era, military transformations must consider wider 




























‘Let me just say one last word 
About this word “transformation.” 
It leaves an impression 
That you start in an untransformed state,  
And then you transform 
And become a transformed state. 
Life isn’t like that. 
Life is dynamic. 
It’s changing, 
And really its transforming.’956 
 
Donald Rumsfeld,  
US Secretary of Defense 
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Annex A: Survey Method 
Sample Description 
Reserve RLC: REME population (trained and untrained strengths): 3,370: 1,247 = 4,617 
total  
Participants approached: Approx 1,500  
Valid sample size: 2015: 427 2016: 258  
2015 Confidence Level: 95 percent 
Confidence Interval: 4.5 (this is the +/- percentage within which the survey can predict 
wider reserve RLC/REME population responses) 
Selection method: The survey was later opened to about one third of the population 
group. 
Those surveyed were reserve RLC and REME personnel. Between April and June 2015, 
and again during the same period in 2016, personnel within these units were asked to 
participate through the chain of command. The surveys were distributed both on paper 
and electronically, and were usually completed during duty hours. Participants were 
informed of the study’s purpose, including its voluntary nature and minimal risk to 
participants. Soldiers were also guaranteed anonymity; for example, individual 
identifiers were not used and all data has been grouped. No under 18s were included and 
consent was obtained from all participants.  
Approximately 1,500 personnel from a total 43 units were approached to 
participate, and there were 117 valid electronic responses and 310 valid paper 
responses. The survey took approximately 25 minutes to complete. The 2015 response 
rate was 28.5 percent, which is consistent with Army Reserve responses in the 2015 Tri-
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Service ResCAS survey (31 percent). The 2016 response rate was too low for statistical 
significance and forced the use of only three selected sub-units with strong response 
rates and internal validity. As a result all details here pertain to the 2015 data. On 
average RLC personnel represented 72 percent of responses, with REME 28 percent. 
This is representative of the RLC and REME reserve population, and, with missing data 
excluded testwise, a chi square test for goodness-of-fit confirmed this (1, n = 427) = .39, 
p = .53. However, as with all surveys, it should be noted that the survey may have 
captured more enthusiastic members of the population. Less enthusiastic members 
would conceivably have lower perceptions of cohesion and are also less likely to 
complete surveys. In 2015, one sub-unit contributed 11 percent of total responses, while 
a number of units provided .2 percent. On average, each unit contributed five percent of 
responses. Only sub-units with average or higher contributions to the response rate are 
examined in this study. Varied responses reflect different emphasises placed by unit 
commanders on participation, and also the training schedule of sub-units. Generally, the 
distributions of age and gender in the sample were similar to the latest figures available 
for the Volunteer Army Reserve, including Group A. Although the sample did include a 
higher percentage (10 percent) of soldiers in the 45-54 age bracket, previous research 
has shown that the RLC/REME population is generally older; therefore the sample is 
representative of the RLC/REME population. Other figures from this population, such 
as marital status and education, are not publicly available. The average number of 
officers in the sample (11 percent) is different at statistically significantly levels to the 
distribution in the reserve population (18 percent), according to a chi-square goodness-
of-fit test (1, n = 427) = 19.5, p = 0.00 (missing data excluded pairwise).  
Survey Design and Administration 
The questionnaire consisted of 60 items. Nine items asked respondents about their 
background characteristics, including which unit and sub-unit they belonged to, level of 
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education achieved, marital status and time in service. This was followed by the 20 
items of Siebold and Denis Kelly’s PCI, with items adjusted to focus on the sub-unit, 
rather than the platoon.957 14 items were taken from the Combat Readiness Morale 
Questionnaire used by Gal, Griffith, and Mark Vaitkus respectively.958 Four items were 
added to this section asking respondents for their assessment of the importance of 
professionalism over social bonds, both personally and in their sub-unit. Five further 
items asked soldiers about their levels of confidence in FR20 and its impact on their 
sub-unit. Finally soldiers were asked if they had served with the Regulars in the last 12 
months. Those who had proceeded to answer a further seven items on their experiences 
of working with the Regulars. Possible answers were on a 5-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 = ‘Very Strongly Disagree/Very Low’; 2 = ‘Disagree/Low’; 3 = ‘Can’t 
Say/Moderate’; 4 = ‘Agree/High’; and 5 = ‘Strongly Agree/Very High’. This method of 
coding followed ResCAS, but differed to Siebold and Kelly’s. 
Individual Perceptions of Sub-Unit Cohesion 
Firstly, in order to prove that Siebold and Kelly’s PCI was statistically applicable to 
British Army Reserve RLC and REME soldiers, these soldiers’ responses to PCI items 
underwent reliability analysis at the individual item and scale levels. At the individual 
item level, the Cronbach alpha score was .94, indicating excellent internal consistency 
reliability. Corrected item-total correlations ranged from .51 to .76, indicating all items 
deserved to be included. The individual inter-item correlations were also similar to 
Siebold and Kelly’s, ranging from .25 to .84. As the PCI created scales to measure each 
of the combined affective and instrumental elements of the horizontal, vertical, and 
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organisational components of cohesion, it was also necessary to test the reliability of 
these 10 scales in the current sample. This was done following the PCI item structure 
outlined in Table 2, in Chapter Seven. At the scale level, the Cronbach alpha score was 
.92, indicating excellent internal consistency reliability. Corrected item-total 
correlations ranged from .60 to .78, indicating all items deserved to be included. Inter-
scale correlations were also similar to Siebold and Kelly’s, ranging from .40 to .70. 
Overall, the PCI was therefore applicable to the sample at similar levels of significance 
as Siebold and Kelly’s study.  
Background Characteristics as Predictors of Cohesion, Readiness, and Personal 
Confidence 
As this survey included a reduced selection (14) of the items used in Gal’s, Griffith’s, 
and Vaitkus’ morale and readiness studies for brevity, it was necessary to conduct 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) on the items used in this survey to determine the 
underlying relationships between them. Missing values (average 1 percent per variable) 
were excluded pairwise. The factor extraction method was principal components with 
varimax rotation. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy was .89, 
and Bartlett’s test of Sphericity was p =.000, indicating that factor analysis was 
appropriate. The content of factors (with loading > .30) was then examined. With an 
eigenvalue set at 1, three major factors emerged. An inspection of the screeplot revealed 
a clear break after the second factor, and using Catell’s (1966) scree test it was decided 
to retain two factors for further examination. Parallel analysis of principle components 
confirmed the two factor solution. These three were labelled ‘sub-unit readiness and 
morale’ and ‘personal confidence’ and accounted for 40.7 and 9.9 percent of variance, 
respectively.  
Next, the arrangement of items on the factors implied by the EFA underwent 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using Amos 22 software. Nine questionnaire items 
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(sub-unit readiness, soldiers' readiness to fight if necessary, sub-unit togetherness, sub-
unit skill in main role, sub-unit morale, confidence in sub-unit major 
weapons/equipment systems, better trained than most other reserve sub-units, enough 
time to train as sub-unit, personal morale) were regressed onto the latent construct of 
‘sub-unit readiness and morale’. Five items (confidence doing job on operations, 
confidence sub-unit can do job on operations, officer/soldier relationships, confidence 
in own professional skills and abilities, confidence in personal kit/ weapons) were 
regressed onto the latent construct of ‘personal confidence’. The CFA indicated that the 
lowest correlated variables on each construct: personal morale and confidence in 
personal kit/ weapons, respectively, did not fit the model. This was the case even when 
loaded on the ‘personal confidence’ construct and these variables were removed to 
produce an eight and four variable construct respectively. 
The overall chi-squared statistic (X2 (53) = 205.59, p <.000 was statistically 
significant. While this would usually result in a poor fit of the data to the specified 
model, the chi-squared statistic is influenced by larger sample sizes. Larger samples 
produce larger chi-squared values that significant even when the data does fit the model. 
In such cases, the ratio of chi-squared statistic to degrees of freedom is recommended. 
In this study, this ratio was 3.88. Ratios of 5.0 or less are considered a good fit of data. 
The comparative fit index (CFI) was .92, over the .90 value requirement. The root mean 
standard error of approximation (RMSEA), which measures the extent to which the 
variance-covariance matrix derived from the data differed from that implied by the 
model was .08. The lower the RMSEA score, the better the ‘fit’ of the data. Scores of 
.05 are considered a good fit of data to the model, while scores up to .10 are considered 
an adequate fit. Finally, all standardised regression paths of items to their respective 
latent constructs were low to large in size. Values ranged from .33 to .92 and the median 
score was .65. Once CFA had confirmed the constructs, scales were created. 
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Next, to examine the relationship between background characteristics, cohesion, 
Sub-Unit Readiness and Morale, and Personal Confidence outcomes, separate multiple 
regression analyses, each corresponding to one of these outcomes, were conducted. 
Predictor variables were soldier background characteristics. Multiple regressions asses 
the relationship between the each predictor variable and the outcome variable, whilst 
controlling for all other predictor variables entered into the model. In this study it was 
necessary to dummy code the cap badge variable into RLC. Separate correlations were 
then conducted to get REME scores for comparison, although it is important to note that 
these should be used for indicative purposes only. Due to the fact that standardised 
coefficients do not accurately represent dummy coded variables (1 = present, 0 = not), 
unstandardised coefficient B values are presented throughout this study. These represent 
the relationship between a unit increase in predictor variable values to a unit in outcome 
variable values. It should also be noted that, as in all multiple regressions, variables 
outside the model may explain additional variance. 
Sub-Unit Level Perceptions of Working with Regulars and the Impact of FR20 
In order to gain an understanding of the relationship between the 12 items concerning 
respondents’ experiences of the FR20 reforms and working with the regulars, it was 
necessary to conduct another EFA. Missing values (average one percent per variable) 
were excluded pairwise. The factor extraction method was principal components with 
varimax rotation. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy was .89, 
and Bartlett’s test of Sphericity was p =.000, indicating that factor analysis was 
appropriate. With an eigenvalue set at one, two major factors emerged. An inspection of 
the screeplot revealed a clear break after the second factor, and using Catell’s (1966) 
scree test it was decided to retain two factors for further examination. Parallel analysis 
of principle components confirmed the two factor solution. These two were labelled 
‘Working with the Regulars’ and ‘Impact of FR20’ and accounted for 48.5 and 15.5 
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percent of variance, respectively. The loading of the individual items on their respective 
factors is outlined in Table 6 and ranged from .69 to .85, and the median was .77. 
 
Table 7. 
Rotated Item Loading on Factors 
Questionnaire Item Working with 
Regulars 
Impact of FR20 
48. I am optimistic that the Army Reserve reforms 
will increase the capability of my sub-unit 
 .712 
49. Since the Army Reserve reforms have been 
introduced (July 2013) my sub-unit is becoming 
better at its job 
 .805 
50. Since the Army Reserve reforms have been 
introduced (July 2013) my sub-unit is  better 
equipped 
 .789 
51. Since the Army Reserve reforms  have been 
introduced (July 2013) I have experienced better 
integration with the Army in training 
 .735 
52. Since the Army Reserve reforms have been 
introduced I have experienced better integration with 
the Army on operations 
.308 .686 
54. Working closely with the Regulars has increased 
my own professional competence 
.765  
55. Working closely with the Regulars has increased 
my sub-unit's competence 
.724  
56. Working closely with the Regulars was a 
valuable experience 
.850  
57. I liked working with the Regulars .830  
58. I felt the Regulars made me welcome when we 
worked together 
.801  
59. I felt the Regulars understood my role when we 
worked together 
.783  
60. I felt the Regulars utilised my sub-unit correctly 









Annex B: Restricted Interview List 
1: Privates - Corporals, 142 Squadron 165 RLC Regiment, Banbury, 13 June 2015. 
2: NCOs, 142 Squadron 165 RLC Regiment, Banbury, 13 June 2015. 
3: OC/2iC, 142 Squadron, 165 RLC Regiment, Banbury, 13 June 2015. 
4. OC, 142 Squadron, 165 RLC Regiment, Banbury, 2 June 2015. 
5: Privates - Corporals, 398 Squadron, 157 RLC Regiment, 24 June 2015.   
6: NCOs, 398 Squadron, 157 RLC Regiment, 24 June 2015.   
7: Privates - Corporals, 160 Fd Coy, 105 Bn REME, 11 July 2015. 
8: NCOs, 160 Fd Coy, 105 Bn REME, 11 July 2015. 
9: Officer, 160 Fd Coy, 105 Bn REME, 11 July 2015. 
10: Privates – Corporals, 232 Sqn, 165 Regt RLC, 20 January 2016. 
11: NCOs, 232 Sqn, 165 Regt RLC, 20 January 2016. 
12: NCOs, 160 Fd Coy, 105 Bn REME, 27 July 2016. 
13: Privates, 130 Fd Coy, 105 Bn REME, 2 February 2016. 
14: NCOs, 130 Fd Coy, 105 Bn REME, 2 February 2016. 
16: Major General Kevin Abraham, Andover, 14 January 2014 (Unrestricted). 
17: Personal communication, Reserve officer, 28 April 2016. 
18: Major General Dickie Davis, 27 February 2015 (Unrestricted). 
19: 2iC, 398 Squadron, 157 RLC Regiment, 24 June 2015.   
20. Personal communication, 232 NCO, 20 January 2016. 
21: Personal communication, OC, 398 Squadron, 157 RLC Regiment, 24 June 2015. 
22: Personal communication, 232 NCO, 5 February 2016. 
23. Personal communication, Adjutant, 165 Regt RLC, Fieldwork 7 May 2015. 
24. Personal communication, Officer, 7 Rifles, Fieldwork 7 May 2015. 
25. Personal communication, NCO, 232 Sqn, 165 Regt RLC, Fieldwork 7 May 2015. 
26. Personal communication, CO, 165 Regt RLC, Fieldwork 7 May 2015. 







Annex C: Survey  
The Impact of Future Reserves 2020 
(FR20) on Reserve Logistics Sub-Units' 
Cohesion and Readiness: 2016 Survey 
HOW TO COMPLETE THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
The Army Reserve RLC/REME Cohesion and Readiness survey is the first to specifically 
examine soldiers’ attitudes to the impact of the Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) reforms on 
these units. FR20 is the series of recent investments and changes made to the Army Reserve 
designed to increase their effectiveness and readiness. It is important that the Army Reserve 
understands your perceptions of the effect these policies are having on your sub-unit. The 
information you give will help inform future policies. The survey usually takes about 10-15 minutes 
to complete. 
• Please mark an X, or click if taking the electronic survey, on the box next to the answer that 
best applies to you – in your CURRENT situation. All surveys are anonymous and your responses 
will remain absolutely confidential. No attempt will be made to identify you. Only civilian 
researchers outside of the Chain of Command will see the completed surveys. 
• Please note that by completing this survey you have given your consent to participate in this study 
and confirmed that you are 18 years old or more. However, participation is entirely voluntary and if 
you choose not to take part this will not disadvantage you in any way. 
• If you have any problems or questions regarding the questionnaire please call Patrick Bury on 
07724341982 or alternatively email pbb201@exeter.ac.uk 




Please mark each answer with an X in the relevant box. 
1. Are you REME, RLC or Infantry? 









    Transgender 
3. Age group 






4. Rank  
Please choose equivalent 
 Private Soldier 





 Colour/Staff Sergeant 
 WO2 
 WO1 
 Second Lieutenant 
 Lieutenant  
 Captain 
 Major 
 Lt Colonel 
 Colonel or above 
5. Unit (Battalion, Regiment etc) 
  
6. Sub-unit (Company, Squadron etc) 
  
7. Marital Status 








 Prefer Not to Answer 
8. Education 
 Less than GCSE 
 GCSE 
 A Levels 
 A Levels and some college 
 Obtained degree (BA, BSc etc) 
 Graduate education (MA, MSc, PhD) 
 
9. Time in service 
Please choose closest category 
 0-11 months 
 1-3 years 
 4-6 years 
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 7-9 years 
 10-12 years 
 13-15 years 
 16-18 years 
 19-21 years 
 Over 21 years 
SUB-UNIT COHESION INDEX 
In this next section, we ask you several questions about your sub-unit and others in it. Read each 
carefully, and then tick the box to the answer that best describes your opinion. 
10. Private soldiers in this sub-unit (Company, Squadron etc) uphold and support Army values 
 Strongly Agree Agree Can't say Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
11. Leaders in this sub-unit set the example for Army values 
 Strongly Agree Agree Can't say Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
12. Privates trust each other in this sub-unit  
 Strongly Agree Agree Can't say Disagree Strongly Disagree 




13. Privates in the sub-unit care about each other 
 Strongly Agree Agree Can't say Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
14. How well do Privates in your sub-unit work together to get something done? 
 Very Well Well Borderline Poorly Very Poorly 
      
15. Privates in this sub-unit pull together to perform as a team   
 Strongly Agree Agree Borderline Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
16. Leaders in this sub-unit trust each other.    
 Strongly Agree Agree Borderline Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
17. Leaders in this sub-unit care about each other.    
 Strongly Agree Agree Borderline Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
18. Privates in this sub-unit can get help from their leaders for personal problems.    
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 Strongly Agree Agree Borderline Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
19. Leaders and Privates in this sub-unit care about each other. 
 Strongly Agree Agree Borderline Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
20. Leaders and Privates in this sub-unit train well together 
 Strongly Agree Agree Borderline Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
21. Leaders in this sub-unit have the skills and abilities to lead Privates on operations  
 Strongly Agree Agree Borderline Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
22. Privates in this sub-unit know what is expected of them.   
 Strongly Agree Agree Borderline Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
23. In this sub-unit the behaviours that will get you in trouble are well known.  
 Strongly Agree Agree Borderline Disagree Strongly Disagree 
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24. Privates play an important part in accomplishing the sub-units mission  
 Strongly Agree Agree Borderline Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
25. Privates/ JNCOs are proud to be in this sub-unit.  
 Strongly Agree Agree Borderline Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
26. How satisfied are the Privates/ JNCOs in this sub-unit with the time for family, friends and 
personal needs?  
 Very Satisfied Satisfied Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied Dissatisfied Very dissatisfied 
      
27. How satisfied are Privates/ JNCOs with social events in this sub-unit? 
 Very satisfied Satisfied Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied Dissatisfied Very dissatisfied 
      
28. Privates/ JNCOs in the sub-unit feel they are serving their country 
 Strongly Agree Agree Can't say Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
29. Privates/ JNCOs in this sub-unit have opportunities to better themselves. 
 Strongly Agree Agree Can't say Disagree Strongly Disagree 
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SUB-UNIT READINESS AND MORALE 
In this next section, we ask you several questions about your attitudes toward your equipment and 
your sub-unit (Eg Company/Squadron etc). Read each carefully, and then tick the box to the answer 
that best describes your opinion. 
30. What is the level of morale in your sub-unit (Company/Squadron etc)? 
 Very High High Moderate Low Very Low 
      
31. How would you describe your sub-unit's readiness for operations? 
 Very High High Moderate Low Very Low 
      
32. How would you describe your fellow soldiers' readiness to fight if and when it is necessary?  
 Very High High Moderate Low Very Low 
      
33. How much confidence do you have in your sub-unit's major weapons/equipment systems? 
 Very High High Moderate Low Very Low 
      
34. How much confidence do you have in your personal kit/ weapons? 
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 Very High High Moderate Low Very Low 
      
 
35. How would you rate your own professional skills and abilities as a soldier (operating and 
maintaining your equipment, using your weapons, etc.)? 
 Very High High Moderate Low Very Low 
      
36. How would you describe your sub-unit's togetherness, or how "tight" are members of your sub-
unit? 
 Very High High Moderate Low Very Low 
      
37. What is the level of your personal morale? 
 Very High High Moderate Low Very Low 
      
38. The relationships between officers and NCOs/soldiers in your sub-unit are? 
 Very Good Good Moderate Bad Very Bad 
      
 
39. What is the level of your sub-unit's (Company/Squadron etc) skills in its main military role? 
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 Very High High Moderate Low Very Low 
      
40. How confident are you that, given sufficient pre-deployment training, you can do your job on 
operations? 
 Very High High Moderate Low Very Low 
      
41. How confident are you that, given sufficient pre-deployment training, your sub-unit can do its 
job on operations? 
 Very High High Moderate Low Very Low 
      
42. We have enough time to train together as a sub-unit.  
 Strongly Agree Agree Can't say Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
43. I think we are better trained than most other sub-units in the Army/Army Reserve. 
 Strongly Agree Agree Can't say Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
44. In my sub-unit, it is more important to be a good soldier than to be liked. 
 Strongly Agree Agree Can't say Disagree Strongly Disagree 
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45. I would be friends with somebody in my sub-unit who is not up to the required professional 
standard. 
 Strongly Agree Agree Can't say Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
46. I worry a lot about not meeting the expected professional standard in my sub-unit. 
 Strongly Agree Agree Can't say Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
47. In my sub-unit it is more important to be ‘one of the lads’, or accepted socially, than to be a good 
soldier. 
 Strongly Agree Agree Can't say Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
If you are a REGULAR, thank you for your time and you have completed the survey. Please 
CONTINUE if you are a RESERVIST. 
FR20 AND INTEGRATION WITH THE REGULARS 
In this section we ask you about your experiences of the reform of the Reserves (FR20) and 
working with the Regular Army. FR20 is the series of recent investments and changes made to the 
Army Reserve designed to increase their effectiveness and readiness. 
48. I am optimistic that the Army Reserve reforms will increase the capability of my sub-unit. 
 Strongly Agree Agree Can't say Disagree Strongly Disagree 
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49.  Since the Army Reserve reforms have been introduced (July 2013) my sub-unit is becoming 
better at its job. 
 Strongly Agree Agree Can't say Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
50.  Since the Army Reserve reforms have been introduced (July 2013) my sub-unit is better 
equipped. 
 Strongly Agree Agree Can't say Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
51.  Since the Army Reserve reforms have been introduced (July 2013) I have experienced better 
integration with the Army in training. 
 Strongly Agree Agree Can't say Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
52.  Since the Army Reserve reforms have been introduced I have experienced better integration 
with the Army on operations. 
 Strongly Agree Agree Can't say Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
 





If YES, please CONTINUE to answer the questions below. If no, thank you for your time and you 
have completed the survey 
54.  Working closely with the Regulars has increased my own professional competence. 
 Strongly Agree Agree Can't say Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
55.  Working closely with the Regulars has increased my sub-unit's competence. 
 Strongly Agree Agree Can't say Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
56.  Working closely with the Regulars was a valuable experience. 
 Strongly Agree Agree Can't say Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
57.  I liked working with the Regulars. 
 Strongly Agree Agree Can't say Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
58.  I felt the Regulars made me welcome when we worked together. 
 Strongly Agree Agree Can't say Disagree Strongly Disagree 
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59.  I felt the Regulars understood my role when we worked together. 
 Strongly Agree Agree Can't say Disagree Strongly Disagree 
      
 
60.  I felt the Regulars utilised my sub-unit correctly when we worked together. 
 Strongly Agree Agree Can't say Disagree Strongly Disagree 
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